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ABSTRACT
“THE WHOLE NATION WILL MOVE”: GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING IN HARLEM
AND THE ADVENT OF THE LONG, HOT SUMMERS
SEPTEMBER 2018
PETER D. BLACKMER, B.A., WAGNER COLLEGE
M.S.Ed., WAGNER COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: James Smethurst
“The Whole Nation Will Move” provides a narrative history of grassroots
struggles for African American equality and empowerment in Harlem in the decade
immediately preceding the era of widespread urban rebellions in the United States.
Through a street-level examination of the political education and activism of
grassroots organizers, the dissertation analyzes how local people developed a
collective radical consciousness and organized to confront and dismantle
institutional racism in New York City from 1954-1964. This work also explores how
the interests and activities of poor and working-class Black and Puerto Rican
residents of Harlem fueled the escalation of protest activity and demands for human
rights and self-determination that pushed local and national civil rights
organizations in new, more radical directions with the advent of the 1964 Harlem
Rebellion.
Though the body of scholarly work focused on the Civil Rights and Black
Power movements beyond the South has grown exponentially in the past decade,
viii

struggles for rights and power in Harlem have been underappreciated for their farreaching influence upon this era. As an international hub of Black political thought
and cultural production, Harlem was home to organizers, artists, intellectuals, and
local people whose contributions to Black Freedom Struggles throughout the
African diaspora complicate popular narratives of the Civil Rights Movement, and
challenge the geographies and periodization of the Black Power Movement.
By closely analyzing local, national, and global trends in grassroots struggles
for human rights and self-determination in the ten-year period preceding the
Harlem Rebellion, this dissertation frames the outbreak of the rebellion as the result
of a collective disillusionment with the repressive limitations of liberal governance
in an era of global revolution. This analysis issues a fundamental challenge to the
popularly accepted narrative that explains urban rebellions as consequences of an
oppressive “powder keg,” thereby denying conscious political agency to Black
communities who sought to resist oppression and reform government in the years,
months, and days leading up to these uprisings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On a cold January night in 1964, hundreds of Harlem residents crowded into
a small gymnasium on West 118th Street, where James Baldwin sat alongside Jesse
Gray, John O. Killens, and John Lewis at a long table at the end of the room. The
makeshift speakers’ platform was surrounded on all sides by local people and
community leaders who had come to show their support for a massive rent strike
that was underway in Harlem. Rising from his seat, Baldwin explained to the
audience that he had come as a witness, to testify against those responsible for
establishing and maintaining the cruel housing conditions in Harlem that had fueled
such community resistance. The housing crisis in Harlem was not a local, isolated
issue, Baldwin contended, but rather symptomatic of broader systems of racial
oppression in the urban north. “It is a more complex situation in the North,”
explained the internationally renowned author, essayist, and playwright. Compared
to the Southern states, where the perpetrators of racism were easy to identify, those
responsible for exploitative housing, segregated schools, and economic inequality in
the urban North were harder to distinguish. “It’s hard to find the landlord,” Baldwin
continued, “it’s hard to know where the enemy is.”
Much more than a lament of racial inequality in Harlem, Baldwin’s comments
at the rent strike rally offer critical insights into the institutional nature of racial
oppression in the urban North. “There is a contradiction between the lives white
people live and the lives we live,” Baldwin observed, “The landlords, the city and the
state are responsible.” Through this statement, Baldwin issued a fundamental
1

challenge to one of the most popular perceptions of American Jim Crow society in
the 20th Century. For decades, this popular analysis has held that two distinct forms
of racial subjugation existed in the United States: one de jure, the other de facto.
This enduring understanding of de jure subjugation explains the system of southern
racial oppression as one defined and codified by laws and regulations that gave legal
credence to the personal and cultural racism inherent in white southern society.
Conversely, this popular analysis suggests that a de facto system of racial
subjugation existed in the North, in which racism existed and was practiced on a
personal and cultural level within white society, but not officially sanctioned by
governing structures. By naming the city and the state as responsible parties in
establishing and enforcing racial oppression in Harlem, Baldwin not only threw
down a fundamental challenge to these flawed perceptions, but gave voice to what
many Harlem residents had believed all along.
While offering a useful explanation of Jim Crow society in the urban North,
this 1964 address also illuminates the nature of the fight waged by Black
communities to resist and transform these complex systems of oppression. “This is a
revolution,” Baldwin declared, adding that such a struggle would become “harder
and harder because the revolution has to revise the entire system.”1 Such an
appraisal of the freedom struggles waged by Black and Puerto Rican communities in
Harlem was hardly romantic or hyperbole. By the time Baldwin delivered this
analysis, thousands of Harlem residents had come to similar conclusions after

Fred Halstead, et al., Harlem Stirs (New York: Marzani & Munsell Publishers,
Inc., 1966), 62.
1
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nearly a decade of confrontations with various levels of the city’s power structure.
Through these experiences in organized grassroots struggles for Black rights and
power in Harlem, local people not only developed a systemic critique of racial
oppression in the urban North. This radical analysis developed in the streets of
Harlem informed a militant grassroots political movement that threw down a
challenge to the largest city in the United States and inspired communities in other
American cities to do the same.
In the decades since Baldwin’s address in Lower Harlem, histories of the
Black Freedom Struggles of the 1950s-1960s have focused largely on campaigns
against segregation, racial violence, and disenfranchisement in the rural South,
contributing to a popular narrative that has painted racial oppression and the Civil
Rights Movement as uniquely southern phenomena. Histories of concurrent
struggles for rights and power in the urban North have much to contribute to
present popular discourse around systemic racism and institutional inequality,
organized resistance and urban rebellions—topics which remain murky at best in
popular knowledge—yet these histories have only recently begun to receive a
similar level of scholarly interest as those in the South. Though the body of scholarly
work focused on the Civil Rights and Black Power movements beyond the South has
grown exponentially in the past decade, there remains a dichotomy in popular
perceptions of the Civil Rights Movement in the South and the North. Whereas
popular narratives of the Southern movement are routinely characterized by
discourse about nonviolent resistance, Black Freedom Struggles in the urban North
have long been painted as byproducts of the southern movement and characterized
3

by urban “riots” that erupted by the mid-1960s. Consequently, decades-long
grassroots struggles for rights and power in Harlem, long considered a Black Mecca,
have been underappreciated for their far-reaching influence upon this era.
In recent years, scholars of African American history have produced several
notable works that prominently locate the contributions of Black communities in
New York City within more expansive histories of the Civil Rights and Black Power
movements.2 New scholarship has also focused on the forces of systemic racial
oppression that spawned the oft-overlooked 1964 Harlem Rebellion, and the ways
in which this uprising influenced national policies on crime and policing.3 Despite
these recent publications, however, little work has been done to comprehensively
analyze the significant struggles waged by Harlem communities for civil rights,
human rights, and self-determination during the ten-year period of the Black
Freedom Struggle preceding the 1964 Harlem Rebellion.
As a result, present scholarship largely maintains the problematic, yet
popularly accepted narrative that explains urban rebellions as consequences of an
Adina Back, “Up South in New York: The 1950s School Desegregation
Struggles,” (PhD diss., New York University, 1997); Martha Biondi, To Stand and
Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2003); Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative
History of Black Power in America (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006); Brian Purnell,
Fighting Jim Crow in the County of Kings: The Congress of Racial Equality in Brooklyn
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013); Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker
and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty:
The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House,
2008); Clarence Taylor, ed., Civil Rights in New York City: From World War II to the
Giuliani Era (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011).
2

Michael Flamm, In the Heat of the Summer: The New York Riots of 1964 and
the War on Crime (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
3
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oppressive societal “powder keg,” thereby denying conscious political agency to
Black communities which sought to resist oppression and reform government in the
years, months, and days leading up to these uprisings. This absence of a street-level
analysis of the ten-year period of community activism preceding the Harlem
Rebellion marginalizes the significant roles played by local people and grassroots
leaders, including Ella Baker, Jesse Gray, Mae Mallory, and Malcolm X, in organizing
Harlem residents to fight against racial oppression and demand a more equitable
society. These narratives are essential for explaining the outbreak of urban
uprisings in the 1960s not as “race riots,” but as rebellions against American
Apartheid in the nation’s cities.
“The Whole Nation Will Move: Grassroots Organizing in Harlem and the
Advent of the Long, Hot Summers,” addresses this gap by closely analyzing local,
national, and global trends in grassroots campaigns for African American human
rights and self-determination in Harlem in the decade immediately preceding the
era of widespread urban rebellions in the United States. This project traces the
development of a collective radical political consciousness in Harlem and analyzes
how poor and working-class Black and Puerto Rican residents fueled an escalation
of protest activity that pushed local and national civil rights organizations in more
assertive, imaginative, and radical directions in the early 1960s. Forged through
school boycotts, rent strikes, economic picket lines, and protests over police
brutality, this popular consciousness and political action reflected frustrations over
the limitations of racial liberalism in New York City and was mobilized to fight for
self-determination and a more progressive form of urban governance. Through
5

participation in local organizing efforts to improve living conditions and combat
institutional racism, some of the most marginalized communities in New York City
developed a radical critique of urban power structures that challenged the
legitimacy of an inherently oppressive society.
These trends also reveal a continuous resistance on the part of the city
government to concede any demands of civil rights organizations for an equitable
share in the city’s economic, political, and social power structures beyond
superficial, reformist political maneuverings. In turn, this dogged resistance—which
included violent police repression of organizers, activists, and local people—
spurred grassroots organizers to adopt more militant rhetoric and tactics as they
fought to secure human rights and self-determination for African American
communities in Harlem and throughout the city. This increasingly militant and
radical organizing had profound influences on the political consciousness of local
people in Harlem and shaped the political climate of the area in the early 1960s. The
project thus frames the outbreak of the 1964 Harlem Rebellion as the result of a
collective disillusionment with the repressive limitations of liberal governance to
meaningfully address systemic racial oppression. Though a spontaneous act of
police brutality provided the impetus for the 1964 Harlem Rebellion, the fatal
shooting of 15-year-old James Powell that July occurred within a volatile political
climate charged by increasingly repressive state violence that was employed to
maintain the racial status quo as radical and revolutionary analyses were inspiring
mass mobilization in Harlem and throughout the city.

6

Building upon the current historiographical trend of utilizing “local studies”
of the Civil Rights Movement to examine a range of nationally significant themes and
concepts, this project centers the experiences of local people in Harlem as a means
of analyzing histories of racial oppression, community organization, and political
movements in the urban north. My interdisciplinary research draws from extensive
archival collections, along with existing and original oral history interviews, to
illustrate how Black communities in the urban north shaped national debates
around integration, direct action, human rights, community organization, selfdetermination, nonviolence, nationalism, and political power during the modern
Civil Rights era. Through a close examination of the political education and activism
of grassroots organizers, such as Ella Baker, Jesse Gray, Jack O’Dell, Mae Mallory,
Malcolm X, and many others, the dissertation analyzes how Harlem leaders
influenced these fundamental national debates through local campaigns for tenant
rights, educational equality, economic empowerment, and police reform.
Though a local study of the Movement in Harlem, “The Whole Nation Will
Move” also situates these struggles for rights and power within the national and
global political contexts that they were fundamentally connected with. As an
international hub of Black political thought and cultural production, Harlem was
home to organizers, artists, intellectuals, and local people whose contributions to
Black Freedom Struggles throughout the diaspora complicate popular narratives of
the Civil Rights Movement, and challenge the geographies and periodization of the
Black Power Movement. Pan-African political thought was a significant aspect of
popular political consciousness and organizing in Harlem, and by the early 1960s,
7

African nationalism and independence movements had inspired a revolutionary
consciousness throughout the diaspora and helped to fuel a surging radicalism in
Harlem. By locating grassroots struggles for rights and power in Harlem within this
broader context, this project analyzes the ways in which national and global
liberation struggles informed local political action. Thus, “The Whole Nation Will
Move” again, frames the outbreak of the rebellion in Harlem not as a “race riot,” but
as a radical political expression in an era of global revolution.
Chapter Two, “A ‘Rising Tide’ Coming In,” analyzes the social forces in Harlem
and beyond that contributed to the evolution of an insurgent Black political
consciousness in the mid-1950s, and how that consciousness translated into
political action. Through an examination of the various strands of national political
thought and action that coalesced in Harlem in the early 20th Century, this chapter
analyzes the era that laid the groundwork for movements for Black rights and
power during the Civil Rights Era of the 1950s-60s.
Chapter Three, “In Harlem With A Revolutionary Dream,” analyzes how Jesse
Gray, Mae Mallory, and Malcolm X built upon the radical traditions of the post-World
War II era to shape a popular organizational shift away from middle-class, moderate
approaches to civil rights and integration, and toward radical grassroots organizing
for human rights and self-determination. The work of these three leaders from
1958-1959 intersected with a wide array of influential local, national, and
international figures and demonstrated the ways in which local people in Harlem
were mobilized in consciousness and empowered through action to engage in
sustained struggles for rights and power in Harlem and beyond in the 1960s.
8

Chapter Four, “An Extremely Dangerous Luxury,” analyzes the outcomes and
impacts of a confrontation between Harlem residents and the NYPD outside the 28th
Precinct in the summer of 1959. This brief, yet dramatic demonstration marked the
apex of months of local and national debates around nonviolence, self-defense,
integration, and Black nationalism that had converged in Harlem that summer.
Described as a “near riot,” this confrontation and its fallout represented a growing
popular disillusionment with liberal approaches to addressing issues of institutional
racism in New York City and helped to launch radical grassroots organizers into
more prominent leadership roles in the city.
Chapter Five, “Majestic Lions of the Valleys and Plains,” examines the
convergence of local, national, and global freedom struggles in Harlem from 19591963 and the emergence of what Dr. John Henrik Clarke described as the “New AfroAmerican Nationalism.” Through an exploration of the evolving actions and
ideologies of Mae Mallory and Malcolm X during this period, along with their
expansive networks, this chapter analyzes the formative roles played by local
people in challenging racial oppression in the urban north and pushing the national
Civil Rights Movement in more radical directions in the early 1960s.
Chapter Six, “Talking and Acting in Our Interest,” traces the development of
both the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Northern Student Movement
(NSM) in Harlem from 1960-1963 to analyze the ways in which local people shaped
the emergence and evolution of national civil rights organizations. Beginning as
interracial organizations dedicated to supporting the southern Civil Rights
Movement, by 1963 these organizations shifted their focus to community-based
9

organizing for Black equality and empowerment in the urban north. Through the
active involvement and influence of grassroots organizations and indigenous
leaders, these organizations would transform their positions on integration,
community-based organizing, self-determination, nationalism, and nonviolence, and
in the process, emerge as leading forces in northern Black freedom struggles.
Chapter Seven, “Something’s Gotta Be Wrong,” examines the emergence,
evolution, and impacts of the Harlem rent strikes of 1963-64 within the context of
escalating demands for immediate rights and power in New York’s Black and Puerto
Rican communities. Through their involvement in the rent strikes, thousands of
Harlem residents came face to face with the many sides of institutional racism in the
city and consequently developed a more radical critique of the city’s power
structure. This chapter thus frames the outbreak of the 1964 Harlem Rebellion as
the result of a collective disillusionment with the repressive limitations of liberal
governance to meaningfully address systemic racial oppression.

10

CHAPTER 2
A ‘RISING TIDE’ COMING IN: THE BLACK MECCA AS URBAN MOVEMENT
CENTER, 1954-1957
In final analysis, Harlem is neither slum, ghetto, resort or colony, though it is in
part all of them. It is—or promises to be—a race capital. –Alain Locke (1925)4
Just below a drawing of Roland Hayes on the front cover of the March 1925
issue of Survey Graphic magazine, the words “Harlem: Mecca of the New Negro”
were printed in large, bold font. The Survey Graphic, which mostly appealed to a
readership interested in topics of social work and philanthropy, was inspired to
publish the issue after the magazine’s editor met Alain Locke at a debutante dinner
organized by Charles S. Johnson to honor the young artists, writers, and intellectuals
of the “New Negro Movement.”5 This Movement represented the expressions of the
social, artistic, and political consciousness of a new generation of African Americans,
born after slavery, that converged in urban centers like Harlem and later Chicago
during the Great Migrations. In his preface to the issue, titled “Harlem,” editor Alain
Locke introduced readers to the social intricacies and dynamics of the neighborhood
that provided the fertile ground for the development of this new generation of race
women and men. “The reformers, the fighting advocates, the inner spokesmen, the
poets, artists and social prophets are here,” Locke wrote, “and pouring in toward
them are the fluid ambitious youth and pressing in upon them the migrant masses.”
Though surrounding communities may have been aware of the social impacts of the
4

Alain Locke, “Harlem,” Survey Graphic 53 (1925): 629.

Alain Locke, ed., The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance (New
York: Touchstone, 1997), x-xi.
5
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Great Migration into Harlem and other urban centers around the First World War,
Locke contended, they remained “largely unaware of the psychology of it, of the
galvanizing shocks and reactions, which mark the social awakening and internal
reorganization which are making a race out of its own disunited elements.”6 To
Locke and many other conscious observers, this “social awakening” and unifying
social reorganization that was taking place in Harlem signified the potential of the
neighborhood as a “race capital,” a Black Mecca.
This vision of Harlem as a Black Mecca put forth by Locke and others of the
Harlem Renaissance and broader New Negro Movement was not merely an
observation of contemporary social phenomena—it was a proclamation of Black
survival, achievement, and empowerment made possible through the active
struggles of resilient communities. In other words, through the struggles of Black
people to survive (and sometimes thrive) in a hostile city and remake a section of
New York in their image, the groundwork was laid for a new generation of race
leaders to emerge and struggle to remake the city, nation, and world in their image.
Though there were certainly political, economic, and social forces unique to New
York City in the early 20th Century that influenced the growth and development of
Harlem’s Black communities, this same growth was often achieved in spite of
various forces that restricted equal access to prosperity as white New Yorkers. It
was, in fact, these conflicting forces of opportunity and repression that made Harlem
unique and provided the backdrop for its canonization as a “race capital” of the
world. Giving voice to this unique potential that Harlem represented for the Black
6

Locke, “Harlem,” 630.
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world, writer James Weldon Johnson predicted in the same 1925 issue of Survey
Graphic that “Harlem will become the intellectual, the cultural and the financial
center for Negroes of the United States, and will exert a vital influence upon all
Negro peoples.”7
Johnson’s words proved prophetic as Harlem’s community swelled in size,
reputation, and influence in the following decades. New generations of artists,
community leaders, scholars, and politicians entered into the fray, each influenced
by the cultural and political milieu of the Black Mecca, and standing on the
shoulders of those who had come before. By the 1960s, Harlem had fostered the
development of a wide array of homegrown and migrant race leaders, such as
Marcus Garvey, Audley Moore, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Ella Baker, Malcolm X, Mae
Mallory, and Jesse Gray whose experiences in the neighborhood would shape
political movements from the grassroots to international arenas for generations to
follow.
This chapter will draw upon the traditions of Black political, social, and
economic consciousness and struggle in the Black Mecca that laid the groundwork
for the emergence of new directions in struggles for civil and human rights and
Black empowerment during the Civil Rights Era of the 1950s-1960s in New York
City. Much like Locke in “Harlem,” this chapter narrates and analyzes the social
forces in Harlem and beyond that contributed to the evolution of an insurgent Black
political consciousness in the mid-1950s, and how that consciousness translated
into political action. The years from 1954 to 1957, particularly, represented a
7

639.

James Weldon Johnson, “The Making of Harlem,” Survey Graphic 53 (1925):
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formative period in Harlem’s development as a “movement center” in the
burgeoning Civil Rights Movement.
As defined by sociologist Aldon Morris, a “movement center is a social
organization within the community of a subordinate group, which mobilizes,
organizes, and coordinates collective action aimed at attaining the common ends of
that subordinate group.” Although Morris’s framework was constructed to analyze
and explain the social forces that contributed to the development of “coordinated
collective action” in a particular location, such as Montgomery, Alabama, and thus
does not strictly apply to the case of Harlem with the neighborhood’s amalgamation
of generally uncoordinated ideologies, organizations, and interests, the framework
provides a useful starting point for understanding how organizations and
movements developed in Harlem and the neighborhood’s place within the Civil
Rights Movement. By 1964, Harlem’s grassroots political scene would more closely
resemble the “movement center” framework laid out by Morris, but it was during
the gestation period between 1954-1957 that local activists drew upon the Black
Mecca’s traditions of resistance and liberation struggles to confront local and
national issues and lay the groundwork for the transformative social movements of
the early 1960s.
v
Nearly eleven years had passed since Harlem’s last rebellion when Malcolm X
returned to the neighborhood in June of 1954 to lead the Nation of Islam’s Temple
No. 7. In the wake of the Second World War, white hostility to Black claims of
equality and mobility led to days of rebellion in 1943 following the shooting of a

14

Black veteran by a white police officer in Harlem. Malcolm Little had born witness to
the rebellion as a young waiter and hustler, but after a stint in prison, returned to
the neighborhood over a decade later as Malcolm X, convert to the Lost-Found
Nation of Islam.
An Islamic sect born of the Black nationalism of the early 20th Century, the
Nation of Islam was founded in Detroit by the enigmatic W.D. Fard in 1930. Just four
years later, however, the Nation came under the direction of Elijah Muhammad after
Fard mysteriously disappeared. Born Elijah Poole in 1897, Muhammad migrated
north from rural Georgia and was later re-named by Fard, who proclaimed himself
the incarnation of Allah, to reflect the former’s status as the “messenger” of Allah.
Poole had been born into the time period that historian Rayford Logan coined as the
“nadir of American race relations.” This “nadir,” spanning from roughly 1875-1920,
marked the most harrowing period in the African American experience since the
conclusion of the Civil War.8 The period was an outcome of the reactionary
overthrow of Reconstruction in the South that violently curbed African American
economic, political, and social advancement and paved the way for the
establishment of Jim Crow society.9 This reactionary war was waged most visibly
through public lynchings, or extra-judicial killings, meant to make examples of Black
Historian Rhonda Y. Williams uses the date range of 1875-1920 to classify
the nadir. See Rhonda Y. Williams, Concrete Demands: The Search for Black Power in
the 20th Century (New York: Routledge, 2015).
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men, women, and children who dared to defy white-imposed societal norms aimed
at repressing attempts at uplift. According to statistics from the Tuskegee Institute,
between the time of Elijah Poole’s birth and the time he first met Fard in Detroit in
1931, nearly two thousand African Americans nationwide had been victims of
lynching.10
This period of rampant racial terrorism and violence had profound impacts
upon a young Poole, who had come face to face with the brutal realities of southern
racism as a child. When Elijah Poole was around 10-years-old, he witnessed the
lynching of an 18-year-old African American man in Cordele, Georgia. According to
biographer Claude Andrew Clegg III, this “traumatic experience stayed with Elijah
for the rest of his life and certainly made him more susceptible to black separatist
doctrines.”11 Furthermore, the young Elijah was particularly disturbed that this
murder had taken place within a predominantly Black section of Cordele. Citing
Muhammad’s own remembrances of the event, Clegg claims that “Elijah could not
understand how this could have happened to a young man ‘in the midst of his own
people,’ while ‘all our grown men right there in the section’ watched and dared not
intervene.”12 After witnessing a second lynching around 1920 when a Black man had
been tied to a pickup truck and dragged through the streets of Macon, Poole
The exact number of recorded lynchings that occurred between 18971931, according to the Tuskegee Institute, is 1,928. “Lynchings: By Year and Race,”
University of Missouri-Kansas City, accessed October 1, 2016,
http://law2.umkc.edu/Faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html/.
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eventually fled the South with his family in 1923, lamenting that he had experienced
‘enough of the white man’s brutality in Georgia to last me for 26,000 years.’13 Like
many of the thousands of Black Southerners who sought reprieve in the North
during the Great Migrations, what Poole and his family found upon their arrival in
Detroit was merely another brand of the oppression they had suffered through in
Georgia.
Another victim of such violence that drove Poole from the South was Earl
Little, whose murder in East Lansing, Michigan in 1931 demonstrated that there was
no sanctuary from racial terrorism to be found in the North. Little, a preacher and
avid follower of Marcus Garvey and the United Negro Improvement Association
(UNIA), was no stranger to the types of physical and psychological racial violence
that brought Elijah Muhammad north and to the NOI in 1931. After having seen
three of his brothers killed by white men (one by lynching), Little risked the same
violence to promote Marcus Garvey’s platform of liberation, nationalism, and racial
pride for people of African descent. For this advocacy, Little met the same fate as his
brothers in 1931, which was believed to have been at the hands of The Black Legion,
a local white supremacist and terrorist organization. Though he paid the ultimate
price for his militant advocacy of racial pride and independence in a country that
was patently hostile to these notions, Little left an indelible legacy of protest and
resistance for his progeny to embrace and build upon. Little’s son, Malcolm, later
said of his late father’s racial advocacy, “the image of him that made me proudest
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was his crusading and militant campaigning with the words of Marcus Garvey,” a
crusade that made him a “tough man” in young Malcolm’s mind.14
In spite of the immense hardships and sufferings of millions of African
Americans throughout the nation during the nadir that Poole and Little lived
through, this period witnessed a flowering of Black political consciousness and
militancy that would influence generations of race leaders to follow. In New York,
where the multifaceted realities of Jim Crow society assumed the form of urban
racial ghettoes, Black communities proved particularly receptive to political
ideologies that offered views of alternative possibilities to the oppressive conditions
under which they lived. One of the most influential figures in promoting race
consciousness and militancy in the early 20th Century was Marcus Garvey, a
Jamaican migrant who settled in Harlem in 1916. In Harlem, Garvey found a
heterogeneous Black community from throughout the United States and African
diaspora who brought with them a range of experiences with racial oppression and
ideas for how they could get free.15 Settling within the invisible walls of a racial
ghetto in northern Manhattan, this was the base to which Garvey’s Black nationalist
approach to racial uplift was tailored and drew the most support from.
In 1917, with the help of Amy Ashwood and Amy Jacques, Garvey formed the
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which “built its following by
regaling black working-class people with nationalistic language, symbolism, [and]
Alex Haley and Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X as Told to Alex
Haley (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992), 6.
14
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pageantry of racial pride,” according to Rhonda Y. Williams. “When Garvey spoke of
the greatness of the race,” biographer E. David Cronon wrote, “Negroes everywhere
could forget for a moment the shame of discrimination and the horrors of
lynching.”16 Garvey’s emphasis on psychological empowerment for Black people
was an imperative precursor to economic and political empowerment. In the
context of the violence of Jim Crow society and the racial pogroms that were taking
place throughout the nation in the early 20th Century (most notably in East St. Louis
in 1917), Garvey’s preaching of racial consciousness that called Black communities
to transformative action must be understood as an inherently radical intervention.
Although Garvey’s movement crumbled under the weight of organizational
shortcomings, contentious relationships with other Black liberation groups, and
government repression, his meteoric rise had formative impacts on the political
development of generations of Black communities in Harlem and beyond. As Cronon
notes, Garvey “achieved little in the way of permanent improvement for his people,
but he did help to point out the fires that smolder in the Negro world.”17 Although he
was certainly not alone in his efforts to fan these “smoldering” flames, his rhetoric
and praxis of Black empowerment inspired a generation of leaders that emerged in
his wake, including Audley Moore and Malcolm X, and is indicative of the
relationships between political rhetoric, empowerment, and organizing in Harlem.18
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Furthermore, Garvey and the UNIA’s advocacy of “black political autonomy and
building an independent black community” foreshadowed struggles for Black selfdetermination in cities in the 1960s, undergirded by the notion that “the city is the
Black man’s land,” as James Boggs put it in 1966.19
Although Garvey’s influence waned in the post-war years, his legacy was
rekindled in the 1950s as African nations fought for independence from colonial
powers and Black nationalist ideologies resurged in Harlem and the United States.
Through his conversion to the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X seized the torch for a new
generation of African Americans who were ready to be “inflamed.”20 Though
Malcolm had great successes in establishing and organizing temples in Boston and
Philadelphia just months before arriving in Harlem in 1954, the opportunity to lead
the storefront Temple on the corner of West 116th Street and Lenox Avenue in
Central Harlem felt different to him. This appointment provided the young minister
with a chance to return to Harlem, where he had come of age as a young hustler and
learned the social intricacies of the neighborhood and its peoples. More importantly,
For extended narratives and analyses of struggles for Black empowerment,
equality, and liberation in New York City during the Civil Rights era, see Williams,
Concrete Demands; Peniel Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History
of Black Power in America (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006); Martha Biondi, To
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Harvard University Press, 2003).
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however, this specific appointment represented to Malcolm a unique opportunity to
grow the Nation of Islam and spread its teachings of Black liberation and
empowerment in ways that were not possible in any other single temple. Temple
No. 7 was located in an international city with a Black population that would grow
from 750,000 to over one million in its five boroughs in the decade from 19501960.21 Moreover, the Temple’s physical place within the Black Mecca situated the
NOI and Malcolm within the transformative ideological spaces that Harlem had
historically nurtured and sustained. Upon his arrival in Harlem, therefore, Malcolm
was stepping into a grand political arena that would profoundly influence his
ideological and political development.
One of the most well-known landmarks in Harlem’s political landscape that
Malcolm would become intimately acquainted with was “Speakers’ Corner.” Just ten
blocks northwest of Temple No. 7, the corner of 125th Street and Seventh Avenue
served as an informal, open-air classroom, theatre, and church, depending on the
orator and audience. From spring to fall, speakers called out to small, transient
crowds from stepladders and makeshift platforms, “raining abuse” on Jim Crow
society, deconstructing systemic racial oppression, and exhorting potential converts
to nationalist organizations. The common sight at Speakers’ Corner, reporter Peter
Goldman wrote, was “a lone man on a wobbly pine platform or a ladder…squalling at
little crowds of black people who tend to get bored and drift on unless you raise
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some hell.”22 Although Goldman painted Speakers’ Corner as a carnivalesque scene,
these orators brought Black radical thought and analysis to the street-level and
played a significant role in popularizing critical political consciousness across
generations. “Speakers’ Corner made it easy to raise critical questions, to be
concerned about what’s happening locally and internationally,” Harlem native and
author Toni Cade Bambara later wrote. “It shaped the political perceptions of at
least three generations. It certainly shaped mine.”23
Speakers’ Corner, and the expressive political culture that it characterized,
was significant not only for helping to shape the racial consciousness of Harlem
residents, but also for promoting connections between different generations of
struggles for Black liberation. Longtime residents of the neighborhood who had
experienced different phases of struggles for equality in the early decades of the 20th
Century served as bridges to connect pre- and post-war eras of organizing with the
burgeoning Civil Rights Movement in the mid- to late- 1950s. At Speakers Corner,
these generations could not only debate, but also meet and connect to chart new
directions in the old struggle for liberation. Through his connection with a former
Garveyite, Lewis Michaux, Malcolm X gained entrée to Speakers’ Corner and was
aided in his rise in Harlem’s competitive street-speaking scene.
Michaux, whose National Memorial bookstore was a landmark in Harlem and
key site for the dissemination of Black radical thought, served as a “gateway” to
Peter Goldman, The Death and Life of Malcolm X (Champaign: University of
Illinois Press, 1979), 53.
22
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Harlem’s past, where Malcolm and other young nationalists expanded their
knowledge of leaders and movements in the neighborhood and cultivated new
analyses in the late 1950s.24 According to scholar William Sales, though Malcolm
“received formal exposure to Black nationalism” through the teachings of Elijah
Muhammad, it “was tempered and altered in the political culture of Harlem with its
street corner debaters, orators, and radical intellectuals.”25 As Malcolm immersed
himself in Harlem’s radical political scenes while organizing Temple Seven, he built
upon his personal connections to Black radical traditions to develop his reputation
as an exceptional orator, intellectual, and leader. In the following years, local,
national, and global events and trends would coalesce to propel Malcolm and his
brand of Black political empowerment to the forefront of struggles for Black
liberation in the Black Mecca and beyond.
The Brown Decision and the Fight for Educational Equality in Harlem
In May 1954, just weeks before Malcolm had made his return and began his
rise in Harlem, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education altered
the course of struggles for Black liberation in the city, nation, and world. Influenced
by the testimony of psychologist and Harlem resident Dr. Kenneth Clark, Chief
Justice Earl Warren and the United States Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of
“separate but equal” that had legally sanctioned racial segregation for over 50 years
was “inherently unequal.” The Court’s ruling went beyond the initial intent of the
lawsuit to ensure equal educational opportunity for African American children to
24
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challenge the legitimacy of the institution of racial segregation that underwrote the
segregation of schools. For this reason, an editorial in the New York Amsterdam
News referred to the Brown decision as a “second emancipation for the Negro in
America.”26
Though formal school segregation had been declared unconstitutional in
New York State in 1938, schools in the city remained heavily racially segregated and
unequal well through the 1950s and beyond. Several factors contributed to this
maintenance of school segregation, many of which were the result of public policies
sponsored by city government. Certainly, residential segregation was a determining
factor in educational segregation and was driven by both “de facto” and “de jure”
practices and policies. Additionally, public policies determining the drawing of
school district lines and location of new school construction served to effectively
maintain and enforce segregated schools. Furthermore, teacher quality and
assignment, student population and overcrowding, and the physical condition of
school buildings all impacted the quality of education that Black students received
and were heavily influenced by public policy.
Recognizing governmental culpability in the quality of education their
children were receiving, Black parents and civil rights activists targeted school
segregation and its root causes, like residential segregation, in the 1950s. As
historian Martha Biondi explains, “civil rights leaders exposed this governmental
complicity in maintaining racially defined schools, calling into question the accuracy
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of the phrase de facto to describe racial segregation in New York City public
schools.”27
It was not until the Brown case, however, that public officials recognized a
sense of urgency in entertaining the complaints of parents and civil rights leaders
regarding the city’s schools. Contrary to popular understandings of struggles for
educational equality, as Biondi notes, New York City was one of the first places in
which the Brown decision “sparked a push for integration.”28 It was the expert
testimony of Dr. Clark during the Supreme Court hearings that finally persuaded city
officials, including Mayor Robert Wagner, to take interest in matters of educational
equality, however ineffectual this interest would prove to be.
Two weeks before the Supreme Court reached their decision on May 17, the
Intergroup Committee on New York’s Public Schools held a conference titled
“Children Apart,” which called attention to the adverse affects of educational
segregation and inequality in the city.29 Leaders of the group, which represented a
coalition of 28 community organizations, included influential figures including Drs.
Kenneth and Mamie Clark, Judge Hubert Delany, and Ella Baker, an NAACP leader
and fierce advocate of grassroots leadership who would go on to mentor the
formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) six years
later.30 The momentum generated by the conference, which was attended by over
27
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175 parents, teachers, and civic leaders, coupled with the Brown decision, spurred
the Board of Education to heed Dr. Clark’s calls for a study to investigate segregation
in the city’s schools. Ultimately however, like many government-sponsored studies
or investigations, the study and city’s subsequent formation of the Commission on
Integration represented little more than a token concession to the pressure brought
upon City Hall by the Brown decision and Black community leaders.31
This mobilization did, however, provide a foundation for heightened
community action in Harlem. According to historian Barbara Ransby, the conference
“primed” the activists, educators, social workers, and parents in attendance for
action in the wake of the Brown decision and “kicked off” several years of protests
for school desegregation and reform.32 Among those who were “primed for action,”
was a group of Black mothers, including Mae Mallory and later known as the
“Harlem Nine,” who would mount their attack on educational inequality and
institutional racism in the years to follow.33
Drawing upon the rhetoric of activists and organizers in the post-war era,
these parents, teachers, and civic leaders in Harlem drew explicit connections
Adina Back, “Exposing the ‘Whole Segregation Myth’: The Harlem Nine and
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between northern and southern forms of racial oppression to locate their struggles
for equal educational opportunities within a larger, national context of oppression
and liberation struggles. Mae Mallory, for instance, argued that educational
inequality in the city exposed the fallacies of the “whole segregation myth” believed
by white audiences that understood racial segregation to be the exclusive trademark
of southern states.34 By invoking southern racism within this context, northern
organizers like Mallory effectively dramatized the forms of institutional racism that
they faced to debunk popular myths that painted northern cities as beyond the
purview of Jim Crow society.
Surely, most Black residents of Harlem needed little convincing that they
lived under a northern style of Jim Crow society; the contradictions in rhetoric of
equality and progress in the North were stark to anyone who headed down Fifth
Avenue south of 110th Street and compared the quality of education, housing,
employment, and law enforcement found there to conditions in Harlem. However,
by drawing connections to racial oppression in the South, northern organizers
brought these contradictions into popular focus and caught the attention of media
outlets and public officials who balked at comparisons to the Jim Crow South. In the
post-war era and beyond, these comparisons that Mallory and other educational
activists invoked, were also frequently, and effectively, drawn to address the
functions and practices of the police in Harlem.
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Struggles for Police Reform in the Jim Crow North
As historians of the struggles for civil rights in post-war New York City have
pointed out, northern organizers increasingly came to identify police brutality
within a national context of racial violence against African American communities.
Additionally, as the nation held up the banner of “democracy” in the face of a war
against fascism in Europe and Japan, African Americans and their allies on the home
front called out the contradictions evident in the freedoms they were denied.35 In
Harlem, white officers of the NYPD were often the most visible representations of
this denial of freedom, as they were seen as the enforcement arm of white
supremacy in the face of swelling demands for Black liberation in the post-war era
and beyond.
The underlying factor of this increased Black militancy, as Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. elaborated upon in Marching Blacks in 1944, was “that racial prejudice
had finally come under the attack of the new Negro and the new white man.” In his
lyrical style forged from years at the pulpit of the Abyssinian Baptist Church, Powell
referred to this growing consciousness and activism as a “rising tide” that “bigots in
high places tried to hold back.” While he stopped short of calling the police by name,
Powell proclaimed that “it is they and men of their kind, interested in preserving the
status quo of dual democracy, who, in my opinion, stimulated…every race riot in
America in 1943.”36
Biondi, To Stand And Fight, 72-73. For extended analyses of post-war
police abuses and struggles for reform in New York City, also see Marilynn S.
Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon
Press, 2003).
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While Powell’s analysis emphasized the institutional nature of racist
repression in the city and nation, his successor as Harlem’s representative on the
City Council, Benjamin Davis, Jr., brought that analysis to a concrete, street-level
view in his 1947 pamphlet, Lynching Northern Style: Police Brutality. Davis, a lawyer
and Communist Party member, had been elected to fill Powell’s seat when the latter
embarked upon his first congressional campaign in 1943. As a response to the
inaction of NYPD commissioner Arthur Wallander in 26 cases of alleged brutality
brought to his attention, the pamphlet decried this rampant police abuse and
tactfully put forth an analysis that identified the functions of lynching and police
violence within the context of institutional enforcement of white supremacy. In the
wake of increased Black demands for equality in the post-war era, the pamphlet
echoed the sentiments held by many Black residents of Harlem in the post-war era
and beyond, that police violence was employed to “create the impression that
Negroes are unworthy of the full citizenship which they rightfully demand.” Put
more simply, the pamphlet argued that the recent escalation of police violence was
designed to “keep the Negroes ‘in their place.”37
Judge Hubert Delany, member of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and of the
Intergroup Committee on New York’s Public Schools, was no stranger to the realities
of northern policing that many residents of Harlem lived with. In 1951, three years
before the Committee’s “Children Apart” conference and the Brown decision, white
NYPD officers savagely beat Delany’s nephew outside of his home on Bradhurst
36
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Avenue in Harlem. William Delany, a 29-year-old Black man who had been left
crippled by the polio virus as a child, was beaten unconscious and kicked in the face
after the white officers ordered him off his own front stoop.38 The beating of William
Delany came during a five-year period from 1947-1952 in which 46 unarmed
African Americans were killed by police in the state of New York, according to
investigations of the NAACP.39
In response to the brutal beating of his nephew, Judge Delany penned a biting
statement about police brutality that ran on the front page of the weekly Harlem
newspaper the Amsterdam News.40 In his response, Delany charged “police in
Harlem consider that they have the God-given right in a poor community…to keep
the peace with the nightstick and blackjack whenever a Negro attempts to question
their right to restrict the individual’s freedom of movement.” To further emphasize
the weight and urgency of his criticism of the heavy-handed practices of police
officers, Delany accurately pointed out “such actions on their part lead to riots.” Far
from hyperbole, Delany’s analysis drew from a knowledge base that was common
sense to many Harlem residents who had born witness to the police-incited
rebellions of 1935 and 1943.
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Ten years after the 1943 rebellion, and two years after Delany’s article, a
1953 controversy involving the NYPD and FBI finally gave way to a modicum of
police reform in New York City. Following an investigation into the brutal beatings
of Jacob Jackson, a Black truck driver, and his neighbor Samuel Crawford in Hell’s
Kitchen in 1952, word got out of a secret agreement that existed between the NYPD
and FBI to block federal oversight of police brutality cases in the city.41 Protests
ensued and at the behest of a coalition of 19 community organizations known as The
Permanent Coordination Committee on Police and Minority Groups, which included
the NAACP, ACLU, National Urban League, and the AFL, the NYPD established the
Civilian Complaint Review Board.42
This internal panel, staffed by three non-uniformed members of the NYPD
who served in administrative roles within the Community Relations Division was
little more than window dressing for a corrupt and inherently oppressive
institution. The panel conducted no hearings—its members simply reviewed
reports from commanding officers and recommended actions to the Police
Commissioner on the basis of the reports they received.43 Furthermore, the Police
Commissioner was not mandated to implement any recommendations of this
advisory panel. From its inception, the internal nature of the CCRB drew the ire of
Black and Latinx populations who felt an internal review board could not possibly
41

Johnson, Street Justice, 22-25.

42 Johnson,

Street Justice, 224; Vincent J. Cannato, The Ungovernable City: John
Lindsay and His Struggle to Save New York (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 156.
James R. Hudson, “Police Review Boards and Police Accountability,” Law
and Contemporary Problems 36, no. 4 (1971): 523.
43

31

be impartial in handling complaints levied against the NYPD. According to
Councilman Earl Brown, the new review board was nothing more than “the same
old system with a new coat of whitewash.”44
As tensions continued to rise with the growth of the modern Civil Rights
Movement in the mid-1950s at local and national levels, the internal-review
structure of the CCRB came under increased fire from Black and Latinx populations
who were disproportionately targeted and mistreated by an overwhelmingly white
NYPD. However, the only modification of the CCRB’s procedures, prior to its shortlived reform under Mayor John Lindsay in 1966, came in May 1955 in response to
community demands. In essence, the only modifications to the CCRB made in this
concession were the ability of complainants to file a claim of misconduct at any
precinct and the shift of handling of complaints to the Deputy Commissioner of
Community Relations.45
It took less than a week for complaints to flow into the new system, one of
the first of which came from nine-year-old Elbert Dukes, a Harlem resident who
filed the charges with the assistance of the New York Branch of the NAACP. Dukes,
an honor student at PS 181, was beaten with a pair of handcuffs by officers inside
the 28th Precinct, where his mother found him handcuffed to a steam pipe with
blood on his head, face, neck, and chest.46 While Dukes’ case drew scant attention
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from media outlets and civil rights organizations in New York, the death of 14-yearold Emmett Till in Money, Mississippi just months later sent shockwaves through
the city, nation, and world.
The Murder of Emmett Till and a National Awakening
On August 20,1955, Emmett Till boarded a train from Chicago, Illinois to the
Mississippi Delta to visit his relatives in the town of Money. Like many Black
northerners whose families had fled the south during the Great Migrations, Emmett
Till still had relatives in the South that he would visit on occasion. Over a forty year
span, this mass migration from the South brought Chicago’s Black population from
around forty thousand to half a million, with 75 percent of these migrants coming
from the state of Mississippi. Of the myriad factors that drove Black communities
north, one of the most pressing, as Elijah Muhammad testified, was the widespread
terrorism inflicted by reactionary white supremacist organizations, such as the Ku
Klux Klan and the White Citizens Council. With an intention of violently curbing
efforts at Black uplift, this reactionary terrorism was particularly evident in the
wake of the Brown v. Board decision, as multiple politically-motivated racist
murders took place in the Delta in the months and days preceding Till’s arrival on
August 21st. This string of violence visited the 14-year-old one week after his arrival
when he was kidnapped, brutally beaten, and shot for allegedly saying “bye, baby” to
a white woman in a store in Money. His body was found three days later in the
Tallahatchie River tied to the heavy metal fan of a cotton-gin.47
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Echoing the sentiments of the pamphlet Ben Davis published in 1947
regarding police enforcement of white supremacy in the North, the two men who
had savagely murdered Till believed it their mission to uphold herrenvolk society in
the South. According to reporter William Bradford Huie, a white journalist who had
interviewed the acquitted murderers, the two men felt they “had to make an
example of a young man like Emmett Till.” “They were told,” Huie said when asked
about their motives, “that with the beginning of the Supreme Court decision, this
was a war.”48 If it weren’t already clear to Black communities throughout the nation,
the abdication of justice in the face of Till’s gruesome murder was an unmistakable
indicator that each step toward Black equality would be met with potentially lethal
pushback. It was also a call-to-action for a new generation of young African
Americans who were both terrified and enraged by Till’s death.
Anne Moody, who in a few short years would become active in the NAACP,
CORE, and SNCC, was also 14-years-old in Mississippi at the time of Till’s death. In
her 1968 autobiography, Moody recollected, “before Emmett Till’s murder I had
known the fear of hunger, hell, and the Devil. But now there was a new fear known
to me—the fear of being killed because I was black.” Shortly thereafter, however,
this fear turned to anger. “I hated the white men who murdered Emmett Till and I
hated all the other whites who were responsible for the countless murders,” Moody
reflected, “But I also hated Negroes. I hated them for not standing up and doing
something about the murders.”49
William Bradford Huie interview with Blackside, Inc., August 30, 1979,
Henry Hampton Collection, Washington University Libraries.
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The psychological impact of Till’s murder reached young African Americans
far beyond the state of Mississippi, as well, and inspired many to action when they
came of age. Frances Beal, who grew up in Binghamton, New York, was the same age
as Till and Moody in 1954 when she heard of Till’s death. “It was…some sort of
awakening…like, that could happen to me,” Beal later reflected. “It created in you a
feeling that something needed to be done about this.” Beal became active in
struggles for equality three years later as a student at the University of WisconsinMadison.50 William Strickland, a native of Roxbury, Massachusetts who would later
become National Director of the Northern Student Movement (NSM) in Harlem,
recalled, “the thing that I think struck the consciousness of everyone and
subsequently was the reason, I later discovered, why many people of my generation
joined SNCC was the murder of Emmett Till, because Jet [magazine] had his pictured
displayed.”51
Jet’s coverage of Emmett Till’s disfigured corpse left indelible impacts on the
consciousness of African Americans and people the world over. Mamie Till Bradley
Mobley, the mother of the slain boy, had decided to have an open-casket funeral for
her son in Chicago, stating that she “wanted the whole world to see” what had been
done to her son.52 According to historian Jeffery O.G. Ogbar, these images “magnified
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the salience of racial oppression like no single event in recent times had.” Indeed,
the hyper-visibility of racial oppression and brutality in Till’s murder, and its tacit
acceptance by the state of Mississippi and federal government, sounded a “clarion
call” to African Americans far beyond the South and inspired a new generation of
activists and leaders that would shape the Civil Rights Movement in their image in
the following years.53
In New York, coverage of Till’s murder and trial was carried in newspapers
for months, and was a focal point of sermons, speeches, mass meetings, and rallies.
Crediting northern struggles with “stimulating” awareness of racial violence and
mobilizing protest on a national level in the post-war era, Biondi argues that the
agency of Till’s mother and uncle, and the interest in Till’s murder from northern
Black politicians and media outlets, “built on…strategies in earlier struggles.”54
While the influence of strategies used in post-war struggles against racial violence in
New York, such as the NAACP’s visible anti-lynching campaigns, can certainly be
seen in the ways that Till’s murder was publicized and mobilized around. In turn,
this mobilization energized and influenced new directions in local and national
struggles for Black liberation.
In analyzing the impacts of Till’s murder on political mobilization, Rhonda Y.
Williams referred to 1955 as a “year of responses.” This was particularly evident in
Harlem, as individuals and organizations were spurred to action in ways both old
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and new that year. In the days, weeks, and months following Till’s death,
advertisements filled newspapers like the Amsterdam News promoting voter
registration campaigns. Crowds thronged to mass meetings and rallies in Harlem
organized by established organizations like the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
and the NAACP. Commenting on a meeting held at Williams Institutional (CME)
Church in early October, African American city councilman Earl Brown wrote in an
Amsterdam News column, “Never before in Harlem’s history has a crowd been so big
and shown so much determination to do something about the way their people are
brutalized in their own country. They want action.”55 At another early October rally
organized by the New York Branch of the NAACP, 3,000 people packed the Lawson
Auditorium on 125th Street while another 5,000 reportedly “pushed against police
lines” outside. Inside the auditorium, New York Branch president Russell P.
Crawford reminded the crowd that “the conditions which spawned these tragic
happenings are part of our America’s dilemma and exist in some degree throughout
the country.”56 Crawford went on to reference racial discrimination in housing,
education, and employment in the city as evidence of the oppression that persisted
in the North as well.
Although these demonstrations and campaigns were carried out with a
greater sense of urgency in the latter months of 1955, they represented relatively
moderate approaches to civil rights agitation. As Councilman Brown noted in
55
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response to the October meeting at Williams Institutional (CME) Church, “the Negro
people are not only ready to follow their leaders in a battle for equality…they are
often ahead of them. This is the situation today.”57 Despite the large turnout, the
resolutions passed at the NAACP rally at Lawson Auditorium the same week were
indicative of the relatively conservative nature of the organization’s approach that
would be challenged in New York in the following months. The gathering voted to:
send resolutions to Mississippi Governor Hugh White and President Eisenhower
protesting the handling of the Till trial and the “atmosphere of lawlessness in the
state; appeal to New York voters to prevent white supremacists from being elected
to Congress; and call for federal investigations into denial of voting rights in the
recent Democratic Primary in Mississippi and the recent murders in the state.58
Though these resolutions were noteworthy for their approach in seeking federal
intervention in matters of civil rights, which would become common practice
throughout the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement, it was becoming clear that a
growing number of Black communities were anxious to explore new routes toward
liberation. In Harlem, this was particularly evident in the expanding grassroots
organizing efforts of Ella Baker, as well as the budding popularity of Malcolm X and
the Nation of Islam in the late 1950s.
Ella Baker, the NAACP, and the Struggle for Grassroots Leadership
Though the New York branch of the NAACP had been active for decades in
struggles for equality in education, housing, and employment, by the 1950s the
57
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branch’s influence at the grassroots had significantly waned. This trend was
attributable, in part, to heightened government suppression of political dissidents in
the late 1940s and early 1950s. As the anti-Communist repression of the Cold Warera expanded in the city and nation under the influence of Senator Eugene
McCarthy, the NAACP was mired with internal turmoil over Communist involvement
in the organization. Many of the organization’s more militant members and leaders
were consequently ousted as Communists and those remaining tread a more
conservative path so as to avoid further persecution.
This turmoil and government repression soured the branch and organization
for many members, leading to a steep decline in membership from 1946 to 1952.
Even before the affliction of McCarthyism hit the branch, though, some of its more
progressive members had become critical of the branch’s effectiveness. Ella Baker,
for instance, had resigned as secretary of the branch in 1946, citing an air of
condescension toward local people and a general antagonism toward grassroots
involvement. 59 Though Baker would remain involved in the branch for several more
years, the nature of her disillusionment was an early indicator of a trending popular
movement away from established organizations and towards grassroots political
involvement in Harlem in the mid- to late-1950s.
While the Branch took a more activist and grassroots approach to civil rights
agitation under Baker’s leadership from 1952-1953, particularly in regards to
demonstrations for educational equality and police reform, this heightened
mobilization was more a reflection of Baker’s direction than a sustained
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organizational focus at that moment. That Ella Baker moved the branch’s
headquarters from their downtown location to Harlem is indicative of the
organizational philosophy that she envisioned for the branch. Baker sought to
center and empower local people in organizational direction, decision-making, and
action. In the struggles she led for school desegregation and police reform during
her tenure as president and beyond, Baker emphasized grassroots participation and
tactics, while also building coalitions of local community organizations.
After playing a central role in organizing the “Children Apart” conference and
lobbying city officials with the Intergroup Committee on New York’s Public Schools,
Baker decided to change her focus “from debate to direct action.”60 Certainly, direct
action campaigns were not new phenomena in struggles for civil rights in New York
City. This paradigm shift for Baker, however, was symptomatic of a growing trend in
freedom struggles in the city as local and national events spurred local people to
demand and organize for more immediate action. For Baker, this shift in focus
necessitated a shift in organizational approach from established, mainstream civil
rights organizations, like the NAACP, to independent, grassroots political organizing
capable of mobilizing broader populations for political action.
In response to reticence from City Hall to address educational segregation
and inequality on the heels of the Brown decision and the ineffectiveness of the New
York NAACP in demanding enforcement of the decision, Baker helped to found an
organization called Parents in Action Against Educational Discrimination. A
grassroots organization of primarily Black and Puerto Rican parents, Parents in
60
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Action employed a variety of tactics, including direct action confrontations, to fight
for integrated schools and greater parental involvement in educational policy
making. As Ransby argues, Baker’s formation of Parents in Action represented an
effort to “circumvent the NAACP’s paralytic bureaucracy and ‘go slow’ politics.”61
As Ella Baker sought to connect people and organizations in struggle through
local coalitions in Harlem, she also sought to connect local and national struggles for
civil rights in ways that emphasized grassroots political mobilization. Just months
after the murder of Emmett Till, Rosa Parks decided that she “was tired of giving in”
to white supremacy when a bus driver in Montgomery asked her to give up her seat
to a white passenger.62 In the days that followed, E.D. Nixon, Fred Gray, and Jo Ann
Robinson and the Women’s Political Council launched a boycott of the bus company
that would grow to last 381 days and signal the advent of a sustained national
Movement for Civil Rights. To provide support for the boycott from the North, Baker
helped to organize a coalition of political, labor, religious, and civil rights groups
known as In Friendship. The coalition helped to organize fundraising events in New
York City in 1956, including a May rally at Madison Square Garden, to support the
efforts of the Montgomery Improvement Association, along with lesser-known
struggles for civil rights in Clarendon County, SC and Yazoo, MS. In these efforts,
Baker was determined to provide much needed material funds for southern Black
communities, as well as to foster the development and empowerment of indigenous
61
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leadership. This emphasis on indigenous leadership was reflective of Baker’s work
in New York with the NAACP, as well as her travels beyond the state as a field
secretary, and contributed to the flowering of grassroots organizing that would
characterize Black freedom struggles in the early 1960s.63
The Grassroots Organizing and Leadership of Malcolm X and the NOI
As Ella Baker and the New York Branch of the NAACP struggled to adapt to
the repressive political climate of the Cold War era and move towards a grassroots
approach to civil rights, Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam sought to mobilize Black
outrage in new organizational directions in the late 1950s. Like Baker, who drew
from her post-war organizing roots to influence the grassroots trajectory of Black
freedom struggles in the mid-1950s, in the wake of Emmett Till’s murder the Nation
of Islam found fertile ground for cultivating the Black Mecca’s traditions of militant
Black nationalism to mobilize local people in ways that would drastically impact the
evolution of the Civil Rights Movement. Influenced by the nationalist doctrines of
Garvey, the Nation of Islam fervently critiqued the integrationist approach to civil
rights advocacy that undergirded the Brown decision and Montgomery Bus Boycott.
Elijah Muhammad, who claimed a causal relationship between acts of
lynching and increased NOI recruitment, argued that the murder of Emmett Till was
a “lesson” for those who sought integration with an inhumane white society.64 The
NOI’s critique of this approach rested on a rejection of the notion of integrating into
a morally and politically corrupt society built upon the subjugation and exploitation
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of Black bodies and minds. This sentiment was later poignantly expressed by James
Baldwin in The Fire Next Time, as he queried in a long-form essay on the NOI, “Do I
really want to be integrated into a burning house?”65
Through another seminal question raised in his best-selling inquisition of
American society, Baldwin urged his readers to consider the historical context of the
NOI’s emergence as a national force in the late 1950s and early 1960s. “Why,”
Baldwin asked, “were [Harlem audiences] hearing it now, since this was not the first
time it had been said?”66 In other words, what factors were responsible for the
increasingly popular reception of the NOI’s message at the dawn of the 1960s,
considering that Elijah Muhammad had been preaching the same message for nearly
thirty years by that point? In a response that foreshadowed Martin Luther King Jr.’s
later proclamation that “the arc of history is long, but bends toward justice,”
Baldwin suggested that the NOI’s growth in organizational size and influence in
shaping political discourse was the natural result of a historical cycle. Though
careful to not “minimize [Muhammad’s] peculiar role,” Baldwin argued “in a way…it
is not he who has done it but time. Time catches up with kingdoms and crushes
them…time reveals the foundations on which any kingdom rests, and eats at those
foundations.”
Citing global examples of imperialist aggression that exposed the inherent
contradictions of Euro-centric doctrines of “civilization,” “Christianity,” and
“morality,” Baldwin argued “time has passed, and in that time the Christian world
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has revealed itself as morally bankrupt and politically unstable.”67 Though Baldwin’s
analysis explains rising opposition and resistance as a natural consequence of
oppressive actions, the agency of individuals and communities in organizing and
propelling this resistance must also be given consideration. An analysis of the rise of
Black radical thought and organizing, generally, and the NOI, specifically, in the late
1950s, therefore, also necessitates a street-level examination of how ideas, analyses,
and resources were mobilized to empower communities, challenge oppressive
institutions, and influence the direction of broader social movements.
Certainly, time brought no shortage of revelations of a morally and politically
corrupt American society in the 1950s. And as continuous acts of racial violence
demonstrated a white backlash to major gains in the struggle for Black equality, the
Nation’s critique of the burgeoning southern Civil Rights Movement became
increasingly well-received in northern cities. Indeed, a growing number saw the NOI
as a useful alternative to integrationist organizing as Black Americans received a
clear message that steps toward their advancement would be met with violent
retribution and that local and federal governments were not willing to intercede for
their protection. Echoing the sentiments of Anne Moody in response to Till’s
murder, many critiqued the futility of any reliance upon local and federal authorities
for protection, while also challenging the lack of initiative within Black communities
to protect themselves, and thus found possible recourse in the theology and praxis
of the NOI.
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As Ogbar notes, however, “stories about lynching alone could not convince
black people that…Islamic black nationalism was a viable alternative to Christianity
and integration.”68 As Muhammad’s experiences with racial violence as a child in the
South had influenced his espousal of doctrines of separatism and self-defense, the
harsh realities of racial oppression experienced in northern Black communities
found a voice in Elijah Muhammad and his dynamic minister, Malcolm X. “One did
not need to prove to a Harlem audience that all white men were devils,” Baldwin
wrote, “they were merely glad to have, at last, divine corroboration of their
experience.”69 Still, however compelling many found the rhetoric of the NOI to be,
few were lining up outside the doors of Temple No. Seven to convert in the mid1950s. According to Goldman, Malcolm’s early years with Temple No. Seven were “a
Sisyphean labor,” characterized by the young minister “begging and badgering”
Harlem residents to “hear the word of God,” but rarely able to assemble more than a
handful at a time to listen.70
Though the emergence of the national Civil Rights Movement certainly
attracted attention to the NOI and influenced its growth in the late 1950s, this
growth must also be attributed to the grassroots organizing efforts of Malcolm X and
his fellow ministers. For years, the Nation’s primary recruiting base was the
American carceral system, where ministers offered visions of redemption and
reclamation to these hyper-marginalized populations through racial pride,
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knowledge-of-self, and a strict code of personal conduct. Beyond merely instilling
racial dignity and personal reform, however, ministers guided converts in
developing analyses of institutional racism that made sense of their incarceration
and social marginalization. Though aspects of their theology and analysis may be
considered fantastic, the Nation astutely and attractively attributed the social,
economic, and political marginalization of their recruits to the symptoms of
systemic racism imposed and enforced by a morally deviant white society.
Not only did the Nation offer an explanation for the lived experiences of
potential converts, they also provided a tangible avenue to challenge the very
systems that created and maintained these oppressive symptoms. By adhering to a
strict code of personal and moral conduct that rebuked these symptoms, converts
were effectively challenging white supremacy in tangible ways through practicing a
devout lifestyle and abstaining from elements of crime, vice, and “immoral”
practices that white society sought to impose upon them and thereby maintain
social, political, and economic power. Furthermore, the “morality” that the Nation
promoted and instilled in its converts and sympathizers, though expressed in
theological terms, was also couched within a sense of social, political, and economic
responsibility to racial advancement. Poet and activist Sonia Sanchez, a Harlem
resident in the 1940s-50s who later joined the NOI in the 1970s, explained this
aspect of Nation ideology:
Here was this…organization talking about resurrecting and… reordering your
life. And not just, I don't mean moral in terms of dress; I mean moral in terms
of responsibility to your people. It was that kind of morality that they were
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talking about. ‘You are responsible to your people. So, therefore, you must do
the following.71
The Nation thus promoted the notion of the personal as inherently political, which
provided an accessible vehicle for racial consciousness and empowerment amongst
populations that represented an “untapped reservoir of Black political power.”72
These were the messages that Malcolm X carried to the streets, pool halls,
nationalist meetings, and Christian churches as he worked to expand the Nation’s
recruitment and organizing of this “untapped” power base in Harlem. In recognizing
the competition that existed amongst nationalist organizations for the attention and
loyalties of Harlem residents, Malcolm sought to distinguish the NOI through
aggressive recruitment campaigns, which he described as “fishing,” throughout the
neighborhood. By Malcolm’s estimation, there was hardly a street that he and a few
other ministers had missed. “We would step right in front of a walking black man or
woman so that they had to accept our leaflet,” Malcolm later told Alex Haley. “And if
they hesitated one second, they had to hear us saying some catch thing such as ‘Hear
how the white man kidnapped and robbed and raped our black race.”73 It was
through this blunt rhetoric, which “made it plain,” that Malcolm was able to reach
and engage broad audiences by breaking down complex analyses of systemic racism
in “terms that people could understand,” while also giving public voice to
conversations that many were already having behind closed doors. As Malcolm X
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and his other ministers took this approach to the fringes of nationalist meetings and
to the sidewalks of storefront churches, they “began to get visible results almost
immediately.”74
Eschewing notions of respectability politics that constrained participation in
established civil rights organizations like the NAACP, as Ella Baker critiqued,
Malcolm reached people where they were, and captivated them with his engaging
rhetoric that inspired not only a heightened critical political consciousness, but also
a sense of racial pride and empowerment. According to Sanchez, who was initially
skeptical of Malcolm’s rhetoric and analysis,
…he articulated that kind of oppression and what we needed to do to feel
good about ourselves and to make for some kind of movement… he said it in
a voice like we had never heard before… he said it for even the brothers on
our block who didn't go to church, so couldn't involve themselves in the Civil
Rights Movement…who were hanging out on corners.75
In addition to reaching out to the “brothers” on street corners or at nationalist
meetings attended predominantly by men, Malcolm and his ministers also made
concerted efforts to recruit Black women to the Nation. Recognizing that the
majority of the “storefront Christians” they “fished” were women, Malcolm tailored
his after-church messages along gender lines. Proclaiming the beauty of Black
women in the face of an oppressive white society where ads for skin-lightening
creams and hair-straightening products proliferated in Black media outlets,
Malcolm promoted a gendered sense of racial pride in his speeches to these
audiences. In these same speeches, he also invoked gendered notions of “respect”
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and “protection” to appeal to his audience when he preached, “The black man needs
to start today to shelter and protect and respect his black women!”76 Indeed,
Malcolm’s appeals to a popular desire for safety and protection from hostile and
violent oppression in Harlem at the hands of the police, and at the hands of lynch
mobs in the South, found receptive audiences in Harlem in the late 1950s, even if
many were still hesitant to formally join the NOI.
“No one man should have that much power”
Malcolm’s active presence on the streets of Harlem finally paid off in 1957, as
an incident of police brutality provided the necessary platform to propel he and the
Nation into the public eye in New York City. On a late April night, Johnson X, a
member of Temple No. 7, and two other men intervened as NYPD officers were
“working over” a Black suspect with their nightsticks at the corner of 125th Street
and Lenox Avenue. Johnson approached the officers and asked them, “Why don’t you
carry the man on to jail?” before walking back into the small crowd that was
beginning to grow as more police cars arrived at the scene. Not satisfied with the
rate at which the dense crowd was receding, the responding officers began swinging
their nightsticks to speed up the process, cracking Johnson in the head in the
process. As Johnson yelled a prayer in agony, more officers rushed at him, knocking
him down as “blood gushed” from his head, and continued to attack him as he lay
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bleeding on the ground. Johnson was then taken to the 28th Precinct on 123rd Street,
where the relentless beating continued while he was handcuffed to a chair.77
As word got around of the beating, a crowd of 500, including members of the
Nation of Islam led by Malcolm X, gathered outside the precinct, demanding that the
injured Johnson be provided medical attention. After initially being told that there
was no such man in the precinct, police eventually permitted Malcolm inside to
examine Johnson, as the crowd continued to swell outside. Upon seeing Johnson’s
condition, Malcolm demanded that the man be taken to the hospital to treat his head
injuries. While Malcolm met with police officials, members of the Fruit of Islam, the
NOI’s regimented unarmed security detail, formed perimeters outside the precinct
“arms folded, like a battalion awaiting orders,” as an increasingly volatile crowd
continued to grow behind them. Upon hearing of Johnson’s transfer to Harlem
Hospital, the crowd marched up to 135th Street, where 2,000 assembled, eager to
catch wind of the man’s fate. After being treated, Johnson was quickly released back
to police custody and returned to the 28th Precinct, where the crowd continued to
swell to an estimated 4,000. While Johnson remained in a cell, Malcolm X once again
negotiated with “nervous” police officials who feared that situation outside the
precinct was teetering on the edge of a “riot.”78 Malcolm was assured that Johnson
would continue to receive medical treatment, and in return agreed to calm the
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crowds outside. Upon exiting the precinct, according to Amsterdam News managing
editor James Hicks, Malcolm “gave one brief command to his followers and they
disappeared as if in thin air.”79 Astounded by the swift, disciplined dispersal of the
NOI and massive crowd, a policeman on the scene infamously commented, ‘no one
man should have that much power!”80
The “power” that Malcolm demonstrated outside of the 28th Precinct
garnered front-page attention in the Amsterdam News, under the sub-heading of
“God’s Angry Men’ Tangle With Police.” After the story ran, “for the first time,”
Malcolm later recalled, “the black man, woman, and child in the streets was
discussing ‘those Muslims.”81 The standoff on 123rd Street was a major victory for
the NOI and Malcolm in Harlem. Not only did Johnson X receive the highest police
brutality settlement in city history at the time, the Nation also demonstrated to
audiences in Harlem and beyond that they wielded the power to confront racist
forces in the city—and win.82 “What Harlem wanted from Malcolm and the
Muslims,” Goldman wrote, “was proof that they were as big and bad as they claimed
to be.”83
At a moment when justice for victims of racial violence was in short supply
locally and nationally, the Nation’s offer of protection against a police department
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that functioned, as many believed, to “keep the Negroes ‘in their place,” drew many
new converts into their ranks. One such convert was Benjamin Goodman, an Air
Force veteran who was struck by
…how this man Malcolm X was out front protesting against that act and how
the Muslim brothers and sisters reacted. The brotherhood is what attracted
me. The unity. How a Muslim goes to the aid of a brother when he is
mistreated. It seemed like unity and brotherhood and—love. So I went there
to seek out the Muslims.84
Goodman, an underemployed Black man self-described as having been “born
dissatisfied” with racism in America, was one of many in Harlem who found in
Malcolm, and the Nation, a sense of empowerment and a way of confronting the
oppressive white institutions that colored their lives. In the wake of Johnson’s
beating, the Nation grew from “a few hundred,” to an estimated two thousand, “with
a presence and impact far larger than the actual number,” as Goldman notes.85
Malcolm had effectively proven to the grassroots bases he sought to reach that he
could back up his powerful rhetoric with concrete action, and from these
populations at the margins of urban society built “an army of people nobody
wanted.”86
Jesse Gray and the Radical Roots of Tenant Organizing
While Malcolm X built the NOI into the “fastest growing membership
organization in urban areas” in the late 1950s after his showdown with the NYPD,
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the grassroots organizing that he championed was bolstered by the return of
another charismatic leader to Harlem. After spending two years in the South, Jesse
Gray returned to Harlem in 1957 to form the Lower Harlem Tenants Council, a
tenants’ rights organization that advocated for poor and working-class renters.87
In many ways, Gray’s history as an organizer was reflective of major trends
in Black liberation struggles in the post-war period through the Civil Rights Era.
Born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1923, Gray attended the historically Black Xavier
University in New Orleans before joining the Merchant Marine during World War
II.88 Through the Merchant Marine, the nation’s only nonsegregated branch at the
time, Gray was introduced to the National Maritime Union (NMU), an 80,000member left-led affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).89
According to NMU official Josh Lawrence, who would later join Gray in the
Community Council on Housing, “in the thirties and even the early forties there were
only two places in the South where black and white could meet together—in the
black churches and the halls of the NMU.”90
Indeed, the NMU was founded upon the premise that racial equality was an
essential prerequisite for achieving national class solidarity and empowerment.
During the war, Ferdinand Smith, the Black vice president of the NMU, had worked
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alongside Eleanor Roosevelt and Paul Robeson to successfully advocate for Hugh
Mulzac, a former Garveyite, to be appointed as the first Black captain of the
Merchant Marine.91 Through his affiliation with the NMU, Jesse Gray “came under
the tutelage” of Communist Party leader Harry Haywood, and established himself as
part of a cohort of Black radicals, such as Smith, Lawrence, Ewart Guinier, and his
college friend Jack O’Dell, whose experiences at sea fostered a radical political
consciousness and informed their struggles for rights and power on land.92 “Those
were my greatest years,” Gray later recalled. Through his experience in the Left-led
NMU, Gray “was able to acquire tremendous experience; organizationally,
politically, and everything else…the whole Left influence on trade unions was a
tremendous education.”93
Primed for off-ship organizing and “intent on overthrowing” Jim Crow society
after the war, Gray and O’Dell set up shop at NMU headquarters in New York City.
While O’Dell attended the NMU Labor School, Gray continued to periodically ship
out of port until the anti-Communist purges of the Cold War era struck the NMU in
the late 1940s, effectively purging Gray from its ranks in 1952.94 Like Ella Baker,
who took charge of the New York Branch of the NAACP that year on the heels of
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their own Communist purge, Gray built upon his political education and organizing
experience in the NMU, as well as traditions of organizing in Harlem, to chart a new
course for grassroots organizing in the neighborhood and beyond.
The initial vehicle for Gray’s organizing was the Harlem Tenants Council
(HTC), a tenants’ rights initiative of the American Labor Party (ALP), a left-wing
subsidiary of the Communist Party.95 In 1952, Gray joined the Council at 28-yearsold, and by the following year, was organizing tenants and leading demonstrations
against slumlords, deteriorating housing conditions, and city housing agencies as
Director of the organization. Gray’s early demonstrations with the HTC from 19531954 focused on advocating for tenants who had been unjustly evicted from their
apartments, demanding repairs and violations be addressed in housing units,
petitioning the city’s Housing and Rent Commissions on behalf of tenants, and
demanding Black representation in leadership positions in housing policy-making
bodies.96
Despite these early efforts, Gray and the HTC remained relatively weak, and
by the end of the decade, only 51% of Harlem’s housing stock would be classified as
“sound,” compared to 85% citywide.97 Additionally, only 17% of nonwhite
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households in the city and suburbs would be owner-occupied, compared to 40% of
white households.98 Furthermore, the agencies charged with addressing housing
conditions in the city, including the Housing and Rent Commission and Robert
Moses’ Committee on Slum Clearance, had no Black or Puerto Rican representation.
To many of Harlem’s residents, these factors of racial inequality in housing and
representation were symptomatic of larger systems of racial oppression in Harlem
that created unequal conditions and provided little recourse for redress.
By the end of the 1950s, tenant organizing in Harlem would become
emboldened by the upsurge of the Civil Rights Movement nationally and locally, and
apartment buildings would become a hub for organizing poor and working-class
Black and Puerto Ricans for not just quality housing, but also for political
empowerment. Like Malcolm, Gray saw these poor and working-class residents as
an untapped well of political power and hoped to inspire sustained political action
through first empowering these tenants to change their most pressing problems. As
Jesse Gray later said, “People ask me why I spend all my time on heat and hot water
and I say heat and hot water is the biggest organizing tool we have; it may even kick
off the revolution in the ghetto.”99
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In the waning days of the year, Amsterdam News editor James Hicks declared
1957 to be the “year Negroes fought back.”100 In the South, nine Black students in
Little Rock, Arkansas braved crowds of intransigent segregationists supported by
police and the governor, to compel federal enforcement of the Brown decision and
successfully desegregate Little Rock Central High School. In New York, Malcolm X
and the Nation of Islam faced down the New York Police Department in a startling
display of power to signal a new challenge to age-old practices of racist policing in
Harlem. Across the Atlantic, Ghanaians celebrated their independence from Britain,
elevating Kwame Nkrumah to international acclaim and heralding an era of global
Black empowerment.
Local, national, and global developments in the three years following the
Brown v. Board of Education decision marked a new chapter in the long struggle for
Black equality in Harlem, during which communities built upon traditions of radical
political consciousness and action in the neighborhood to engage in new struggles
for equality, liberation, and empowerment. Drawing from post-war struggles for
civil rights, along with nationalist and labor movements in the city, the surging
grassroots organizing efforts of Ella Baker, Malcolm X, Mae Mallory, and Jesse Gray
came to shape the Black Freedom Struggle in New York City and beyond in the next
decade. Largely eschewing the middle-class respectability politics of older civil
rights organizations, these organizers sought to build their bases amongst those at
the margins of political society as a way of mobilizing an untapped well of potential
political power.
James L. Hicks, “1957: Year Negroes Fought Back,” New York Amsterdam
News, December 28, 1957; Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour, 19.
100

57

It was also during this period that a new generation of future activists and
organizers began to come of age in their racial and political consciousness. With the
murder of Emmett Till in 1955 broadcast nationwide, the wonton brutality of white
supremacy in the face of Black uplift sounded a call-to-action for young people
across the nation who saw their reflection in the face of the 14-year-old. With the
guidance of veteran organizers like Baker, it was this generation of Till’s peers who
would take to the streets in the early 1960s to alter the trajectory of the burgeoning
Civil Rights Movement in the South, as well as the North.
In Harlem, this brief yet momentous period laid the groundwork for
protracted struggles for rights and power in New York City that would have
profound impacts upon the nature of these struggles nationwide in the following
years. Though Malcolm X would rise to international acclaim in the 1960s for his
piercing rhetoric that awakened and empowered people of African descent while
stripping white supremacy to its core, his rise in Harlem in the mid-1950s was
characterized by his dogged organizing efforts at the grassroots and aided by local,
national, and global political climates. Like Malcolm, the successes of Gray, Baker,
Mallory, and many other organizers in Harlem were grounded in their mobilization
of resources that were “not only material but intellectual and emotional.”101 The
grassroots organizing of these leaders during an era that represented real
possibilities for fundamental societal change empowered local people in Harlem to
become active in their communities and build movements that would have far-
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reaching impacts on the national Civil Rights Movement and city, state, and federal
politics in the coming years.
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CHAPTER 3
“IN HARLEM WITH A REVOLUTIONARY DREAM”: JESSE GRAY, MAE MALLORY,
MALCOLM X, AND THE FLOWERING OF RADICAL GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING IN
HARLEM, 1958-1959
You see, Sir, I am also a maladjusted Negro and I wonder why the thousands of
other maladjusted Negroes can’t get all other Negroes to become maladjusted
too. All the progress to be made will be made by maladjusted Negroes.
-Mae Mallory (1956)1
A rebellion is not a revolutionary movement unless it changes the structural
arrangements of the society or else is able to project programmatic ideas
toward that end. The Negro movement does not have the latter, and in America
neither arms nor demonstrations nor protest marches mean very much without
such ideas.
-Harold Cruse (1964)2
In June of 1960, editor James Hicks used his column in the New York
Amsterdam News as he had in the waning days of 1957—to serve notice to “white
people downtown” and “misinformed Negroes” that there was a “New Negro in
Harlem.” That summer, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. geared up his campaigning
machine as the downtown Tammany Hall Democratic machine mounted a challenge
to Harlem democrats in the party primary elections for the second time in two
years. Joined by Tammany-defectors J. Raymond Jones, a political veteran in Harlem
and Powell’s 1958 campaign manager, and Manhattan borough president Hulan
Jack, Powell’s United Democratic Leadership Team swept the six primary contests,
Mae Mallory, “Maladjusted Follower,” New York Amsterdam News,
November 24, 1956.
1
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while berating their Tammany-backed opponents as “Uncle Toms.” This decisive
victory signaled the possibility of a long-awaited paradigm shift in Black
participation in electoral politics in Harlem toward an open rebuke of white
sponsorship and party allegiance, and looked toward mobilizing independent
political power more broadly in future elections. To Hicks, the results of the primary
elections were indicative of one of the most telling characteristics of this “New
Negro” in Harlem—“he does not want any white person downtown telling him how
to handle his affairs uptown.”3
The political climate in 1960 that welcomed the emergence of this “New
Negro in Harlem,” as James Hicks declared, can be attributed in large part to the
organizing efforts of grassroots leaders Jesse Gray, Malcolm X, and Mae Mallory and
their organizational networks in the waning years of the 1950s. The work of these
three leaders from 1958-1960 intersected with a wide array of influential local,
national, and international figures and demonstrated the ways in which local people
in Harlem were mobilized in consciousness and empowered through action to
engage in sustained struggles for rights and power in Harlem and beyond in the
1960s. The demands raised by these leaders for Black self-determination at the
grassroots during these years represented a radical challenge to New York’s
entrenched white power structures and more moderate civil rights organizations,
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and shaped the course of looming battles over rights to citizenship, human rights,
and political power in the city.
As the national Civil Rights Movement continued throughout southern states
in the late 1950s, most notably in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, African American
communities in New York City waged struggles of their own for desegregation,
equal economic and educational opportunities, human rights, and selfdetermination. Building upon national and local radical organizing efforts during the
post-World War II era, Jesse Gray, Mae Mallory, and Malcolm X helped to shape a
popular organizational shift away from middle-class, moderate approaches to civil
rights and integration, and toward grassroots organizing and empowerment for
human rights and self-determination in ways that would have formative impacts
upon the evolution of the Black Freedom Struggle both locally and nationally. By
1959, the growing power and influence of this swelling grassroots militancy would
become abundantly clear in New York City as a series of local and national events
coalesced in Harlem to issue a challenge—and a warning—to the white power
structures of the nation’s largest city.
v
“Black workers in the back street”: The Post-War Roots of Radical Tenant
Organizing
In 1958, Jack O’Dell left the U.S. Communist Party (CPUSA) and found himself
back in New York City. In the years since returning from his service in World War II,
the 35-year-old Detroit native had cut his teeth as a progressive union organizer and
as an active participant in burgeoning struggles for civil rights in the South. The
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great-grandson of a self-emancipated slave who had escaped bondage to join the
Union Army, O’Dell’s racial and political consciousness was shaped at an early age
through his family legacy, as well as through the political and symbolic presence of
race women and men like Paul Robeson, Marian Anderson, and Joe Louis in popular
culture. Closer to home, O’Dell was also inspired by his grandmother’s resistance to
northern Jim Crow in Detroit, later recalling the influence that her boycott of a
downtown soda fountain that discriminated against Black patrons had on his
political consciousness.4 To O’Dell, the actions of these familial and iconic figures
“gave one optimism despite the cold-bloodedness of the insult of segregation” and
inspired him to follow in their steps.5
O’Dell’s entrée to the Communist Party came in 1950 when he joined Jesse
Gray, his longtime friend and fellow seaman, and Ferdinand Smith and Paul
Robeson, two of his personal “heroes,” as a member of the CPUSA.6 Joining the Party
was a logical outcome of O’Dell’s experiences during World War II and in the years
following. Like Gray, O’Dell had attended the historically Black Xavier University in
New Orleans and joined the Merchant Marine during World War II. The only nonJack O’Dell interview with James Early, May 13, 1997, Box 2, Folders 1-2,
Jack O’Dell Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture; Jack O’Dell and
Nikhil Pal Singh, Climbin’ Jacob’s Ladder: The Black Freedom Movement Writings of
Jack O’Dell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 14.
4
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Though there has been scholarly debate surrounding Jesse Gray’s affiliation
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segregated branch of the armed services, the Merchant Marine provided both O’Dell
and Gray with a means of fighting the war against fascism without acceding to the
demeaning treatment Black servicemen were subjected to in the other branches.
Through the Merchant Marine, Gray and O’Dell became actively involved in the
National Maritime Union (NMU), an 80,000-member seafarer’s union and left-led
affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). According to scholar
Nikhil Pal Singh, the progressive CIO, which had split from the more conservative
American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1935, “possessed a legendary status”
amongst members of the Black working class in the 1930s-40s, “for its commitment
to nondiscrimination and to organizing black workers.”7 To O’Dell, this reputation
was earned through the work of Communist Party members in the NMU and CIO,
such as Ferdinand Smith and Harry Haywood, whose organizing efforts influenced
the unions’ non-segregationist policies and dedication to the advancement of racial
equality. “They said an injury to one is an injury to all,” O’Dell later reflected, “these
were my people and this is where I want[ed] to be.”8
The Communist Party had made strong inroads in Harlem in the Great
Depression era. Recognizing the political, cultural, and intellectual significance that
Harlem possessed within national Black consciousness, the Party focused its
organizing efforts on Harlem during this period as a means of mobilizing support
from the political base of Black Americans. Through their active involvement in
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causes that promoted civil rights and Black equality, including their defense of the
Scottsboro Boys, the CP earned a favorable reputation in Harlem. Furthermore, the
Party contributed to a political milieu that championed direct action campaigns,
including mass marches, rent strikes, and economic boycotts, which shaped the
protest landscape in Harlem for years to come. 9 The Party’s early advocacy of civil
rights also attracted the membership of radical black women in Harlem, including
Audley Moore, who joined the Party in the 1930s, and later became a revered
influence within Black nationalist movements. Moore was born into the postReconstruction era of white Southern “Redemption” in Louisiana, and was raised on
family traditions of self-defense and economic nationalism as means of survival.10
These traditions attracted her to the program of Marcus Garvey, whom she first
heard speak in New Orleans, and she became active in the U.N.I.A. after moving to
Harlem in the early 1920s. In Harlem, Moore became involved in various political
organizations, demonstrating a continual quest for a political program that
effectively synthesized analyses of race, class, and gender oppression into an
operational movement for Black liberation and empowerment. Finding racial
Mark Naison, Communists in Harlem During the Depression (New York:
Grove Press, Inc., 1983), xvii-xviii.
9
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segregation alive and well while campaigning for the Republican Party in the early
1930s, Moore was drawn to the Communist Party by their defense of the Scottsboro
Boys and the Party’s position on Black self-determination and nationalism in its
Black Belt thesis. Though crediting the Party as where she “really learned to
struggle,” in part through tenant organizing, Moore eventually left the Party in 1950
when it became apparent to her that they lacked the radical racial consciousness
necessary to build a movement for Black liberation and empowerment.11
Like Moore, the organizational training and experience that O’Dell and Gray
received in their time with the NMU prepared them to carry the lessons of leftlabor-led struggles for rights and power in the pre- and post-war periods into
influential positions of leadership in the burgeoning civil rights movement in the
late 1950s. The “most advanced workers in the country sailed as NMU seaman,”
Gray later said, adding that “Black workers in particular gave leadership to the NMU
[and] arose then as a tremendous, conscious force.”12 In addition to the praxis of
leadership and organizing experiences that the NMU offered through the union’s
various committees, the educational opportunities that the union afforded were
critical in promoting the political development and consciousness of Black sailors
like O’Dell, Gray, Smith, and Josh Lawrence. With an NMU policy requiring each ship
to carry a library, radical sailors in leadership positions on the ship’s committee
were able to decide what texts went on the shelves of the ship’s library. This
leadership position offered the significant opportunity to influence the nature of
11
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onboard political dialogue, and it was Gray, as ship chairman of the SS Washington,
who introduced O’Dell to the works of W.E.B. Du Bois, including Black
Reconstruction and Black Folks: Then and Now, the latter of which O’Dell credited as
one of the most influential works on his political thought.13 Lengthy excursions with
workdays of only 5-6 hours left O’Dell and Gray with plenty of time to read widely,
and both were attracted to works, like those of Du Bois, which provided historical
analyses of the ways that race and class intersected in the creation and maintenance
of oppressive power structures.
Through their readings and travels, O’Dell and Gray also found inspiration for
possible means of challenging these structures. Of particular significance for both
men was Friedrich Engels’ The Housing Question, a discourse on the correlation
between capitalism and housing conditions, published in 1877.14 In this series of
articles, Engels argued that “the housing shortage is no accident; it is a necessary
institution and it can be abolished together with all its effects on health, etc., only if
the whole social order from which it springs is fundamentally refashioned.”15
Though careful to delineate the differences between landlord-tenant and employerlaborer relationships according to Marxist theory, which he helped to shape, Engels
argued that housing conditions (shortage and poor quality) were intrinsically linked
to capitalist exploitation, and therefore, required the overthrow of capitalist society
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to truly eradicate. Recognizing the lengthy trajectory inherent in this proposition,
however, Engels conceded that “In the beginning…each social revolution will have to
take things as it finds them and do its best to get rid of the most crying evils with the
means at its disposal.”16 Having witnessed the harsh realities of housing conditions
faced predominantly by Black communities in Jim Crow Detroit and New York,
though, O’Dell and Gray also recognized that “the housing question” was an
inherently racial one in American society. Influenced by Engels’ analysis and their
subsequent studying of housing policy, “the housing question” became for O’Dell
and Gray an undeniable illustration of the relationship between economic and racial
oppression in American society, seen most clearly in the Black ghettoes of the urban
North. “The fact is that housing isn’t just another issue,” O’Dell later asserted,
“housing is like bread and butter and a job.”17 Of even greater significance, however,
this “bread and butter” issue represented a possible means by which to bring a
social revolution to pass.
The “most crying evils” of housing, Gray and O’Dell believed, provided a
widely-identifiable issue that poor Black communities could be mobilized around to
mount a political challenge to both oppressive housing conditions and the urban
power structures that created and maintained them. It was during a shipment to
Great Britain in the mid-1940s that the two found inspiration for this analysis. While
in port, O’Dell later recounted in an interview with scholar Roberta Gold, he and
Gray learned that the tenant movement in Scotland had “made a breakthrough” in
16
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electing representatives to Parliament. Influenced by an era of militant labor
organizing in nearby Glasgow, poor and working-class tenants in Clydebank had
launched a widespread rent strike in 1920 as a means of challenging exploitative
housing and labor conditions. With an initial goal of preventing the repeal of rent
controls after World War I, tenants fought through the courts—and through acts of
civil disobedience—to maintain government protections for renters, and fostered
the political empowerment of economically and politically marginalized populations
in Scotland. As a result of their seven-year rent strike, tenants achieved two
immediate feats: they prevented the repeal of rent controls and protected their
standard of living amidst a period of intense economic hardships for the poor and
working classes. Most significantly, though, the Clydebank Rent Strikers were able
to form a political base amongst the poor and working classes, capable of electing
radical representatives to Parliament.18
While certainly far short of a “fundamental refashioning” of society, the
successes of the tenant movement in Scotland signaled to Gray and O’Dell the
potential political power that lay dormant in poor and working-class Black
communities in the United States. According to O’Dell, the two men “felt that [the
Glasgow residents’ accomplishment] was our goal too, to develop a kind of tenants’
movement, out of these slums and ghettoes, people who would fight for a national
housing policy that guaranteed that working people had decent housing.”19 Gray,
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however, had visions of more expansive—if romantic—possibilities for tenant
organizing. The housing question, to Gray, had the potential to “fuse” and mobilize
the latent political power of poor people most marginalized by urban society. “Rent
is like that; housing can do it,” Gray later argued. “We can base a party in the ghetto,
we can bring in the mass of people of unrest, progressives with no place to go.”20
Like the leaders of the tenant movement in Clydebank, Gray believed that poor and
working class tenants could be politically mobilized through issues of housing to
foster collective radical consciousness, with the ultimate goal of fundamental
societal transformation.
To act on these analyses, however, Gray and O’Dell would have to leave their
beloved NMU. After the war, the federal onslaught of McCarthyism and Communist
persecution sweeping the nation in the late 1940s and early 1950s effectively
subverted and dismantled left-labor-led struggles for racial equality and class
solidarity. In this period, the influence wielded by Communist and leftist members
in the NMU came under heavy fire in racially charged attacks from anti-communist
forces amongst the rank and file, orchestrated by white NMU veteran Joseph Curran,
a former Communist himself.21 The ensuing purges of CPUSA members and fellow
travellers from the NMU led to the ouster of Ferdinand Smith and O’Dell in the late
1940s, and Gray around 1952.22 The Jamaican-born Smith was ultimately deported,
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O’Dell moved into organizing in the South with the CIO’s Operation Dixie and
Southern Negro Youth Conference, and Gray slid into housing activism and leftist
political organizing in New York City. Though purged from the ranks of the
organization that contributed greatly to their political development, O’Dell and Gray
left the NMU well prepared to put their analysis of systemic racial and class-based
oppression into praxis as the modern Civil Rights Movement emerged in the mid1950s.
Aware of the limitations that communist persecution placed upon the
effectiveness of his organizing in the South, O’Dell left the Party in 1958 and
reunited with Gray in Harlem. Having participated in some of the opening salvos of
the modern Civil Rights Movement, O’Dell “saw a movement was emerging,” but
after numerous run-ins with federal and local anticommunist forces, understood
that “the sickness of the country was not going to let people who presented
themselves as Communists… participate, and I had to participate.”23 While O’Dell
had been organizing throughout the South, Gray had begun working in Harlem “with
a revolutionary dream,” and quickly established himself amongst New York’s radical

Although Roberta Gold notes that Gray was purged from the NMU “around
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tenant organizers in the early 1950s.24 In the post-war years in New York City,
tenant councils “became one of the most raucous elements of the city’s left,”
according to housing scholar Joel Schwartz.25 Left-led tenant organizing had deep
roots in the city, and the American Labor Party (ALP) in particular, made housing a
central issue of its political platform as a means of building a voting base in the city’s
poor- and working-class renters.26 Founded in 1936 by garment trades union
leaders, and later coming under the influence of the Communist Party, the ALP
established strong bases in Jewish, Black, and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in New
York. 27 Gray had joined the ALP around 1952, and immediately became involved in
political organizing. That year, Gray led a committee to run former Communist City
Councilman Ben Davis—then imprisoned under the Smith Act—for State Assembly
in New York City’s 11th Assembly District on the Freedom Party ballot. Offering a
glimpse of the showmanship and revolutionary rhetoric that he would come to be
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known for in the years to follow, Gray compared the Davis campaign to “electing
Kwame Nkrumah from a Ghana jail.”28
In his early experiences with the ALP, Gray’s organizing efforts clearly
demonstrated his analysis on the intrinsic relationships between race, class, and the
housing question. In addition to campaigning for Davis that year, the 28-year-old
Gray also joined the ALP’s Harlem Tenants Council (HTC), quickly rising to lead the
tenants rights organization by 1953. While other Party members had gone
underground during this period to escape political persecution, Gray remained
heavily involved in mass work. “During this period,” Gray later recalled, “the housing
movement was really growing, tenants’ struggles, we couldn’t go underground.”29
Like Audley Moore, who described her tenant organizing experiences with the
Communist Party in Harlem as “one of the great struggles,” the HTC under Gray’s
leadership clearly identified their housing advocacy as an essential component of
broader struggles against racial and class-based discrimination. In a leaflet
distributed in the early 1950s from their headquarters at 306 Lenox Avenue, the
HTC declared—in both English and Spanish—that “THE END OF DISCRIMINATION
IN ALL HOUSING IS THE KEY TO THE END OF DISCRIMINATION IN EVERYTHING.”30
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Though the HTC clearly defined their ideological position on the role of
tenant organizing within broader liberation struggles, their practical approach to
“the housing question” in the early 1950s was much like that of a neighborhood
service agency. Like the tenant organizing of ALP clubs and other tenant councils,
the HTC mainly operated within the city’s prescribed housing policy channels by
facilitating complaints against landlords and advocating for rent control, while also
organizing anti-eviction campaigns. Despite the limited reach of this advocacy, the
political significance of the HTC’s work should not be discounted. In addition to
providing needed services to local constituencies, Gray and the HTC also fought for
representation of Black tenants in policy-making positions and campaigned for
political candidates that supported the interests of poor- and working-class renters.
In a press release from April 1954, the HTC criticized the “complete lack of any
Negroes among the new top leadership recently appointed by Mayor Wagner to
head the City Department of Housing and Building,” under the headline of “LILYWHITE LEADERSHIP HIT BY HARLEM TENANT COUNCILS.”31 While the early efforts
of Gray and the HTC did incorporate political demands for representation, selfdetermination, and grassroots empowerment within a service-based framework,
the organization lacked real political influence or power. It was not until the late
1950s with the rise of the national Civil Rights Movement that demands for tenants
rights and political power escalated, and Gray began to build a local political
movement around housing.
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“Maladjusted Negroes” and “Hopeful Followers”: The Harlem Nine and Rising
Black Militancy
When Jack O’Dell arrived in Harlem in 1958 to work with Gray and his newly
formed Lower Harlem Tenants Council, he found a “community that had a rhythm of
organization.”32 As younger generations were becoming inspired and mobilized
through escalating local and national struggles for rights and power, older residents
carried their knowledge and lessons from Depression-Era and post-War organizing
into a new national political climate. The successes of the various organizations and
individuals that fought for Black equality and empowerment during the post-war
era, including Garveyites, the Communist Party, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and the
NAACP, provided valuable experiences for a generation of radical organizers who
would bring these lessons with them into new, yet familiar struggles in the Civil
Rights Movement. Additionally, the shortcomings of these organizations provided a
useful foil against which radical Black women organizers, like Ella Baker, Vicki
Garvin, and Audley Moore, developed their own analyses of the intersections of race,
class, and gender in the 1950s that were shaping the emergence and later direction
of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements. In many ways, the tempo of the
“rhythm of organization” that O’Dell found upon his arrival in Harlem had been set
by Black women, and by 1958, they were beginning to pick up the pace.
That September, a group of nine Black mothers began a boycott of three
junior high schools in Harlem to protest the inferior education that their children
were receiving in segregated schools. On the first day of the new school year, Carrie
32
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Haynes, the spokeswoman for the Junior High School Coordinating Committee,
announced that the parents of 15 students in Harlem would be keeping their
children out of school to protest the unequal, segregated schools they were assigned
to.33 In the wake of the Brown v. Board decision four years earlier, parents and civil
rights activists in New York City had emerged on the forefront of national struggles
for school desegregation, and the emergence of the boycott marked an escalation in
these fights, with Black women at the helm. The efforts of these women activists,
according to scholar Adina Back, “represented the growing voice of black parents,
independent of national civil rights organizations like the NAACP, choosing the
boycott rather than the boardroom as the tactic for demanding integrated schools in
New York City.”34 The grassroots approach of these mothers was indicative of the
growing impatience amongst poor and working-class New Yorkers with the more
conservative, middle-class approach to civil rights organizing that the NAACP
championed in the late 1950s.
This group of women, whom the Amsterdam News dubbed the “Little Rock
Nine of Harlem,” had begun planning the boycott a year earlier when they formed
the Junior High School Coordinating Committee to wage a campaign for “Freedom of
Choice of Junior High Schools.”35 The Coordinating Committee was an offshoot of
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Parents in Action Against Educational Discrimination, a coalition of organizations
formed to organize parents to fight for desegregated schools and greater parental
involvement in educational policy making. Among the leaders of the coalition was
Ella Baker, who sought to compel action from the apathetic Board of Education –and
to sidestep the bureaucratic approach of the NAACP—by organizing a more militant
grassroots base to carry out popular, direct-action campaigns for equality and selfdetermination in public education.36 Though chair of the Education Committee of
the New York branch, Baker recognized the limitations of the NAACP and refused to
allow her organizing to be constrained in the same ways.
Calling for a citywide campaign of political education and mass action, the
organizing efforts of Parents in Action demonstrated a concerted grassroots focus
on training and mobilizing parents to become advocates for educational and racial
equality. The coalition urged parents to tune into a weekly radio program focused
on educational discrimination, write to the Board of Education with their
complaints, and sign a petition. Additionally, Ella Baker and other organizers held
weekly workshops to educate parents on their rights and organize collective
action.37 Through these efforts, Parents in Action essentially created a training
institute for mass participation in grassroots political action, culminating in a rally
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at City Hall in September 1957. At the rally, held just two weeks after Governor
Orval Faubus used the Arkansas National Guard to physically prevent the
integration of Little Rock High School, Baker warned Mayor Wagner of the political
implications of his malignant neglect in allowing the city’s schools to remain
separate and unequal. In concluding her address, which included demands for an
open transfer policy, greater parental power, and improved services in
predominantly Black schools, Baker called Wagner’s attention to a statement he had
made regarding the importance of the upcoming mayoral election. “It is with this
fully in mind,” Baker cautioned, “that we have instituted among parents of the
subject schools a registration and voting drive.”38 If Mayor Wagner were not willing
to take action on school segregation and inequality in New York City, Parents in
Action intended to supplant him with someone else who would.
Like her friend and NAACP colleague Daisy Bates in Little Rock, Ella Baker’s
decision to operate outside of the generally bureaucratic approach of the NAACP
and the prescribed channels of city government, affected an “increased fervor on the
part of the black communities to make some changes,” according to Baker.39 This
“increased fervor” can largely be attributed to the emphasis placed on grassroots
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empowerment in Parents in Action, which according to Adina Back, had significant
impacts on the “growing militancy” of many Black parents in New York.40
Mae Mallory was one such parent, though the roots of her militancy were
already firmly planted in the soil that Parents in Action cultivated. Born in Macon,
Georgia in 1927, Willie Mae Range was raised on racial pride and self-defense from
an early age. After a series of clashes with white children in Macon—one in which
she “bloodied” the heads of a group of children who tried to stop her from rollerskating on the paved streets of a white neighborhood—Mae’s mother sent her to
live with her grandmother in Brooklyn when she was nine years old.41 After a brief
marriage to Keefer Mallory as a teenager in Brooklyn, Mae Mallory moved to Harlem
in the late 1940s, and eventually settled in an apartment at 27 Morningside Drive. 42
As a single Black mother to two children, oscillating between employment
and welfare support, Mallory was acutely aware of the ways in which the
intersections of her race, gender, and class identities within the white, patriarchal,
capitalist urban power structures of New York City limited her access to political,
social, and economic empowerment. Like Queen Mother Moore, Mallory’s search for
meaningful ways to fight for Black equality and empowerment in the face of this
triple oppression had led her to the Communist Party in the early 1950s. “Every
40
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time I raised a question of better wages, better working conditions, and equality for
black people,” Mallory later said in an interview with Timothy Tyson, “somebody
would tell me that was communist…so I decided I better seek out the
communists.”43 Also like Moore, however, Mallory found herself disenchanted with
the Communist Party due to their lack of a genuine dedication to Black liberation.
After leaving the Communist Party in great disappointment, Mallory tested
the waters of Harlem’s Black nationalist scene in the mid-1950s. Mallory’s
involvement, however, went no farther than attending some meetings of various
organizations. Finding these organizations to be militant in rhetoric, but lacking in
praxis and gender equity, Mallory decided to set her own course in the struggle for
Black liberation, “to work with this group and with that group,” free from the
doctrinaire confines of the Communist Party and Black nationalist organizations.44
Mallory did not limit her critique of civil rights leadership to the CPUSA and
Black nationalist organizations, however. In a letter to the Amsterdam News in 1956,
Mallory emphasized the necessities of independent and indigenous grassroots
leadership for effectively mobilizing the masses for political action. Proudly
declaring herself a “maladjusted Negro,” Mallory criticized leaders in Black
communities for “being followers themselves of certain groups that dictate to them,”
and therefore, not being “maladjusted enough.” In the letter, Mallory concerned
herself with the daily labors of organizing at the grassroots, placing a premium on
educating the “stragglers” in Harlem to become actively involved as “hopeful
43
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followers” in the struggle for Black liberation and empowerment. Like Ella Baker,
Jesse Gray, and Malcolm X, Mallory believed that this vast pool of “stragglers” in
Harlem represented an essential wellspring of political power that needed to be
tapped into for effective, sustained action. To Mallory, the masses needed to become
“maladjusted” to an oppressive society through education, agitation, and
organization. “All the progress to be made,” Mallory argued, “will be made by
maladjusted Negroes.”45
By the time Parents in Action, of which she was a member, launched their
September rally at City Hall, Mallory had already established herself in the fight for
educational equality for Black children in Harlem. Beginning in 1956, Mallory led a
year-long charge for the construction of a new school after the death of a Black child
during recess at PS 10 prompted her to inspect the conditions of the school her
children attended. Finding a building with only two decrepit bathrooms for 1,700
children, Mallory organized a group of mothers to demand a new school be built,
and, after battling with city and state officials, the group was ultimately successful in
their efforts. “The officials in Albany were not quite prepared for this angry Black
woman,” Mallory later wrote. 46 Nor were local media outlets prepared to recognize
her efforts. Like many of the efforts of Black women organizers in the Civil Rights
Movement, male members of the group were given credit in the media for leading
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the fight.47 Regardless, the victory was a formative experience in Mallory’s political
development. “Getting that school was quite an achievement,” Mallory later wrote,
“and gave me so much confidence in the fact that you can fight City Hall and win!”48
On the heels of her victory at PS 10, Mallory jumped right back in the ring
with city officials when her daughter was denied registration at a nearby junior high
school. While working with Parents in Action that July, Mallory filed a lawsuit in the
state Supreme Court against the NYC Board of Education to challenge the legality of
the Board’s zoning policy, which prevented her daughter Patricia from enrolling in a
“substantially better” school than the one she was zoned for. Represented by Paul
Zuber, a young Black attorney and fellow member of the Parents Committee for
Better Education, the suit built upon the legal precedent of the Brown decision by
arguing that the zoning policies effectively forced parents to send their children to
segregated schools.49 At a public hearing held by the Board of Education earlier that
year, Mallory stated that the school her daughter attended in Harlem was “just as
Jim Crow” as the school she had attended as a child in Macon, Georgia, and criticized
the Board for not providing students at schools in predominantly Black
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neighborhoods with the same quality of education as those in predominantly white
areas.50
Of course, the Board of Education was not responsible for the de jure and de
facto patterns of housing discrimination and residential segregation that impacted
the racial demographics of neighborhood schools. Mayor Wagner acknowledged
that segregated schools were the result of “old established housing patterns,” and
argued that the solution to the education problem lay in the enforcement of fair
housing practices “in order to eradicate any neighborhood restrictions based upon
race or ethnic origin.”51 The Mayor’s sentiment was echoed by Algernon Black of the
New York Society for Ethical Culture in his support of the Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs Bill
of 1957, which extended protections for fair housing practices in public housing to
include privately-owned dwellings as well. Black referred to the bill as the “Number
One civil rights action which must be taken in the North if we are to implement
desegregation in the schools.”52
Mallory, however, was less concerned with breaking down the barriers of
residential segregation than she was with ensuring that Black children received
quality education, regardless of where they lived. Notably absent in Mayor Wagner’s
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assessment of educational inequality in the city was any mention of plans to resolve
problems of unqualified teachers, substandard curricula, and hazardous buildings.
The mayor’s rhetoric advanced the position that the desegregation of schools, inand-of itself, would inherently correct the issues of educational inequality plaguing
the city’s Black communities. To Mallory, however, the desegregation of New York’s
public schools was a means by which Black students could gain access to
“substantially better” education, and therefore better employment opportunities. “I
don’t want my child to just sit side by side with white children,” Mallory said in a
television interview, “I just want the same classrooms with equal opportunity for
my child.”53 Mallory essentially saw school desegregation as a tactic that had the
potential to force the city to provide equal resources to all schools, because the fates
of white and Black students would be bound together. Though Mallory lost the
lawsuit, her efforts set the stage for a dramatic confrontation the following year,
when “The Harlem Nine” launched their boycott of New York City public schools.
When the new school year began in September 1958, Mallory and the Junior
High School Coordinating Committee announced their boycott of three junior high
schools in Harlem. Having found little recourse through the Board of Education or
the courts, the group of mothers known as “The Harlem Nine,” decided to escalate
their tactics by engaging in this collective act of civil disobedience. Though by this
point Ella Baker had left New York for Atlanta to work with Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the collective action of the boycott
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demonstrated the power of indigenous leadership that she had championed during
her years in Harlem. Indeed, Carrie Haynes, Mae Mallory, Viola Waddy, and the
other poor and working-class Black women of “The Harlem Nine” had built upon the
organizational foundation that Parents in Action laid, to mount a direct action
challenge to institutional racism in the City of New York. “Conference upon
conference has procured nothing,” Carrie Haynes explained to a reporter in defense
of the boycott, adding “we’re going to see this through to the bitter end.”54
With the assistance of community leaders, including Rev. Eugene Callender
and Attorney Paul Zuber, the boycotting parents arranged private tutoring sessions
for their children in order to comply with the state’s compulsory education law.
However, when the Board expressed satisfaction with the education the children
were receiving in these ad hoc schools, the mothers cancelled the sessions to
purposefully violate the compulsory education law and force a confrontation with
the Board of Education and city government. To up the ante, the parents also filed a
$1 million lawsuit against the Board of Education, Superintendent, Board of
Estimates, and Mayor Wagner, all of whom they accused of “sinister and
discriminatory purpose” in maintaining racial segregation in Harlem.55 These
actions proved successful in finally provoking a response from the Board of
Education when Superintendent John Theobald requested a state investigation of
the schools—and summoned the Harlem Nine before the Domestic Relations Court
for violating the compulsory education law.
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The ensuing trials of the Harlem Nine proved momentous for Black freedom
struggles in New York. In the first wave of trials brought against six of the Harlem
Nine that December, Judge Nathaniel Kaplan ruled that the mothers were guilty of
violating the State’s compulsory education law. Two of the women folded and
agreed to send their children back to school, but the other four, including Viola
Waddy and Mae Mallory, were steadfast. “We will go to jail and rot there, if
necessary,” Waddy told a reporter, “but our children will not go to Jr. High Schools
136, 139, or 120.” 56 Though they had their toothbrushes packed and affairs in
order, the women avoided jail time when Justice Justine Polier issued a landmark
decision in favor of two of the other boycotting mothers a week later. In her
decision, which Carrie Haynes later praised as “one of the great historical
documents of our nation,” Judge Polier argued that though the Board of Education
was not responsible for the conditions of residential segregation that created
segregated schools, the Board had “done substantially nothing to rectify a situation
it should never have allowed to develop.”57 Citing the stark contrast in the quality of
education provided to students in predominantly Black schools compared to their
white counterparts, Judge Polier held the Board of Education responsible for the
unequal conditions created by segregated schools. Whereas the Brown decision four
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years earlier had ruled de jure segregation to be unconstitutional, Judge Polier’s
decision was celebrated as the first ruling against de facto segregation in schools.58
While the Polier decision was lauded by the Black press and community
organizations, the reactions it elicited from the Board of Education and white city
residents demonstrated a collective desire to defend the city’s racial status quo from
forced integration. When the Board decided to appeal the decision, Black
community leaders and organizations rallied in opposition to the primarily white
body. The 350,000-member Empire State Baptist Convention, for example, called for
Mayor Wagner to dismiss all white members of the Board and threatened a mass
march on City Hall if the appeal was not withdrawn. Dr. Gardner Taylor, a Baptist
minister and lone Black member of the Board, asserted that by appealing the
decision the City was telling Black and Puerto Rican students “you can’t go to
schools that are equal, you can’t have equal opportunities here.” Furthermore, Dr.
Taylor argued that with the appeal “the board erased the last line of differences
between Little Rock and New York.”59
Mae Mallory could certainly attest to this erasure, judging by the reprisals
and threats that she received for her part in these struggles against school
segregation. During her struggle with the Board of Education the previous year,
Mallory was arrested on felony charges of receiving welfare assistance while she
was employed. To Mallory, the arrest was an obvious act of political retaliation for
her outspoken criticism of the Board, as the city had not acted against her, she
58
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argued, until she spoke out against the Board’s zoning policies.60 Mallory also
received several threatening letters from individuals who opposed her work to
desegregate the public schools. One anonymous letter she received from a former
resident of Alabama read: “You should have lived down there and told them which
school you wanted your daughter to go to. They would have hung you from a tree.”61
Though Judge Polier had ruled in favor of the Harlem Nine, it quickly became clear
that their struggles for educational equality would continue to be met by staunch
opposition in the city.
The struggles for educational equality these Black women waged in Harlem
represented a formative moment for the Black freedom struggle in New York City. In
the long run, their boycott laid the groundwork for future school boycotts in the city
and forced the city to confront its complicity in establishing and maintaining de
facto segregation and institutional racism. In the short run, their actions won
immediate, tangible benefits for Black children, demonstrated the collective power
of Black women organizers, and contributed to broader conversations about
analyses and strategies in local and national struggles for liberation. Harry
Haywood, a Black communist leader and mentor of Jesse Gray, for instance,
characterized such boycotts as “futile protests against de facto segregation,” that
merely supplemented the “legalistic and legislative approach of NAACP with
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demonstrations” and avoided “basic economic issues” in the North.62 To Mae
Mallory, however, her educational activism was inseparable from “basic economic
issues,” particularly the ability of Black women to find decent employment
opportunities. “I wanted both my children to get the best possible public education
that they could,” Mallory later recalled in an interview, “because I wanted to break
the cycle of women doing days work or factory work.”63 Guided by the influence of
Ella Baker’s emphasis on grassroots political empowerment, the organizing efforts
of Mae Mallory and the Harlem Nine in the waning years of the 1950s represented
demands for indigenous leadership, the empowerment of Black women, and selfdetermination that would come to typify struggles under the banner of “Black
Power” in the years to come.
“The Vanguard of Racial Liberation”: The 1959 Rent Strikes and the “Negro
Revolt”
While there were many organizations that sought to break down the
institutional barriers that established segregated northern ghettoes, leaders like
Mae Mallory, Jesse Gray and Jack O’Dell, sought to mobilize communities within
these confines to seize control of the social, economic, and political levers of power
in “the Black [wo]man’s land.”64 Though Mallory used desegregation as a tactic for
educational access and parental empowerment, her primary interest was Black selfHarry Haywood, “Black Political Power: The Next Stage in the AfroAmerican Liberation Struggle," Haywood Papers.
62

63

Back, “Exposing the ‘Whole Segregation Myth,” 81.

James Boggs, Racism and the Class Struggle: Further Pages from a Black
Worker’s Notebook. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
64

89

determination and economic, political, and social empowerment. Likewise, the
interests of Gray and O’Dell in tenant organizing were as a means to an end of Black
liberation and political power. Though organizing around issues of discrimination in
housing had deep roots in Harlem, the experiences that informed Gray and O’Dell’s
analysis of the significance of “the housing question” in struggles for Black liberation
differentiated their organizing from that of established civil rights organizations and
tenants councils. Unlike the more bureaucratic approach of the newly formed
Metropolitan Council on Housing, who one activist described as “older white liberal
types, social worker types as opposed to activist types,” Gray adopted strategies,
tactics, and rhetoric that were more reflective of growing demands for Black civil
rights and self-determination.65 To O’Dell, the approach of Gray and the LHTC was,
in essence, that of “a tenant movement…trying to empower itself,” as opposed to “a
social service thing,” like the MCH and other tenants councils.66 Furthermore, while
the MCH operated on a citywide basis, the LHTC sought to grow an organization
from the grassroots by building at a neighborhood level in Harlem.67
Though Gray had built a reputation in Harlem as a vocal advocate for the
rights of poor Black renters in the neighborhood, building a movement of tenants
proved to be a difficult task. Operating out of their storefront headquarters on 116th
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Street, Gray and O’Dell organized from 110th Street to 150th Street as the Lower
Harlem Tenants Council struggled to establish a substantial base of indigenous
leaders who were committed to taking on the responsibilities of organizing.68
Despite these organizing struggles, Gray and O’Dell did manage to eek out some
minor victories in achieving rent reductions and organizing tenants for anti-eviction
protests.69 Although their successes largely came in the form of concessions from
city agencies and court orders to induce landlord responsibility, Gray and the LHTC
showed signs of gaining traction as a burgeoning tenant movement amongst
Harlem’s poor Black renters. In April 1959, Gray and the LHTC delivered a petition
to New York City Housing Authority Chairman William Reid, demanding improved
maintenance services and increased police protection. The petition was signed by
1,000 heads of families in the Stephen Foster Houses, a 1,500 family public housing
project on Lenox Avenue and 115th Street. The swift response that Gray and the
LHTC received from Reid, who vowed to address the situation within a week,
demonstrated the impacts that collective tenant action could produce.70
On the heels of the victory at the Stephen Foster Houses, Gray announced
plans to initiate a larger tenant movement in Harlem’s public housing projects.71
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However, after the initial declaration of these plans, Gray largely turned his focus to
organizing tenants in privately-owned tenement buildings who suffered from some
of the worst housing conditions in the city. In the months following the petitiondrive at the Foster Houses, Gray and the LHTC captured the attention of Harlem and
the city as they brought direct action tactics back into the playbook of the growing
tenant movement. On the first day of July, tenants from four dilapidated apartment
buildings down the block from the LHTC office on West 116th Street declared a rent
strike to force their landlords to repair the buildings. Chanting “No repairs, no rent,”
a group of fifty tenants—primarily women—walked a picket line in front of the four
six-story brick buildings carrying signs that read “My Child is Too Pretty to Die,”
“Act Like Landlords: They Do Nothing, We Pay Nothing,” and “Restore Law to
Housing.”72 As the tenants walked the picket line, Gray patrolled the block, giving
instructions to the picketers and passing out leaflets with details about the tenants’
case. “The charges run the same through all the houses,” he told a reporter at the
scene. “No paint, falling ceilings, no hot water for months at a time and this terrible
plague of rats. Babies can’t sleep at night for them.”73 Though Gray was the leading
organizer of the strike, the foot soldiers of the burgeoning rent strike movement
consisted mainly of poor and working-class Black women. Gray’s “militant,
Ibid. An article from the New York Amsterdam News claimed “Mr. Gray
announced that within two weeks [of the Stephen Foster Houses protests] he will
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maternalistic rhetoric,” as Thomas Sugrue put it, highlighted the oppressive
conditions faced by Black women, which not only made for dramatic and empathetic
headlines, but also “mobilized angry mothers to demand that government protect
their families.”74
These housing conditions that the tenants of West 116th Street protested
were all too familiar for residents of Central Harlem. Statistics on housing compiled
the following year for the 1960 census showed that only 51 percent of housing units
in the area were considered “sound,” while 38 percent were “deteriorating” and 11
percent were “dilapidated.” These statistics showed a stark contrast with the rest of
New York City, where 85 percent of housing units were sound, while only 12
percent were deteriorating, and 3 percent dilapidated.75 The impacts of these
conditions for tenants were far-reaching, and often had dire consequences. Deaths
from “home accidents” in Harlem were nearly double those of the rest of New York,
and just months before the tenants of West 116th Street launched their rent strike, a
2-year-old boy died in a fire in one of the buildings.76 In addition to the collective
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trauma and outrage the child’s death induced, tenants also complained that the
structural damages caused by the fire had yet to be repaired.77
Although launched with the relatively conservative goals of forcing repairs
and getting rent reductions, the emergence of the July 1959 rent strike was a
significant development in ongoing grassroots struggles for rights and power in
Harlem. Coverage of the strike appeared in the New York Times, as well as the
Amsterdam News. The July 4th edition of the latter featured a story on the strike
directly below a headline that read “Negro Revolt,” in the largest font the weekly
newspaper had.78 In that issue, which also contained coverage of NAACP pickets
over employment discrimination, backlash from white parents over school
integration, and political struggles for control of the Harlem Democratic Party, the
editorial board evoked a vision of impending mass mobilization for civil and human
rights in Harlem. Citing Gray’s claims that the LHTC had organized 6,000 tenants in
40 other buildings that were prepared to join the rent strike, one reporter declared
that their actions represented “one of Harlem’s first major rent rebellions.”79
Although the paper used the terms “protest,” “revolt,” and “revolution”
loosely and interchangeably to present a provocative vision of a potential
coordinated mass movement in Harlem, the editorial board also acknowledged that
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the “series of revolts” were the result of “spontaneous efforts” from various
uncoordinated organizations. These simultaneous, yet uncoordinated actions
represented the diversity in analyses of organizations that sought to mobilize
different target populations in Harlem. While the economic protests waged by the
NAACP that week scored an immediate victory for Black salesman who had been
shut out by white liquor stores, Amsterdam News reporters projected the branch’s
focus on civil rights agitation for the rights of the Black middle-class onto the
economic interests of the larger Harlem community. The tenant organizing of the
LHTC, however, was informed by Gray’s analysis of the possibilities for liberation
through a mass mobilization of the underclasses in Harlem who were impacted in
dire ways by the intersections of institutional oppression based on their race, class,
and gender identities. As Sugrue argues, while larger civil rights organizations, like
the NAACP, focused on middle-class oriented agitation and saw “quality of life”
politics as “marginal,” Gray saw organizing around these issues as the “vanguard of
racial liberation.”80
Despite the diversity in analysis inherent in these mobilizations, there
existed in praxis a unifying emphasis on direct action campaigns. The surge of these
campaigns represented a general coalescence of demands for justice, and promoted
a popular culture of struggle for rights and power in the waning days of the 1950s.
As summer arrived in 1959, Harlem was “seething with grim unrest,” and residents
disillusioned with the gradual pace of established civil rights organizations were
taking to the streets in greater numbers than in recent years to protest the racial
80
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inequalities that bounded their daily lives in various ways.81 Though this uptick in
civil rights agitation was not unique to Harlem, the Black Mecca drew the national
spotlight that July as national and local struggles for Black liberation intersected in
the nation’s largest city in a nearly-explosive manner.
Mississippi, Monroe, and Harlem: The 1959 NAACP Convention and the
Question of Nonviolence
As the masses were beginning to mobilize through rent strikes and boycotts
in Harlem in the spring of 1959, several acts of racial violence rocked the South, and
had profound impacts upon Black political consciousness and the direction of
national freedom struggles. In late April, a lynch mob dragged 23-year-old Mack
Charles Parker from his cell in a Poplarville, Mississippi jail, where he was being
held for the alleged rape of a white woman.82 As with the brutal murder of Emmett
Till four years earlier, the white southern justice system—with the assistance of
federal agencies—allowed Parker’s killers to walk free after his body was pulled
from a nearby river. The responses of southern civil rights leaders to the lynching of
Mack Parker, according to scholar Timothy B. Tyson, “revealed that black
Southerners were far from committed to nonviolence,” and contributed to a growing
national dialogue over the use of self-defense in freedom struggles.83 When the
news of the lynching reached Jackson, Mississippi, NAACP field secretary Medgar
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Evers told his wife Myrlie, “I’d like to get a gun and start shooting.” In Monroe, North
Carolina, where members of the local NAACP branch had formed a rifle club and
engaged in open combat with the Ku Klux Klan two years earlier, branch president
Robert F. Williams argued that the tragedy could have been prevented with armed
self-defense.84 In New York City, readers of the Amsterdam News followed the case
as editor James Hicks reported from Poplarville in weekly installments with
headlines such as “Mississippi is Hell,” and editorials sprung up in support of armed
self-defense. In a May 16th column, titled “They Lynched Us All,” City Councilman
Earl Brown charged that “the only way to break the chain of one-way death in Dixie
would be for the Negroes to kill when attacked.”85 In a letter to the editor a week
later, a Brooklyn resident writing under the name of “Cousin Mack,” made the case
for the establishment of an armed organization that could move throughout the
country and “take reprisals on whatever bigot is unfortunate to find himself within
our reach.”86
The sentiments offered by Councilman Brown and Cousin Mack
demonstrated not only the national reach of the Parker lynching, but also the
reverberations of a thunderous declaration made by Williams the day after Mack
Parker’s body was found in the Pearl River. On May 5th, two cases came to trial in
84
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Monroe, both involving white men accused of brutal assaults upon Black women.
Prior to the trials, when Black women and men in Monroe sought to bring these
white attackers to justice through violent retribution, Williams urged that they
allow the cases to go through the courts. However, when charges were dropped in
the first case, and a verdict of not guilty reached swiftly in the second, this blatant
miscarriage of justice brought the ire of Monroe’s Black women down upon
Williams, whom they argued, “was responsible for this man not being punished.”87
“These people have declared open season on Black women,” one woman told
Williams outside the courtroom, and pointedly asked “what are you gonna say
now?”88 The anger of these women, Williams later said, “made me realize that this
was the last straw, that we didn’t have as much protection as a dog down there, and
the Government didn’t care about us.” At that point, Williams turned to reporters on
the scene and declared that the time had come for Black people to “meet violence
with violence,” and that “we must be willing to kill if necessary.”89 With these words,
Williams sent shockwaves through the nation and stirred the radical imaginations of
Black communities that were growing increasingly indignant over the daily violence
of American racism.
In the following months, Williams became a national cause célèbre, attracting
loyal supporters and fervent detractors alike. Outside of Monroe, Williams found
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some of his greatest supporters amongst Harlem’s radical intellectuals, writers, and
organizers, including Julian Mayfield, John Henrik Clarke, and Malcolm X. Williams
had first met Malcolm a year earlier during a trip to New York, and found an ardent
supporter in the minister and his congregation at Temple Number 7. “Every time I
used to go to New York he would invite me to speak,” Williams said in a 1968
interview, also noting that “they were giving me money every time I would go to the
temple.”90 With the help of Malcolm and Mayfield, Williams was able to build a
veritable arsenal in Monroe, including military carbines, dynamite, and machine
guns, the latter of which Mayfield was said to have delivered early that spring.91
That June and July, Williams made several trips to the NAACP headquarters
in New York City to deal with the fallout from his advocacy of armed self-defense,
which included his suspension from the organization. Though Williams made these
trips for the purpose of appealing his suspension, the visits also allowed the militant
leader to strengthen connections with his comrades and supporters in the North.
During these trips, Williams spoke to crowds at street rallies, in barrooms, and at
various institutions to spread the word of what was taking place in Monroe and
share his analysis on armed resistance in domestic and international struggles for
Black liberation.92
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Though Williams had the fervent support of radical activists and intellectuals
in Harlem and throughout the nation, he faced reactionary responses from within
and without the NAACP. In addition to the heightened government surveillance that
his declaration drew from J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, the late spring and early summer
brought a dramatic struggle between Williams and the national NAACP, which
sought to distance itself from the Union County president’s open advocacy of armed
self-defense. Though national executive secretary Roy Wilkins acknowledged
privately that “the thought of using violence has been in the minds of Negroes,” he
actively maneuvered, privately and publicly, to discredit Williams and undermine
his growing influence in the organization.93 Indeed, armed self-defense was a
common practice as a means of protection and survival for leaders of local branches
of the organization throughout the South. The national organization, however, was
not willing to affirm a general policy in support of the Constitutionally-protected
right for fear of political retribution and alienating its white supporters. The bitter
debate in the organization between Williams and Wilkins not only reflected a
widening rift in the organization over non-violence and self-defense, but also more
broadly, it demonstrated a growing disillusionment over the constraining
relationship between the national organization and its local branches.
These debates came to a dramatic head in July during the NAACP’s 50th
anniversary convention, scheduled for the week of July 13th in New York City. As
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the convention was nearing its commencement, journalist Louis Lomax reported,
there were “deep rumblings of unrest and discontent,” over the organization’s
reticence to embrace the tactics of non-violent direct action. The direct mass action
campaigns waged by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his Southern Christian
Leadership Conference had provided tangible benefits to Black communities in
Montgomery, while the legal approaches of the NAACP, though highly significant in
their own regard, had done little since the Brown decision to inspire and mobilize
the masses. As the convention neared, this was the primary issue that many
delegates sought to raise for debate, in hopes of convincing the executive board to
“relinquish its absolute power and institute a more democratic procedure,”
according to Lomax. The larger goal of these delegates then, beyond the embrace of
non-violent direct action, was to compel the highly bureaucratic organization to
develop a more expansive tactical approach that empowered the rank-and-file in its
movement for desegregation. 94 Given the struggles that Ella Baker had undertaken
over the past several years to make the New York branch of the NAACP more
responsive and accountable to the grassroots, the convention’s location was quite
fitting for this debate.
As the convention opened, however, it quickly became apparent that this was
not the debate that would be troubling the floor and corridors of the gathering. With
the firestorm surrounding the suspension of Robert Williams and his position on
armed self-defense, those delegates who supported direct action and the
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democratization of the national organization hitched their wagons to Williams’ case
and their arguments were subsumed within a defense of the embattled leader from
Monroe. By conflating the two issues, these delegates played into the hand of Roy
Wilkins, who had cunningly stacked the deck against Williams through his
maneuverings with many of the most notable speakers and delegates at the
convention. As Timothy Tyson notes, a tone of moderate, middle-class respectability
was set from the convention’s opening session when Governor Nelson Rockefeller
took to the stage to address the crowd of 3,000 gathered in the New York Coliseum
the evening of July 13th.95 After assuring the crowd that segregation was “on its way
out” in New York State and in the nation, the Republican governor proclaimed that
America had been “fortunate in the kind of leadership the NAACP has given in this
great struggle for civil rights.” Furthermore, the New York Times reported,
Rockefeller lauded the gathered delegates for having “made no appeal to violence,”
for having “rejected retaliation in kind to threat and terrorism,” and for having
“repulsed the threat of communism to invade your ranks.”96 This focus of the
governor’s address, Tyson argued, was “an unmistakable reference to the Williams
case,” and was designed to firmly establish the narrative set by Wilkins as the
defining position of the Convention. The link was made even more explicit after the
governor’s speech concluded, when the chair of the convention declared that
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deliberations on the Williams situation would be brought before the convention
later in the week.97
The Nation Meets the Nation: “The Hate That Hate Produced” and the Rising
Black Underclass
While those gathered at the New York Coliseum for the convention shuffled
in to hear Governor Rockefeller’s speech at the opening session, a startling
documentary news series aired on Mike Wallace’s television program, News Beat.
Viewers who tuned into Channel Thirteen in New York that evening were greeted by
the characteristically stern white reporter, as he adjusted his footing and fidgeted
with a stack of papers. “While city officials, state agencies, white liberals, and soberminded Negroes stand idly by,” Wallace began before finding his footing and affixing
his gaze to the camera, “a group of Negro dissenters is taking to street corner
stepladders, church pulpits, sports arenas, and ballroom platforms across the United
States to preach a gospel of hate that would set off a federal investigation if it were
preached by southern whites.” To illustrate Wallace’s narration, the program then
showed rare video footage of a gathering where Black men, carefully dressed in
suits and ties, and Black women, adorning flowing white robes and head scarves, sat
on opposite sides of a hall watching a performance of a short play, in which a
symbolic white man was put on trial in a Black court for his crimes against
humanity. When the spirited prosecutor exhorted the jury to bring back a verdict of
guilty, the audience delivered their own verdict through a dignified, yet thunderous
applause. Returning to the News Beat studio, Wallace explained that this indictment
97
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echoed throughout major cities across the country, and recited the predictable
guilty verdict. “The sentence,” Wallace paused for dramatic effect, “is death.” New
Yorkers, Wallace later said, “were stunned.”98
The program, provocatively and problematically titled “The Hate That Hate
Produced,” was created as an exposé of the Nation of Islam, who Wallace referred to
as “the most powerful of the Black supremacist groups” in the nation. Though
Malcolm X and the NOI had gained heightened popularity and notoriety in New York
City two years earlier following their intervention in the beating of Johnson X by the
NYPD, white New Yorkers and Americans in general knew next to nothing about the
growing organization. The news series provided white America—Wallace
included—with a frightening first glimpse into the organization’s existence. “What I
felt about Malcolm X when I first saw him on film,” Wallace recalled in an interview,
“was that he was a demagogue, racist.”99 The broadcast was the idea of Louis Lomax,
a neophyte to Harlem who, like Wallace, was shocked the previous summer when he
first encountered the militant rhetoric that reverberated from nationalist street
corner rallies in the neighborhood. Unfamiliar with the history and culture of street
corner oration in Harlem, Lomax condemned such rhetoric as “inverse racism,” and
an article he wrote for the Baltimore Afro-American even compared Black
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nationalists to the Ku Klux Klan, White Citizens Council, and Adolf Hitler.100 Lomax,
devoid of a nuanced understanding at that moment of the emergence of the NOI
within the historical trajectory of Black nationalist political organizing, was largely
responsible for the problematic narrative spun by “The Hate That Hate Produced.”
Furthermore, Lomax’s analysis, which reduced the nuances of the Nation’s
ideologies and programs to that of a Black counterpart to the KKK, took on different
meanings, and had different impacts, when reiterated by a white news anchor.
Though little known to Lomax, Wallace, and most white New Yorkers, the
Nation of Islam’s roots ran deep in Harlem and the organization was only just
beginning to really bear fruit. In the two years since the beating of Johnson X, the
NOI had become the fastest growing organization in American cities, with its
influence reaching across the nation and around the globe, due in large part to the
dogged efforts of its charismatic minister in New York. Though operating within the
doctrinaire constraints of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad’s theology, Malcolm
invoked the inherently political implications of the Nation’s ideologies and
programs to locate the NOI within the context of local, national, and international
struggles for liberation and empowerment. During this window in New York City,
Malcolm’s organizing efforts, which connected local and global struggles for Black
liberation, demonstrated his development as a Pan-African and nationalist thinker
and organizer. While leading several high-profile challenges against police brutality
in the city, Malcolm was also building connections with Pan-Africanist organizations
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locally and globally. In his address at an African Freedom Day rally in Harlem earlier
that spring, part of which aired on “The Hate That Hate Produced,” Malcolm spoke
poignantly to an enthusiastic crowd of the interrelation of struggles for liberation
throughout the African diaspora. By the time the news series aired, in fact, Malcolm
was on a three-week tour of the Middle East and Africa, travelling under the name of
Malik El-Shabazz “so that my brothers in the East would recognize me as one of
them.”101
As local freedom struggles were being transformed from the grassroots by
poor and working-class Black communities, Malcolm was appealing to this base and
helping to shape this transformation led by those most deeply and personally
impacted by the daily transgressions of an oppressive white society. The NOI’s
theology was particularly relevant for many within the ghettoized Black
underclasses in American cities, who saw the personification of the NOI’s “white
devil” theology in their daily experiences with police officers, teachers, employers,
and welfare caseworkers. It was amongst this demographic base that Malcolm and
the NOI focused their organizing, with the purpose of mobilizing a mass movement.
By focusing their efforts on poor and working-class Black communities, as William
Sales has argued, the NOI challenged the notion that the middle-class was the
primary “agent of change” in Black communities. Furthermore, this challenge was
directed at the middle-class specifically because “its thinking was seen as totally
dominated by the integrationist-assimilationist paradigm.” Like Ella Baker, Jesse
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Gray, and Mae Mallory, Malcolm viewed the Black underclasses in urban American
society, disaffected with gradualist approaches to liberation, as a grassroots
vanguard possessing the potential for bringing forth fundamental societal change.
Though their programs and analyses were significantly different, these influential
and burgeoning organizers understood that these communities were becoming “the
most explosive and dynamic” force in urban society.102
“The people of Harlem are in an angry mood”: A “Near Riot” Shakes New York
City
The same evening “The Hate That Hate Produced” hit the airwaves, the
frustrations and momentum swelling behind the “Negro Revolt” in Harlem nearly
reached a tipping point. The afternoon of July 13th, while NAACP members
convened in regional organization meetings at the Coliseum on Columbus Circle,
Carmela Perez walked into the Regent Restaurant and Bar on Seventh Avenue with a
friend to have a drink. It was a warm summer day, and Perez, a 21-year-old Bronx
resident of Italian and Puerto Rican descent, came from an earlier party, where she
had been drinking for some time. According to John Panuthos, the owner of the
restaurant, Perez was “apparently highly intoxicated” when she walked in, and
within a few minutes excused herself to the ladies’ room. After about 45 minutes
had passed with Mrs. Perez still in the restroom, her companion asked the owner to
help “get her out.” The two men pried open the door, and asked two female
employees to assist in removing Perez from the bathroom, who was “very drunk”
and “refused to leave.” The two women managed to evict Perez from the ladies’
102
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room, but the struggle continued in the dining area, where the young woman
“lodged” herself in a booth and was reportedly “kicking, screaming, and swinging” at
the employees as they tried to eject her from the restaurant.103 “I was drinking a lot
but I know what I’m doing when I’m drinking,” Perez told a reporter later that
evening, adding that, “I didn’t want to leave, that’s all.”104
As the employees struggled with Mrs. Perez inside the bar, an NYPD patrol
car carrying two officers pulled up and parked outside. Norman Hammes, a white
patrolman, entered the restaurant to get a cup of coffee, while Lieutenant John
Angrist stayed in the car. With the altercation still continuing in the booth, Panuthos
welcomed the timely arrival of Hammes, and approached the patrolman to “get
[Perez] out of the place.” According to Panuthos, however, the struggled only
intensified with the intervention of Hammes. “The way she was fighting,” Panuthos
told a reporter, “he had to use force to subdue her.” Hammes, who Panuthos
described as “a little fellow,” struggled with the unruly patron who was “doing
everything in her power to try to maim him.” In the struggle, Hammes slapped Perez
and eventually pulled her up by her hair as he tried to remove her from the booth.105
Angrist was now inside, having been called in for assistance, and the two officers
reportedly dragged Perez about 40 feet from the restaurant to the patrol car while
For details of the incident at the Regent Restaurant and Bar, see “Crowd
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punching and kicking the woman, according to a witness statement.106 Unaware of
the confrontation that had taken place inside, many witnesses outside watched as
two white officers manhandled a young, olive-skinned woman.
While bystanders looked on, the two officers struggled to get Mrs. Perez into
the car, eventually settling for confining her to the floor of the front seat underneath
the dashboard. After finally securing Perez around 5:30 PM, according to the same
witness who lived across the street from the restaurant, the patrol car “drove off at a
high rate of speed” up Seventh Avenue. Within moments, however, the car made a
sudden turn at 117th Street, striking the concrete median dividing Seventh Ave.
According to the officers, Perez had grabbed the wheel and stepped on the
accelerator, causing the vehicle to crash. Charles Samuel, a 30-year-old Black postal
worker had been fixing a tire near the intersection of Seventh Avenue and 117th
Street when the patrol car crashed, and as a crowd began to form, Samuel
approached the police car to see what had happened. Upon finding two white
officers struggling with Perez in the car, Samuel demanded to know why they were
handling the young woman so roughly. Hammes then got out of the car and grabbed
Samuel, while simultaneously drawing his gun as the crowd drew closer. As Samuel
struggled to free himself from the officer’s grasp, the .38 chrome-plated Colt was
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discharged, striking Hammes in the left hand before hitting Angrist in the lower
back.107
Moments after the gunfire rang out, twenty patrol cars responding to a call
for backup arrived on the scene and Perez and Samuel were whisked away to the
28th Precinct on West 123rd Street as the crowds followed in procession. Rumors of
police brutality traveled quickly in Harlem, and in a scene reminiscent of the beating
of Johnson X two years earlier, a crowd of nearly 1,000 angry Harlem residents soon
surrounded the 28th Precinct to demand Samuel’s release. That some in the crowd
were unaware of what had actually transpired to provoke the demonstration speaks
to the perceived prevalence of police brutality in the neighborhood. “I don’t know
what happened,” a protestor told a reporter, “but I know these Harlem cops, and we
oughta turn the station out.”108 Just weeks earlier, in response to recent allegations
of police brutality against Black women, Malcolm X had in fact warned Deputy Police
Commissioner Walter Arm that “if we can’t get justice from the law, then we’ll have
to seek justice elsewhere.”109
As the crowd continued to swell in size and anger outside the precinct, that
very sentiment resounded, and a “riot” seemed imminent. Amongst the crowd,
however, were State Senator James Watson, Assemblyman Lloyd Dickens, and
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middleweight boxing champion “Sugar” Ray Robinson, who managed to talk their
way inside the precinct in hopes of defusing the situation. Robinson, who Watson
later commended for preventing “a serious situation from exploding into a race
riot,” coolly explained to high-ranking officers in the precinct that in order to
prevent the looming threat of violence, the crowd needed to see Samuel walk out of
the precinct. The three men were then able to negotiate a compromise, by which the
slew of charges facing Samuel, including felonious assault and inciting to riot, were
reduced to a summons for disorderly conduct. In exchange, Robinson addressed the
crowd to assure them that the police had not abused Mrs. Perez, though he later told
reporters “it was apparent the woman had been beaten.”110 Accompanied by his
wife and ad hoc negotiating team, Samuel walked out of the precinct and the crowd
slowly dissipated.
Though the immediate threat of a potential “riot” was narrowly avoided, the
confrontation outside the 28th Precinct put the city on notice, and made a political
lightning rod of the conditions faced by Black communities in Harlem that
community leaders had been working feverishly to address. As would be the case
five years later, politicians, police, newspapers, and community leaders sought to
explain the causes of the latest unrest and jostled to devise ways to curb any further
trouble. In speaking to reporters about police abuse of Muslims two weeks before
the “near-riot,” Malcolm X echoed the sentiments of many Black New Yorkers when
he explained that Muslims had been waiting for the police to give them justice, but
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now, “I’m not responsible for anything that happens.”111 While the city narrowly
avoided a violent confrontation that July, it had become clear to many that Harlem’s
Black communities were no longer willing to wait to receive justice—they were now
fighting to seize it for themselves.
v
The confrontation outside the 28th Precinct that July represented an initial
climax of the heightened demands for rights and power that had been escalating
within Harlem’s Black communities in the previous days, weeks, and months. The
collective anger that drew over one thousand people to spontaneously protest at the
precinct that night was illustrative of a growing impatience with moderate
approaches to civil rights advocacy, along with a swelling embrace of militant
grassroots political action in Harlem in the waning days of the 1950s. By the end of
the decade, there was demonstrated—and growing—support in Harlem for local,
national, and global struggles for Black liberation based upon principles of selfdetermination, indigenous leadership, self-defense, and Black political
empowerment. In turn, these local struggles in Harlem were intersecting with and
influencing national and global freedom struggles. Though these principles would
become most closely associated with the Black Power Movement in the latter-half of
the 1960s, the organizational analyses and efforts of leaders such as Ella Baker,
Jesse Gray, Mae Mallory, Malcolm X, and others signal that these tenets of Black
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Power were firmly grounded in radical grassroots struggles in Harlem in the late
1950s.
In the two weeks following the confrontation at the 28th Precinct,
newspapers up and down the east coast, and as far away as Sudan, carried stories of
the altercation and rising racial tensions, each seeking to explain the underlying
causes that led Harlem residents to nearly storm the building.112 Speaking to
reporters the night of the incident, Hulan Jack attributed the conflict to rising racial
tensions in the neighborhood, fueled by substandard housing, poor schools, and
low-paying jobs. “The people of Harlem are in an angry mood,” Jack said, “and the
city’s got to do something about it.”113 As would be the case five years later when
Harlem was rocked by an actual rebellion, media outlets and city officials, like Jack,
employed the “powder keg thesis” to explain the causes of racial unrest. According
to this analysis, forces of political, societal, and economic oppression made powder
kegs of Black communities, filling them with potentially explosive resentment that
could be spontaneously sparked by an act of alleged police abuse.
Though inherently flawed for its denial of conscious political agency to those
within the hypothetical keg, the thesis nonetheless dominated mainstream
explanations of what had taken place in Harlem that July. Acting upon this analysis,
which also made invisible governmental complicity in building and filling the keg,
On August 22, 1959, the Amsterdam News carried an editorial written by
Malcolm X from Khartoum, stating that “Racial trouble in New York occupied
prominent space on the front pages here and in other parts of Africa yesterday.
Everyone here seems aware of America’s color problems.” Malcolm X, “Africa Eyes
Us,” New York Amsterdam News, August 22, 1959.
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city officials launched a series of meetings, studies, and committees in attempts to
drain some of the powder from the keg, while also taking measures to fasten down
its lid. The former, however, represented mere concessions in an apparent effort to
appease moderate-middle class Black leadership in Harlem, in hopes that they could
salve the hostility of the masses. However, it had become apparent over the past two
years that this class of leadership did not represent the interests of those most
disenfranchised by racial oppression in Harlem. Notably absent from a meeting
called by Mayor Wagner on July 21st was any representation from grassroots
organizations that embodied the growing spirit of militancy and self-determination
among the poor and working classes that was beginning to characterize struggles
for Black liberation in Harlem and beyond. Indeed, it was this growing militancy that
city officials sought to suppress in the years following the “near-riot” through
increasingly militarized and oppressive policing.
In a letter to Mayor Wagner following the July 21st meeting at City Hall, Hulan
Jack acknowledged the importance of a more responsive government that would
allow “the little people of the Harlem community” to “speak for themselves,” “offer
suggestions,” and “get results through their city government.”114 Though Jack’s
rhetoric on representation and accountability may have been fundamentally similar
to the demands of civil rights leaders for equal access to the levers of political power
in the city, there existed a grave disconnect between this hopeful rhetoric and the
lived realities of Harlem residents that had been continuously and systematically
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denied effective avenues for political agency. This disconnect was illustrated in a
more personal way when Jack was booed off the stage of an NAACP rally by
members of the Nation of Islam in late July.115
By the start of the new decade, growing numbers of Harlem residents were
vociferously demonstrating their disillusionment with moderate approaches to
Black liberation, and advocating for more independent and radical analyses,
strategies, and tactics for achieving fundamental societal change. Building upon the
neighborhood’s traditions of radical political organizing, grassroots organizers in
the final years of the 1950s had begun to awaken and mobilize the masses to
challenge and transform the political, social, and economic landscape of the nation’s
largest city. As James Hicks wrote a few months later, there was a “New Negro in
Harlem” who was poised to mount a serious challenge to old ideas and institutions
of power.
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CHAPTER 4
“AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS LUXURY”: THE HARLEM AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM IN HARLEM, 1959-1962
Northerners indulge in an extremely dangerous luxury. They seem to feel that
because they fought on the right side during the Civil War, and won, they have
earned the right merely to deplore what is going on in the South, without
taking any responsibility for it; and that they can ignore what is happening in
Northern cities because what is happening in Little Rock or Birmingham is
worse. –James Baldwin (1960)1
The “near riot” outside the 28th Precinct on July 13, 1959 represented a
dramatic illustration of the escalating demands for rights and power that had been
resonating throughout Harlem that spring and summer. Inspired by local, national,
and global struggles for Black liberation and empowerment, greater numbers of
Harlem residents were becoming active in grassroots campaigns to build the
collective power necessary to improve conditions in housing, education,
employment, and law enforcement in their neighborhoods. Just over a week before
the incident, the Amsterdam News had characterized this surging mobilization as the
“Negro Revolt,” marked by the most “hostile and serious” collective mood in Harlem
since the 1930s, “when uptowners took measures into their own hands.”2 Though
the editorial staff specified the reference in regards to economic boycotts aimed at
opening job opportunities in the 1930s, the provocative language invoked memories
from 1935, when an allegation of police brutality triggered an uprising in Harlem.
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That rebellion, which many Harlem residents still remembered, had erupted in the
spring of 1935 within a context of mounting campaigns against discrimination in
employment and law enforcement. Though the protests outside the 28th Precinct did
not grow into a large-scale rebellion, most conscious observers in Harlem
understood the “near riot” as a logical consequence of decades of oppressive
resistance from the city’s white power structure to struggles waged by Black
residents for civil rights, human rights, and political power. “If we were disposed to
brag and boast,” the Amsterdam News editorial staff declared a few days later, “we
could scream in headlines: ‘We knew it all the time!”3
This brief, yet powerful demonstration outside the precinct was a significant
moment in the development of the modern Civil Rights Movement in New York City
for three primary reasons. First, the fact that a spontaneous protest mobilized
nearly 1,000 angry residents shows that there existed a level of collective political
consciousness in Harlem that could quickly translate into direct action. Beyond
merely demonstrating a popular frustration with continued police abuses, which
alone would not account for a collective direct confrontation of such scale, this
action reflected the influence of a popular political culture in Harlem that was being
shaped by the rhetoric and praxis of a more radical set of grassroots leaders. In
other words, the action illustrated that there was a large, and growing, population of
Harlem residents, not necessarily affiliated with traditional civil rights
organizations, who were nonetheless enraged by racial injustice and believed that
they should—and could—do something about it beyond the usual gradualist
3
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approaches. Furthermore, that the crowd compelled the release of Charles Samuel
from the precinct on reduced charges showed that this type of collective action
could yield tangible victories.
Second, contestations over rights and power in Harlem in the immediate
wake of the unrest represented a growing popular disillusionment with liberal
approaches to addressing issues of institutional racism. The escalation of protests
and growing numbers of local people engaged in struggles for civil and human rights
in Harlem demonstrated a general dissatisfaction with responses from City Hall that
failed to address the underlying racial causes of political, social, and economic
inequality. If the outbreak of unrest was predictable to the Amsterdam News, then
the ensuing responses from City Hall should have come as no surprise. Sticking close
to the script that Mayor LaGuardia had drawn up in in response to the 1935 uprising
in Harlem, Mayor Wagner announced the formation of a committee tasked with
studying the conditions in Harlem that led to unrest, and reporting back to the
Mayor with recommendations of how city resources could be more effectively
utilized to prevent future disturbances. However, it quickly became clear to many
Harlem residents that the objective of these efforts was not to attack the
foundations of systemic racism in the city, but rather to offer a modicum of reform
as a means of easing racial tensions. At the same time, city officials were also taking
steps to prepare for the possibility of future disturbances through an increased
militarization of the New York Police Department. The general futility of liberal
investigation-commission politics to meaningfully address racial inequality in the
city, coupled with an expanding police apparatus geared toward curbing resistance
118

in the aftermath of the “near-riot,” would shape the course of struggles for Black
liberation and empowerment in the years to come.
Third, by forcing a public referendum on issues of inequality in Harlem, local
people effectively helped to thrust leaders of more radical grassroots organizations
into the mainstream of political discourse in the city. That the protests outside the
28th Precinct came on the same day as the opening of the NAACP’s contentious 50th
Anniversary conference, and the airing of “The Hate That Hate Produced,” which
introduced Malcolm X to the masses by television, is historically significant not
because of any causal relationship between these events, but because the
correlation of events during a heightened period of protest activities in Harlem
places New York City more prominently within the historical trajectory of debates
over non-violence, self-defense, Black Nationalism, community control, and selfdetermination within the evolution of the national Civil Rights Movement.
Furthermore, Harlem leaders who were buoyed to greater prominence locally and
nationally by the events of July 1959, including Jesse Gray, Mae Mallory, Malcolm X,
and others, owed much of their political development to their organizing
experiences in Harlem. In the years to follow, these grassroots leaders built upon
their political education in Harlem and ascended to formative roles in national
struggles for Black liberation.
v
“It was not a riot,” a ranking officer in the New York Police Department told a
reporter as crowds dispersed from outside the 28th Precinct on July 13, 1959, “but it
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could easily have become one.”4 In the following days, it became evident that the
demonstration had given City Hall cause for alarm. Although a potentially disastrous
confrontation had been avoided that night, the conflict signaled to city officials the
potential that existed in Harlem for another rebellion. The highly-charged mass
demonstration that night, coming amidst a period of surging demands for Black
equality and empowerment in Harlem, struck a nerve in City Hall and set in motion
a series of governmental responses aimed at easing racial tensions in the city in
hopes of preventing a repeat of 1935 or 1943. The ensuing government actions
indicated that many city officials perceived of this “near-riot” as an inherently
political demonstration rooted in the social, economic, and political marginalization
of Black residents.
Although the mass demonstration forced city officials to acknowledge this
reality, their approaches to addressing these issues of racial inequality proved to be
geared toward preventing further unrest, rather than rectifying the underlying
issues of inequality that bred such protests. Recognized as such by many Harlem
residents, the city’s responses to conditions in Harlem demonstrated the limits of
liberal governance for achieving meaningful societal change, and contributed to a
widening political gulf between grassroots activists and city officials. Sensing that
prescribed avenues for political redress were insufficient for improving their lived
conditions, greater numbers of Harlem residents became mobilized in the early
1960s to fight for rights and power through direct action campaigns at the
grassroots. To better understand this declension of relations between Harlem
4
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residents and city government, the actions of City Hall in the wake of the “near-riot”
will be analyzed in detail as a case study in how the limits of liberal governance in
confronting inequality and oppression in the Jim Crow North can spawn heightened
demands and increased agitation for civil and human rights and political
empowerment.
The Harlem Affairs Committee: Responses to Racial Unrest in a Liberal City
As news of a Harlem crowd nearly storming a police precinct travelled far
and wide, city officials moved quickly to neutralize the threat of greater disorder.
The following day, a group of Harlem politicians and officials gathered at City Hall
for a closed-session meeting with Deputy Mayor Paul O’Keefe. The meeting,
described as “peace talks” by the Amsterdam News, was called by Manhattan
Borough President Hulan Jack and attended by political leaders in Harlem, including
State Senator James Watson and Assemblyman Lloyd Dickens, who had both been
present outside the 28th Precinct. The purpose of the meeting, according to Dickens,
was to “determine the general angle which brought about the situation,” and to
provide these political leaders with a forum to issue recommendations to resolve
the unrest.5
Though the meeting began with a detailed examination of the charges of
police brutality that had triggered the demonstrations outside the precinct,
conversation eventually shifted to addressing the political climate and “rising race
tension” in Harlem. During the two-hour meeting, Jack charged that this tension was
Al Nall, “Notarized Riot Statement: ‘The Cop Dragged Her Out By Her Hair,”
New York Amsterdam News, July 18, 1959.
5
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rooted in an increasing resentment by Harlem residents over “inadequate housing,
poor schools, unsanitary conditions, and low-paying jobs.” Jack concluded that what
was needed from the Wagner administration was a greater effort to establish
channels of communication with Harlem residents to “make them feel as though
they’re part of the city.”6 To the Borough President, the answer to relieving tensions
was simple: make the government more accountable to the people, and make the
people feel as though they have a voice in government.
Lloyd Dickens took Jack’s analysis a step further by demanding that Black
citizens “be integrated from an executive standpoint” in all city departments, citing
particularly the need for Black police captains to command Harlem precincts.7
Though Dickens’ demands for Black representation in city policy-making positions
in Harlem echoed nationalistic demands for community-control and selfdetermination, the Black political class in Harlem seemed to be in general consensus
that Harlem’s potentially-explosive problems could be solved through the usual
channels of representative government. At the conclusion of the meeting, O’Keefe
smiled broadly as he posed for photos with the group of officials—and Sugar Ray
Robinson—and announced that he would personally investigate the situation and
set-up an appointment for the group to meet with Mayor Wagner upon his return
from the U.S. Conference of Mayors in Los Angeles.
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After catching a red-eye flight back into the city two days later, the Mayor
met with Police Commissioner Stephen Kennedy for an hour-long briefing on police
responses to the unrest earlier in the week. Kennedy had been active all week in
mobilizing an increased police presence in the city to curb any threat of further
unrest, and had much to say about the matter to the press. In an immediate
response to the demonstrations Monday night, Kennedy had deployed an additional
88 officers to the 28th Precinct in an attempt to maintain order. Warning against the
continued threat of “race riots” two days later, Kennedy also sent police
reinforcements to three other predominantly Black neighborhoods: BedfordStuyvesant in Brooklyn, South Jamaica in Queens, and the East Bronx. These moves
to expand the police presence in Black communities drew the ire of many Harlem
leaders, who charged Kennedy with trying to create “a police state.” New York
NAACP officials Jawn A. Sandifer and L. Joseph Overton, for instance, stated that this
increased police deployment would only aggravate the situation, arguing that
oppressive policing was one of the leading factors in rising racial tensions in
Harlem.8
Kennedy harangued these allegations as “outrageous,” and complained that
the police were being made “scapegoats” for the various socio-economic factors
contributing to racial tension in Harlem. The commissioner defended his actions by
publicizing crime statistics for Central Harlem, which he described as “shocking,”
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though he refused to provide statistics from other precincts for comparison.9
Furthermore, Kennedy couched his defense in fear-mongering terms typical of ColdWar era repression of political dissent. “A race riot,” Kennedy told reporters, “could
cause more destruction of community relations than an atom bomb.” With such
rhetoric of hyper-criminality and widespread destruction, Kennedy effectively
convinced city officials, press outlets, and even some civil rights leaders, that
expanded police powers were necessary to maintain law and order and prevent
disaster.10 In the following days, weeks, and months, Kennedy would build upon this
platform to further bolster the powers of the NYPD to enforce “law and order” in the
city.
Mayor Wagner left his meeting with Kennedy feeling confident in the Police
Commissioner’s handling of the incident outside the 28th Precinct. Like Kennedy, the
Mayor expressed to reporters the need to preserve “law and order,” but also
downplayed the threat of any possible “race riots” in the city. Also like Kennedy, the
Mayor pointed to underlying problems rooted in economic inequality as the causes
for “tensions” in Harlem. Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Wagner argued
that Harlem needed better housing, improved building conditions, more schools,

Amsterdam News editor James Hicks argued in his editorial column on July
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more playgrounds, and, “perhaps a closer relationship with the department heads
involved.” This last point proved to be the basis for the Mayor’s administrative
responses to the problems he saw as contributing to the unrest in Harlem. Moments
later, Wagner called for a meeting with community and political leaders in Harlem
and city officials the following week to “see whether we can work out better
liaison—to have people give complaints more rapidly, and their hopes and
aspirations.”11 It was clear that Harlem residents had drawn the attention of City
Hall to questions of inequality in the neighborhood. The next step for City Hall was
to figure out what answers they could come up with to make these questions less
explosive.
On July 21st, the Mayor invited a group of nearly 90 city officials and
representatives from Harlem to City Hall for an “initial exploration” of ways in
which city and community resources could be “more effectively utilized” to address
the problems contributing to unrest.12 Wagner had requested nearly every
department head to attend, including the Police Commissioner, the Commissioner of
Housing and Buildings, the Superintendent of Schools, and many others whose
departments were implicated in the poor living conditions in Harlem.13 Notable

Peter Kihss, “Mayor Calls Parley on Harlem; Seeks Liaison to Ease
Tension,” New York Times, July 17, 1959.
11

Executive Memorandum from Mayor Robert Wagner to City
Commissioners, Box 64, Folder 743, Papers of Mayor Wagner: Subject Files, New
York City Municipal Archives (henceforth referred to as Wagner Papers).
12

“City Officials at the Meeting of the Mayor with Harlem Community
Representatives at City Hall on Tuesday, 2:30 P.M., July 21, 1959,” Box 78, Folder
966, Wagner Papers.
13

125

among the Harlem leaders in attendance were Congressman Adam Clayton Powell,
Jr., Councilman Earl Brown, Assemblyman Dickens, Senator Watson, and
Assemblywoman Bessie Buchanan. Also in attendance were several members of the
clergy, civic leaders, and business owners.14 In his account of the meeting, Brown
described the gathering as “the most imposing group of city officials ever in one
room with Harlem citizens to discuss its problems.”
Notably absent from both of these meetings, however, was any
representation from community-based organizations or grassroots civil rights
leadership, who were in a better position to provide meaningful commentary and
analyses of the situation in Harlem. Furthermore, only twelve of the sixty-eight
invited representatives from Harlem were women.15 It was clear that though
grassroots leadership was beginning to represent and mobilize a greater number of
poor and working-class Harlem residents whose interests were underrepresented
in city governance, this leadership was largely excluded from any dealings with the
formal political power structure in the city.
Delegates to the meeting voiced a number of suggestions for the alleviation of
adverse conditions and the economic, political, and social empowerment of Harlem
residents, but the topic of policing dominated the meeting and its press coverage.
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“Although bad housing conditions are considered to be Harlem’s gravest problem,”
Brown argued in his regular column in the Amsterdam News, “nobody uttered a
single word about them.”16 Brown’s claims were overstated; delegates repeatedly
suggested improvements in education, housing, health, and sanitation policies, and
demanded representation in policy-making positions.17 Even though hyperbole,
Brown’s claims were illustrative of a heightened popular focus on policing. This
attention on police in Harlem was logical, since police actions triggered the unrest
and brought years of police brutality, abuse, and misconduct to the forefront of
popular consciousness and conversation.
One of the most controversial discussions around policing was raised when
Powell and Buchanan requested that more Black policemen be assigned to Harlem.18
Though this request echoed the calls of Harlem residents who had demanded
proportional representation in the police force for years, the notion sparked
adamant opposition. In their criticisms of this suggestion that race be taken into
account in public policy, white and Black officials alike turned the argument on its
head and invoked the rhetoric of southern segregation to discredit Powell and
Buchanan. “Such an act of segregation is simply not right,” Police Commissioner
Kennedy told a press conference, adding that “rather than segregate the police
16
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department, we must continue to fight for a truly integrated city.”19 Meanwhile,
Brown took the analogy a step further when he argued that Powell and Buchanan
“took the same position that [Arkansas] Gov. Faubus and all other Southern white
supremacists have taken about the race problem: Jim Crow the Negro and
everything will be fine and dandy.”20
The transcript of the meeting, however, showed that at no point in the
proceedings did anyone suggest that Harlem be made a “Black Precinct.”
Suggestions were made for greater integration of police in Harlem, interracial
patrols, and new procedures for handling allegations of brutality.21 Police
Commissioner Kennedy deliberately mischaracterized requests for reform in an
attempt to seize a moral high ground on race relations in the city, in spite of the
NYPD’s inhumane reputation in Harlem. Furthermore, the Commissioner found
support for his defensive posturing across the aisle. This hostile intransigence from
the NYPD, masked with lofty rhetoric to gain popular support, was a tactic that the
department would employ frequently in the following years to deceive the public
and defend against demands for reform.
If the meeting produced little in the way of tangible benefits to improve
societal conditions, it did provide Harlem representatives with a rare opportunity to
voice their concerns, complaints, and recommendations to such a collective of city
19
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officials. However, it was also recognized that this access to government needed to
be extended to the people as well. The most important achievement of the meeting,
as Hulan Jack wrote in a letter to the Mayor, was the recognition that channels of
communication must be established whereby “little people can come forward to
intelligently speak for themselves to make complaints, offer suggestions and get
results through their city government without fear or reprisals.” Judging by the
influx of letters, telegrams, and phone calls to the Borough President’s office, these
meetings did encourage Harlem residents to engage with their political
representatives, and thereby, with electoral politics. Messages poured in with
complaints of slum housing conditions, inadequate healthcare, poor education, and
violations of civil rights, and requests for governmental intervention.
Perhaps sensing the precariousness of his own political standing as elections
neared, Jack pled with the Mayor to act upon these grievances through concerted,
institutional actions. “The administration cannot afford to even think of letting these
people down,” he concluded, “they are with us and they expect and demand that we
be with them.” Although the Borough President’s professed faith in his constituents’
loyalty to city government may have been political rhetoric, he nevertheless
understood that the Mayor needed to act in a meaningful way to address the deepseated problems they faced, or risk the alienation of his constituents from electoral
politics.22
Just over a month later, Mayor Wagner did act when he announced the
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formation of the Committee on Harlem Affairs (CHA), an “action committee” that
would assist his administration in “bringing more effective services” to Harlem. The
Committee was composed of five city officials and seventeen representatives from
Harlem.23 After an initial meeting to review a series of reports from various city
agencies, the CHA decided to form three subcommittees on housing, education, and
law enforcement, based on what they saw as the major problems in Harlem.24 As
Hulan Jack had suggested, these subcommittees were tasked with acting as liaison
between Harlem residents and city officials, and set out to conduct research on
conditions in Harlem in order to provide the Mayor’s office with recommendations
of possible programs for implementation.
From its inception, the CHA came under criticism from Harlem residents who
had little faith that a city-sponsored committee would have any real impact on
improving conditions in Harlem that were deeply rooted within the city’s economic
and political structures. In a sardonic critique of the Mayor’s “compulsion” for
“government by committee,” New York Age columnist Chuck Stone argued that the
CHA had little chance for success. “Committees don’t solve problems,” Stone wrote,
“votes, tough housing laws, court enforcement of these laws, and unbiased police
Office of the Mayor Press Release, September 10, 1959, Box 5, Folder
“Housing, 1958-9,” Papers of Hulan Jack, New York City Municipal Archives
(henceforth referred to as Jack Papers).
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protection solve problems.”25 Amsterdam News editor James Hicks also openly
doubted that the committee would be able to implement any suggestions made to
it.26
A lack of genuine community representation was also cited as a fundamental
objection to the CHA. Shortly after its formation, Hicks described the Committee as
consisting of “a bunch of nice guys who don’t know anything about the man in the
street.”27 Though leadership from the New York NAACP, Urban League, and various
civic associations were amongst the members of the CHA, Hicks’ analysis
demonstrated the perceived disconnect between these types of middle-class
oriented organizations and the bulk of Harlem’s poor and working-class
communities. Though protesters had been in the streets all month, CHA member
and President of the Peoples Civic and Welfare Association Glester Hinds, told
reporters in late July that there was no tension in Harlem. Furthermore, Hinds
charged, “all people, regardless of race, should let the law take its course.”28
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It was clear to many, however, that Hinds and others in the CHA were out of
touch with those in Harlem who were most disenfranchised by political, economic,
and social inequality and frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the “course” of the law.
Echoing the analyses of grassroots leaders like Ella Baker, Jesse Gray, Mae Mallory,
and Malcolm X, Stone and Hicks suggested to their readership that it was this
demographic which held the reigns of political power in the city. “In the final
analysis,” Stone wrote, “the real persons who are going to reduce Harlem’s problems
to their lowest common denominator are not Mayor Wagner or his…committee, but
the Negroes themselves.”29 Despite its inherent flaws and lack of popular support,
the CHA nonetheless went to work in Harlem at the dawn of the 1960s.
For the next several months, the three subcommittees of the CAH met
periodically to discuss their findings, write reports, and issue recommendations.
The recommendations issued to the Mayor are significant for understanding the
ways in which city and civic leaders proposed to solve what they viewed as the most
pressing social problems in Harlem at that time.30 Furthermore, the responses that
these recommendations received from the corresponding City Commissioners offer
insights into how city officials evaluated their own effectiveness in addressing issues
of inequality in Harlem, along with a metric by which to gauge the willingness of city
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officials to engage with citizens through the democratic process to reform
government.
The Subcommittee on Education
At the July 21st meeting, four main suggestions for improving education were
raised repeatedly by representatives from Harlem: increased curriculum in Harlem
schools, reduced split-sessions, reduced overcrowding by transferring students to
under-enrolled schools, and the assignment of experienced teachers to Harlem.31 To
many Harlem parents and community members, each of these recommendations
was aimed at eradicating symptoms of a segregated school system, which continued
to trap Black children in underdeveloped schools. None of these suggestions were
new, as they had largely provided the basis of struggles waged for educational
equality in Harlem over the previous five years in the wake of the Brown v. Board
decision. Despite the efforts of local leaders like Ella Baker and Drs. Kenneth and
Mamie Clark, however, there had been little progress made toward fulfilling these
demands.
From the outset, it became evident that the Subcommittee on Education was
particularly troubled by the “de facto” segregation of Harlem schools, which Mae
Mallory and the Harlem Nine had garnered national attention for fighting against
the previous year.32 Without mentioning these struggles for desegregation in their
final report, the Subcommittee criticized the Board of Education for failing to
Memorandum from Joyce Phillips Austin to Deputy Mayor Paul T. O’Keefe,
August 7, 1959, Box 109072B, Folder 249, Carro Files.
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implement any of the recommendations of the Commission on Integration, which
had arisen from the Brown decision under the leadership of the Clarks and Ella
Baker. The implementation of these earlier recommendations, the Subcommittee
argued, was “essential to relieve tensions in Harlem.” Furthermore, the
Subcommittee found that as a result of the Board’s sluggish and ineffectual
enactment of these recommendations, there had actually been an increase in
segregated schools over the previous five years.33
To resolve the problems associated with Harlem’s separate and unequal
schools, the Subcommittee insisted that the COI recommendations be implemented,
requested timely reports on the progress of school integration, and suggested that
an additional committee be established to evaluate the conditions of each school in
Harlem. In his official response to these recommendations, Superintendent of
Schools John Theobald offered little to those looking for action plans or guarantees
to improve Harlem schools. Theobald balked at providing an answer as to why the
COI’s recommendations had not been implemented, rejected calls for an advisory
committee to evaluate the conditions of schools, and promised that a progress
report on desegregation would be forthcoming for the first time since 1957. In
essence, four months of work from the Subcommittee produced suggestions for
further studies and reports of conditions in Harlem schools, and a public rejection of
these meager requests from the Superintendent of Schools.
The Subcommittee on Housing
Initial Recommendations Submitted by the Subcommittee on Education,
December 23, 1959, Box 109072B, Folder 250, Carro Files.
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In a 1935 report, Mayor LaGuardia’s Commission on the Harlem Riot laid out
its suggestions for improving housing conditions in Harlem. The Commission’s
primary points focused on the need for a planned housing program for Harlem to
address its shortage of sound units, and a better enforcement of housing codes.
Additionally, the Commission encouraged Harlem tenants to organize and protest
exorbitant rents, and if these failed, to engage in rent strikes. Deemed too “radical,”
the 1935 report was never publicly released, and the problems it addressed
remained largely unchanged. Nearly twenty-five years later, Harlem was still short
on decent housing; building codes still weren’t being enforced; and tenant leaders
had begun to revive a dormant rent-strike movement. 34
With the intractable nature of Harlem’s housing problems over the previous
two decades, the Subcommittee on Housing was treading on familiar ground as it
began its work. Despite Councilman Brown’s claims, several suggestions were put
forth to combat Harlem’s “grave” housing problems at the July 21st meeting. These
recommendations demonstrated a collective concern with problems that remained
unresolved since 1935, with a few modern twists to reflect current developments.
The major points of contention centered on urban renewal and tenant displacement,
enforcement of housing codes and laws, development of low and middle-income
housing, and Black representation in Robert Moses’ Committee on Slum Clearance.35
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These initial comments, though overshadowed by the controversy over policing,
provided the foundation for the Subcommittee’s work in the following months.
The complexity of Harlem’s housing problems was made clear in the
Subcommittee’s report to Mayor Wagner that December. In an eight-page document
that implicated eleven different city agencies, all three branches of city government,
and several state and federal departments, the Subcommittee recommended
reforms pertaining to urban renewal and relocation, sanitation, building inspections
and code enforcement, rodent control, housing development, and healthcare.36 Of
greatest concern to the Subcommittee was the need for more housing units for low,
and particularly, middle-income residents, and the careful relocation of residents
displaced by urban renewal sites.37 Of more immediate concern to many Harlem
residents, however, were the dangerous conditions of apartments that low-income
families were largely confined to, as residential segregation made it extremely
difficult to find housing outside of the ghetto. These were the conditions that were
bringing tenants out into the streets, and filling the mailboxes of city officials with
complaints. The Subcommittee did offer recommendations for strengthened
building code enforcement and harsher penalties for neglectful landlords, though
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the Department of Buildings deferred any response pending the passage of three
bills in to the City Council to provide greater enforcement powers to the City. In the
interim, the Department of Buildings conducted a wave of inspections in the
following months, turning up thousands of violations.
Though the Subcommittee showed signs of class bias favoring moderate and
middle-income Harlem residents in some aspects of their report, Chairman Hope
Stevens touched upon a vital point in a post-report memo to Mayor Wagner. “We
believe it to be the greatest importance,” Stevens wrote, “that residents of the
Harlem community be given proof that they are sharing in the development of the
city through participation in its governmental functions at levels where their
influence can be felt.”38 To Stevens, a degree of self-determination for Harlem’s
Black residents was imperative if hostilities toward the city’s oppressive white
power structure were to be eased. More than any other area of racial discrimination,
Stevens argued, housing inequality most directly contributed to a “psychological
situation around which feelings of hostility with resulting tensions will continue to
center.” The nature of this “psychological situation,” Stevens warned Wagner in
conclusion, could be greatly influenced by the Mayor’s efforts to empower Harlem
residents by providing political representation at policy-making levels to promote a
sense of collective agency. Like Jesse Gray, Stevens understood the political gravity
of the housing question in Harlem, and his warning to the Mayor proved prescient.
The Mayor’s responses to the housing question had profound impacts on the
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direction of struggles for rights and power in the city and will be explored in greater
detail in the following section.
The Subcommittee on Law Enforcement
The heated public debate around the actions and policies of the NYPD in the
immediate wake of the “near-riot” swelled as the Subcommittee on Law
Enforcement got to work. Speaking to a crowd of nearly 5,000 gathered at 125th
Street and 7th Avenue for the annual Marcus Garvey Day celebration in early August,
United African Nationalist Movement president James Lawson blasted the NYPD for
its rampant brutality against African Americans, called for Black police captains in
Black neighborhoods, and demanded Stephen Kennedy’s resignation as police
commissioner.39
Though the nationalist leader had been painted as a dangerous militant in
“The Hate That Hate Produced” just weeks earlier, Lawson’s comments at the rally
were hardly radical, and certainly not unique. Indeed, his charges of police
misconduct and demands for Black representation within the upper ranks of the
NYPD had been brought up by others at the July 21st meeting and consequently
became major focal points of the Subcommittee on Law Enforcement’s
deliberations. For two months, the Subcommittee held weekly meetings and
conferred with individuals and representatives of various organizations and city
departments, including Amsterdam News editor James Hicks, and the Black police
union of the NYPD, the Guardians Association.
“Nationalists Demand Kennedy’s Dismissal,” New York Amsterdam News,
August 8, 1959.
39
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The political tug-of-war that ensued over the Subcommittee on Law
Enforcement elevated a host of deep-seated racial problems within the NYPD’s
policies and practices of policing Black communities in New York City to a higher
level in public discourse and warrants a more extensive analysis. In their November
report, the Subcommittee put forth nine recommendations for improving relations
between the police and Harlem community. These included: the appointment of a
Black Deputy Commissioner, ending the common police practice of using Harlem as
a training ground, improved race and human relations training for police, expanded
public relations efforts, ending illegal searches and seizures, and increasing the
number of Black officers on the force. In essence, the Subcommittee’s
recommendations demonstrated a primary concern with improving the image of the
police in Harlem through greater Black representation within the NYPD, improved
interpersonal police training, and through curbing some of the most flagrant abuses
commonly reported by Harlem residents. Notably absent from the report, however,
was any mention or suggestion of disciplinary procedures for police officers that
violated departmental policies or infringed upon the civil rights of Black citizens.40
Although the liberal nature of these recommendations posed hardly any
threat to the fundamental structures or powers of the NYPD, they were nonetheless
met with a characteristically defensive response from Commissioner Kennedy.
Doubling down on his previous refusal to hire more Black officers, Kennedy
misrepresented the Subcommittee’s recommendation as an illegal quota system,
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and declared that appointments in the NYPD would not be made “on the basis of
politics, color, race or religion.” Kennedy went on to describe his efforts to
professionalize the police force, expand human relations training, and profess his
opposition to police misconduct as a means of dismissing each concern laid out in
the Subcommittee’s recommendations. As a means of deflecting responsibility for
racial tensions in Harlem away from the NYPD, the Commissioner put forth a
narrative suggesting that police were being unjustly treated as scapegoats for “the
long accumulated ills of the Harlem community.” Kennedy explained that strained
police-community relations in Harlem were a result not of police malfeasance, but of
citizens taking out their frustrations over racial oppression on officers merely trying
to fulfill their duty to “protect the community as a whole.”41
Kennedy’s response was met with a predictably damning public rebuke from
the members of the Subcommittee and other public figures in Harlem.
Subcommittee Chairman Thomas Dyett called Kennedy’s comments a “vituperative
outburst of fury,” and suggested that the Commissioner’s hostility was based on his
realization that tensions in Harlem had grown “steadily and even alarmingly” under
his leadership. In this scathing critique, Dyett addressed several of Kennedy’s
claims, giving particular attention to the lack of Black officers and illegal searches
and seizures. Expanding on the Subcommittee’s insistence on the “psychological
importance” of having more Black officers in the NYPD, Dyett argued that Kennedy’s
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failure to appoint a Black deputy commissioner could give the impression that the
Police Commissioner “intends to maintain a lily-white staff.”42
Furthermore, Dyett contended that the appointment of only white men as
Deputy Commissioners “may in itself be telling evidence of discrimination.” Black
residents of New York City hardly needed Dyett to tell them what they already
believed to be true. It certainly did not appear coincidental to many that in a police
force of 23,000 there were only 1,200 Black officers (5.2%); that of 60 inspectors
only one was Black (1.6%); that of 212 captains there was not a single Black officer;
or that only 10 of 750 lieutenants were Black (1.3%).43 The significance of Dyett’s
claim lay not in the observation of racial disparity, but in the premise of his
argument, which held that a disparate adverse impact of otherwise race-neutral
policies on a particular racial group constituted evidence of racial discrimination. It
would be another five years before this argument became codified in federal law
through the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Like the Black mothers of the
Harlem Nine, Dyett had issued a challenge to the system of de facto, yet government
supported, segregation in the city, which officials like Kennedy had tried to mask
with rhetoric that professed allegiance to racial equality.
In addition to his criticism of racial discrimination in employment and
promotion, Dyett also took Kennedy to task for his apparent justification of illegal
searches and seizures. Though Kennedy noted in his comments that he did not
“Comments on Recommendations of Sub-Committee on Law Enforcement,”
February 19, 1960, Box 109072C, Folder 252, Carro Files.
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condone such conduct, he nonetheless went on to justify its occurrence based on the
difficulties officers faced in making “split-second” decisions about the civil and
human rights of those involved in an alleged crime.44 “These split-second decisions,”
Dyett charged,
have at times included the shooting of teenagers running away from the
scene of a crime, resulting in the handing out of a death sentence by an overzealous or perhaps vicious policeman for an offense for which the Court of
Appeals might hesitate to approve capital punishment.45
While Kennedy tried to spin the lived experiences of Harlem residents into a
narrative of police benevolence in the face of community hostility, Dyett attempted
to provide a check on the Commissioner’s propagandistic interpretation. This
advocacy from the Subcommittee on Law Enforcement far outpaced that of the
other two Subcommittees of the HAC, yet still proved largely ineffectual in
producing meaningful police reform.
Kennedy’s continued intransigence also prompted Adam Clayton Powell to
escalate his critiques of the embattled Police Commissioner in early 1960. As he had
during the July 21st meeting at City Hall, Powell continued to demand greater Black
representation amongst the ranks of the NYPD. During a February sermon at the
Abyssinian Baptist Church, Powell berated Kennedy for his repeated refusals to
comply with the recommendations of the CHA. Powell echoed Judge Dyett’s charge
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that the Commissioner had created a “lily-white” department, and went on to
demand Kennedy’s resignation.46
About a month later, Powell expanded upon his sermon in a statement
published in the Pittsburgh Courier. After explaining in detail his demands for Black
representation in policy-making positions within the NYPD, Powell expressed
concern over the patterns of police repression that frequently followed any public
protests over police actions. “The immediate answer they get,” Powell charged, “is
an arrogant statement in the press from the Commissioner immediately followed by
the dispatching of ‘shock troops’ to the area in an open attempt to intimidate the
people.” Powell’s analysis certainly rang true for the “near-riot” months earlier, and
countless other protests of police misconduct in the years and decades prior.
Repeating his demand for the Commissioner to resign, Powell suggested that the
Mayor appoint “an interim board of responsible citizens to clean up the mess” in the
police department. Powell insisted that as a basic tenet of a democratic society,
police power must be subjected to civilian control “under the will of the people.”
Kennedy’s dogged refusal to submit to the will of the people in Harlem and beyond
reaffirmed for the Congressman and his constituents the need to seek out and fight
for the realization of this democratic ideal. With Kennedy’s hostility to sensible
police reform supported by the Mayor on one side, and surging demands for police
accountability and community control on the other, the Subcommittee’s efforts
proved to merely stoke the tinder of a looming wildfire.
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In a meeting of the Subcommittee on Law Enforcement with Mayor Wagner
in April 1960, Jack Blumstein expressed several points that were indicative of the
general ineffectiveness of the Committee on Harlem Affairs in resolving issues of
inequality in Harlem. Despite the eight months of work put in by the three
subcommittees of the CHA, Blumstein pointed out that racial tensions in Harlem
were still high, and that “a spark could set off real trouble.” Blumstein’s comments
were nearly identical to those of Mayor Wagner the previous July when he
announced the formation of the Committee. “Positive action and quick help is
needed,” Blumstein argued, insisting that Black communities needed to be “made
aware and aroused sufficiently” to feel as though they had a voice in government
and were “a part of the team to maintain law and order.”47
The reason for the CHA’s ineffectiveness lay inherently in the premise upon
which the committee was founded. As conceived by Mayor Wagner, the purpose of
the CHA was not to solve the problems of inequality caused by institutional racism
in the city, but rather to ease racial tensions in Harlem through making the
government appear more amenable to calls for Black equality and empowerment.
“The best way to refuse to grapple with a problem,” Chuck Stone opined, “is to
appoint a committee.”48 This government-by-committee approach to investigating
and reporting on racial tensions in Harlem was exemplary of liberal approaches to
issues of racial inequality in New York City. Rather than attempting to meaningfully
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Law Enforcement, April 7, 1960,” Box 109072B, Folder 249, Carro Files.
47

Chuck Stone, “Okay, Harlem, You’re a Malted Milkshake,” New York Age,
undated newsclipping, Box 109072B, Folder 249, Carro Files.
48

144

address the root causes of racial and economic inequality, this approach dealt with
their symptoms in an attempt to ensure tranquility rather than to promote justice.
Because of its fundamentally flawed and limited premise, the CHA proved
more effective in further straining relations between Black communities in Harlem
and City Hall than in cooling the volatile racial and political climate that had
provoked unrest in the first place. Though there was little public faith from the start
that the CHA would be able to enact any meaningful reform in Harlem, the
Committee’s futility in implementing even the most conservative measures of
reform affirmed an increasingly popular cynicism of city government’s ability to act
upon the interests of Black communities in New York City.
Furthermore, although one of the guiding principles of the Committee was to
promote greater dialogue between local people and city government, few efforts
were actually made to include any representation from the ranks of those in the city
most adversely affected by the daily assaults of institutional racism. In a report to
the Subcommittee on Law Enforcement, the Guardians Association suggested that
this demographic, “the unfortunate, underprivileged, and unstable elements,” must
be represented within city government, for they were the “most likely group to
cause a major community disorder.”49 Seeking redress for the violence of
institutional racism and finding little representation in city government, greater
numbers of disenfranchised Harlem residents became mobilized at the dawn of the
1960s to engage in organized grassroots struggles for civil rights, human rights, and
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political power. With demands for Black equality and empowerment surging locally
and nationally, the ideological rift between City Hall and Harlem appeared to be only
widening, despite the nominal efforts of the CHA to narrow the gap as the new
decade began.
Tenants Rights, Human Rights, and Political Power in Harlem
Though grassroots community leadership was mostly excluded from the
formation and proceedings of the CHA, many leaders and residents saw the
Committee as a political tool and seized on the opportunity to raise their concerns
and demands to city officials. While struggles for equality in education, housing,
employment, and policing had been in motion well before the summer of 1959, the
dramatic events that unfolded that summer in New York and the nation forced these
fights for civil and human rights to the fore of popular consciousness in Harlem. One
of the key movers in this groundswell of activism in Harlem, Jesse Gray’s burgeoning
tenant movement was also a primary beneficiary of the heightened visibility the
summer of 1959 provided.
Gray’s organizing efforts to capitalize on this political momentum were aided
by a flood of coverage of Harlem housing conditions in local newspapers,
particularly the Amsterdam News. On the heels of Gray’s recently launched rent
strikes and the subsequent “near riot,” the Amsterdam News devoted nearly an
entire edition to covering housing problems in Harlem and exhorting readers to
take action. In what the editorial board described as an effort to “shock the moral
conscience of the city,” the front fold of the paper was covered with photographs of
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Black men, women, and children holding large rats they had killed in their Harlem
apartments. More photographs of Black women and their children who had been
bitten by rats appeared in the following pages, alongside a column describing some
of the recent infant victims of these “vicious, flesh-loving” rodents.50
Like Gray, the Amsterdam News emphasized the horrific impacts that ratinfested apartments had on Black women and children to elicit sympathy and
outrage amongst their readership. Furthermore, to broaden their audience and gain
the support of “the entire city,” the editorial board explicitly encouraged clubs, civic
organizations, and individuals to clip out the page of photographs and share them
with people who may not have been aware of the housing conditions in Harlem. “We
know of no better way to convince city officials that the problem does exist,” an
explanatory editorial argued, “than by showing them the actual truth in pictures.”
This media tact was not merely an attempt to cast sunlight on a festering illness as a
means of disinfecting—it was a call to political action. To familiarize their
readership with the city officials “responsible for it all,” the editorial board plastered
their headshots, names, and titles directly below the photographs of rat-bitten
babies and their mothers.51
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The tactic proved effective, as letters poured into the offices of the Mayor and
Borough President in the following weeks and months. Desperate Harlem residents
complained of unsanitary conditions, infestations of rats, roaches, and mice, and
having gone days or longer without hot water. The influx of correspondence and
media attention fueled by protests in the streets resonated throughout City Hall and
prompted Hulan Jack and Deputy Commissioner of Buildings Harold Birns to expand
the number of buildings they inspected in the early fall.52 Few residents, however,
had reason to believe that inspections and the nominal fines for violations that
typically followed were capable of forcing landlords to make repairs of their
buildings. This lack of faith in city agencies to expediently resolve pressing housing
problems made joining Gray and the Lower Harlem Tenants Council’s rent strike a
more appealing option for many. In one striking building on West 118th Street,
tenants had been without hot water for over five months when they joined the
strike.53 In early August, Gray announced that two more buildings had joined,
bringing the total number of striking buildings to twenty-one.54 By the end of the
month, the New York Herald Tribune reported that 125 buildings in the area
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bounded by Fifth and Eighth Avenues and 110th and 118th Streets were engaged in
the rent strike.55
Though the LHTC’s rent strike brought people into the streets by the dozens
and hundreds to take part in protests and rallies, direct action campaigns were but
one facet of Gray’s organizing arsenal. During his many years of organizing in
Harlem, Gray had demonstrated his skillful abilities to deal with political
movements both in the streets and in the suites. Although much of the scholarly
attention that Gray has received focuses on his showmanship in the streets,
including dramatic anti-eviction demonstrations and militant street corner rhetoric,
his skillful maneuverings within the political system have been under-recognized.56
In 1953, Gray and the Harlem Tenants Council successfully waged “a great struggle”
to save rent control in New York City when Governor Thomas Dewey proposed a
15% rent increase across the board in the state.
Three years later, Gray and the HTC achieved “a major break” in the
community when they forced the passage of the Rooming House Bill in 1956.57 By
the early 1950s, single room occupancy (SRO) dwellings, or rooming houses, had
become the targets of urban developers, such as Robert Moses, for demolition and
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redevelopment due to a popular narrative that painted rooming house residents as
predominantly Black men who were criminal elements in society and a leading
source of urban blight. In reality, however, SRO units were often the only lodgings
that tens of thousands of poor and working-class Black families could afford, or find,
given the severe housing shortage in Harlem. The bill that Gray and the HTC
succeeded in pushing through was designed to stop the summary eviction of tenants
from SRO units and to provide a legal guarantee of due process for thousands of SRO
tenants.
While coordinating the rent strikes in the summer of 1959 on a building-bybuilding, and block-by-block basis to demand building repairs in the short-run, Gray
was also using this political mobilization to advocate for long-term legislative
reform. In a letter to Hulan Jack in August 1959, Gray charged that the squalid
housing conditions that were allowed by City Hall to proliferate in Harlem were
caused in part by “unscrupulous landlords who hire wine-bibbers and dope addicts
as Superintendents.” In addition to the abdication of their duties which created
unsafe living conditions, Gray argued that having addicts or drunks as building
superintendents also attracted more addicts to congregate in the building’s vicinity,
making the housing problem “more trying.” To rectify this problem, Gray and the
Lower Harlem Tenant Council demanded that new standards and requirements be
set for superintendents, including criminal background checks and quarterly
inspections from city agencies. Gray suggested that this legislative reform would
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“immediately improve the overall housing situation in Harlem,” adding that the
demand was backed by the residents of the 21 buildings on rent strike at that time.58
Less than a month later, the Borough President sent an impassioned letter to
Mayor Wagner describing at length his position on the housing question in New
York and offering legislative solutions to address what he called “the most explosive
issue since Civil Rights.” Though Jack’s concerns with housing had developed over a
number of years, the influence of Gray’s demands on Jack’s analysis were evident in
his correspondence with the Mayor. Citing the rampant problem of landlords hiring
inexperienced or irresponsible superintendents as one of the “greatest evils” leading
to housing deterioration, Jack urged the Mayor to appoint a city administrator to
prepare and introduce legislation to regulate the employment of superintendents.
Jack also suggested that the Mayor support legislation to permit the Department of
Buildings and Department of Health to seize rents from intransigent landlords and
make necessary repairs to housing units. 59
The latter suggestion echoed a demand that Gray had been raising for nearly
a decade—that government be given the power to take control of private property
to make emergency repairs for tenants when landlords were either unwilling or
unable to do so. Though criticized by a city planning official for being “impatient”
and “pressing for faster action than we can achieve,” Jack was not alone in his
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support for a receivership law.60 In early 1960, the New York City Council called
upon the State Legislature to pass a receivership bill introduced by Senator James
Watson. The bill naturally had the active support of Gray, who brought a “mass
delegation” of tenants from the LHTC to Albany that February to demand the bill’s
passage, along with other legislative acts to improve housing conditions in Harlem.61
Despite this support from community activists and city officials, the receivership bill
failed to make it through the Republican-controlled state legislature. It would be
another two years until such a bill was enacted in New York City.
In addition to making legislative headway, it was clear that by 1960 Gray’s
tenant movement was gaining popular momentum in the city, and was capable of
scoring some tangible benefits for low-income renters in Harlem. Coupled with the
radical zeitgeist of the summer of 1959, Gray’s rent strike and organizing efforts had
made Harlem’s housing problems a top priority for city officials. The ensuing “cellarto-roof” inspections conducted by the Department of Buildings and Department of
Health revealed thousands of violations in Harlem tenements, led to stiffer fines and
summons for slumlords, and prompted long-overdue repairs. The resulting court
proceedings against landlords were indicative of a changing popular tune when it
came to building code enforcement in the city. When the attorney for a Harlem
landlord brought to trial likened the high bail set for his client to that set for
“murderers,” a city magistrate sharply retorted, “is it less than murder to allow
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buildings to deteriorate and jeopardize the health and welfare of the tenants?” The
landlord was eventually fined over $3,000 and given 60 days to rectify the
violations.62
These victories, though perhaps minor in the grand scheme, were significant
for movement building and endeared Gray to those residents of Harlem most
adversely impacted by race-based housing and economic injustice. As Gray’s stature
grew in the hallways of Harlem tenements and in the corridors of City Hall,
accolades began to pour in for the dynamic leader. Readers of the Amsterdam News
sent in hundreds of ballots nominating Gray for the honorary title of “Mayor of
Harlem” in 1959.63 After delivering an impassioned plea for better housing during a
hearing on welfare at the Upper Manhattan Court in 1960, Gray was reportedly
“showered with kisses from housewives.”64 A letter to the editor of the Amsterdam
News in 1961 lauded Gray as a “patron saint” to tenants in Harlem.65
Through winning tangible benefits for his constituents through direct action
campaigns and legislative lobbying, Gray and the LHTC were taking pivotal steps
towards building a grassroots movement of poor Black Harlem residents for
economic and political empowerment. Although he did not “see the revolution
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around the corner,” as Northern Student Movement organizer Danny Schechter
would later note, Gray’s understanding of the processes of societal transformation
emphasized the “need to organize people around struggle.”66 The education that
Gray received during his time in the NMU and Community Party, along with his
subsequent organizing experience in New York, informed his analysis that “struggle
unifies the community.”67 By organizing tenants to demand improved housing
conditions, Gray sought to not only empower renters to improve their daily lives,
but to unify the community through struggle to demand and eventually seize
economic and political power in the city.
Gray’s efforts to mobilize Harlem tenants and improve housing conditions in
the early 1960s were characterized by this duality between long-range movement
building and pragmatic housing reform for tangible gains in the short-run. The
pressing realities of housing conditions in Harlem made it necessary for the LHTC to
use whatever tools were available to protect tenants and demand housing justice,
which at times meant working through the channels of liberal housing reform. This
duality largely characterized the surging organizing efforts of Gray and the LHTC
from 1960-1962.
Throughout 1960, the LHTC waged direct action campaigns to force city
agencies to conduct inspections of Harlem housing units and hold landlords
accountable for rampant violations. Though Gray was the figurehead of these
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demonstrations, the majority of the feet on the streets belonged to Black women
who carried signs and picketed in front of various tenements and city
administration buildings to demand inspections and repairs. While coordinating
these protests in favor of liberal housing reform, Gray was also orchestrating
political campaigns in an attempt to translate this groundswell of grassroots
mobilization into a movement for community control of the levers of governmental
power in Harlem.
That June, Gray and the LHTC challenged the political mainstream in Harlem
by backing a slate of candidates for judicial posts on the Tenth Municipal Court. The
posts were of particular interest to Harlem tenants, as these justices were
responsible for ruling on the grievances levied by tenants against neglectful and
exploitative landlords. The week before the primary, 100 delegates to the LHTC’s
annual convention voted to endorse the candidacy of incumbent Justice Herman
Stoute and challenger Connie Jones for the two seats on the bench—thereby
opposing candidates supported by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s United Democratic
Leadership Team. The LHTC’s decision to formally endorse these candidates came
after the president-justice of the Municipal Court rejected the organization’s
demands that he dismiss “pro-landlord” Justice Maxwell P. Shapiro. In responding to
the court’s rebuke, however, Gray and the LHTC did not limit their involvement to
an endorsement of alternative candidates for the bench. At the convention, Gray also
sent a more dramatic message to the white power structure in Harlem, when he
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announced that Justice Shapiro would be “hanged in effigy” at a mass rally at 125th
Street and Seventh Avenue that weekend.68
In 1961, when state rent control laws were up for renewal, the LHTC again
directed their energies toward ensuring that a proposed statewide rent increase
would not make it through the Legislature. The LHTC and other housing
organizations called upon political, religious, and civic leaders to oppose the
increase and held several rallies along with other organizations to drum up popular
opposition and resistance to the planned changes in rent control.69 As 1961 was also
an election year in the city, the debate became a pressure point upon Mayor
Wagner’s re-election campaign, and Wagner’s support for the extension of rent
control eased his path to victory.70 Despite a “smug” Mayoral administration that
prided itself on its support for housing reform, the basic demands of housing
inspections raised over the past two years had yet to be meaningfully addressed.71
While the rent control debate and city elections were swirling that year, Gray
and his band of tenants escalated their fight for more expedient housing inspections
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and code enforcement. For five months that spring and summer, a group of LHTC
members “tired of waiting month in and month out” for building inspectors to act
against slumlords conducted their own weekly building inspections in an attempt to
rouse the city to action on the tenants’ behalf.72 Though a relatively conservative
action at face value, this initiative demonstrated a willingness of LHTC members to
assume the roles of city officials to govern their own community, while also
providing a useful organizing tool. The volunteer inspections gave the rank-and-file
of the LHTC an entrée into the halls and apartments of buildings and provided an
opportunity to build relationships with unaffiliated tenants. Largely conducted by
poor and working-class Black women, this type of unglamorous, building-bybuilding organizing, garnered little media attention, but helped to build and grow
the LHTC into a viable organization in the early 1960s.
As patience with the slow pace of housing improvements waned over the
following year, LHTC protests continued, and in 1962, city and state legislators
responded with policy measures designed to create a “slumless city.”73 That
February, after the administration of rent control policy was transferred from the
state to the city, Mayor Wagner announced the formation of the Rent and
Rehabilitation Administration (RRA) to carry out a “new look” municipal housing
program. As one of its fundamental initiatives, the RRA attempted to prod landlords
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into making repairs to buildings through incentives such as government loans and
tax abatements. While Gray and the LHTC had been pushing for the proverbial stick
to discipline recalcitrant landlords, the Wagner administration was offering them a
carrot. To many Harlem residents, the RRA was merely the same old routine of lax
building code enforcement dressed up in new clothes.
A more promising legislative action came a few months later, when the state
legislature finally passed a receivership bill that Gray, Senator Watson, and other
tenant rights activists had been advocating for years.74 To Gray, a receivership law
represented “one of the most important concepts” for systemically improving
housing conditions for low-income renters.75 In theory, the receivership bill would
allow the city to expedite the process of repairing housing violations by subverting
the delays caused by the habitual stalling of negligent landlords. In practice,
however, Harlem tenants found that the sluggish routine of inspections, delays, and
inaction continued largely uninterrupted that year. That September, a wave of
inspections on W. 117th Street turned up over 1,400 violations in 23 buildings, yet
by December, tenants were still waiting for repairs to begin.76 With the receivership
process dragging, Gray and the newly re-named Community Council on Housing
(CCH) resorted to pickets and marches on City Hall to demand that the RRA slash
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rents until the city took control of the buildings and made repairs. By the end of
January, city officials were still inspecting the buildings and considering seizing
some of them through receivership—and many tenants were still without heat or
hot water.77
While Gray was struggling to force city agencies to utilize legislative tools to
improve conditions for Harlem tenants, he was also expanding his analysis and
advocacy of Black empowerment outside of these liberal political channels. By the
year’s end, Gray was beginning to explicitly embrace tenets of Black economic and
political nationalism. In June of 1962, rumors began to spread around Central
Harlem of a “gentleman’s agreement” between white merchants and the Uptown
Chamber of Commerce designed to bar black businesses from opening up shop on
125th Street between Eighth and Lenox Avenues. Nationalist organizations,
including James Lawson’s United African Nationalist Movement, formed a coalition
to coordinate boycotts and demonstrations of several white-owned businesses on
125th Street to protest the alleged restrictive covenant. Leading the coalition was
Lewis Michaux of African Nationals in America and owner of the landmark National
Memorial Bookstore, as well as Jesse Gray, who called for a week-long boycott and
picket of stores on 125th Street unless a white restaurateur pulled his plans to open
a restaurant that would compete with the only Black-owned restaurant in the
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commercial hub.78 According to the Amsterdam News, the City’s Commission on
Human Rights quickly intervened to “prevent any flareup which would lead to
rioting.” Though the protests drew the ire of Jackie Robinson and A. Philip Randolph
over allegations of anti-Semitic chants at demonstrations, the restaurateur
eventually agreed to either take on Black partners or sell the business to Black
investors.79 The victory was minor, particularly since few Black residents could
afford to take over the business, but it nonetheless demonstrated a collective push
for Black economic empowerment and community control in a neighborhood long
exploited by white outsiders.
Gray’s embrace of Black economic nationalism was not isolated, but rather
indicative of an evolution in his public political thought. Though he had long been
active in radical electoral politics, it was not until the early days of 1963 that Gray
began to publicly advocate an explicitly racial political nationalism—a full three
years before Stokely Carmichael would seize the national spotlight with his clarion
call for “Black Power” in Mississippi. That February, Gray announced his candidacy
for Democratic District leader of the 16th Assembly District, declaring, "regardless to
how good a white man is, he cannot speak for us." Following his announcement, the
New Pittsburgh Courier reported that “Mr. Gray is of the opinion that in any area
predominantly populated by Negroes or Puerto Ricans, a Negro or Puerto Rican
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should be at the helm of that district.” 80 Though still on the margins of electoral
politics in Harlem in early 1963, Gray had firmly established himself as a key
mobilizer of a surging Black political consciousness at the grassroots, which was
shaping, and being shaped by, a Black radical political milieu in Harlem in the early
1960s.81
This embrace of self-determination and community control was not
inconsistent with the ideological underpinnings of Gray’s housing advocacy, and
indeed was a logical extension of it. Dating back to their days in the NMU and
Community Party, Gray, Jack O’Dell, and Harry Haywood had continuously debated
“the national question” as it related to Black liberation and Black popular
consciousness. The national question, Gray later argued, “must be one of the
fundamental questions in building a popular peoples coalition in this country.”82
Furthermore, Haywood, Gray’s mentor in the NMU, argued in 1964 that a
“grassroots nationalist” movement for Black political power must fight for political
control in centers of population concentration to enable Black communities to
“control decisions affecting his life and destiny.”83 Gray had continuously advocated
for the representation of Black tenants within the political system as a means of
80
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gaining direct access to, and control over, the levers of power that could improve
their housing conditions. The housing question, to Gray, O’Dell, and Haywood, was a
means by which raise Black political consciousness at the grassroots and mobilize
poor Black communities to build a mass national movement for Black political
power and liberation.84
Though Gray’s organizing efforts from 1959-1962 have been interpreted by
scholars as little more than an advocacy of liberal housing reform masquerading as
a radical tenant movement, these narratives tend to gloss over Gray’s analyses on
social transformation that informed his tenant organizing.85 Although Gray did
utilize the tools of liberal housing reform, this tactic was a part of a duality that
characterized his organizing and was more complementary to his visions of a radical
housing movement than it was contradictory. In Gray’s analysis, organizing tenants
to demand reforms in government housing policies was a means by which poor and
working-class Black tenants could be mobilized to not only build political power, but
also to alter the ideological basis that undergirded housing inequality. When the
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LHTC demanded that city agencies prioritize housing inspections in the early 1960s,
the purpose was to force the city government to adopt a more proactive housing
policy than the reactive policy of only intervening upon the receipt of complaints.86
To Gray, safe and quality housing was a basic human right, a positive right,
which a government had an obligation to ensure and regulate. “My principle
objective,” Gray later said, “has been to change the 350-year old concept of property
first and people second.”87 Gray defined this struggle as a “human rights movement,”
with a goal of dismantling the systemic race and class based oppression that
informed housing policies and maintained a racial and economic hierarchy in the
city. In order to supplant the values that informed government policies privileging
the right of wealthy white landlords to accumulate property and capital, poor Black
tenants needed to organize themselves to seize political power in their
communities. Seen in this light, Gray’s demands and mobilization for housing
inspections in the early 1960s takes on a less accommodating, and far more radical
shape.
By the end of 1962, it was clear that Gray and the CCH were gaining
momentum and that Hulan Jack’s earlier assessment of housing inequality as the
“most explosive issue since civil rights” had been quite prescient. The organizing
efforts of the CCH from 1959-1962, coordinated by Gray and organized by a cadre of
Black women tenants, had pushed tenant organizing to the forefront of Black
liberation struggles in the city. Fueled by the momentum the CCH helped to
86
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generate, a host of influential individuals and organizations became active in tenant
organizing during these years. In the spring of 1960, attorney Paul Zuber, who had
previously represented Mae Mallory in her suit against the NYC Board of Education,
provided counsel for 15 families on 137th Street who had been without running
water for over a month. Zuber filed legal complaints in municipal court, and also
withheld rent on behalf of the tenants until all repairs were completed in the
building.88
The direct action tactics characteristic of the Civil Rights Movement and the
CCH were also influencing the organizing of more liberal housing advocates. At the
third annual conference of the more moderate Metropolitan Council on Housing in
1961, members advocated for “mass demonstrations” to demand a moratorium
against demolitions. Yorkville Assemblyman Mark Lane, who had been actively
involved with the Political Committee of the LHTC the previous year, called for
“mass action” to force a stalled tenement repair bill out of legislative committee.
Citing the nonviolent direct action campaigns of the sit-ins and Freedom Rides in his
keynote address, housing attorney Harris Present encouraged the MCH to “court
mass evictions” to win a moratorium on demolitions. Though the MCH’s advocacy of
direct action ebbed and flowed in the following years based on the currents of
housing legislation and civil rights organizing in the city and state, it was clear that
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this large, middle-class housing organization was being directly influenced by
actions from the grassroots.89
With the formation of the East Harlem Tenants Council and a CORE housing
clinic on West 125th Street in 1962, the tenant movement that Gray and the CCH had
spearheaded in Harlem showed signs of expanding across ethnic lines and into the
mainstream of the Civil Rights Movement. For several years, Gray had been
attempting to make inroads with New York’s rapidly growing Puerto Rican
communities and had found a capable comrade in Ted Vélez, a young social worker
and City College graduate. Vélez began volunteering with Gray and the LHTC around
1960, and two years later used his experience and connections to establish the
EHTC in the barrio of East Harlem. Under the leadership of Vélez and Tony Williams,
the EHTC followed the organizational and tactical models of the CCH, and developed
a “network of building captains” to promote indigenous leadership and a selfsustaining movement among Puerto Rican renters.90
While Vélez and Williams were building their organization in East Harlem,
the New York (Harlem) Congress of Racial Equality (NY CORE) was changing their
tact on housing activism. Though NY CORE had previously focused their organizing
efforts around open-housing campaigns, as demonstrated during a February 1962
protest at Gracie Mansion to demand that City Hall “give us a strong law for
Schwartz, “Tenant Power in the Liberal City, 1943-1971,” 169-171;
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integrated housing,” by the year’s end the chapter had begun to expand their focus
to address the conditions of slum housing.91 According to Schwartz, NY CORE had
found itself “caught in the crosscurrents of civil rights and Muslim nationalism” and
opened the housing clinic to keep up with the rising tide of grassroots organizing for
community empowerment. Though Schwartz attributes NY CORE’s shift in housing
advocacy to the “accelerating civil rights movement,” Gray and the CCH were
actively shaping the struggle for Black liberation in New York and played a central
role in making tenants rights a fundamental component of these same struggles. At
its inception, CORE announced that the housing clinic would send investigation
teams into buildings and “call on residents” to inform them of their housing rights.92
By the following year, NY CORE would evolve from this limited premise to fall more
closely in line with the direct action organizing efforts of the CCH.

The period from 1959-1962 proved to be a formative one for struggles for
tenants rights and human rights in Harlem. At the dawn of the 1960s, Jesse Gray and
the LHTC/CCH had brought tenant organizing and rent strikes back into the popular
lexicon of Black freedom struggles in New York City. Over the following three years,
Gray and his cadre of tenant organizers used the momentum of the 1959 rent strikes
and heightened demands for rights and power to build a grassroots movement that
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pushed tenants rights and housing rights to the center of popular discourse around
civil rights, human rights, and political power in Harlem. With this groundswell of
activism from the grassroots came important legislative victories, as well as the
growth of an organizational framework that politically mobilized poor and workingclass Black renters in consciousness and in action. Despite these tangible and
intangible strides made by Gray and the CCH, however, the rampant abuses of Black
and Puerto Rican tenants continued to plague Harlem communities. The liberal
responses from City and State governments proved capable of rectifying violations
in some buildings, but wholly incapable of addressing housing inequality in any
systematic ways. For some renters and organizers, this piecemeal approach to
housing reform had a pacifying effect—tempers cooled as inspectors converged
upon buildings and occasionally succeeded in forcing repairs. Many others,
however, were growing increasingly impatient with the limited reach of these
largely ineffective liberal responses to the most pressing needs of Harlem’s Black
community.
v
In July of 1960, James Baldwin lifted American audiences out of their
Davenports and dropped them into the streets of Central Harlem in a gripping essay
in Esquire magazine. In blunt, yet moving terms in “Fifth Avenue Uptown: A Letter
from Harlem,” Baldwin laid bare the material and psychological realities of life on
the “fetid block” of the Harlem ghetto built and enforced by whites, and occupied by
African Americans. Using the housing situation faced by so many Black residents of
Harlem as an entrée and central theme of the piece, Baldwin explained to readers as
167

few other writers could, the human toll that slum housing conditions took on its
residents. “They patiently browbeat the landlord into fixing the heat, the plaster, the
plumbing; this demands prodigious patience; nor is patience usually enough,”
Baldwin wrote. “Such frustration, so long endured,” he continued, “is driving many
strong, admirable men and women whose only crime is color to the very gates of
paranoia.”93
This frustration, Baldwin argued, was caused not merely by the seemingly
intractable problems of inhumane housing conditions in Harlem, but also by the
popular understanding that such conditions were symptomatic of a larger system of
racial oppression. Housing projects and policemen, Baldwin explained, were hated
for the same reason in Harlem: “both reveal, unbearably, the real attitude of the
white world, no matter how many liberal speeches are made, no matter how many
lofty editorials are written, no matter how many civil-rights commissions are set up
[emphasis added].” Having grown up in Harlem and born witness to the daily
realities of racial oppression there, Baldwin understood and expressed what few
whites were able or willing to comprehend: liberal governance would not, and could
not, improve or solve the conditions of a ghetto. The only way a ghetto could be
improved, Baldwin argued, was “out of existence.”94
Baldwin’s essay read like a direct critique of the anemic liberal responses to
racial inequality and unrest from City Hall in the wake of the “near riot” in Harlem in
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1959. Lofty speeches and editorials abounded while the Mayor’s Committee on
Harlem Affairs investigated well-known problems and submitted reports offering
piecemeal solutions for curbing racial tensions. To be certain, there were genuinely
progressive proposals scattered amongst the CAH’s proceedings, but the premise
upon which the Committee operated was not designed to dismantle the institutional
walls of the ghetto, but rather to whitewash them to provide a semblance of reform
and to cool a heated political climate. Furthermore, while city officials were touting
liberal reforms to psychologically disarm rising protests at the grassroots, they were
also taking measures to militarize the city’s police force to physically suppress
surging demands for rights and power.
Despite the best efforts of City Hall to undercut Black demands for human
rights and political empowerment in this period, organizers at the grassroots were
succeeding in mobilizing and organizing Harlem residents in consciousness and in
action. While Jesse Gray and the CCH were expanding their organizing efforts in
Harlem to include more buildings and more fundamental demands, Malcolm X along
with a growing cadre of radical Black artists, activists, and organizers were reshaping the political landscape of Harlem, the city, and the nation.95 As more Harlem
residents became increasingly aware and impatient with the designed limitations of
a liberal government for rectifying institutional inequality in any meaningful way,
support for more radical alternatives rose, and an already limited trust in City Hall
fell further. By 1963, Harlem was on the cusp of becoming a movement center,
The organizing efforts of Malcolm X, Mae Mallory, the Fair Play For Cuba
Committee, and other Black radical activists and organizations will be examined in
detail in Chapter Four.
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empowered with a radical political consciousness and united through struggle. In a
post-script to “Fifth Avenue, Uptown” published in 1961, Baldwin warned readers
that “any effort, from here on out, to keep the Negro in his ‘place’ can only have the
most extreme and unlucky repercussions.”96
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CHAPTER 5
“MAJESTIC LIONS OF THE VALLEYS AND PLAINS”: MAE MALLORY, MALCOLM X,
AND THE “NEW AFRO-AMERICAN NATIONALISM” IN HARLEM, 1959-1963
Passive resistance may work for peripheral things such as the right to eat at a
lunch counter, the right to use comfort stations and waiting rooms on a nonsegregated basis. Passive resistance has helped to show the need for more
militant action. No people under the sun ever won complete liberation by
completely passive means. –Mae Mallory to Lorraine Hansberry (1963)1
They call us racial extremists. They call Jomo Kenyatta also a racial extremist
and Tom Mboya a moderate. It is only the white man’s fear of men like
Kenyatta that makes him listen to men like Mboya. If it were not for the
extremists, the white man would ignore the moderates. To be called a
‘moderate’ in this awakening dark world today, that is crying for freedom, is to
receive the ‘kiss of death’ as spokesmen or leaders of the masses…for the masses
are ready to burst the shackles of slavery whether the ‘moderates’ will stand up
or not. –Malcolm X (1960)2
As dawn rose on the new decade of the 1960s, America was startled awake
by a new militancy demonstrated by young civil rights activists who were taking
bold new steps in the long march toward freedom. In February 1960, college
students in Greensboro, North Carolina and Nashville, Tennessee began sitting-in at
segregated lunch counters to expedite the process of desegregation through
nonviolent direct action. Impatient with the gradual pace of desegregation since the
Brown decision that had been continually hamstrung by the dogged resistance of
local white communities and a complicit federal government, students throughout
the South directly confronted segregation in their communities and consequently
Letter from Mae Mallory to Lorraine Hansberry, June 1, 1963, Box 1, Folder
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pushed older leaders to embrace new tactics. Images of young, sharply dressed
Black men and women being brutalized by white posses at department store lunch
counters spread throughout the nation in newspaper and television news reports. In
the North, civil rights organizations waged sympathy protests and boycotts of
Woolworth’s department store in several major cities.
In a matter of months, this new militancy and groundswell of student
activists were organized into the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) under the guidance of veteran grassroots organizer Ella Baker. Resisting
overtures from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to form a
youth branch of Dr. King’s organization, SNCC’s formation as an independent,
grassroots student organization marked a clear departure from the bourgeois
leadership that had long dominated mainstream civil rights organizations. With the
new decade still in its infancy, this generation of students—the age peers of Emmett
Till—had sparked what James Baldwin described as “a revolution in the
consciousness of this country which will inexorably destroy nearly all that we now
think of as concrete and indisputable.”3
While southern college students waged campaigns against segregation and
shifted the Movement into a higher gear, struggles for independence and liberation
in Africa and across the Diaspora were reinvigorating a revolutionary international
consciousness in African American communities—particularly in New York City. As
Rhonda Y. Williams notes, SNCC emerged in an era of resurgent Pan-Africanism
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amidst the establishment of 17 new African nations.4 This revolutionary
consciousness had deep roots in Harlem, where Marcus Garvey’s UNIA had inspired,
awoken, and mobilized generations of African Americans. By the early 1960s,
Harlem was experiencing a rebirth of Pan-African, nationalist, and revolutionary
popular thought, as cadres of nationalist leaders and radical intellectuals brought
revolutionary analyses to street corners, salons, newspapers, and rallies. “A militant
new generation has arisen,” poet Rolland Snellings (Askia Touré) wrote in 1963,
“truly Garvey’s ‘cubs in the woods’ have become majestic lions of the valleys and
plains.”5 Though inspired by anti-colonial independence movements in Africa and
the Caribbean, this heightened radical consciousness was also fundamentally
influenced by the experiences of Harlem’s poor and working class communities that
had been shaping the direction of local grassroots struggles for equality and
empowerment over the past several years. Indeed, the proletarian leadership of this
“New Afro-American Nationalism,” as Dr. John Henrik Clarke termed the emergent
political phenomena, had “turned away from a leadership that was begging and
pleading to a more dynamic leadership that is insisting and demanding.”6
The Civil Rights Movement in Harlem in the early 1960s was marked by a
distinct popular break with what singer Abbey Lincoln called the “crumb-crunching,
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cocktail-sipping Uncle Tom leadership” class and an assertion of liberation and selfdetermination by any means necessary.7 The masses in Harlem and throughout the
nation had grown demonstrably impatient with the limits of liberal governance, as
well as the lack of vision and sense of urgency that many felt characterized the
moderate, middle-class civil rights organizations, to meaningfully address the
unceasing inequality and oppression faced by poor and working-class Black
communities. This evolution of the Movement in Harlem was not merely rhetorical.
Building upon the successes of organizations like the Community Council on
Housing (CCH), the Nation of Islam (NOI), and the Harlem Nine in mobilizing
communities and achieving tangible victories, existing and emerging civil rights
groups began to shift their focus to community organizing and building radical
grassroots organizations of the most marginalized communities in Harlem.
The period from 1959-1963 represented a dynamic and formative stage in
struggles for rights and power in Harlem that had significant reverberations
throughout the nation. Though many years in the making, this evolution was
expedited at the dawn of the new decade by the convergence of local, national, and
global freedom struggles in Harlem. This chapter analyzes these political trends and
catalytic events from Harlem to Havana, and Greensboro to the Congo, which
influenced this shift in militancy and organizational analyses in the Black Mecca and
beyond. Debates about community organizing, nonviolent resistance, armed selfdefense, civil disobedience, liberal reform, self-determination, and revolutionary
nationalism were commonplace from street corners to theatre stages and indeed
7
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characterized the growth of the Movement during this period. By analyzing the
evolving actions and ideologies of Mae Mallory and Malcolm X, along with their
expansive networks, this chapter considers not only the impacts of broader
struggles upon the Movement in Harlem, but more significantly, the formative roles
played by local people in challenging racial oppression in the urban north and
pushing the national Civil Rights Movement in more radical directions in the early
1960s.
v
As thousands gathered in New York City in July of 1959 for the 50th
Anniversary Convention of the NAACP, copies of a small, unfamiliar newspaper
called The Crusader made their way through the corridors of the New York Coliseum
at the southern end of Central Park. Though members came from across the country
to commemorate the organization’s “Golden Anniversary,” the celebratory impetus
for the occasion was overshadowed by the mounting internal debate over the
NAACP’s positions on nonviolent direct action and armed self-defense. That spring,
president of the Monroe NAACP branch, Robert F. Williams, had infamously
declared his intention to “meet violence with violence” in the face of unrelenting
attacks upon Black women by white men, and now he stood ready to defend himself
from being suspended by the organization amidst rising national support for armed
self-defense and self-determination. On the other end of the park from where the
Convention was being held, copies of Williams’ newly launched newspaper, The
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Crusader, flooded the streets of Harlem, where many Black residents were following
the proceedings of the Convention with great interest.8
Mae Mallory, herself a vocal advocate of armed self-defense and selfdetermination, had recently celebrated a major legal victory against de facto
segregation in Harlem’s public schools when she first caught wind of Williams’ fights
against Klan violence and NAACP suppression. As the Convention was proceeding, a
neighbor approached Mallory at her apartment on West 129th Street and told her to
tune into the local radio station WLIB. “She says there is something on there that
you would be interested in,” Mallory later recalled, “and this was during the NAACP
Conference…when Robert Williams was there…brought up on charges by the
national body [for] advocating armed self-defense.” The radio coverage of the
Conference proved a formative moment in Mallory’s political development and
finally brought her personal analyses on self-determination, human rights, and selfdefense within intersectional struggles for Black liberation into organizational
practice. “I heard it and I said ‘My God, you know, this is only right.’ So instead of
going to work that day I got up and went in the streets and organized some support
for Robert Williams,” a man she had never met.9 Mallory quickly drew upon her
connections with the Harlem Nine and other women in her neighborhood with the
intention of picketing the NAACP convention if Roy Wilkins did not “drop the
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charges against Rob.”10 Though the protest failed to materialize, Mallory
nonetheless threw herself into the struggle to support the Black community in
Monroe.
In Robert and Mabel Williams, Mallory found kindred spirits in a grassroots
fight against state-sponsored racial violence shaped by class and gender. In Monroe,
the Williams’ had effectively organized one of the few working-class branches of the
NAACP, a distinction that fundamentally shaped the analyses and actions of the
branch, and brought the Monroe branch into conflict with the national organization.
Though the right to armed self-defense was guaranteed by the US Constitution and
widely practiced within Black communities throughout the South, the national
organization, characterized by middle-class, moderate leadership, refused to
publically endorse self-defense as an acceptable tactic in struggles against state and
vigilante violence. Like the Williams’, Mae Mallory was quite familiar with how class
dynamics impacted civil rights organizing. As a contemporary of Ella Baker in
struggles for school desegregation in Harlem, Mallory recognized the same limits
that the bureaucratic approach of the NAACP placed upon such efforts and thus
organized a more militant grassroots base to carry out popular, direct-action
campaigns for equality and self-determination in public education.11

Letter from Mae Mallory to Mabel and Robert F. Williams, June 3, 1963,
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downtown see us picket the NAACP.”
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Additionally, like the Williams, Mallory’s experiences with gendered and
class-based racial violence shaped her political analyses of institutional racism and
embrace of armed self-defense. Raised by a community of Black women in the South
who advocated self-defense and demanded equality, Mallory was taught at a young
age to “hold your head up, stick your chest out, and march to the tune of ‘The World
Is Mine.”12 Mallory brought this resolve to the school boycott, when she was
subjected to accusations, death threats,13 and criminal reprisals in response to her
relentless demands for educational equality for her two children. After early
attempts by her children’s school principal to paint Mallory as a “Communist” and
troublemaker failed to deter her demands for a new school, Mallory was arrested on
charges of fraud and grand larceny in 1957 for briefly receiving welfare benefits
while she was employed. “I had never been to jail in my life,” Mallory recalled, “but
this whole furor around the schools stirred up such a thing until the power structure
decided that they would try to find something that they could discredit me with.”14
To Mallory, the arrest was not simply a matter of political retaliation to curb the
school protests, but a systemic response designed to cripple her ability to find
employment and housing, care for her children, and stifle any further protests.
“They try to pile as much on you as they can pile on you to see if you will snap, to see
if you will break,” she said of her persecution, “and I am just determined that I’m not
12
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going to.” With the help of Ramona Garrett, a former CPUSA member and PanAfricanist organizer in Harlem, Mallory had a three-year sentence reduced to thirty
days, but the experience left her embittered by the political system and determined
to dismantle it.15
The systemic critique of American society that Mallory had developed by
1960 was reflective of an analysis that was becoming increasingly popular among
Black communities in Harlem and throughout the nation. As the protests outside the
28th Precinct had demonstrated that summer, many Harlem residents recognized
the inherently oppressive nature of American society and were no longer willing to
accept the limitations of liberal governance for redressing grievances. This popular
analysis was not only informed by the systemic, intersecting forces of racial
oppression faced by poor and working-class communities in Harlem. Coming amidst
an influx of liberation movements throughout the African Diaspora, the courageous
armed resistance of the Williams’ and the Monroe NAACP inspired a revolutionary
fervor amongst Harlem residents, organizers, and intellectuals in their local
struggles for human rights and self-determination. Having already established
herself within Harlem’s grassroots civil rights milieu through the school boycotts,
Mallory played an active role in inspiring and shaping the flowering of this
revolutionary consciousness at the grassroots in Harlem at the advent of the 1960s.
Though Robert Williams’ suspension was ultimately upheld by the national
NAACP, his unwavering claim to the right of armed self-defense in the face of racial
terrorism inspired Black communities across the nation and earned him the
15
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allegiance of a powerful cadre of radical organizers and intellectuals in Harlem. As
Timothy Tyson notes, Williams’ advocacy of Black economic empowerment, selfdetermination, Black culture, and armed self-reliance “reinvigorated many elements
of the black nationalist tradition whose forceful emergence in the mid-1960s would
become known as Black Power.”16 These aspects of Williams’ political ideology had
deep roots in Harlem’s Black radical tradition, and his occasional trips to New York
City in 1958 and 1959 brought Williams into close contact with the likes of writer
Julian Mayfield, historian John Henrik Clarke, and the Nation of Islam’s Harlem
minister Malcolm X. Williams received warm reception in Harlem, often leaving with
donations from Malcolm X for arms and ammunition, and was regularly invited to
speak at street corner rallies and in the NOI’s Temple Number Seven. “I was the only
one from the NAACP who could go down in Harlem and stand on a ladder on a
corner and speak there,” Williams later said of these visits.17 These early visits to
Harlem provided Williams with valuable inroads into a national network of
influential Black radicals, but the heightened publicity he received during the
summer of 1959 inspired a more coordinated effort to support the Black community
of Monroe.
When Mae Mallory finally heard of the Williams’ crusade for human rights,
economic empowerment, and self-determination in Monroe on the radio that
summer, she launched herself into organizing work to support their fight. “Our
group decided that well, we’ll all join his chapter,” Mallory recalled, “let him set up
16
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his own organization and we’ll all join him.”18 The group that Mallory assembled,
whose ranks included Robert Williams’s first cousin Ora Mae Mobley, was a small
but determined organization called The New York Crusader Family. Named after the
Williams’ newspaper, The Crusader, which he and Mabel would send north to
Harlem in bundles, The NY Crusader Family (also known as Crusaders For Freedom)
initially began their work by distributing the circular throughout New York City. “It
was a very interesting little pamphlet,” Mallory continued, “so then we decided let’s
send people The Crusader for Christmas instead of Christmas cards because this is a
greater message, you know, than Hallmark.”19 Flying under the banner of
“Advancing The Cause of Race Pride and Freedom,” the messages carried in The
Crusader were well received in Harlem. In the place where Cyril Briggs had called
for an armed war against the KKK in the 1920s on the pages of his own newspaper,
The Crusader, Williams found the inspiration for the title of his paper and the
vociferous support of nationalist organizers like Mallory and Queen Mother Moore,
who “rallied the support teams” for the Black community of Monroe.20
From Havana to Harlem: The Cuban Revolution and Black Radicalism in New
York City
From 1959-1961, The NY Crusader Family escalated their organizing efforts
to aid the struggle in Monroe, while also supporting national and global freedom
struggles from the streets of Harlem. The political climate in Harlem at the advent of
18
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the 1960s was charged by the wave of revolutions beginning to sweep through the
African continent, as well as its diaspora. In 1958, Guinean independence leader
Sekou Toure became the first president of the newly formed Republic of Guinea, and
by the end of 1960, 17 more nations in Africa would emerge independent through
their own revolutionary struggles. On New Year’s Day in 1959, the era of
anticolonial revolution appeared at the doorstep of the United States when Cuban
dictator Fulgencio Batista fled the island nation, signaling the victory of the guerilla
army led by Fidel Castro. Happening just 250 miles off the coast of Miami and
orchestrated by charismatic leaders of African descent, the Cuban Revolution
captured the attention and imagination of African American communities already
impatient with the slow pace of racial progress and stoked a revolutionary fervor
amongst Black radicals.
African American newspapers and writers throughout the United States
extolled the victory of an integrated army, led in large part by Afro-Cubans, over an
oppressive dictatorship and carried the words of Castro who vowed to “eliminate all
forms of discrimination.”21 Black journalists like William Worthy, and reporters
from the Amsterdam News and other syndicates, reported back to African American
communities with their experiences on the island and the promises of the
revolution. “The important lesson in the Cuban experience,” Julian Mayfield wrote,
“is that social change need not wait on the patient education of white
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supremacists.”22 Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who had persuaded Congress in the
previous year to cease the US shipment of arms to Batista forces, visited the island
at Castro’s invitation that January and urged Congress to support the new Cuban
government, while also publicly hoping that the Cuban victory would inspire similar
revolutions throughout the Caribbean and Latin America.23
The shockwaves that the Cuban Revolution sent across the globe
reverberated particularly loudly in New York City, with Harlem playing host to
Castro and other foreign dignitaries in 1960. During a visit to the city in the spring of
that year, Fidel Castro was greeted by the roar of 20,000 revelers at Pennsylvania
Station in Midtown Manhattan, with 40,000 more gathered in Central Park to
celebrate the revolutionary’s arrival in the United States.24 “Every Afro-American in
his right mind supports Fidel Castro,” Mae Mallory wrote of the Cuban leader’s
popularity in Harlem, “even if he is afraid to do so publicly.”25
Despite the popular reception he received from African American
communities across the nation, Castro and his revolutionary government in Cuba
quickly became a target of Cold War era suspicion and persecution from the United
States government. Perceived as a threat to the economic interests of powerful US
investors and the imperial aspirations of US global capitalism under the guise of
22
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“democracy,” Castro was subjected to Communist smear campaigns and countless
assassination attempts from the CIA. For Black organizers and intellectuals who had
been active in left-labor led struggles during the post-World War II era, these
repressive tactics that characterized the McCarthy Era were all too familiar, and
many organized to actively support Castro’s government in spite of US opposition.
In the spring of 1960, a group of 30 intellectuals and activists formed the Fair
Play For Cuba Committee to challenge mainstream media narratives about the
Cuban government and to coordinate active support for the revolutionary
government. Of the thirty founding members of the FPCC, which included the likes
of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and American writer Norman Mailer, nearly
one third were African American, most of whom were “drawn from among [Robert
F.] Williams’s nationalist supporters in Harlem.” These members included writers
James Baldwin, John O. Killens, and Julian Mayfield, journalists William Worthy and
Richard Gibson, historian John Henrik Clarke, and Robert Williams himself.26 In June
of that year, FPCC provided Williams with the opportunity to visit the island as an
official guest of Fidel Castro and the Cuban government.27
On his way to Havana, Williams was given a warm farewell reception from
The Crusader Family before flying out of New York City. Though not involved in an
official capacity with FPCC, the organizing work that Mae Mallory undertook in
Harlem with The Crusader Family brought her into close collaboration with many of
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the group’s members and their broader networks. In many ways, this expansive
network of organizations and affiliations that Black FPCC members represented was
illustrative of the deeply rooted Black radical tradition that was flowering in Harlem
by the early 1960s. Inspired by the impatience of the student sit-in movement
erupting in the South, as well as the anti-colonial climate of revolution throughout
the African Diaspora, Black activists in New York City escalated their local protest
activities within a national and global context in the early 1960s.
This network of affiliations that both preceded and emerged in the wake of
the FPCC included organizations such as the Harlem Writers Guild (HWG), the
Organization of Young Men (OYM), and On Guard Committee For Freedom (OGFF),
publications such as Freedom, Freedomways, and Liberator magazines, and countless
ties to the diverse array of notable Black leaders, nationalist groups, and community
organizations. Though many of the individuals involved in this radical political
milieu lived outside of Harlem, as James Smethurst notes, “when black artists and
intellectuals engaged in radical cultural and political African-American identified
activities, organizations, and institutions, their symbolic (and often practical) locus
was often still Harlem.” The continued work of radical grassroots organizers in
Harlem, including Mae Mallory and Jesse Gray, and artist-activists like actors Ossie
Davis and Ruby Dee, Smethurst argues, carried the torch of “the long history of Left
and nationalist political and artistic activity” which made Harlem a logical and fertile
location for radical organizing in the early 1960s.28
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Though less known in the artistic and intellectual spheres that many of these
activists occupied, Mae Mallory was known in the streets of Harlem and emerged as
a driving force behind many of the most explosive organizing activities in the city
from 1960-1961. Furthermore, Mallory’s evolving political analysis and actions
during this period marked a rejection of moderate civil rights organizations and a
budding embrace of self-determination, armed self-defense, Pan-African solidarity,
and revolutionary nationalism—an evolution that signified a trending radicalization
amongst poor and working-class Black communities in Harlem from 1960-1964.
Like Williams, Mayfield, Worthy, and countless other activists, Mallory drew
inspiration from the Cuban Revolution that fueled her organizing and political
analysis. When Castro visited New York City in September 1960, Mallory and the
Crusaders For Freedom coordinated a motorcade to welcome the iconic
revolutionary at Idlewild (now John F. Kennedy) Airport, and organized rallies
outside of the Hotel Theresa after discourteous treatment at a midtown hotel
prompted his move uptown to Harlem. The Crusaders gave Castro a rousing
welcome at the Hotel Theresa, chanting “Vive Castro!” and “Venceremos” along W.
125th Street while carrying signs that read “Give em hell Fidel” and “Harlem loves
Castro.”29 Mallory herself denounced the brusque treatment Castro had received at
the Shelbourne Hotel, charging that the “biased” management was “carrying out the
policy of the State Dept., to lie, to be impolite and create as much confusion and
chaos as possible.”
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Mallory also pointedly questioned the motives of the federal government in
attempting to salve the situation by offering Castro’s delegation a free stay at the
Shelbourne rather than move to Harlem. “In this country of Free ENTERPRISE does
it mean that people that the United States Gov’t call UNFRIENDLY should live rent
free rather than let a native born black man make one cent on his enterprise,”
Mallory charged, “or is there something that it would behove [sic] the black man in
these United States to learn from Fidel Castro?”30 In Mallory’s analysis, these
intentional and conspiratorial political maneuverings of the State evinced a
fundamental contradiction in American society. That a capitalist, “free enterprise”
society was willing to sacrifice the principles of free market trade to either prevent
Black businesses from earning capital, or to suppress radical internationalist
communications, further demonstrated to Mallory the systematic depths of
American racism and marked an evolution of her critique of the racist foundations
of capitalist society.
If Mallory was correct in her assessment of governmental anxieties over the
subversive possibilities of Castro’s visit to Harlem, the influence that the visit had on
many radical intellectuals and activists proved that Big Brother had reason to be
concerned. Like Mallory, Castro’s arrival had a profound impact on the political
development of Sarah E. Wright, an African American aspiring novelist and member
of the Harlem Writers Guild (HWG). “Fidel was part of a flood of new Third World
leaders,” Wright later wrote, “who were now coming to serve notice that the days of
the Black Man’s Burden…were drawing to a close.” Formed in 1950 as a writing
30
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salon for radical Black artists and intellectuals, including Wright, Killens, Clarke,
Mayfield, and singer Abbey Lincoln, the HWG by 1960 represented what Smethurst
describes as “the unrepentant left”—those intellectual-activists who remained
unwavering in their support of the ideological bases of the Leftist and nationalist
movements of the post-World War II era in spite of the systemic suppression that
dismantled such movements during the McCarthy Era.31 With the radical fervor of
the post-war era showing promising signs of life by 1960, intellectual-activists like
those in the HWG brought the radical politics of that era into organized action at the
turn of the decade.
The political analysis and activism of many HWG members was also informed
by close personal relationships with local, national, and global liberation struggles,
which were converging in Harlem during this period with their active assistance. In
her reflections on the HWG, Wright explained that firsthand reports of racial
violence in the South, where many HWG members had come from, conveyed “a
greater immediacy to us than the nightly TV footage.” At the same time, Wright
noted, “we were also at one with the seething ghettos of the North, our ears attuned
to Malcolm’s message.” And with 1960 dubbed the “Year of Africa” by the United
Nations for the anti-colonial revolutions sweeping the continent, HWG members
immersed themselves in solidarity work for various armed liberation struggles, and
were instrumental in spreading a consciousness of Africa to African American
communities. To Wright and other members of the HWG, then, Castro’s nearby
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victory and triumphant arrival in Harlem signified that “there was a new day
coming!”32
Wright learned of Castro’s arrival in Harlem during a weekly meeting of the
HWG that she was hosting in her Lower East Side apartment with her husband,
Joseph Kaye, and attended by John O. and Grace Killens, John Henrik Clarke, and Bill
Forde. When a phone call for Clarke announced that the Cuban premier was moving
to the Hotel Theresa, the group hastily sped uptown to join the throngs of revelers
on W. 125th St. and Seventh Ave., braving the rain and rough police presence to
celebrate Castro’s arrival and “protect Fidel against unseen menaces.”33
Though the majority of those who flocked to lay eyes on Castro may not have
been Fidelistas, as Julian Mayfield noted, the feeling along 125th Street “was that
anybody so completely rejected by white America must have some good points.”34
“While most of white New York was gnashing its teeth, Harlem was erupting!,”
Wright recalled, echoing Mallory’s assessment of the fearful responses of
government agencies to Castro’s arrival, which included FBI surveillance and police
suppression of demonstrations. Despite the hostilities displayed by city and federal
agencies, and the ambivalence of local “mainstream leaders” (including Jackie
Robinson and the previously-supportive Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.), the thousands
that greeted Castro on a near-daily basis in Harlem effectively served notice that the
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collective mood of the people was aligned more closely with that of Mallory and
Wright, rather than the established leadership class. As Smethurst notes, Castro’s
meetings in Harlem with Malcolm X, Robert F. Williams, and other community
leaders “energized nationalists and leftists (and Left nationalists), facilitated the
circulation of radical ideas in the community, and reinforced the image of Harlem as
a center for such ideas.”35
Though the immediate exhilaration that Mallory, Wright, and thousands of
others in Harlem felt during Castro’s ten-day visit would fade, it nonetheless left a
lasting mark on the collective consciousness of a generation of activists and local
people. “What has always remained…of Fidel’s visit,” Wright recalled over 30 years
later, “is a social vision immersed so deep in my heart it can never be dislodged.”36
Like Wright and other members of the HWG, the revolutionary fervor of 1960
stoked the radical imaginations of the African American leftist and nationalist
literary communities in New York City and prompted a shift to more active
organizational involvement in radical struggles for rights and power in Harlem.
One of the first organizations to emerge from the downtown literary scene
amidst this political zeitgeist was the Organization of Young Men (OYM), formed in
1960 by writer LeRoi Jones (Amiri Baraka). A native of Newark, NJ, Baraka had
traveled to Cuba with FPCC that July at the invitation of Richard Gibson, along with
Sarah Wright, Harold Cruse, Julian Mayfield and his wife Ana Cordero, where he met
Castro and Robert F. Williams for the first time. Seeing the fruits of an anti-colonial
35
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revolution firsthand in the streets of Havana, Baraka’s tour of the island pulled back
the curtains on a concept that had previously seemed “foreign,” “romantic,” and
even “hopeless” to him and other self-fancied rebels in the United States.37 Coupled
with the southern student movement, the trip spurred Baraka to reconsider the
efficacy of the “bland revolt” that the culture of the downtown beat scene
represented and provided the inspiration and push needed to begin putting his
evolving radical political consciousness into organizational practice.
Once back in New York, Baraka began working his connections in the literary
scene to put together a group to raise political consciousness downtown. The
Organization of Young Men emerged from these efforts as an all-Black group of
writers, musicians, and intellectuals, including Archie Shepp, Harold Cruse, Calvin
Hicks, and A.B. Spellman, who recognized that “it was time to go on the offensive in
the civil rights movement.”38 According to Smethurst, the OYM was
intended as a vehicle for downtown black artists and activists to engage and
enter into the more militant side of the domestic civil rights movement and
to link civil rights in the United States with struggles against colonialism and
neocolonialism around the world, while maintaining a distance from
‘mainstream’ civil rights organizations.”39
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Smethurst’s assessment is evident in a recruitment letter sent in the spring of 1961,
in which Baraka sent out a call to “young Negro men…to form some highly militant
organization…to combat the rise of Uncle Tomism, shallow minded white liberalism,
racism, and ignorance.” “The new nations of Africa, and the newly independent
peoples of Asia and Latin America,” Baraka continued, “form, now, a majority of the
peoples of the world. They are, indeed, our brothers…but we must earn this
brotherhood by acting.”40 Though by Baraka’s own admission the group lacked a
collective analysis and sense of direction, it nonetheless represented “a confirmation
of rising consciousness” that resonated throughout the city and would quickly
converge with the radical political milieu that was surging in Harlem.41
Furthermore, as Smethurst notes, the formation of the OYM marked a “crucial step
in Baraka’s move toward Black Power” and the opening of the Black Arts Repertory
Theatre School five years later.42
“A nation within a nation”: Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam in Harlem, 19591961
If Baraka’s pilgrimage to Cuba provided the push factor for his involvement
in organized political action, this process was expedited by his introduction to
Malcolm X through “The Hate That Hate Produced” the previous year. While Mike
Wallace’s weeklong television special had evoked shock and outrage in white
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audiences, the stirring visuals of the NOI and its loquacious young minister
electrified a generation of Black audiences. “He charged me in a way no one else had
ever done. He reached me,” Baraka later recalled. To Baraka and many other young
militants, the emergence of Malcolm X represented the rise of a dynamic new
leadership that rejected gradual approaches to liberation and more accurately
reflected the increasingly militant mood and analyses of the Black masses. “What
Malcolm said were things that had gone through my mind but he was giving voice
to,” Baraka remembered, “his media appearances made my head tingle with
anticipation and new ideas. He made me feel even more articulate and forceful,
myself, just having seen him.”43 Though “The Hate That Hate Produced” had exposed
the Nation to the racist vitriol of white American society, the national visibility the
program offered also provided a springboard for their recruitment and expansion.
One of the major facets of the NOI’s recruiting strategies at the turn of the
decade was the dissemination of pamphlets, handbills, and newspapers throughout
the streets of Harlem, where members ardently “fished” for converts. The NOI’s
increased emphasis on producing and circulating literature also had another
motivation, though. As Manning Marable notes, the media firestorm that followed in
the wake of Mike Wallace’s television special motivated the NOI to establish its own
media outlets in an attempt to gain control over its image. Though for years Elijah
Muhammad had written columns in the Pittsburgh Courier and the Los Angeles
Herald-Dispatch, the spotlight that the NOI had attracted by 1959 presented a prime
opportunity for the Nation to launch their own publications to both write their own
43
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narratives and to reach their goal of adding one million converts by 1961.44 Despite
the increasing demands of leading Mosque No. 7, organizing new mosques across
the nation, and managing his heightened public profile, Malcolm X took the lead in
launching what would become one of the NOI’s “most potent vehicles,” Muhammad
Speaks.
After a short-lived attempt at publishing a magazine titled The Messenger in
the fall of 1959, Malcolm X scored immediate, widespread success in launching
Muhammad Speaks in May of 1960.45 To get the paper off the ground required
tireless dedication from Malcolm, who set aside a room in his house in East
Elmhurst, Queens, for the paper’s production. “He would have pages plastered all
over the wall,” Elijah Muhammad’s son Wallace Muhammad recalled. “The whole
room was just turned into a workplace for the production of the paper.”46 Printed
out of an office at 113 Lenox Avenue in Harlem, the tabloid-sized paper sold for
fifteen cents and was billed as “a militant monthly dedicated to Justice for the Black
Man.”47 Bundles of the newspaper were swiftly delivered to Mosques across the
nation and members of the NOI were ordered to fill strict quotas of sales and
subscriptions. Neatly-dressed members of the Nation became regular fixtures on the
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streets of Harlem where they hawked copies of the paper, while also setting up shop
outside of churches, NAACP meetings, street rallies, and any other places where
African Americans congregated.48 The relentless salesmanship of NOI members
(performed under threat of economic or physical punishment) had remarkable
impacts in short time. As Marable notes, Muhammad Speaks “quickly attracted tens
of thousands of regular readers, the vast majority of them non-Muslims.”49 Within
its first two years in publication, the newspaper had a circulation of over 50,000 and
by 1963 Muhammad Speaks would have the largest distribution of any African
American newspaper in publication.50
In addition to the tireless efforts of the NOI’s ever-present sales force, the
paper also drew widespread readership by featuring columns from well-known
writers who wrote effectively to the mood of the Black masses in Harlem and the
nation. The pages of Muhammad Speaks regularly contained columns in the early
1960s from notable Harlem writers Langston Hughes, John Henrik Clarke, and
Sylvester Leaks, who helped to shape the political analysis of the widely circulated
paper. An activist and associate of Clarke, Leaks was a particularly ideal fit for
covering issues of self-defense and self-determination, which were central pillars of
NOI ideology. Described by Julian Mayfield as a “militant writer” who knew when it
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was time to “lay down his pen, stop talking and wade in with his fists,”51 Leaks in the
following years would become head of Crusaders For Freedom and a fixture at
street rallies and radical organizing campaigns.
After its early successes in Harlem, production of Muhammad Speaks
eventually shifted to the NOI’s national headquarters in Chicago, where Elijah
Muhammad and his inner circle could exercise closer control of the paper. Though
Muhammad’s conservative doctrine of political abstinence, Victorian social mores,
and Black capitalism was reflected in his columns, Smethurst points out that “the
general editorial direction of the paper was militantly antiracist and anti-imperialist
(and often anticapitalist) as well as nationalist.” This juxtaposition of Muhammad’s
conservatism with the radical leftist and nationalist leanings of a national editorial
staff drawn from veterans of the African American press and Popular Front in
Chicago foreshadowed looming contestations over political ideology and activism
between Muhammad and Malcolm.52
As Malcolm and the NOI shot into surging national conversations around civil
rights, integration, Black nationalism, self-determination, and self defense by 1960,
the Harlem minister was increasingly sought after for public debates and lectures on
these issues that were shaping the direction of the Black Freedom Struggle. Malcolm
X used these opportunities to not only confront misrepresentations of the NOI’s
theology as racist or hate-mongering, but also to expound his positions on the
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direction of the Black Freedom Struggle and challenge the legitimacy of its
mainstream leadership. In March, Malcolm X was invited to debate Rev. William M.
James of the Metropolitan Community United Church in Harlem on a local radio
broadcast moderated by radical white attorney William Kunstler. Citing claims by
Roy Wilkins that the NOI was “no better than the Ku Klux Klan,” Kunstler quickly
pressed Malcolm to defend the racial separatism preached by Elijah Muhammad. In
defending the nation’s theology, Malcolm rejected Wilkins’s comments as
uninformed and called attention to the hypocrisy of western religions that
historically practiced racial discrimination but now condemned the Nation of Islam
for religious exclusivity.53
While affirming the Nation’s theology in public appearances that spring,
Malcolm also explained its nationalistic ideologies that drew from traditions of
secular Black nationalism while also contributing to its resurgence in the early
1960s. At a lecture at Boston University the same month, Malcolm X devoted much
of a two-hour question and answer session to explaining the NOI’s position on the
“nation question” and reparations. As “back salary” for generations of enslavement,
Malcolm told the interracial crowd, Elijah Muhammad called for the United States to
compensate Black Americans with “either a tract of land, or several states, wherein
they could form their own government.”54 Although these aspects of the Nation’s
theology built upon past generations of Black nationalist political organizing, in
53
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these early appearances Malcolm exercised caution in explicitly commenting on the
Black Freedom Struggle as mandated by Muhammad’s position on political
noninvolvement.
While most of Malcolm’s public appearances at the dawn of the 1960s were
dedicated to explicating the theology and programs of the Nation of Islam, he did
make overtures to local civil rights and nationalist groups in Harlem. Though he had
actively supported Robert F. Williams with funds and a public platform when he
visited Harlem over the previous few years, Malcolm X’s primary engagement with
Harlem’s freedom struggles had been in the realm of psychological decolonization
and empowerment through his revelatory public speeches and dramatic stands
against police brutality. “People use that cliché, ‘the university of the streets,” Peter
Bailey recalled, “but that really was the university of the street because it was a
tremendous learning experience.”55
Malcolm X, who Bailey described as a “master teacher,” also recognized that
if the Nation were to bring about fundamental societal change, they would need
allies to put their liberatory education into praxis. Having cut his teeth on the street
corners of Harlem’s grassroots nationalist scene, Malcolm knew fully well that the
sectarian nationalist groups competing for followers were stifling collective action.
As John Henrik Clarke would describe the following year, “this nationalism is being
hampered by too many organizations and too many leaders with conflicting
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programs.”56 With the likes of James Lawson, Carlos Cooks, Eddie “Pork Chop” Davis,
Bessie Philips, and many other veteran speakers and organizers staking claims to
various corners and constituencies, Malcolm made a move in the spring of 1960 to
bring these nationalist factions, civil rights groups, and community leaders together
under a common banner of Black liberation and empowerment in Harlem.
In May 1960, an advertisement in the New York Amsterdam News announced
a “huge 6-hour outdoor” rally to be held at the corner of 125th St. and 7th Ave. Under
a bold headline announcing the Harlem Freedom Rally, a stone-faced photograph of
Malcolm X issued a call to religious, political, business, and civic leaders in Harlem.
“Let us forget our religious and political differences. We must come together on the
same platform in a great display of UNITY against our common enemy, and fight for
one common cause…complete and immediate FREEDOM for the Black Man in
America.” The list of speakers invited to the rally represented a veritable crosssection of African American political thought in Harlem, many of whom had been
involved in the Mayor’s Commission on Harlem Affairs the previous year. The
expansive guest list included Roy Wilkins, Lester Granger, Martin Luther King, Jr., A.
Philip Randolph, Jackie Robinson, Hope Stevens, James Watson, Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., James Lawson, and Sugar Ray Robinson, among many others known in
Harlem’s political, religious, and social circles.57
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Shortly after noon on May 28th, an estimated four thousand people flocked to
Harlem Square where speakers blasted Louis X’s “A White Man’s Heaven is a Black
Man’s Hell” from a stage set up in front of Louis Michaux’s bookstore.58 On the
grandstand, Bessie Philips, Percy Sutton, Wallace Muhammad, Max Roach, Louis X,
Hope Stevens, and Louis Michaux looked out onto a bustling crowd on the streets
and sidewalks where dozens raised signs reading “We Must Have Some Land.”59
Rising to the podium, Malcolm began his address with calls for unity amongst Black
leaders for the purpose of achieving freedom, equality, justice, and human rights so
long denied by the American government.
Far from a sentimental call for symbolic brotherhood, Malcolm explained
that this unity in leadership must be built and directed by the grassroots. The
purpose of the rally, he explained, was for the masses to become familiarized with
“our leaders who have been acting as our spokesmen.” Reflecting a growing local
and national disillusionment with gradualist leadership in the wake of the “nearriot” in Harlem and the sit-ins throughout the South, Malcolm pointed to the need
for local people to control their own movements. “We want to get behind leaders
who will fight for us…leaders who are not afraid to demand freedom, justice, and
equality,” he declared, “we do not want leaders who are hand picked for us by the
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white man. We don’t want any more Uncle Toms.”60 Keeping with NOI doctrines,
Malcolm challenged the crowd to begin this process by building unity in their
neighborhoods by abstaining from “immoral habits” that divided the community.
From there, Malcolm argued, the people needed to “form a platform that will be
good for all our own people, as well as for others,” and give “intelligent active
support to our political leaders” who would fight fearlessly and unselfishly for this
platform of Black liberation.
In this speech, Malcolm blended elements of the Nation’s theology of moral
conservatism, racial separatism, and economic nationalism with calls for selfdetermination, secular Black nationalism, and Pan-Africanism that were
characterizing grassroots freedom struggles in Harlem at the time. Describing the
20 million Black Americans as constituting a “nation within a nation,” Malcolm
invoked the “Spirit of Bandung” and cited his recent trip to Africa to call for
“freedom from colonialism, foreign domination, oppression and exploitation.” It was
clear in his speech that Malcolm saw the Bandung Conference and ongoing anticolonial liberation struggles as models for building a revolutionary united Black
freedom movement in the United States led by the militancy of the masses.
Using Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya as examples of “extremists” and
“moderates,” respectively, Malcolm explained the centrality of “extremists” in
advancing liberation struggles, despite the disparaging connotation of the term in
mainstream media outlets. “To be called a ‘moderate’ in this awakening dark world
today…is to receive the ‘kiss of death’ as…leader of the masses,” Malcolm declared,
60
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“for the masses are ready to burst the shackles of slavery whether the ‘moderates’
will stand up or not.”61 With Hope Stevens as the only invited speaker to actually
show up, it was evident that “moderate” leaders were generally unwilling to engage
in talks with the “extremist” spokesman for the Nation of Islam at this point. Though
Marable may have overstated his claims that the rally was responsible for
“transforming Malcolm into a respectable political leader in Harlem’s civic life,” the
Harlem Freedom Rally nonetheless marked a significant entrée for Malcolm into
coalition building in Harlem and showed an early step toward active engagement in
political organizing.62
While it is unclear if Elijah Muhammad objected to Malcolm’s focus on
politics and Pan-Africanism in his Harlem Freedom Rally speech, he was explicit in
his displeasure when Malcolm held a summit with Fidel Castro in the Hotel Theresa
that fall. To be certain, Malcolm had been a regular fixture at Harlem rallies for
visiting African leaders, including Guinean President Sekou Touré the previous fall
and a Nigerian attaché months later. Throughout the summer of 1960, Malcolm
spoke at Harlem street rallies about the “march toward freedom of the dark masses
throughout the rest of Africa, Asia and even Latin America,” warning of the
“explosive Congolese situation” where global neo-colonial forces threatened the
leadership of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.63 So when Malcolm made his way to
the Hotel Theresa to greet Fidel Castro that fall as part of a previously formed
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welcoming committee, it was a culmination of sorts for this early period of his PanAfrican thought.
Joined by Amsterdam News columnist James Booker, NOI member Luqman
Abdul-Hakeem, and a few others, Malcolm and Fidel met in the revolutionary
leader’s ninth floor room around midnight as throngs of revelers milled about on
the sidewalks outside. After Malcolm expressed his support for the revolutionary
government and assured Castro that the masses in Harlem were not deluded by the
anti-Cuban “propaganda” in the US media, Castro expressed his solidarity with PanAfrican liberation struggles. “We are all brothers. It is wonderful that 14 new African
nations are in the United Nations,” Castro warmly expressed to Malcolm. “They are
oppressed and exploited just as we are,” he continued, “the new nations and we in
Latin America are all African Americans.”64 Though their conversation was brief,
Malcolm left the Hotel Theresa inspired by Castro and his successful overthrow of
an oppressive government. Castro also threw down an indirect challenge during
their meeting, which was surely not missed by Malcolm. “We in Cuba have done in
18 months,” Castro stated plainly, “what you are still trying to do for 400 years.”65
While Muhammad fumed from Chicago, telling reporters that he would have
prevented Malcolm from visiting Castro had he known, the masses in Harlem were
galvanized and empowered by the international stage and proximity to
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revolutionary power that one of their own now occupied.66 “Malcolm was
considered a grassroots leader,” Abdul-Hakeem later noted, “he was very popular in
Harlem.”67 Though still largely ostracized by mainstream civil rights leaders, it was
evident that Malcolm’s credibility among the masses in Harlem and other major
cities was rapidly growing. Within just a few years time, the militant minister had
successfully taken on the NYPD, been featured in a weeklong television broadcast,
challenged moderate leaders to embrace the militancy of the masses, and summited
with revolutionary leaders—all while maintaining his active presence in the streets
of Harlem.
While his meteoric ascension was met with scorn from moderate civil rights
leaders and white liberals, apprehension from Muhammad, and repression from law
enforcement, it was enthusiastically embraced by thousands of African Americans.
From 1959-1961, the membership of Mosque No. 7 in Harlem rose from 1,125
members (569 of whom were considered “active”) to 2,369 members (767 active).68
By 1960, the Nation of Islam had grown to 200 Mosques nationwide with 50,000
members, with tens of thousands more who never joined but were in sympathy with
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or actively supported the NOI’s positions. 69 Much of this growth must be directly
attributed to Malcolm’s organizational skills in building many of these Mosques, as
well as his liberatory rhetoric, which was mobilizing ideological resources by
empowering thousands to break free from the chains of psychological colonialism
and embrace more radical analyses and actions.
The UN “Riots” and the Emergence of the “New Afro-American Nationalism” in
Harlem
While participating in solidarity campaigns in support of international
liberation struggles, intellectuals and activists in New York City were also
organizing on behalf of struggles in the southern United States—all while continuing
their local fights for African American rights and power. Like Wright, Baraka,
Malcolm X and countless other radical New Yorkers, Mae Mallory understood these
seemingly diverse struggles as intrinsically linked aspects of a global struggle for the
human rights and self-determination of racially-oppressed peoples. As sit-in
demonstrations swept through the South, heralding the emergence of southern
student involvement in the Civil Rights Movement, the New York Crusader Family
was routinely on the front lines of solidarity protests and demonstrations in Harlem.
In March 1960, the Crusader Family, CORE, and the NAACP co-sponsored a
protest at a Harlem Woolworth’s, drawing 300 people to the corner of 125th Street
and 7th Avenue. At the rally, the Crusader Family distributed flyers calling for a
national boycott of Woolworth’s, couching their demands in language familiar to
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those involved in New York City’s vibrant post-war organizing network. “We fought
for democracy everywhere and we demand the right to eat anywhere,” the flyer
read, “We will no longer fill the front lines overseas—and go in the back doors at
home!...Join the picket line in the fight for freedom in the free? world.”70 Through
this type of rhetoric, The Crusaders, like OYM downtown, challenged Harlem
residents to locate the fight against segregation in public accommodations in the
South within the context of national and global armed struggles to advance the
causes of democracy and freedom, all while becoming actively involved in these
struggles in their neighborhoods.
Mallory’s impressive track record of local organizing, coupled with her
relationship with Rob and Mabel Williams through The Crusader Family, brought
her directly into the fold of an emergent network of radical organizations operating
out of Harlem. By the spring of 1961, it was clear that the Pan-Africanist, leftist,
nationalist, and revolutionary ideologies promoted by generations of radical
organizers and street corner speakers in Harlem had gained traction in a way
unseen since the Garvey Movement. Just months after Castro’s visit to Harlem, local
and global Black freedom struggles converged in New York City in an explosive way
that February following the assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba.
The first leader of the newly liberated African nation, Lumumba had risen to
power in June of 1960 after being released from jail for his part in political uprisings
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against the Belgian colonial government the previous year.71 With his rise to power
and the liberation of the Congo from Belgium’s notoriously horrific control coming
amidst a wave of African liberation movements, Lumumba’s charisma and bold
defiance in the face of colonial oppression endeared him to African American
radicals and aspiring revolutionaries. “Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and
Sékou Touré were the Holy African Triumverate which radical black Americans held
dear,” Maya Angelou lamented years later, “and we needed our leaders
desperately.”72 So when Lumumba’s death was made public on February 13th, 1961
after a neo-colonial power struggle in the Congo, Black radicals in the United States
were incensed by what they (correctly) assumed was a calculated political
assassination, coordinated by the Belgian government with support from the United
States and United Nations.73
The fallout from Lumumba’s assassination in the US was fast and furious,
particularly in New York City, as radical activists and organizers of all stripes
coalesced to protest the active roles played by the American government and United
Nations in suppressing the interrelated struggles for African independence abroad
and Black liberation domestically. “Suddenly…Lumumba became Emmett Till and all
the other black victims of lynch law and the mob,” John Henrik Clarke wrote. “The
Lowell “Pete” Beveridge, “The Death of Lumumba,” Liberator 1, no. 1
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plight of the Africans still fighting to throw off the yoke of colonialism and the plight
of the Afro-Americans,” Clarke continued, “became one and the same.”74 As had the
murder of Emmett Till nearly six years prior, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
galvanized Black communities, who recognized the culprit of this foul deed as the
global system of white, Euro-American supremacy, and sparked a momentous
protest at the United Nations headquarters in New York City just days after the
word got out.
With the U.N. Security Council set to meet on February 15th, 1961, members
of the HWG and Cultural Association for Women of African Heritage (CAWAH) drew
upon their expansive connections with Black leftist and nationalist groups to quickly
mobilize a diverse coalition of radical organizations and local people for a
demonstration at the UN. This network was illustrative of the resurgent radical
milieu in Harlem, which had begun to establish a semblance of cohesion through
active common support for the militant struggles waged by the likes of Robert F.
Williams, Fidel Castro, and Patrice Lumumba. Though Richard Gibson would later
claim “it was Williams who inspired that much publicized and highly effective
demonstration in the United Nations,” it was Black women who turned that
inspiration into organized action.75
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One of the key architects of this ad hoc coalition was novelist and trade-union
activist Rosa Guy, a co-founder of the HWG and CAWAH, who had migrated to
Harlem from Trinidad as a young girl.76 Over the previous year, Guy’s fluency in
French had allowed her to foster a close relationship between HWG members and
the Congolese UN delegation, which had felt otherwise isolated in New York because
French was the only European language most of the delegation spoke.77 The
intimate connection Guy, the HWG, and their extended network had established
with their brothers and sisters from the Congo made Lumumba’s assassination all
the more personal and sharpened their resolve to protest this international
injustice.78
In response, Guy, Maya Angelou, Sarah Wright, and Abbey Lincoln, all
founding members of the recently formed nationalist women’s group CAWAH (as
well as members of HWG), organized a mass demonstration at the United Nation’s
headquarters on 42nd Street in about two day’s time.79 According to Angelou, the
women had initially settled on staging a symbolic protest at the UN donning black
must be given to the Black women of CAWAH who orchestrated the event. Tyson,
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veils and rising from their seats in a solemn protest when Adlai Stevenson began his
announcement of Lumumba’s death. Recognizing a need to connect their
demonstrations with the masses, however, the women decided to put the word out
in Harlem—with the help of Lewis Michaux—to inform the people of Lumumba’s
death and drum up support for a much larger demonstration. Two days before the
UN Security Council was scheduled to meet, Angelou, Guy, Lincoln, and other
CAWAH members addressed an evening rally in front of Michaux’s bookstore at the
intersection of 125th Street and 7th Avenue. After Michaux warmed up the crowd,
Abbey Lincoln stepped to the microphone, and told the thousands gathered in
Harlem Square that Lumumba was dead. “The whites killed a black man,” she icily
informed the crowd, “another black man.” The crowd was livid, and seized on the
opportunity to join the women in their demonstration at the U.N. that Friday.80
When the UN Security Council convened the morning of February 15th, about
75 activists, many wearing black armbands or black veils, sat in small groups in the
gallery having made their way through the swirling crowd of protestors outside the
building. Harlem had turned out for the demonstration, with thousands milling
about on the sidewalks seeking an outlet to channel their righteous anger. Just
outside the chamber doors, scores of other activists representing CAWAH, HWG, On
Guard Committee For Freedom (OGFF), the Liberation Committee for Africa (LCA),
and the Crusader Family waited in line to gain entrance to the council chamber.81
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Despite the picket lines marching outside the building and the bustling crowds
trying to gain entry to the chamber, the Council session came to order and
proceeded in normal fashion until Adlai Stevenson took to the podium and began his
first formal speech as U.S. representative to the United Nations. When Stevenson
declared his support for U.N. secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld, the man
responsible for Lumumba’s protection, the session quickly went south.82
As Stevenson glibly announced US support for the man who many African
and African Americans saw as complicit in the murder of Lumumba, a member of
OGFF rose from her seat in the gallery in protest. Any intentions that CAWAH had of
staging a peaceful protest were thwarted when the gallery quickly erupted as
security guards “rushed” at the woman and protestors lashed out at the Council with
cries of “Killers!” and “Murderers!” As the crowd chanted “Lumumba! Lumumba!” in
unison, the chamber doors swung open and the throngs of activists who had been
waiting outside rushed in, “bowling over” guards and shutting down the council
session.83 Bedlam roared in the chamber as a wave of guards swept in to clear the
room while protestors inside tussled with guards and white bystanders. Carlos
Moore, an Afro-Cuban nationalist well known in the streets of Harlem, jumped on
the back of a white man and brought him to the ground, while Maya Angelou
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watched as a “stout black woman” grabbed another white man by the jacket and
“shook him like a dishrag.”84 OGFF leader Calvin Hicks was dragged from the gallery
by a group of guards, as a photographer snapped a picture that landed on the front
cover of the next day’s edition of the New York Times.
Though Angelou did not identify this woman by name in her autobiography,
it is possible that she was describing Mae Mallory, who had been involved in
coordinating the protests and had made her way inside the chambers that
morning.85 Despite having previously organized picket lines and similar
demonstrations in New York, Mallory rarely participated in nonviolent direct action
herself. “I couldn’t follow any discipline of non-violent demonstration,” Mallory later
said, “so I never bothered to go out on any of the picket lines or anything.”86
Described as “a very physical woman, a block of granite” by Conrad Lynn, a notable
New York civil rights activist-attorney who had represented Robert F. Williams,
Mallory did not take kindly to being accosted by guards inside the U.N. When a
guard grabbed her as she pushed her way into the chambers, Mallory swiftly took
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off her shoe and “cracked his head with my shoe heel. Then I wrapped my fist in the
necktie of another guard.”87
As protestors and bystanders alike surged out of room to escape the brawl
and influx of security guards, the conflict spilled out onto the sidewalk, where the
thousands of protestors who had not been able to enter the building became
enlivened by the news that a “riot” had taken place inside. Though the crowd
wanted “an extravagant disorder,” as Maya Angelou remembered, the police on the
scene “yearned for vindication.”88 From the steps of the building, a group of officers
looked down on the crowd, “their eyes glittering” before charging at Mae Mallory,
Calvin Hicks, and LeRoi Jones (Baraka) who were now marching on the sidewalk.
“They attacked us, clubs flying,” Baraka later recalled.89 Once again, Mallory capably
demonstrated her right to self-defense. “Mae put up a terrific battle,” Baraka
continued, “the police were sorry they ever put their hands on her. It took several of
them to subdue her.”90 According to Conrad Lynn, Mallory “took two policemen and
cracked their heads together and knocked them unconscious.”91
Though Baraka and Mallory were forcefully stuffed into a paddy wagon and
several security guards were left injured inside the building, the protests continued
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throughout the day on the west side of 1st Avenue between 42nd and 43rd Streets. As
the afternoon wore on, crowds shepherded by various nationalist and leftist groups
braved the cold and a zealous mounted police force to bring their protests to the
Belgian Consulate and to Times Square before regrouping in Harlem for a rally later
that evening.
At the end of the day, Lumumba remained in his grave and the raucous
demonstrators at the UN were no closer to bringing to justice those responsible for
the African leader’s assassination. To be fair, few expected from the outset that the
protests would yield these types of results, and many had merely sought a vehicle
for channeling their anger and demonstrating their opposition to global white
supremacy through direct action. If there was an element of catharsis in the protest,
however, it was a useful byproduct of an organized action that marked a watershed
moment in Black Freedom Struggles in the city. Not only did the protestors shed
light on the destructive potential of the active political fault lines that ran between
Black communities and white-dominated power structures on an international
stage; they also revealed the rapidly expanding gulf between mainstream, middleclass civil rights organizations which were presumed to represent Black
communities, and the radical activists and grassroots organizations that were once
again proving more capable of playing that role. “Harlem was in commotion,”
Angelou testified, “and the rage was beyond the control of the NAACP, the SCLC or
the Urban League.”92
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The heated debates that helped carve these divisions played out in
newspaper coverage of the demonstrations in the following days and weeks.
Hinging fundamentally on conflicting analyses of local, national, and global white
supremacy and what means constituted acceptable Black responses, radical
intellectuals including James Baldwin and Lorraine Hansberry challenged the typical
narratives spun by white commenters and moderate Black “leaders.” Columns in the
New York Times described the protests as “disgraceful” and chided the “race
consciousness” of Black nationalism as “an enemy of democracy.”93 NYPD
commissioner Stephen Kennedy once again set his sights on Malcolm X, who he
claimed was the chief instigator of the whole ordeal. In Washington, the New York
Times reported, US officials characteristically blamed “Communist agitators” for
fomenting pro-Lumumba sentiments and orchestrating unrest, while President
Kennedy affirmed his support for the UN and alluded to Soviet involvement in the
Congo.94
Joining the papers and politicians in their condemnation of the UN protestors
were City Councilman Earl Brown and head of the National Urban League Lester
Granger. Caping for the white power structure and moderate Black leadership,
Brown decried the “disgraceful,” Communist-backed protestors, while Granger
described in his Amsterdam News column the “sick shame” he felt while “screaming
men and women milled around the U.N. venting their ignorant frustrations or
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malicious anger.”95 United Nations Under Secretary Dr. Ralph Bunche went so far as
to apologize for the behavior of his “duped” and “misled” fellow citizens. The
conduct of the protestors, Dr. Bunche assured his colleagues, “was in no way
representative of the American Negro’s.”96
Over the next several weeks, however, Baldwin and Hansberry took turns
assuring readers of the New York Times that the conduct of the demonstrators at the
UN was a much more authentic representation of the climate in Black America than
Dr. Bunche professed in his condemnation. In a lengthy article titled “A Negro
Assays the Negro Mood,” Baldwin swiftly rebuked the accounts of white pundits and
“prominent Negroes” who blamed Communist infiltration for the disruptive protests
and used his platform to draw attention to the domestic issues which fueled the
vigor of the demonstration. “What I find appalling—and really dangerous,” Baldwin
opined, “is the American assumption that the Negro is so contented with his lot here
that only the cynical agents of a foreign power can rouse him to protest.” Baldwin
characteristically challenged white readers to look introspectively at their society
which denied any semblance of agency to their Black compatriots, while also calling
attention to the complicity of northern white liberals for their gradualist mentality
toward Black equality. At bottom, Baldwin argued, the UN demonstrations sent a
clear message to white America. “Any effort, from here on out, to keep the Negro in
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his ‘place,” he warned, “can only have the most extreme and unlucky
repercussions.”97
In her letter to the editor of the New York Times two weeks later, Hansberry
piggybacked on Baldwin’s assessment of African American identification with
African liberation struggles, calling for Pan-African unity and placing the blame for
Lumumba’s assassination squarely on Euro-American imperialism. A gifted young
playwright who had enjoyed international acclaim following her landmark
Broadway debut of A Raisin in the Sun two years prior, Hansberry pulled no punches
when it came to her rebuke of Dr. Bunche. Whereas Baldwin alluded to the remarks
of the UN Under Secretary, Hansberry called him out by name and challenged his
assumed right to speak on behalf of African Americans. “As so many of us were
shocked and outraged at reports of Dr. Ralph Bunche’s ‘apologies’ for the
demonstrators,” she wrote, “we were also curious as to his mandate from our people
to do so.” If Hansberry’s condemnation of the leadership role assumed by, or
bestowed upon, Bunche and others of his ilk were not clear enough, she concluded
her letter with an apology to Pauline Lumumba and the Congolese people for
Bunche’s remark.98 Through this apology, Hansberry not only disavowed the
leadership of moderate male “leaders,” but also claimed such a role for herself and
the masses of disaffected African Americans who were more capable of
authentically representing their own interests and analyses.
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While the mainstream media and various levels of government explained
away the explosive political significance of the UN demonstrations, activists in
Harlem mobilized the sentiments expressed by Baldwin and Hansberry and
calculated their next steps for channeling this momentum into sustained, organized
action. Most organizers recognized, as Baldwin had in his New York Times article,
that the mass participation and explosive nature of the protests had as much to do
with the assassination of Lumumba as they did with the socio-economic conditions
in Harlem created by systemic racism. Drawing inspiration from the protest, HWG
members Calvin Hicks and Sarah Wright expanded their organizing efforts for their
nascent organization On Guard For Freedom. As a member of both OYM and OGFF,
Hicks managed to orchestrate a merger of the groups to strengthen the coalitions
formed over the demonstrations. Like Jones (Baraka), Hicks urged downtown Black
artists to engage in organized struggle and understand the vital links between art
and politics. Through OGFF, which operated out of Harlem, “downtown black
bohemians” were brought together with uptown artists with roots in the older
leftist movements in Harlem.99
Dan Watts, a former architect turned journalist, effectively used the furor
over the protests to formally announce the formation of the Liberation Committee
for Africa (LCA), which had been organized the previous year. The radical PanAfricanist organization, Tinson notes, “distinguished itself from the Civil Rights
establishment” through its critiques of gradualism, demands for “immediate
liberation,” and embrace of the activism of more militant leaders like Rob Williams,
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Malcolm X, and Mae Mallory.100 In the wake of the UN demonstrations, the LCA
carved out a major role in the production and dissemination of leftist and nationalist
political thought and analysis through its literary organ, Liberator. Through the
monthly magazine, Watts, editor Lowell “Pete” Beveridge, and a cadre of
intellectuals, artists, and writers, exposed and opposed global white supremacy and
analyzed domestic and international struggles for self-determination. In the
following years, the writings of this talented collective of writers, many of whom
would influence the emergence of the Black Arts and Black Power movements in the
years to come, would play a formative part in promoting and shaping a popular
radical political consciousness in New York City and beyond.101
For Harlem historian John Henrik Clarke, the UN demonstrations marked the
emergence of a new era in African American freedom struggles. Indeed, the protests
had brought together a coalition of Black leftist and nationalist groups in New York,
which Smethurst notes, “had not been seen for years, if ever.”102 This was a powerful
manifestation, given the often-contentious sectarian disputes between nationalist
and leftist groups in Harlem that often precluded cooperative action. In an article in
Freedomways that fall, Clarke declared that this formative moment signaled the
arrival of “the new Afro-American Nationalism.” Though incubated for decades in
Harlem, the New Afro-American Nationalism had been rekindled by the
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“international lynching of a black man on the altar of colonialism and white
supremacy” when the collective wounds from the murders of Emmett Till and Mack
Parker were still fresh.103
Fostered by the grassroots efforts of various organizations, including the
NOI, UANM, CAWAH, LCA, and OGFF, the New Afro-American Nationalism was
characterized by a collective identification with Pan-African anticolonial liberation
struggles, an appreciation of cultural heritage, demands for self-determination, and
a rejection of bourgeois leadership and integration as a panacea for American
apartheid. Clarke understood this resurgent political consciousness to be an
inherently proletarian movement against internal colonialism; a movement to
achieve national and personal liberation through the efforts of independent,
indigenous leadership. “In taking this historical step,” Clarke prophesized, “they
have turned away from a leadership that was begging and pleading to a more
dynamic leadership that is insisting and demanding.” Though the coalition of leftist
and nationalist organizations that comprised the UN demonstrations may have
sounded the clarion call of this new consciousness, one of its key progenitors had
abstained from involvement.
“The one that is most feared by white people”: The Resistance and Repression
of Malcolm X
A few days after the watershed protests at the United Nations, Maya Angelou
and Rosa Guy visited Malcolm X at the Nation of Islam’s restaurant on 116th Street in
Harlem. Having witnessed the explosive anger over racial injustice swelling in
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Harlem, the two young writers feared that such fury would turn inward on the
community if not channeled into organized progressive action. Almost immediately,
Angelou and Guy decided to consult the Nation of Islam for guidance on the matter.
“With their exquisite discipline and their absolute stand on black-white relations,”
Angelou wrote, the Nation would surely “know how to control and use the ferment
in Harlem.”104 It was their first time meeting Malcolm X and Angelou was
immediately struck by the minister’s radiant aura and “masculine force.” The two
women explained their involvement in the protest over tea, seeking Malcolm X’s
counsel on how they should proceed.
The response they received, however, was not what either had expected.
“You were wrong in your direction,” Malcolm X stated bluntly. He conceded that the
people of Harlem were rightfully enraged, but advised that “going to the United
Nations, shouting and carrying placards will not win freedom for anyone, nor will it
keep the white devils from killing another African leader. Or a black American
leader.”105 Restraining her frustration with Malcolm’s response, Guy pushed him to
explain what, then, should be done. After briefly reciting aspects of the Nation’s
theology and Elijah Muhammad’s stance on noninvolvement with demonstrations
and rejection of integration, Malcolm offered a degree of support. He would not ask
the people of Harlem to march or to confront violent white authorities, but he also
would not deny the validity of the protests and vowed to make a statement of veiled
support. “I will say that yesterday’s demonstration is symbolic of the anger in this
104
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country,” Angelou recalled Malcolm saying, “That black people are saying they…will
not always allow whites to spit on them at lunch counters in order to eat hot dogs
and drink Coca-Cola.”106
Though Angelou and Guy left the restaurant feeling defeated, Malcolm kept
his word. When the mainstream press and moderate leaders lambasted the “riots” at
the UN, as he had predicted at the restaurant, it was not Angelou nor Guy who bore
the brunt of the media backlash, but Malcolm and the Nation of Islam. In the media
firestorm of fingerpointing and scapegoating that implicated Communists and Black
nationalists, the “Black Muslims” were frequently targeted as the key instigators of
the most recent racial unrest in New York City. After a briefing with NYPD
commissioner Stephen Kennedy and deputy commissioner Walter Arm, Adlai
Stevenson singled out the “Black Muslims” as having been responsible for the
disorder during his speech at the UN. Kennedy was reported to have described the
NOI as “a fanatic Negro national cult, which is one of the most dangerous gangs in
the city,” adding that the NYPD had been actively investigating the group for the past
few years.107
In a national wave of fear mongering, news columns like the Norfolk Journal
and Guide, picked up where Kennedy left off, describing the Nation of Islam as “the
most sinister of all Negro cults in the United States.”108 The Washington Post
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explained to their readers in no uncertain terms that members of the Nation of
Islam were “being conditioned and trained for the ‘War of Armageddon’ when the
blacks—as they refer to themselves—will kill the whites.”109 While insisting that the
Nation of Islam abstained from any local, national, or international political
involvement, and therefore, should not be implicated in the fallout from the
protests, Malcolm X refused to condemn the demonstrators at the United Nations. “I
am not Moise Tshombe,” he told inquiring reporters, “and I will permit no one to use
me against the nationalists.”110 Though his active support for the demonstrations
was constrained by Muhammad’s conservative political doctrine, Malcolm
supported them in spirit and offered the limited support that he was afforded in his
capacity as a minister of the Nation of Islam.
Despite their lack of involvement in political action during the UN protests,
Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam were fundamentally a part of, and making
undeniable contributions to, the surging militancy of Black freedom struggles in
New York City. That Malcolm X was the first person the initiators turned to for
advice in the wake of the protest is telling of his increasingly prominent role within
Harlem’s convoluted radical milieu—an often contentious terrain that he had taken
initial steps toward bringing a degree of unity to months earlier.
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To Mae Mallory, the treatment that the NOI and various nationalist groups
received from the news media and government officials was meant to drive a wedge
between the working coalition present at the UN that February. “The attempt on the
part of the White Supremacists to split the Muslim Afro American from the non
Muslim Afro American is doomed to failure because their (sic.) is one thing that we
have in common that supersedes other differences,” Mallory warned, “and that is a
desire to rid ourselves of White Domination and exploitation.” In her response to the
misrepresentations of the protests in the mainstream media, Mallory echoed
Malcolm’s earlier calls for a Black united front that reached across borders, oceans,
and ideologies. The death of Lumumba signaled to Mallory “that the price of division
is death and defeat for Black people” and that only a united front could “ensure us of
complete victory and liberation from the white exploiters.”111 It was this type of
demonstrable influence on political thought and praxis that the Nation and its
powerful Harlem minister wielded that led John Henrik Clarke to describe their
movement as “the most dynamic force for protest and change in the United States” a
few months later.
Of all the groups comprising the New Afro-American Nationalism in Harlem,
the frequent attacks upon the Nation of Islam from mainstream media outlets and
government officials demonstrated that the NOI had quickly become “the one that is
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most feared by white people.”112 This white fear was explicit in the increasingly
repressive tactics employed by the NYPD in the four years since the beating of
Johnson X to check the rapid growth of the Nation with heightened surveillance and
counterintelligence programs. “We were watched. Our telephones were tapped,”
Malcolm X later told Alex Haley. “When I was speaking publicly sometimes I’d guess
which were FBI faces in the audience…the police and the FBI intently and
persistently visited and questioned us.”113 Although the NYPD and FBI had kept a
watchful eye on the NOI since the early 1950s, the tense standoff outside the 28th
Precinct in 1957 had created a sense of urgency to curb the growing power of its
Harlem minister. “He was regarded mostly as a rabble-rouser among white police,”
Detective William DeFossett recalled, “a source or possibility for trouble.”114
In their efforts to keep pace with the growing militancy that the NOI so
clearly embodied, the NYPD employed two primary tactics. First, as they had after
the 1959 “near riot,” the department made nominal efforts to improve policecommunity relations through the use of precinct councils and police liaisons to
improve communication and trust between the NYPD and Harlem community.115
DeFossett, a Black detective in the BOSS unit who had grown up in Harlem, acted as
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liaison between the NYPD and the NOI. “I was no secret to the Nation of Islam,”
DeFossett recalled. “They knew who I was, they knew where I lived, they knew all
about me…it wasn’t a secret operation. It wasn’t cloak and dagger.”116 Though
DeFossett downplayed in his oral history the NYPD’s interest in the Nation of Islam
as a matter of keeping peace and maintaining order, the records of the Bureau of
Special Services bear a much different story.
In addition to the use of precinct councils and community liaisons, the NYPD
also employed secretive surveillance tactics to keep a watchful eye on the NOI and
other civil rights and nationalist groups. “I had heard that there were all kinds of
means used to infiltrate the Muslims,” former deputy commissioner Robert Mangum
recalled, “they used every means they could to acquire as much information as they
could about the Muslim movement.”117 Scattered amongst the crowd at nearly every
meeting or rally the NOI held in Harlem in the late 1950s and early 1960s were a
handful of plainclothes detectives from the Bureau of Special Services (BOSS), the
NYPD’s counterintelligence squad that targeted individuals and organizations
deemed “subversive.” At the Harlem Freedom Rally, for example, BOSS sent six
undercover detectives to observe, record, and report on the speeches made and
people in attendance.118
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At dozens of other meetings, BOSS detectives would stake out down the
block, jotting down license plate numbers of vehicles carrying passengers to NOI
gatherings. Detectives then cross-checked these license plate numbers with vehicle
registrations and conducted background checks on the owners of the vehicles, often
soliciting support from neighboring states. Through this type of indiscriminately
invasive surveillance, local people were unwittingly caught in a national dragnet
cast by agents charged with protecting the interests of the white State. Rather than
keeping peace and maintaining order, as DeFossett contended, BOSS engaged in a
concerted effort to suppress dissent in the city through the active surveillance of a
wide range of individuals and organizations that sought to upset the racial,
economic, or social status quo.
The counterintelligence programs that BOSS waged against the NOI and
others in New York City were part of a national surveillance network of local and
federal law enforcement agencies aimed at infiltrating, disrupting, discrediting, and
dismantling groups involved in the Black Freedom Struggle. As the
counterintelligence agency of the nation’s largest city, BOSS played a major role in
shaping this national network through sharing information and strategies with
other municipalities and federal agencies. In an August 1961 memo to the Chief of
Police in Portland, Oregon, BOSS commander Sanford Garelick laid bare the unit’s
confidential counterintelligence methods used against the NOI: “Infiltration of the
organization’s ranks; Direct contact with the organization leaders by Negro police
officers; Close cooperation and exchange of data with Federal and State
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investigative agencies; Intensive investigation and constant surveillance of the
members and activities of the members of the cult.”119
In addition to the national surveillance campaign BOSS was contributing to,
the House Un-American Activities Committee announced shortly after the UN
protests that it would conduct investigations into the activities of Pan-African,
Muslim, and Black nationalist groups in an attempt to prove communist infiltration,
as they had tried the previous year with Jesse Gray. Though critical of the NOI and
other nationalist organizations, the inherent contradictions of these inquisitions
were glaring to the editors of the Baltimore Afro-American. “We are unable to share
the committee’s alarm over the activities of the black supremacists as long as the
Congressional red hunters hear and see no evil in the subversive practices of the
white supremacists.”120 As white violence continued unabated throughout the South
and images of white barbarism against peaceful sit-ins flashed steadily across
television screens, many Black communities, if not fully supportive of the NOI, fully
understood the inherent hypocrisy of law enforcement targeting Black freedom
fighters.
Though Malcolm actively disassociated the NOI from explicit political
involvement amidst the whirlwind of abuse from the media and law enforcement, he
nonetheless utilized the elevated platform the protests provided to expound his
positions on Black nationalism, the Civil Rights Movement, and Pan-African
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liberation struggles. At a debate sponsored by the NAACP Youth Council at City
College the following month, Malcolm X again denounced integration as a solution to
American racism and called for reparations in the form of land for a separate Black
nation. “All over the world,” Malcolm told the crowd of 300, “dark people are
rejecting integration with their former oppressors.”121 If Malcolm was unable, or
unwilling, to provide organizational support for Angelou and Guy in the wake of the
UN demonstrations, he left little doubt that he stood in solidarity with their PanAfrican analysis and shared this perspective with crowds by the hundreds and
thousands that spring. Reflecting the surging militancy in Harlem that the UN
protests very clearly illustrated, Malcolm bluntly explained to the crowd "it'll take
more than a cup of tea in a white restaurant to make us happy.”
Though Malcolm’s outright rejection of integration had substantial backing in
Harlem, it remained a primary objective of national civil rights organizations. This
national primacy placed upon direct action to achieve integration was on full display
three days later, when CORE national director James Farmer issued a call for
Freedom Riders to test the federal government’s resolve in enforcing the Supreme
Court’s ruling against segregation in interstate travel in Morgan v. Virginia fifteen
years earlier.
As the Freedom Riders prepared for their journey through the south in the
early spring, with a handful departing from New York City, Malcolm was touring the
nation during a wave of speaking tours on college campuses. After besting historian
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and presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. during an impromptu exchange at
Atlanta University earlier that year, Malcolm X embarked on a national campaign of
public lectures and debates to face the NOI’s critics and elevate their theology
through the spotlight the events provided.122 A week after the NAACP debate at
CCNY, Malcolm traveled up to his old stomping grounds for a public forum at the
Harvard Law School. In his address, Malcolm denounced the folly of “token
integration” while explaining the growing impatience of the Black masses for
anything short of sweeping, systemic change. “There is no such thing as a second
class citizen,” Malcolm declared after citing the violent white objections to demands
for educational equality, “we are full citizens or we are not citizens at all.”123
Among those in attendance at the forum were Louis X, the minister of
Boston’s Temple No. 11, and William Strickland, a Marine Corps veteran and student
at Harvard. A native of Roxbury and former member of the NAACP Youth Council,
Strickland had known both Malcolm Little (Malcolm X) and Louis Eugene Walcott
(Louis X) from around the neighborhood growing up. Immediately drawn to
Malcolm’s rhetoric and analysis, Strickland used their shared Roxbury connections
to re-introduce himself after the event. The meeting marked the beginning of a
lifelong friendship that profoundly shaped Strickland’s political development. While
finishing his degree, Strickland frequented Temple No. 11 and arranged for Malcolm
X to speak on Harvard’s radio station when he was in town. When travelling to New
York City on school recess, he would stop into the NOI’s restaurant on 116th Street
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to see if Malcolm was around. “Though I never joined the Nation, it was Malcolm’s
political perspective that I imbibed,” Strickland remembers, “because in the same
way that Karl Marx is the fundamental critic of capitalism and Frantz Fanon is the
fundamental critic of colonialism, Malcolm X is the fundamental critic of American
racism.”124 Malcolm had even prophesied the kind of profound personal impact that
Strickland experienced during his speech at Harvard. “The same Negro students you
are turning out today,” Malcolm X predicted, “will soon be demanding the same
things you now hear being demanded by Mr. Muhammad and the Black Muslims.”125
By the end of 1963, the Roxbury connection that Malcolm X and Strickland shared
would come to influence the course of grassroots struggles for rights and power in
Harlem when Strickland became national director of the Northern Student
Movement that fall.
The explosive demonstrations at the UN in the beginning of 1961 had clearly
shaped the landscape of struggles for rights and power in New York City. Though
not physically involved, Malcolm and the NOI had tilled the ground from which such
radical analyses and actions had begun to sprout. In turn, the ever-expanding focus
on the NOI in the wake of the UN “riots” provided Malcolm with an elevated
platform in Harlem and throughout the Nation from which to awaken the masses
with his forceful deconstruction of white supremacy and compelling advocacy of
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self-determination, self-defense, and Black nationalism. Despite the increasingly
suppressive actions of local and federal “law enforcement” agencies and the
theological restrictions from Elijah Muhammad that hamstrung Malcolm’s political
activism, he was nonetheless fundamentally impacting local, national, and global
freedom struggles throughout the year of 1961.
Furthermore, along with inspiring a new generation of militant activists and
intellectuals at the grassroots, the popularity of Malcolm’s analysis was also pushing
Muhammad to toe the line of political advocacy. Speaking to the thousands gathered
at Harlem’s 369th Infantry Armory that August, Muhammad declared “Harlem
should elect its own leaders and should not accept the leaders set up for them by the
white man.” Though still adamant about precluding the NOI from active political
involvement, surging demands for self-determination in Harlem forced Muhammad
to concede to the collective mood. “We must elect our leaders and if they do not do
right,” Muhammad warned, “we should cut their heads off.”126 Though Muhammad’s
analysis was couched in demands for a separate Black nation, Malcolm had
nonetheless succeeded in nominally sliding the scale of the NOI’s involvement. It
would not be long, however, before Malcolm would no longer be willing to accept
the continued constraints on his political involvement.
“Unleashing this Black power”: Self-Defense and Self-Determination in Harlem
On a personal level, the demonstrations at the UN proved to have a
galvanizing influence upon Mae Mallory’s political development. Though she had
long claimed the right to self-defense dating back to her childhood in Macon and had
126
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actively organized in support of the Williams’ armed struggle in Monroe, Mallory’s
analysis of the centrality of armed struggle in service of Black liberation evolved in
the months immediately following her clash with police outside the United Nations
building.127 In a little over a year’s time, Mallory had gone from fighting City Hall for
educational equality in Harlem to openly advocating armed revolutionary struggle
in the United States and throughout the African Diaspora.
Mallory’s personal experiences in challenging the dominant white power
structure in New York City and her association with an emerging network of
revolutionary organizations operating out of Harlem can help account for her
radical political development during this period.128 In her writings, Mallory had laid
bare her critiques of the oppressive powers of the State following her earlier arrest
for welfare fraud and the contradictions she observed during Castro’s visit.
Following the UN demonstration, however, her analysis had evolved from a
condemnation of the white power structure to an advocacy of its destruction. In a
letter to the editor of the New York Times on behalf of Crusaders for Freedom, On
Guard, and Black Liberation Movement shortly after the demonstration, Mallory
Though Mallory does not appear to have mentioned the outcomes of her
altercation with the NYPD outside the U.N. in her correspondence or oral history
interviews, Conrad Lynn stated in his autobiography that Mallory was arrested and
charged with assault. “I represented her against the assault charge and we won,”
Lynn claimed, “The police were to embarrassed to admit what a woman had done to
them, and their case fell apart.” Lynn, There Is A Fountain, 163.
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stated in no uncertain terms that not only did the Crusaders call for “death to the
murders of Patrice Lumumba,” but that they would henceforth “dedicate ourselves
to the task of unleashing this Black power until the world is rid of White domination
and exploitation.”129
The organizing activities that Mallory dedicated herself to in the following
weeks and months demonstrated that this was no hollow threat, but rhetoric that
she was prepared to back up with action. After JFK’s failed attempt at overthrowing
Castro during the Bay of Pigs invasion two months later, Mallory joined a national
group of militant Black leaders in issuing a manifesto warning the Kennedy
administration that any attempt to overthrow the Cuban government would be met
with an armed struggle in the US.130 Though Mallory’s politics were clearly within
the vein of international revolutionary struggle, her organizing on the ground in
Harlem continued to revolve mainly around supporting the armed struggle in
Monroe. Mallory’s intentions in her support of Williams were clear. Her immediate
interest, of course, was to aid the armed struggle in Monroe as a means of protecting
and liberating Black communities from racial, economic, and sexual terrorism. At
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the same time, Mallory hoped that her efforts in Monroe would inspire a more
widespread embrace of self-defense and armed resistance. “Remember the school
struggle started with just one then nine,” Mallory wrote to a friend, “perhaps the
idea of self-defense will bear fruit the same as the idea of the school boycott.”131 As
proven by the “near riot” in 1959 and more recently at the UN, Harlem was fertile
territory for Mallory’s analyses, and throughout the spring and summer of 1961 she
and the Crusaders organized rallies and events to raise consciousness and support
for armed struggles in the South.
Mallory’s organizing in this period was representative of not only a
widespread embrace of militancy in Harlem, but also a widening gap between
moderate, middle-class civil rights organizations and poor and working-class Black
communities. In May, the Crusaders held a mass rally in Harlem Square to protest
“southern injustice and brutality” and criticize the ineffective responses of “so-called
leaders” in the face of unabated racial terror. The Crusaders circulated leaflets
throughout Harlem ahead of the event, referring to the 2nd Amendment as the “first
condition for our freedom” and inviting the community to join in the hanging in
effigy of Alabama Governor John Patterson.132 Earlier that month, the Crusaders led
local people in shutting down an NAACP rally in Harlem Square, featuring Roy
Wilkins, Daisy Bates, Manhattan Borough President Edward Dudley, and others, for
refusing to allow Rob Williams to speak. The majority of the 3,000 in attendance,
131

Letter from Mae Mallory to Jeanne, June 23, 1963, Box 1, Folder 2, Mallory

Papers.
132

Papers.

“How Long Will We Turn The Other Cheek?,” Box 2, Folder 10, Mallory

235

some carrying placards of Patrice Lumumba, shouted down speaker after speaker—
even throwing eggs at Roy Wilkins—until the NAACP leaders conceded their
demands to hear Williams. The militant leader was met with a thunderous applause
as he denounced the “Uncle Tom” leadership of the NAACP and urged Black
communities to defend themselves.133 In other leaflets that spring, the Crusaders
cited the unpunished murders of Emmett Till and Mack Parker as evidence that
“passive resistance is a fraud,” while referring to Martin Luther King, Jr. as a
“phoney” and a “passive handkerchief head.”
The militant rhetoric of the Crusaders in condemning moderate civil rights
leadership and its enthusiastic reception in Harlem that spring is illustrative of the
disillusionment with gradualist programs and leaders that was flourishing at the
grassroots. This power struggle within the Black freedom struggle in Harlem drew
national attention and contributed to a broader shift toward localized leadership
and self-determination—hallmarks of Ella Baker’s leadership in New York City and
with SNCC. Writing to congratulate Mae Mallory on shutting down the NAACP rally,
Clark Atlanta University professor Dr. Lonnie Cross (Abdulalim A. Shabazz)
declared, “the rout of the NAACP in Harlem…proves beyond the shadow of a doubt
that the NAACP and the whole of the black bourgeoisie do not speak for the black
masses. They never did. They simply filled the void of the absence of the masses’
own chosen leadership.”134 Cross, an active supporter of Williams and The
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Crusaders who would join the Atlanta Temple of the Nation of Islam by the year’s
end, understood self-determination for poor and working-class Black communities
within freedom struggles as a pre-requisite for achieving liberatory societal
transformation. For Mallory and many Harlem residents, the adherence of
mainstream civil rights organizations to nonviolence in the face of unabated racial
terrorism demonstrated that the NAACP and SCLC were out of touch with the
realities of their lives and incapable of effectively advocating for rights and power
on their behalf. Furthermore, the successes that Mallory and The Crusaders had in
mobilizing thousands of local people demonstrated that self-defense was an issue
that Harlem residents could be effectively organized around.
The escalation of white terrorism that summer in Monroe solidified for
Mallory and other supporters of Williams in Harlem the impotence of nonviolent
resistance and the need for greater involvement in the armed struggle in the South.
Furthermore, these organizing efforts led Harlem intellectuals and activists to an
increased militancy in their analyses of white supremacy and liberation struggles.
By June, members of OGFF, OYM, the Crusaders, and HWG had formed an ad hoc
coalition called the Afro-American Alliance for Action (AAAA) to coordinate efforts
in active support of armed liberation struggles in Monroe and beyond. In a June
meeting attended by Mallory, Williams, John Henrik Clarke, Ossie Davis, Calvin
Hicks, Conrad Lynn, Julian Mayfield, and Ora Mobley, the AAAA debated the topics of
“integration or separation,” “methods of protest,” “economic aspects of struggle,”
Letter from Lonnie Cross to Mae Mallory, May 22, 1961, Box 1, Folder 1,
Mallory Papers. Cross was an active supporter of Rob Williams, as well as The
Crusaders for Freedom, who would join the Nation of Islam in Atlanta that year.
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and “propaganda and legal problems.” The minutes of the meeting illustrate a clear
concern with economic inequality as a central pillar of the Black freedom struggle,
debates over the creation of a landed Black state, and a near-consensus on the
position that “in forging their struggle Afro-Americans must separate themselves
from whites.”135 The influence of the post-war leftist and nationalist roots of these
activists are evident here, as well as the growing influence of Malcolm X and the
Nation of Islam, whose positions on these questions were used as a foil against
which these activist-intellectuals clarified their own positions on economic
inequality, racial violence, and Black nationalism. Subsequent meetings focused on
how these analyses could be put into action, with an immediate interest in raising
local, national, and global awareness of the struggle in Monroe and recruiting
Harlem residents to become actively involved through rallies and picket lines.136 In
early July, the AAAA distributed 25,000 leaflets in Harlem that briefly described the
history of Klan violence in Monroe, and extolled the successes of armed self-defense
in curbing white supremacist terrorism.
The right to armed self-defense was one position that was taken for granted
in the meetings of the AAAA, and raising funds for arms in Monroe remained a
primary mission for the group. Mayfield and Clarke had previously made trips to
Monroe to deliver weapons, but the escalation of violence that spring and summer
made the task all the more pressing. “Finally in 1961 when [Williams] was under
135
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heavy attack by the Klan, he called and asked for financial help,” Mallory reflected,
“so again, I went out and organized a rally to buy guns.”137 The same evening that
Conrad Lynn and Julian Mayfield addressed a rally at the United Mutual Auditorium
in Harlem to spread the word about the situation in Monroe, Mallory and the AAAA
held a meeting with the explicit purpose of raising money to purchase guns for
Williams and his allies. Contributions were received from an array of individuals
and organizations, including Vincent Copeland of the Marxist-oriented Workers
World Party, Dan Watts of Liberation Committee for Africa and Liberator magazine,
Negro Digest editor Hoyt Fuller, several members of the OYM and Socialist Workers
Party, and a handful of local people from Harlem and the Lower East Side.138
Through donations of $12.50 per gun, the AAAA was able to collect a total of
$167.50 that evening—enough to send thirteen firearms to Monroe.139
While the AAAA achieved some modest success in drumming up local
support for the militant southern struggle, their activities also drew the eye of the
FBI. If Mallory was aware of the FBI’s increasingly active surveillance programs at
the time, she showed little regard for their actions when asked years later. “I didn’t
hide the fact that I was raising money to buy guns for black people in the South.”140
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Like Williams in the South, Mallory refused to censor her right to self-defense in the
face of governmental and extrajudicial repression. Even if Mallory had been less
forward in her embrace of armed self-defense, it is doubtful that she would have
been able to evade the reach of local and federal surveillance programs. The FBI had
already begun keeping tabs on most of the activists in her network, including
Williams, Julian Mayfield, LeRoi Jones, John Henrik Clarke, Hoyt Fuller, and John O.
Killens, and had an informant in the July fundraising meeting of the AAAA.141 At the
local level, the NYPD’s Bureau of Special Services (BOSS), its counterintelligence
department tasked with surveilling, infiltrating, and subverting civil rights
organizations, had been keeping a watchful eye on The Crusaders and various other
organizations through undercover agents and confidential informants.142 Her earlier
arrest for alleged welfare fraud had provided Mallory with a first-hand lesson on the
powers that law enforcement agencies wielded to suppress those who challenged
the white-dominated power structure. In the month following the AAAA’s Harlem
rally, Mallory’s education on the repressive powers of the State would continue
when Rob and Mabel Williams called for reinforcements to come to Monroe.
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“Yours for Freedom Now”: The Monroe Defense Committee and Harlem’s
Radical Milieu
Throughout that summer, the correspondence that Mae Mallory received
from Mabel and Rob Williams became increasingly alarming, warning of impending
danger to Monroe’s Black community from racial terrorists. “He called me up one
day and he told me that they expected an attack by the Ku Klux Klan and that he
would suggest that all of the people that wanted to come down there come,” Mallory
later recalled, “so Julian Mayfield and I went down.”143 She had made it known,
however, that she would not be participating on any picket lines because of her
steadfast adherence to self-defense. On August 27th, Mallory was tending to business
at the Williams family home as Freedom Riders and local people trickled in from a
nonviolent demonstration downtown. “Some people had come in from downtown
all agitated and said all hell had broken loose downtown and white folks were trying
to kill the blacks,” Mallory recalled, “and people just came from nowhere, they
wanted to fight, they wanted directions.”144
At the urging of the local police chief, over a thousand armed and hostile
whites had come in droves to forcefully suppress the protests of the Freedom
Riders. As the mob attacked the peaceful demonstrators that afternoon, including
SNCC leader James Forman who had his head split open by the butt of a rifle,
Mayfield and the self-defense guard quickly drove to town, breaking through
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blockades to whisk the protestors away from the crazed mob and police to the
Williams home where hundreds of Black folks were beginning to gather.145
The crowd outside the Williams house had already begun arming themselves
in anticipation of a white onslaught as the sun began to set and a black car carrying a
white couple came rolling down the block. Charles and Mabel Stegall were known to
be members of the local Klan who had paraded through the neighborhood the
previous day with a banner on their car reading “Open Season on Coons.” By this
point, Mallory had come outside and, according to Tyson, was in the front of a
“crowd of angry blacks” that surrounded the car and yanked the Stegalls out.146
Realizing the implications of the crowd actually killing a white couple, Rob Williams
brought the Stegalls into the house where Mallory brusquely kept watch of them.
As word of a hostage situation got out and circulated through the county, it
appeared to Williams as though a pogrom were on the horizon as state and federal
law enforcement prepared for a raid on the house. Though the Stegalls left safely
under the own power, Williams was a marked man. To avoid the all but certain fate
of being lynched, whether legally or extrajudiciously, Williams made the decision to
flee Monroe. He called Julian Mayfield who was stationed at a house across town to
coordinate the escape, quickly explaining “if he didn’t leave Monroe there would be
a bloodbath.” Armed with several guns, Williams stealthily led his wife, two sons,
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and Mae Mallory to a designated meeting place where Mayfield was waiting in his
car.147 “Rob told me to get out in the event that, you know, nobody else can make it,”
Mallory later recalled. “Somebody had to get out, come back to New York and tell
everybody what happened.”148 The five sped north out of Union County in Mayfield’s
red Dodge Rambler, arriving in Harlem the next morning.
News of the situation in Monroe traveled like wildfire. By the morning, the
Williams family and Mae Mallory had learned that they were wanted on kidnapping
charges and acted quickly to evade southern “justice.” While the Williams family
covertly made their way to Cuba as political fugitives, Mallory fled to Cleveland, Ohio
to hide out with family and friends. For Mallory, going underground was not merely
a means of staying out of jail, but a means of staying alive. The horrors of the
southern “justice” system were well documented, and Mabel Stegall may as well
have been speaking on behalf of the majority of Monroe’s white population when
she told reporters a few months later that “Mae Mallory ought to be strung up and if
she ever come up to Union County she might get just that.”149
Over the next month, the FBI conspired with local police to dig up
information on Mallory and set up a national dragnet for her capture. Federal agents
in New York interrogated Mallory’s friends, family, and coworkers, and made
several visits to her mother’s home, where they harassed and intimidated the
elderly woman and Mallory’s daughter, Patricia. Mallory’s face circulated
147
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throughout the country on posters marked “Wanted By FBI,” describing the 34-yearold mother of two as someone with “a violent nature” who “reportedly carries a .22
caliber pistol concealed on her person.” After tapping phones lines and intercepting
mail, the FBI finally got a lead in early October through their surveillance of Conrad
Lynn, who had addressed a letter to Mallory in Cleveland.150 Federal agents acted
quickly to put the screws to members of Mallory’s extended family in Cleveland to
ascertain her whereabouts, and on October 12th, agents were at the door of her
cousin’s home where she was staying. “That Thursday about 25 members of the FBI
came into the house with guns drawn and everything to arrest me,” Mallory recalled.
At that moment, Mallory’s mind raced back to when she was a young girl in Macon
and white police surrounded her aunt’s house for punching a white girl in selfdefense.151 This time, however, the police didn’t leave and Mallory was taken to the
Cuyahoga County Jail. Though she was released on bond for five months, Mallory
would spend the following year in the jail fighting extradition to Monroe.
With Williams exiled in Cuba, Mallory jailed in Cleveland, and three others
jailed in Monroe, a network of activists in New York City, as well as Cleveland,
rallied to defend their comrades and continue their freedom struggles. Within a
matter of days, newspaper advertisements in several major northern cities
announced the formation of the Monroe Defense Committee (MDC). Described as a
“broad, non-partisan defense committee,” by executive secretary Calvin Hicks, the
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national organization with its headquarters on 125th Street included an array of
New York activists, artists, and intellectuals with ties to leading radical groups, such
as the Crusaders, OGFF, CAWAH, AAAA, LCA, HWG, and other leftist and nationalist
groups. Among the MDC’s many notable sponsors were James Baldwin, John Henrik
Clarke, Richard Gibson, LeRoi Jones, Shirley Graham, Julian and Ana Mayfield, Gerald
Quinn, Bayard Rustin, Dan Watts, Max Roach, Abbey Lincoln, Ruby Dee, Ossie Davis,
Sylvester Leaks, Ramona Garrett, and Jesse Gray. “The committee was organized and
is sponsored by many individuals who may not agree with each other on the way in
which full equality for Afro-Americans is to be achieved,” Hicks explained in a letter
seeking support for the group. “However, they do agree that the oppression,
brutality and travesty of justice in Monroe, N.C. which forced Robert F. Williams to
flee for his life must be rectified.”152 While the MDC may not have constituted a
singular united front, the cooperative convergence of this array of activists and
organizations in Harlem did offer a promising sign for those who had been calling
for a Black united front for many years.
Initially, the MDC positioned itself as an information organ responsible for
countering the dominant narratives of white-owned media outlets and politicians
while raising national and global awareness of the true situation in Monroe.
Through explaining the depths of racial violence in Monroe and exposing the
culpability of government officials, including US Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, to Black communities throughout the nation, the MDC aspired to “achieve
mass solidarity behind the fighting spirit of Monroe citizens and Robert F.
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Williams.”153 Articles from MDC members offering radical analyses on the situation
in Monroe circulated throughout New York and the nation on the pages of Liberator
and Freedomways. Posters with a headline of “Save Mae Mallory!” appeared on
utility poles throughout Harlem, reminding local people that their neighbor had
fought and won against segregated schools in New York and was now “being
persecuted because of her militant fight for Black Liberation.”154 Street rallies were
organized in Harlem to educate the masses on the local, national, and global
contexts and implications of the struggle in Monroe. Fundraisers were also
organized to contribute to legal expenses and Ossie Davis dedicated a performance
of his widely successful play Purlie Victorious, starring Ruby Dee, as a fundraiser for
the MDC.155
In Cleveland, the MDC that Mallory had helped organize while initially out on
bond had an even more active presence on the ground under the leadership of
Audrey Proctor and Clarence Seniors, organizing picket lines, holding mass rallies,
and tirelessly pressuring the governor, along with national and international
leaders, to prevent Mae Mallory’s extradition to Monroe.156 Though the “unknown”
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Mallory and her “group with a way out philosophy of self-defense” were initially met
with a cold reception in Cleveland—particularly from the “so-called respectable
organizations”—the MDC’s active presence in the city’s quickly garnered the
support of Black communities and contributed to the flowering of a militant
grassroots milieu in the Midwestern city.157 The influence of the MDC in Cleveland
was apparent to Mallory in the results of the 1962 elections, when “every candidate
that had publicly supported us won except one.”158
Mallory’s fight also captured the attention and imagination of aspiring
revolutionaries in Cleveland, such as Donald Freeman, a graduate of Western
Reserve University and member of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).159
Freeman and the Afro-American Institute collaborated with the MDC and Cleveland
CORE on demonstrations at the Cuyahoga County Jail to demand Mallory’s release
and even secured the endorsement of the local NOI mosque for the protest.160 By the
end of 1962, Freeman and Max Stanford (Muhammad Ahmad), another Ohio student
inspired by the armed struggle waged by Williams and Mallory, had formed the
The Cleveland MDC was also responsible for publishing a collection of
Mallory’s writings from the Cuyahoga County Jail, which offers remarkable insights
into her political ideologies and analyses of Black liberation struggles. Mae Mallory,
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Defense Committee, 1963).
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Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a nascent revolutionary nationalist
organization that would profoundly influence Black freedom struggles in the years
to follow.161
Though the MDC’s formation in New York offered a glimmer of hope for a
Black united front of nationalist activists and organizations, the organization quickly
became entangled in factionalist disputes with another organization called the
Committee to Aid the Monroe Defendants (CAMD). While a detailed account of the
bitter rivalry of the individuals and organizations comprising the two groups is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, the contestations over ideology,
representation, and influence offer important insights into the deeply rooted
histories of leftist and nationalist organizing in New York City during this period.
Effectively operating as an arm of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) through the
leadership of Berta Green and George Weissman, the CAMD was at odds from the
start with many of the MDC’s nationalist members and those who had ties (former
or existing) with the Communist Party.162
The conflict, however, was much larger than leftist sectarianism. In the
estimation of Dr. Albert Perry, an associate of the Williams’ in Monroe and the
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titular head of the CAMD, the four main debates that undergirded the division
between the two committees were over interracial organizing, support for the
Freedom Riders, the ban of the word “Negro,” and salaried officers.163 More broadly,
the division hinged upon the MDC’s steadfast dedication to Black self-determination
and the rejection of white leadership in Black political organizations, as well as their
general disavowal of nonviolence as the only strategy for Black liberation. Conrad
Lynn explained the matter quite frankly to Berta Green, the organization’s white
executive secretary in a letter from May 1963. “The basic reason is plain…politically,
the black people are no longer willing to accept white leadership of their cause.”164
Though the CAMD was more successful in garnering financial and
reputational support from organizations like the NAACP, UAW, and the Baptist
Ministers Conference of Greater New York and Vicinity, Inc.—organizations which
had ardently opposed Williams previously—the militancy that the MDC represented
was more in step with the “New Afro-American Nationalism” John Henrik Clarke
described that was surging at the grassroots in Harlem and elsewhere. To be fair,
the CAMD’s fundraising was indispensable in securing legal representation and
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raising bail for the Monroe defendants and also coordinated a landmark debate at
the Palm Gardens on May 1, 1962 featuring Malcolm X, William Worthy, and James
Farmer, among its other contributions to the Monroe struggle.165 These forums,
Smethurst notes, “brought young black militants from the Lower East Side, Harlem,
and elsewhere in the city in contact with each other” and contributed to “the growth
of community and communication among new radical black artists, intellectuals,
and activists.”166 However, that the CAMD welcomed the support of mainstream civil
rights organizations and focused much of its organizing efforts downtown, where
it’s office was located, indicates a fundamental difference in organizational approach
between the CAMD and MDC.
While acknowledging the important roles played by the CAMD in a letter she
wrote to Mabel and Robert Williams in April 1963 after being released on $15,000
bond from the Cuyahoga County Jail, Mae Mallory argued that “it is obvious to all
who care to see that in spite of all our disadvantages it was The Monroe Defense
Committee that offered the leadership.”167 Though the Cleveland MDC played a
much larger role in the defense of Mae Mallory, she credited the leadership of the
national organization in New York City with inspiring Congressman Adam Clayton
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Powell, Jr. to “denounce the NAACP, CORE, SCLC, etc. for the white domination in the
leadership of Black organizations.” Mallory was referring to a bold declaration
Powell had made in Washington, D.C. just weeks earlier. “The white man has given
the Negro in America just about as much as he intends to,” Powell stated, “we will
achieve only that which we fight for and it can only be done by those organizations
that are totally owned, controlled and maintained by the Negro people.”168 While
Mallory qualified her commentary on the “opportunist” Powell’s advocacy, she also
credited the Harlem congressman with being “able to recognize the trend the
liberation movement is taking.”169 This “trend” of Black self-determination that
Mallory described was a hallmark of the “New Afro-American Nationalism” that
Clarke had heralded on the pages of Freedomways two years earlier following the
UN demonstrations. “No people are really free,” Clarke wrote, “until they become the
instrument of their own liberation.”170 Though Mallory would continue fighting
extradition throughout that year, it was clear to her and many other radical Black
leaders that the physical and legal fights she and the Monroe defendants had waged
for nearly two years had helped to galvanize the radical liberation movement in
Harlem and throughout the nation by 1963.
The New Afro-American Nationalism in Theory and Praxis
While Mallory, Williams, and the Monroe defendants continued their
struggles in the courts and in the streets, the ideological and organizational debates
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that swirled around their activism and defense were taken up in leftist and
nationalist journals. In Clarke’s Freedomways article, he argued that the new wave of
Black nationalism that Mallory and her network of radical activists in Harlem
embodied represented a proletarian “revolutionary force” in the United States.
Characterized by a collective identification with Pan-African anticolonial liberation
struggles, an appreciation of cultural heritage, and a rejection of bourgeois
leadership and integration as a panacea, the “New Afro-American Nationalism” was
also based upon the foundational analysis that African Americans represented an
internal colony of the United States.
In an era where revolutionary nationalist movements were throwing off the
chains of European colonialism and re-mapping the globe, Black leftist and
nationalist critic Harold Cruse noted, it was only logical that an analysis of domestic
colonialism would spur African American nationalist mobilization. In Cruse’s
analysis, however, the self-defense movements waged by Williams specifically, and
Mallory by association, did not constitute a veritable nationalist or revolutionary
struggle. Rather, he argued in a 1962 article in Studies on the Left, Williams
personified a third trend between proletarian Black nationalism and bourgeois
integrationism—a “rebel” who had been forced to disavow the NAACP over
differences in approach rather than objectives.171 Williams had only adopted armed
self-defense as a tactic to achieve equality through integration, Cruse maintained,
but the militancy of the tactic had been popularly mistaken for a “revolutionary”
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struggle despite Williams’ own insistence at that time that he was not a “Black
Nationalist,” but rather an “Inter Nationalist” concerned with fighting for the
liberation of oppressed people throughout the world.172 Nonetheless, Cruse took it
upon himself to ensure that would-be revolutionaries would not mistake Williams’s
iconic struggle for something it was not, and thus set unrealistic expectations for
activism based upon a false premise.
While aspects of Cruse’s critiques of Williams read as scornful or dismissive
of the profound impacts of his struggle upon the broader Black Freedom Struggle,
his analysis did raise vital questions about the relationship between revolutionary
theory, program, and action in movements for African American liberation and
societal transformation. In a 1963 article in Liberator, Cruse described the Monroe
movement as an example of a local “rebellion” against “the American racial status
quo” and argued “a rebellion is not a revolutionary movement unless it changes the
structural arrangements of the society or else is able to project programmatic ideas
toward that end.” Cruse rejected the possibility, or even the value, of African
American communities becoming fully integrated into the social, economic, political,
and cultural institutions of the United States, and thus deemed the programmatic
ideas of the moderate, mainstream civil rights organizations like the NAACP, SCLC,
Urban League, and CORE insufficient for achieving Black equality and liberation.
While dismissing the integrationist programs of these organizations, Cruse also
argued that sound theoretical analysis and “programmatic ideas” were crucially
absent within the praxis of more militant organizations, and in their absence,
172
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“neither arms nor demonstrations nor protest marches mean very much.”173 In
other words, a social revolution was required for African Americans to truly achieve
liberation and self-determination, and this could only be achieved by seizing control
of the levers of economic, political, and cultural power in society. And to Cruse, the
more militant factions of the Black Freedom Struggle had no comprehensive
program for gaining control or influence over these power structures and therefore
could not succeed in bringing a social revolution to pass.
Though arguably patronizing, these critiques that Cruse posited in his essays
offer a useful framework for analyzing the radical thought and praxis of Mae Mallory
and the “New Afro-American Nationalists” in New York City in the early 1960s. On
the one hand, Cruse’s critique has merit in that Mallory seemingly lacked a
comprehensive program for translating her analyses of institutional racism,
economic inequality, gender discrimination, nationalism, self-determination, and
armed self-defense into organized action for fundamental societal transformation
and Black liberation. In her writings, Mallory frequently pointed to the potential for
armed self-defense to inspire the masses and provide the basis for organized
struggle. However, the records of her correspondence and organizational activities
during this period do not indicate that Mallory had developed an analysis of how
self-defense would programmatically achieve economic, social, and political selfdetermination for Black communities.
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A letter Mallory wrote to Lorraine Hansberry in June 1963 is indicative of her
general analysis on self-defense that she expressed in correspondence to various
individuals involved in the Black Freedom Struggle:
There is a very important principle involved here; one that must be resolved.
The whole question of self-defense. Passive resistance may work for
peripheral things such as the right to eat at a lunch counter, the right to use
comfort stations and waiting rooms on a non-segregated basis. Passive
resistance has helped to show the need for more militant action. No people
under the sun ever won complete liberation by completely passive means.174
Mallory went on to describe the limitation of “passive resistance” for adequately
confronting the growing economic crises for African Americans amidst rampant
automation, employment discrimination, and cuts to welfare. While pointing to the
need for “more militant action” and a more expansive arsenal of tactics to achieve
economic, political, and social equality, however, Mallory did not explain in this or
other letters how the “question of self-defense” could be utilized to reach these ends
aside from protecting communities who faced racial terrorism in their struggles for
such.175
On the other hand, that Mallory may not have had a comprehensive program
for utilizing armed self-defense for achieving Black liberation and selfdetermination should not discount its immediate necessities and tangible
contributions. To criticize Williams, and Mallory by association, for not developing a
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revolutionary analysis while using armed self-defense to protect the livelihoods of
Black communities fighting for equality is to ignore the realities of life under a
violently oppressive society and devalue bold action to meet immediate needs.
Furthermore, by lumping the range of personalities involved with the “Monroe
Movement” into a singular category, Cruse ignored the variations in analyses that
those involved in, or inspired by, the struggle in Monroe had developed. Mallory,
specifically, had put forth critical analyses of the institutional intersections of racial
oppression through economic exploitation, gender discrimination, and political
disenfranchisement. Additionally, through her organizing experiences in New York,
she had advocated for Black self-determination within movements and in society
writ large, while also supporting Black political parties and pondering the formation
of a Black state. These types of analyses, rooted in prior nationalist and leftist
struggles in New York, re-emerged within the public lexicon in Harlem and the
nation through the organizational networks that Mallory occupied and shaped.
So while Cruse’s critique of Williams as a glorified integrationist may have
had merit for signaling the need for critical analysis of liberation struggles to
advance more revolutionary theories and actions, it devalued not only the vital
contributions that the Williams’, Mallory, and the Monroe defendants made to
protecting Black life, but also the formative influences that their struggles had upon
the development of more militant and revolutionary analyses and praxis at the
grassroots.
Emerging within the context of an increasingly radical political milieu
charged by the Cuban Revolution, the demonstrations at the UN, and escalating local
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and national struggles for human rights and self-determination, the MDC and CAMD
effectively parlayed Mallory’s national persecution into a public referendum on
armed struggle, state violence, Black nationalism, and political empowerment in
Harlem and beyond. Through street rallies, mass meetings, public forums, and Black
media outlets, these organizations brought local people into the dynamic
conversations and organized actions that were shaping national struggles for Black
liberation. This type of grassroots outreach and organizing was an imperative for
many organizers, including Rosa Guy, who saw “untapped” revolutionary potential
within the Black communities of Harlem. In Guy’s analysis, the militant spirit
embodied in the Monroe movement had inspired local people to push local and
national freedom struggles in more assertive and radical directions. “Certainly,” she
wrote to Robert Williams in 1963, “the militant but limited stance the leaders are
now taking is because of the millions of Robert Williamses behind them.”176
In addition to mobilizing local people to embrace and act upon militant
demands for economic, political, and social justice, the organized struggle to free
Mae Mallory and vindicate Williams also “fostered relationships between older and
younger black radicals,” as Ashley D. Farmer notes, “and introduced them to the
nationalist aspects of the black freedom struggle.” These “younger black radicals”
that Farmer describes included Donald Freeman, who established working
coalitions with CORE, the MDC, and the Nation of Islam through his organizing to
support Mallory with the Afro-American Institute in Cleveland, and Max Stanford
(Muhammad Ahmad), who met his future mentor, Queen Mother Audley Moore, at a
176
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“Free Mae Mallory Meeting” in her home in Philadelphia.177 Stanford was introduced
to Queen Mother Moore through another mentor in Philadelphia, Ethel Azalea
Johnson, a comrade of Robert and Mabel Williams and a confidante of Mae
Mallory.178
Mallory, however, was not merely an inspiration or coincidental connection
for the budding revolutionaries. When Stanford and Stan Daniels were beaten and
arrested at a protest against economic discrimination at a Philadelphia construction
site in the summer of 1963, Mallory wrote to Johnson offering guidance, legal advice,
and strategies for coordinating the pair’s defense.179 As Mallory’s political
development had been shaped by older generations of leftist and nationalist
thinkers and organizers in New York City, it was clear by the summer of 1963 that
her own brand of grassroots militancy was now inspiring and influencing the
evolution of freedom struggles across the country.
Ronald Stokes and Malcolm X’s Political Thought in Transition, 1962-1963
Though his affiliation with the Nation of Islam continued to constrict his
involvement with the types of direct political action that Mae Mallory had engaged
in during these years, Malcolm X was very much in the thick of the radical networks
that Mallory was involved with. By this time, Malcolm had established close

Ashley D. Farmer, Remaking Black Power: How Black Women Transformed
an Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 48; Donald Freeman,
“The Cleveland Story,” Liberator 3, no. 6 (June 1963), 7-8.
177

178

Williams, Concrete Demands, 80-81.

Letter from Mae Mallory to Ethel Azalea Johnson, June 9, 1963, Box 1,
Folder 2, Mallory Papers.
179

258

personal relationships with many of the most influential leftist and nationalist
activists and intellectuals in Harlem, many of whom had played active roles in the
defense of Mallory and Williams. Whether on stages at Harlem Square, in television
studios, or in private meetings, Malcolm made frequent contact with a cross-section
of political thought in New York City, including such notable figures such as Max
Roach, Abbey Lincoln, William Worthy, Percy Sutton, Anna Arnold Hedgeman, Adam
Clayton Powell, Jr., Vicki Garvin, Hope Stevens, Eloise Moore, John Henrik Clarke,
Sylvester Leaks, Bayard Rustin, and James Baldwin. Through these relationships and
many others, Malcolm forged and sharpened his political analysis as he inched
toward an embrace of secular Black nationalism and revolutionary internationalism.
Though the theological nationalism and program of the NOI had empowered
Malcolm to transform his life and connected him with the Garveyite roots of his
childhood, as Sales notes, “by 1962 they also represented the major barriers” to his
“intellectual and activist development.”180 It was through this network of activists
and intellectuals he had cultivated in Harlem, however, that Malcolm was able to
continue his development in the early 1960s, in spite of the restrictions imposed by
the NOI.
While the impacts of Malcolm’s prodigious oratory and organizing skills upon
the trajectory of local and national freedom struggles have received a substantial
amount of scholarly analysis, less attention has been given to the influence that
Harlem activists, intellectuals, and local people had upon the evolution of Malcolm’s
political thought. Notably absent in many narratives of Malcolm’s political evolution
180
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are the significant roles that Black women played in shaping his radical
consciousness and praxis. With deep roots in Harlem’s Left and nationalist
movements during the Great Depression and post-war eras, as Eric S. McDuffie and
Komozi Woodard note, Queen Mother Moore and Vicki Garvin had significant
influences on the radical political milieu that Malcolm would enter upon his return
to Harlem in 1954.
A Pan-Africanist and former Garveyite like Malcolm’s parents, Moore had
established herself as a legendary street corner speaker during the Depression in
Harlem and was active in tenant organizing and anti-eviction campaigns. Garvin had
migrated north to Harlem during the Depression, where she was a pillar in the
formative Boycott Movement and People’s Committee that launched Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. into local and national political power. By the 1950s, Garvin was
continuing the grassroots organizing methods that she had helped to cultivate in
Harlem throughout the North and West through the National Negro Labor
Council.181 In fact, Garvin had attempted to recruit Malcolm Little into the
Communist Party in the 1940s during his days as a hustler in Harlem. As Malcolm
was beginning to make a name for himself with the Nation of Islam in the early
1950s, Moore spread the word about his budding potential to her network of
revolutionary nationalists, including Cyril Briggs and Harry Haywood.182 Through
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their maintained contact with Malcolm, these radical Black women were “forging his
approach to community organizing in Harlem during the 1950s and early 1960s.”183
Although both Moore and Garvin had left Harlem by the turn of the decade,
they had laid the groundwork for a network of radical intellectuals, including Eloise
Moore and John Henrik Clarke, who would serve as Malcolm’s informal secular
advisors in the early 1960s. “I became a part of a shadow cabinet that Malcolm had,”
Clarke later said. “I was the man in history and historical information, and historical
personalities. There were other people on politics, another person occasionally on
sociology, the diversity of people in this shadow cabinet, none of them Muslims, was
equivalent to the faculty of a good university.”184 Although Clarke was cautious in
withholding names for fear of misrepresentation of the nature of these advisors,
Queen Mother Moore’s younger sister Eloise occupied one of these roles.
Before her death in 1963, Eloise Moore played a formative role in shaping
Malcolm’s budding Pan-Africanist consciousness. While Elijah Muhammad’s
insistence on the Asiatic origins of Black Americans and condescending views
toward Africans had hamstrung Malcolm’s outward embrace of Pan-African thought
in the 1950s, the elder Moore later explained in multiple interviews that her
younger sister had fueled Malcolm’s international perspective by the end of the
decade.185 “Eloise taught Malcolm about Africa,” Moore recalled, “and I can tell you
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that when I wanted to talk to Malcolm about Africa, he couldn’t mention the word.”
According to Audley Moore, she made the trip to Chicago to confront Elijah
Muhammad about his disavowal of the African heritage of Black Americans, but was
unsuccessful in changing his perspective after three days of debate in his home. “We
had to teach Malcolm, you hear, and that’s how he was able to get a new insight, put
that to work.”186
Though this type of intellectual prowess that grassroots intellectuals like
Audley and Eloise Moore and John Henrik Clarke brought to Malcolm’s “shadow
cabinet” profoundly influenced his political development in the early 1960s,
Malcolm alone was responsible for distilling their guidance into his own analysis
and action. “None of us ever told Malcolm what to say,” Clarke insisted, “he asked for
correct information on the subject and he did his own interpretation.”187
Nevertheless, the influence of Malcolm’s secular advisors point to the profound
impacts that Harlem’s radical grassroots political milieu had upon the political
consciousness and praxis of a leader who was fundamentally shaping the course of
local, national, and global freedom struggles in the early 1960s.
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By early 1962, it was becoming increasingly evident that Malcolm X was
identifying more with the expansive secular nationalist ideologies that his cabinet
espoused than the Nation of Islam’s narrow theology. According to Manning
Marable, the sermons and lectures that Malcolm delivered in early 1962 “rarely
mentioned the core values of the Nation’s theology.”188 As the naked brutality
against sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and voter registration campaigns in the South
captivated northern audiences, Malcolm was regularly pressed by reporters and
college students to give his positions on these campaigns and the broader Civil
Rights Movement. When northern Freedom Riders journeyed into the South in the
spring of 1961, for instance, Malcolm X denounced the notion of activists taking up
the problems of the South when trouble abounded in northern ghettoes. Reflecting
on his statements to reporters at the time, Malcolm X told Alex Haley “if the
Northern Freedom Riders wanted more to do,” they could stay in their communities
and “light some fires under Northern city halls, unions, and major industries to give
more jobs to Negroes.”189
This type of political commentary that was occupying greater space in
Malcolm’s public life drew reproach from Elijah Muhammad, who wrote to Malcolm
in February 1962 instructing him to abstain from delving into political analysis,
including any discussions of the Nation’s position on the “nation question” which
had been the crux of many of his speeches throughout the previous year.190 With the
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pace of local and national freedom struggles seeming to accelerate by the day, Elijah
Muhammad’s move to re-assert control as the sole Messenger of Allah and the
Nation of Islam fostered a nascent frustration within Malcolm X over the NOI’s
policy of political non-engagement.
Despite the restrictions placed upon him by Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X
continued to engage in critical dialogue about Black liberation through his classes at
Mosque No. 7 and in public appearances. The curriculum that Malcolm developed
for his grueling weekly public speaking class, according to NOI member Benjamin
Karim (Benjamin 2X Goodman), was grounded in “geography, current
events…American history, the history of colonialism.”191 Aspiring ministers were
assigned readings from local, national, and global newspapers to promote an
expansive worldview and foster the skills of critical inquiry and analysis that were
central to Malcolm’s own development and effectiveness as an intellectual and
organizer.
That spring, Malcolm X also debated the merits of integration with James
Farmer at Cornell and shared a pulpit with Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. at his
Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem. Speaking to the congregation of 2,000 packed
inside Abyssinian, Malcolm characteristically cast doubt upon the viability of
integration while also defending the Nation of Islam against charges of not backing
up their militant rhetoric with concrete action. “Just because a man doesn’t throw a
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punch doesn’t mean he can’t do so whenever he gets ready,” Malcolm warned, “so
don’t play the Muslims and the nationalists cheap.”192
Though Malcolm toed the line for the Nation in public, he privately
sympathized with the premise of this kind of criticism that was swirling within
Black communities by 1962. “Privately I was convinced that our Nation of Islam
could be an even greater force in the American black man’s overall struggle—if we
engaged in more action,” Malcolm later confessed. Malcolm privately predicted that
if the Nation did not relax their non-engagement policy and actively participate in
the national liberation movement, the Nation would find itself “one day suddenly
separated from the Negroes’ front-line struggle.”193 Malcolm’s concerns would
prove to be prophetic. Just weeks after he had defended the Nation against charges
of inaction in the face of injustice, the brutal murder of NOI member Ronald Stokes
by the Los Angeles Police Department threw down a formative challenge for the
Nation to back up its militant rhetoric of self-defense with action.
Shortly after midnight on April 27, 1962, NOI member Ronald Stokes was
killed by the LAPD after two officers provoked a confrontation with a group of
Muslims outside Mosque No. 27. Over seventy officers arrived at the scene,
indiscriminately beating and opening fire upon members of the Mosque that
Malcolm himself had organized in 1957. In the aftermath of the police siege of the
temple, dozens were injured and seven men were shot, leaving one paralyzed and
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one dead.194 Ronald Stokes, the Mosque’s secretary and Korean War veteran who
had grown up only a few blocks from Malcolm’s sister Ella Collins in Boston, had
been unarmed and in the process of surrendering when an officer shot him in the
back while his arms were raised above his head.195
The brutal killing sent shockwaves through the Nation of Islam and Black
communities across the country waited with bated breath to see how the Muslims,
for all of their fiery rhetoric, would respond. “Malcolm was furious,” recalled
photographer Gordon Parks, who Malcolm X had urged to meet him in LA
immediately after the shooting. “I expected that particular moment something really
explosive to take over.”196 Parks remembered an anxious Malcolm in Los Angeles,
pacing, shaking his head, and repeating, “they’re gonna pay for it, they’re gonna pay
for it.” Already cognizant by this time of the murmurs within Black communities
that the Nation of Islam was a paper tiger, Malcolm X was preparing for a direct
confrontation with the LAPD. However, a pit stop to the Messenger’s Phoenix home
en route back to the east coast once again stifled any designs Malcolm had for
organized political action. Muhammad ordered his minister to stand down, instead
blaming Stokes’ death on Malcolm’s lack of faith and even Stokes’ own cowardice in
surrendering.197
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Malcolm X was fuming when he returned to New York City for a public forum
hosted by the Socialist Workers Party on May 1st. Joining Malcolm X in the event to
raise funds for the Monroe Defendants were William Worthy and James Farmer. As
the last speaker to address the packed meeting hall, Malcolm X pulled no punches in
his excoriation of the white supremacist society that had stolen the life of his friend.
Making frequent comparisons between the LAPD and the Gestapo forces of Nazi
Germany, Malcolm described what had happened in Los Angeles as “one of the
worse crimes, one of the most inhuman acts of atrocity that have ever been
committed in a…so-called civilized society.” To Malcolm, the murder of Stokes was
the type of damning evidence of a morally bankrupt society that made the Nation’s
position against integration not merely justifiable, but imperative for Black survival.
“I’d rather be dead,” Malcolm declared, “than integrate into a society like this.”198
Furthermore, as the abuses of Black women in Monroe had for Robert
Williams, the murder of Ronald Stokes solidified for Malcolm the necessity of Black
Americans to defend themselves against the violence of white supremacy by any
means necessary. “In America when a Black man resists letting a white man put a
rope around his neck, the Black man is accused of violence,” Malcolm explained. “In
America when a Black man says, ‘I have to defend myself,’ you should call that what
it is, self-defense. And if America has the right to defend herself from her enemies,
the Black man in America has a right to defend himself from his enemies.” Citing the
armed anti-colonial revolutionary struggles waged in Angola, Algeria, and the
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Congo, Malcolm X argued that as a colonized people, Black Americans had the right
to “defend ourselves from the atrocities that these white American colonialists have
been inflicting against us.” To Malcolm, Black Americans had been colonized by a
people that had “perfected the art of hypocrisy to such high degree they’ll stand up
and make themselves look like angels in disguise when they’ve got blood of black
people dripping from their mouths and dripping from their fingers.” This rampant
hypocrisy practiced by explicit white supremacists and liberals alike was the
fundamental basis for Malcolm’s argument against integration, which he concluded
his fifteen-minute address with. “We believe, that as you sow, so shall you reap. And
if you’re going to reap what you have sown, then we don’t want to integrate with
you.”199 Though he had not called for Black communities to take any specific direct
action, thereby abiding by Muhammad’s edict, it was clear that his patience with the
Messenger’s inaction and restrictions had nearly worn out.
As the murmurs about the Nation steadily turned to roars following the
Stokes’ murder, it quickly became evident that Malcolm was hardly alone in his
disillusionment with Muhammad’s non-engagement policies. Though their action in
defense of Johnson X had endeared the NOI to the Black masses in Harlem, many
had grown impatient with their rhetoric that now appeared toothless. Dan Watts
captured this collective mood in an editorial in the May 1962 volume of Liberator, in
which he challenged Malcolm X to “reconcile his militant talk with the non-militant
action of his followers.” While Watts expressed his support for the minister’s truthtelling about the “savagery and uncivilized nature of the white man,” he noted that
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members and supporters of the Nation of Islam needed “more substantial weapons
than the truth of Allah” to defend themselves against the police and other white
supremacist forces.200 This frustration with the Nation’s inaction was not limited to
those outside the religion, as many within the NOI used Muhammad’s refusal to act
upon Stokes’ murder as a critique of his broader policy of non-involvement. “A lot of
us sort of became dissatisfied because…we weren’t doing anything to help our
people who were being brutalized by the whites and the police during the Civil
Rights Movement,” Benjamin Karim recalled. One of Malcolm X’s most trusted
assistant ministers at Mosque No. 7, Karim said that he and others—Malcolm X
particularly—felt that they “should have gotten involved…we should have been able
to retaliate or train those people to retaliate.”201 Though Malcolm remained silent in
his welling frustration with the Nation’s continued inaction after Stokes’ death, this
moment proved a watershed in his relationship with Elijah Muhammad.
As both Marable and Sales note, this contestation that arose between
Malcolm and Muhammad over the Nation’s response to Stokes’ death marked the
emergence of a new period in Malcolm’s political development that would culminate
in his departure from the Nation two years later. This period, Sales argues, was
characterized by Malcolm’s efforts at defining his ideology of Black nationalism
through an “extraction of the secular Black nationalist core of Muslim ideology from
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its religious form.”202 In addition to redefining his political analysis intellectually,
Malcolm X was also taking steps toward redefining his role in struggles for rights
and power in Harlem. Although he had ceded to Elijah Muhammad’s command that
he take no part in organized protest activity in Los Angeles, he began to take greater
political liberties in Harlem by the year’s end.
As his renewed calls for a Black united front in the wake of the Stokes
murder illustrated, Malcolm increasingly saw himself and the Nation of Islam as a
fundamental part of the national Black Freedom Struggle. In fact, after another
nearly explosive confrontation between the NYPD and the Black community in
Harlem the previous summer, Malcolm had joined a group of civil rights, religious,
and labor leaders as part of a committee to combat the symptoms of institutional
racism in Harlem.203 As part of the Emergency Committee for Unity on Social and
Economic Problems, which included the likes of A. Philip Randolph, L. Joseph
Overton, Anna Arnold Hedgeman, and Percy Sutton, Malcolm X cooperated with
moderate leaders to demand a broad platform of policy initiatives to rectify racial
inequality in employment, housing, education, and policing.204 In the months
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following the Stokes murder, Malcolm drew upon these connections to call for
greater protest and political activity in Harlem. At a July rally convened by Mosque
No. 7 in Harlem Square, Malcolm X shared the stage with Cleveland Robinson (Negro
American Labor Council), Bayard Rustin, Eddie “Porkchop” Davis, and Anna Arnold
Hedgeman, demonstrating this nascent cooperation between Malcolm X and
mainstream leaders in the service of building a Black united front.205
One of the primary targets of Malcolm’s rhetoric at rallies throughout that
year was the NYPD, who had stepped up its harassment of the Nation that summer
amidst a broader crackdown on nationalist organizations and activities. After the
“near riots” in the summer of 1961, the NYPD had flooded Harlem with members of
its paramilitary Tactical Patrol Force and announced new regulations on nationalist
street rallies, including a curfew.206 The following summer, officers began harassing
members of the Nation while selling Muhammad Speaks with greater frequency,
leading Malcolm to predict that “the time will come when the Muslims will not be
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able to leave their homes.”207 By the end of the year, this surveillance and
harassment had progressed to such a degree that Malcolm made his first foray into
civil disobedience, demonstrating his budding embrace of direct action in open
defiance of Elijah Muhammad.
On Christmas Day, two Muslim men were arrested at gunpoint at 42nd Street
for allegedly blocking a subway entrance while selling copies of Muhammad Speaks.
When the men went to trial two weeks later, 30 members of the Nation picketed
outside the courthouse, carrying signs that read “America Is Against Human Rights”
and “We Are Living In A Police State.” After the two men were found guilty, the 250
Muslims who had packed the courthouse spilled outside, where Malcolm X
compared New York’s criminal justice system to that of Mississippi and announced
“if the Muslims can’t get justice in court then they will hold court in the street.”208
A month later, Malcolm made good on his promise when he led a
demonstration in Times Square to protest the Christmas Day arrests and the recent
police siege of the Rochester Mosque that resulted in the brutal arrests of over a
dozen Muslims. In the middle of rush hour the evening of February 13th, Malcolm X
and Joseph X (Yusef Shah) led 200 members of the Fruit of Islam as they marched
along the sidewalks from Times Square to Rockefeller Center with signs reading
“America Violates the UN Charter on Human Rights” and “We Charge Genocide.”
Joining the protestors were William Worthy and Socialist Workers Party leader Fred
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Halstead. As the pickets disrupted the flow of rush hour traffic, Malcolm and others
distributed leaflets under a heading that declared “America has become a PoliceState for 20 Million Negroes.” Exhorting Black communities in Harlem and
throughout “the whole Dark World” to act in support of their jailed brothers in
Rochester, the flyers boldly professed, “We will all go to jail today for what we
believe. We will all fight for what we believe. We will all die for what we believe.” If
the protest was an act of nonviolent direct action, the flyers also made it explicitly
clear that the demonstrators were prepared to return any violence inflicted upon
them. “We must let the white man know…that we don’t endorse the foolish
philosophy of ‘turning the other cheek’…We demand Justice or Death!!!!”209
Fortunately, there was no need to act upon these professions, as BOSS detectives
kept a watchful eye on the illegal demonstration but did not intervene.
The protest was uncharacteristic of both the Nation of Islam and the Times
Square area. Demonstrations were technically illegal in New York’s commercial hub,
a fact that was pointed out to Malcolm the day prior by Det. DeFossett. The
detective’s report on his meeting with Malcolm X that day illustrates Malcolm’s
intentions to engage in an act of civil disobedience—a tactic that betrayed the
Nation’s doctrines of non-engagement and obeying the law. Despite his clear
intentions to coordinate a mass protest against police brutality, Malcolm X shielded
himself from accusations of such with feigned coyness. Referring to the planned
march as a “walk,” Malcolm explained to DeFossett that he intended to merely
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“exercise his rights as an individual citizen to walk on the sidewalk in Times
Square.” If anyone were to walk in front or behind him, Malcolm explained, “that is
his business.” Malcolm explained that this “walk” would take place “in the height of
rush hour when people are getting out of work.” As DeFossett continued to badger
him about the next day’s obvious protest, however, Malcolm X eventually conceded
the nature of his plans. “If we are going to get in trouble for nothing,” he explained to
DeFossett, citing the arrest of the two Muslims in Times Square, “we might as well
get in trouble for something.”210
If Malcolm X felt constrained by Muhammad’s order to stand down in Los
Angeles following the Stokes murder, the Times Square protest represented an
effort to loosen these reigns. In his move toward secular nationalism, Malcolm was
beginning to consider and embrace not only new political analyses, but new tactics
as well. And these tactics, it must be noted, proved at least mildly successful in
achieving immediate and longer-range results. As Liberator contributor Rose
Finkenstaedt noted in her coverage of the protests the following month, whereas
“anonymous black men are murdered, beaten, and convicted with impunity day
after day,” Malcolm’s actions had resulted in dropped charges for one of the arrested
Muslims and forced a parlay between he and Mayor Wagner regarding the NYPD’s
suppression of the Nation of Islam.
In Finkenstaedt’s estimation, in these minor victories scored by Malcolm’s
use of direct action and civil disobedience were major lessons for those involved in
the Black Freedom Struggle. “The fact is that the Black Muslims are an indication of
210
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what can be done against another power structure in America,” Finkenstaedt wrote.
“For those of us who might want a little more from this rich and powerful society,”
she added, “there might be much to learn from our brothers, the Muslims, in how we
can beat the white man at his game.”211 While Finkenstaedt’s appraisal speaks to the
influence of Malcolm and Mosque No. 7 on radical political consciousness in New
York City, it is also clear that Malcolm and the Nation of Islam had been learning
much from the people of Harlem at the dawn of the 1960s. The surging militancy of
the Black masses who demanded action to achieve rights and power, along with the
ideological leadership of grassroots intellectuals who helped shape collective
political analyses, had fundamentally impacted Malcolm’s political development in
theory and praxis by 1963.
The Freedom Now Party and the Politics of Black Nationalism
Though the Amsterdam News had kept relatively quiet about this swelling
militancy and nationalism in Harlem, Freedomways, Muhammad Speaks, and
Liberator dutifully chronicled and analyzed the groundswell of Black radical politics
that Mae Mallory and Malcolm X represented to ensure its proliferation at the
grassroots. “The space Liberator created and the voices it represented,” Tinson
argues, “reveal the critical concern of everyday citizens for the political, economic,
and cultural spatial and power relations remapping the world.”212 The surging
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grassroots militancy in Harlem reflected on the pages of these publications was also
forcing more mainstream presses to focus their attention uptown.
In early June of 1963, The New Yorker sent staff reporters to Harlem to
observe and describe the social, economic, and political conditions there for the
magazine’s predominantly white, middle-class subscribers. In their walking tour,
the reporters happened upon a crowd of 800 people gathered at Harlem Square for
a mass rally sponsored by the Harlem Anti-Colonial Committee.213 The small group
led by Bill Jones and Selma Sparks, a veteran of the Negro American Labor Council,
counted amongst its few but distinguished members John Henrik Clarke, Sylvester
Leaks, William Worthy, and Pernella Wattley, each of whom had played an active
role in supporting the Monroe defendants.214 Billed as a protest against “ black
people’s treatment in the white man’s court,” the rally had been organized to spread
critical awareness of Mae Mallory’s extradition fight, the murder of Ronald Stokes by
LAPD the previous year, and William Worthy’s scurrilous arrest for the Cold War
crime of “failing to travel with a valid passport.”215
Among the speakers at the rally were Jones, Sparks, Worthy, Conrad Lynn,
Leaks, and Mae Mallory’s mother, Willie Lee Brown. In their speeches to the
enlivened crowd, Leaks and Lynn both extolled the use of armed self-defense in
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struggles for Black self-determination. “We have guns, and we’re going to make our
presence felt,” Lynn declared after deriding Dr. King’s adherence to nonviolence in
spite of the recent vicious attacks on protestors and bombings of his hotel room and
his brother’s home in Birmingham. “We have power,” Lynn went on to say, as the
crowd grew in size and vigor, “and we’re going to use it!"216 Leaks, who had been
writing as a featured columnist for Muhammad Speaks at the time, expounded
Lynn’s point in his address by declaring that African Americans in the South would
have little trouble voting if they brought their rifles when they went to register.217
Whereas Lynn and Leaks spoke on the need for Black communities to seize
political power by any means necessary, Worthy used his platform to decry the
repressive two-party system and call upon Black voters to chart a new direction. To
Worthy, the right to vote wasn’t worth dying for if the candidates on the ballot were
white men with no interest in Black liberation. Reflecting the spirit of the “New
Afro-American Nationalism,” Worthy argued that Black communities must be in
positions of power to control their own liberation, and thus proposed the formation
of an independent Black political party. “Do you know what would happen if Fidel
Castro were President of the United States instead of John F. Kennedy?” Worthy
asked the audience to illustrate his point. “Bull Connor would be given a fair trial
and then shot. Ninety-five per cent of the police would have to flee to South Africa
for political asylum. J. Edgar Hoover would be thrown into an integrated cell. If that
didn’t cure him, he’d be left there for life.”
216

“The Talk Of The Town,” The New Yorker, June 15, 1963.

217

“Harlem,” Liberator 3, no. 7 (July 1963): 19.
277

Worthy’s point was well received by the sizable crowd who laughed in
appreciation and cheered in agreement. By this point, few amongst any crowd at
Harlem Square had any illusions of racial liberation being bestowed upon Black
communities by the national two-party system or the predominantly white liberal
government of New York City. “There’s going to be trouble,” one observer stated
plainly, citing the decades of systemic inequality and police violence that the
powers-that-be had refused to address in Harlem. “On a hot summer night,” she
predicted, “it wouldn’t take much to set off a riot—not isolated violence but a kind of
revolution.”218
Although in numerous interviews Lynn credited Worthy’s speech as the
impetus for creating the Freedom Now Party, the idea of forming an independent
Black political party had deep roots in New York’s history of Black radical thought
and had been discussed amongst nationalist activists and intellectuals in New York
City for some time before the June rally at Harlem Square. However, the grotesque
racist brutality visited upon the SCLC’s Birmingham campaign that spring by
southern Democrats added a greater sense of urgency and spurred the masses to
earnestly consider rejecting the national Democratic Party in favor of a progressive
third party.219 During a meeting of the AAAA in Harlem two years earlier, Calvin
Hicks had floated the idea of forming a political party and several other members
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suggested that membership be limited to Afro-Americans.220 In the fall of 1962 Dan
Watts and William Worthy had appeared on a panel discussion televised by CBS,
where Watts queried if the interests of Afro-Americans could only be served by “a
political party of his own.”
In her reporting on the program, which aired two days before President
Kennedy’s own televised pronouncement of an embargo of Cuba, Liberator
columnist Rose Finkenstaedt argued “the interests of the black will never be
considered until he becomes an independent political force.” To Finkenstaedt,
however, independent Black political power was not just a vehicle by which to
achieve African American liberation. “If the meaning of America is freedom,
democracy, and anti-colonialism,” Finkenstaedt proposed, “the true interests of
America will only be served through effective Black-led political power.”221
Finkenstaedt, Watts, and Worthy had no lofty illusions about the “meaning of
America” after 300 years of racial oppression, political inequality, and capitalistimperialism. Rather, as part of a global anti-colonial struggle of oppressed peoples
for liberation and self-determination, they argued that independent African
American political power wielded the potential to supplant the global system of
Euro-American hegemony in the United States with a society built upon “man’s
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attainable ideals” of “freedom, justice and equality for all in a classless, hate-free
society.”222
Though Watts and Worthy may have had atmospheric aspirations for such a
party, they were also pragmatic in their expectations. Speaking at a mass rally
organized by Donald Freeman and the Afro-American Institute in Cleveland that
March, Worthy conceded that the party “cannot realistically anticipate meaningful
1964 victories at the polls.” Explaining this first election cycle as a “training ground”
for independent Black politics, Worthy declared “1964 should therefore be regarded
as the year for uniting and educating all militant forces in the black community.”223
The idea was already floating around Harlem, where Progressive Labor Party leader
Bill Epton had begun formulating his campaign for Councilman-at-Large “as a means
of introducing the concept of independent Negro political activity and action.”224
With a groundswell of militancy reverberating through its streets, Harlem
was the logical choice for establishing the FNP’s national headquarters after the
party was officially formed at the March on Washington that August. Alongside
SNCC activists who had planned more disruptive protests at the March to leverage
the power of the masses gathered at the nation’s capital for more immediate and
substantive federal action on civil rights, the steering committee of the FNP
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represented the more radical factions of national Black freedom struggles in
Washington that day. As the steady flow of demonstrators made their way toward
the Lincoln Memorial, Conrad Lynn, William Worthy, and several other FNP
organizers distributed leaflets calling for a new political party with “an all-black
slate and a platform for liberation.” In their manifesto, titled “The Declaration of
Washington,” the organizers called for “all-black political action” that could “deliver
knock-out punches to the enemies of equality” and promote economic justice,
adequate housing, educational equality, and global self-determination.225
As the crowds filtered out of the capital, the fledgling group met at the Park
Sheraton Hotel to plan their next actions and establish the formal organization. After
five hours of deliberations, a national committee was formed with Conrad Lynn as
acting chairman and Harlem Nine veteran Pernella Wattley as corresponding
secretary. The group also emerged with plans for a sit-in at the FBI’s headquarters
to protest the agency’s inaction amidst the unabated racial terrorism sweeping
through the South that had claimed the life of Medgar Evers two months prior.226
The formation of the FNP was met with predictably polarizing receptions
from white commenters, moderate civil rights leaders, and Black communities. In an
editorial published two days before the MOW, the New York Times declared that the
FNP would “extend racism into politics,” increase divisiveness, and embolden white
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racists in the South. Further, the editorial cited the great progress African Americans
had made in recent years and arrogantly stated that the party’s formation “implies a
total misunderstanding of the nature of our political parties and the great flexibility
of the American political system.”227 Similar sentiments were expressed in a letter to
the editor of the Amsterdam News from a Long Island City resident, who reflected
the general concerns and opposition of white communities to the FNP that would
come to characterize popular responses to “Black Power” three years later. “You are
fighting…for freedom, equality, etc. and now fighting for segregation?” the writer
pointedly queried, while offering a prediction that “confusion and violence will lose
the gains made.”228
These sentiments echoed in the responses of some conservative Black
leaders, such as novelist and Pittsburgh Courier editor George Schuyler, who
referred to Lynn and Worthy as “crackpots.”229 Roy Wilkins, however, was notable
for his lukewarm embrace of the FNP, demonstrating the successes that the militant
Black masses had in shifting the scales of “acceptable” political thought and action.
While stating that he “would hate to see purely racial political action in this
country,” Wilkins also conceded that “white people in the South have made the
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parties white parties, and the only logical answer for the Negro is to raise a black
party."230
Though Malcolm X and the NOI had played a significant role in promoting
Black separatism at the grassroots and prompted local organizations to adopt
similar political analyses, the response of Wilkins is significant for its demonstration
of Black nationalist thought entering the discourse of mainstream of civil rights
leadership. Although the NOI’s continued abstinence from political involvement
prevented Malcolm X from giving an explicit endorsement when asked for comment
on the FNP, he did point toward the latent power the eight million unregistered
Black voters across the nation possessed. If this massive base was activated and
organized, Malcolm posited, “they would upset the entire political picture.”231
At a Harlem rally that June, Malcolm had made his position on the oppressive
nature of the American political system characteristically plain. “The Conservative is
a wolf, he lets you know that he does not want you around. The Liberal is a fox, he
pretends to be your friend,” Malcolm explained to the crowd of 2,500 gathered at
the corner of 115th and Lenox. “Both are dogs, and whatever the Negro chooses he is
still in the doghouse.”232 Though Malcolm himself played no formal role in the
organization of the FNP, it was abundantly clear that his brand of nationalist
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thought and analysis had formatively influenced this new direction in Black political
action.
As the collective high from the MOW quickly receded, particularly in the
wake of the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham two weeks
later, the FNP’s national committee got to work in Harlem. In the minds of the more
radical factions of the Movement, and even in some of the mainstream leadership,
the March had created an “impasse” from which organizations would need to
emerge with new tactics and broader objectives or risk losing precious momentum
and leverage. From their office on 125th Street, Lynn, Wattley, and the FNP worked
to move the focus of the national movement from protest to politics by coordinating
a national grassroots political campaign ahead of the 1964 election cycle. In contrast
to the hierarchal status quo of the national two-party system, the national office of
the FNP was designed to serve as a facilitating body, while the party’s platform and
policies were to be defined collaboratively at the grassroots. Worthy described his
visions for the process in an article in Liberator that fall, in which he invited every
reader to form “a study and action group of six to ten persons meeting regularly in
homes, maintaining contact with other such groups in the same community,
federating to form local committees for a Freedom Now Party, and working towards
a founding congress of the new party.”233 Over the next several months, local and
regional committees worked to develop a draft of the FNP’s first platform, which
Liberator would publish in early 1964.
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Through the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the platform, the FNP
put forth a national program to transform the groundswell of Black nationalist
thought into a workable “political vehicle” to unite the masses and effect systemic
social change.234 The economic platform contained provisions for collective
ownership of multiple dwelling housing in cities, nationalization of industries
threatened by automation, a universal healthcare program, and federal aid for the
“economic and cultural rehabilitation” of all Black communities. The political
platform cited the necessity of unified political action at local, regional, and national
levels, flexibility and democratic participation in defining policies and programs,
and the primacy of functional policies over emotional positions.
The cultural platform was the most extensive and centered around a
program of “Cultural Revolution.” Likely influenced by FNP member Harold Cruse’s
analysis of the primacy of African American cultural institutions in social revolution,
the program called for the democratization and nationalization of cultural
production in American society and pointed to the necessity of progressive cultural
production for advancing unification of the African American masses.235 Through
this platform, which showed the influence of the leftist and nationalist movements
of prior generations as well as the “New Afro-American Nationalism” surging in
Harlem and beyond, the FNP evinced their intentions for a clean break with the
“liberal wing of the Democratic Party” and mainstream civil rights leadership to
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bring about fundamental economic, political, and cultural changes in American
society.
Freedom Now, Malcolm X, and Revolutionary Nationalism at the Grass Roots
While the national committee was at work in New York City on both building
a political party and coordinating public protests to draw local attention to national
politics, the most influential of the regional committees was organizing its base in
Michigan.236 Under the direction of Rev. Albert Cleage, Jr., the militant preacher in
Detroit who had been leading campaigns there against urban renewal, educational
inequality, and police brutality, the Michigan Committee of the FNP effectively
mobilized the state’s radical milieu for political action. At the fore of Cleage’s
network of associations was the Group on Advanced Leadership (GOAL), one of the
city’s most radical organizations, which he had founded alongside Milton and
Richard Henry (Gaidi and Imari Obadele) in 1961. By the summer of 1963, the
militant and nationalist politics that Cleage and the Henry brothers embraced had
earned GOAL such notable allies as Malcolm X and James and Grace Lee Boggs, but
also drew the scorn of mainstream civil rights leaders whose gradualist positions
they openly criticized.237
The rift between mainstream leadership and grassroots radicalism that was
sweeping the nation that summer was stark in Detroit, as Cleage clashed with Rev.
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C.L. Franklin over the involvement of leftists and nationalists in a coordinating
conference for northern civil rights leaders planned for the fall. Conceived as a
follow-up to the Walk for Freedom, a widely successful dress rehearsal for the
March on Washington, the Northern Negro Leadership Conference was planned as a
national forum on the state of the Civil Rights Movement with Cleage as chair of the
planning committee. However, as Peniel Joseph notes, Cleage’s invitation of Dan
Watts, William Worthy, and Conrad Lynn as speakers drove a wedge between the
conference chair and Franklin, a close associate of Dr. King who objected to “black
nationalists and other radical groups” taking over the event.238 As a result of the
split, Cleage opted to organize his own conference that was more reflective of the
calls for “Freedom Now,” self-determination, economic justice, and revolutionary
nationalism that were resonating at the grassroots.
It was this split that launched the Northern Negro Grass Roots Leadership
Conference and provided the impetus for the delivery of Malcolm X’s most powerful
and significant public address to this point. While Worthy, Lynn, and Wattley were
busy building the framework for a national Freedom Now Party, Malcolm had been
actively promoting secular political action and the need for a Black united front at a
series of street rallies in New York City that summer. “Around 1963, if anyone had
noticed, I spoke less and less of religion,” Malcolm X later told Alex Haley. “I taught
social doctrine to Muslims, and current events, and politics. I stayed fully off the
subject of morality.”239 Speaking to a crowd of 500 at a rally in Brooklyn that July
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amidst mass demonstrations against hiring discrimination at the Downstate Medical
Center construction site, Malcolm renewed his calls for Afro-American unity and
announced that he would “no longer malign other black leaders.”240 Though
members of the NOI did not participate in the demonstrations due to their professed
rejection of nonviolent direct action, a BOSS detective reported, Malcolm X “made it
clear that if at any time the non-violent pickets are in need of Muslim aid they would
be present to heed their call.”241
At a Harlem rally two weeks prior, Malcolm X was joined by Akbar
Muhammad, the Messenger’s youngest son who had just returned from a semester
at university in Egypt. After Malcolm explained Harlem’s dire housing conditions as
symptomatic of institutional racism, Muhammad issued a call “for unity for all black
men in America and eventually for black men all over the world.” Displaying a
revolutionary Pan-African vision that would lead the younger Muhammad to split
from his father, Akbar Muhammad informed the crowd of 2,500 that several African
nations were prepared to break diplomatic relations with the United States.
Muhammad reported that one of these nations was even “ready to support the black
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struggle in the US with money, arms, and know how.”242 Through his close rapport
with leaders of newly independent African nations, Muhammad had brought visions
of Malcolm’s earlier rhetoric about an African American armed anti-colonial struggle
in the wake of the Stokes murder out of the abstract and into the realm of possibility
for those at the rally.
Like Mae Mallory, whose experiences with incessant racial violence had
inspired an embrace of armed revolutionary struggle, the continued Statesanctioned violence inflicted against members of the Nation of Islam, Medgar Evers,
and protestors in Birmingham that year pushed Malcolm to support such a struggle
in more explicit terms. This revolutionary rhetoric, in turn, was attracting the
attention of more militant activists who gravitated toward Malcolm X. One such
activist was Sherron Jackson (Amina Rahman), a high school student from Harlem
who had been a member of SNCC, Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited
(HARYOU), and the Northern Student Movement (NSM). After an impromptu debate
with Malcolm X at protests at the Harlem Hospital construction site that summer
challenged her to reconsider her positions on nonviolence and integration, Rahman
disavowed her involvement with the Civil Rights Movement and joined the Nation of
Islam—despite her apprehensions about the Nation’s theology, gender roles, and
reticence toward political action.243 For Rahman, Malcolm X was the draw and over
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the next several months she was a regular fixture with him on stage at street rallies
in Harlem.
At these rallies, Rahman routinely criticized her prior participation in
nonviolent demonstrations to achieve integration, arguing that freedom is not the
right to dine at an integrated restaurant, but rather the right to “own the land on
which the lunch counter stands.”244 In addition to this type of economic nationalism
derived from Malcolm’s analysis, Rahman also demonstrated an embrace of the
revolutionary nationalism that was beginning to characterize Malcolm’s rhetoric.
Speaking at a mass rally at 114th Street and Lenox Avenue that September, Rahman
told the crowd of 700 that Black Americans “will never gain anything until they see
the light and place their faith in a god who will represent them. When this is done
black people will then be united in the world wide black revolution and will then
stop turning the other cheek and fight force with force.”245
Though the words were her own, Rahman’s address echoed the sentiments
of a statement made by Malcolm X at a rally they both spoke at a week earlier. “You
don’t get freedom non-violently, without bloodshed or by turning the other cheek,”
Malcolm explained to the thousands gathered near Mosque No. 7. “You don’t get
freedom without being willing to fight for it.”246 Malcolm’s call to action would take
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on an even greater sense of urgency a week later when a white supremacist’s bomb
ripped through the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, stealing the lives of
four young Black girls.
Coming amidst a national wave of heightened militancy, direct action
confrontations, and white reactionary violence, Malcolm’s speeches at these rallies
in New York City throughout the spring and summer of 1963 laid the groundwork
for his address at the Northern Negro Grass Roots Leadership Conference in Detroit
that November. As Malcolm X strode to the pulpit of the King Solomon Baptist
Church on November 10th, he was greeted by the applause of nearly 2,000 Black
people of all political stripes who had gathered there instead of at the more
moderate conference being held at Cobo Hall. Among the thousands packed into the
church’s pews were 138 of the 500 civil rights leaders that had been invited to C.L.
Franklin’s conference—along with many others who had been purposefully
excluded— dwarfing the meager 22 who had showed up to the NNLC.247
That the Grass Roots Leadership Conference had attracted greater
participation than the NNLC was indicative of the increasingly popular identification
with the grassroots militancy represented by the Conference’s conveners, including
Rev. Cleage, James and Grace Lee Boggs, and the Henry brothers, as well as the
invited speakers, such as William Worthy, Donald Freeman, and Malcolm X. During a
series of workshops the previous day, radical leaders from across the country,
including Gloria Richardson, Selma Sparks, Dan Watts, Rev. Milton Galamison,
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Lawrence Landry, Stanley Branche, and Jesse Gray had collectively analyzed the
problems confronting urban Black communities and discussed organizing strategies
around self-defense, independent political action, educational equality, and
economic empowerment.248
By the time Malcolm X took to the rostrum that Sunday evening, participants
had already passed a series of resolutions that included endorsements of the
Freedom Now Party, advocacy of self-defense, and support for Mae Mallory’s
ongoing fight against extradition to North Carolina. In many ways the resolutions
passed by this impressive network of leading radical activists, as Stephen Ward
notes, indicated “a direct connection to the nationalist organizations and black
radical politics that had developed over the preceding two years.”249 Thus, when it
came time for Malcolm X to speak, he was addressing a crowd that was bearing the
fruits of the “New Afro-American Nationalism” that he and many of the other
participants had cultivated in Harlem.
The speech that Malcolm X delivered that evening, now immortalized as his
“Message to the Grass Roots,” represented a synthesis of the varying strands of
secular nationalism, anti-colonialism, Pan-Africanism, and revolutionary
nationalism that had been bubbling up to the surface of his speeches over the
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previous several years. Indeed many of the comments, analogies, and turns of
phrase he would use that night had been heard by crowds in Harlem months earlier.
After reiterating his calls for a Black united front in opposition to a white “common
enemy,” Malcolm swiftly took up the complex topic of revolution and
characteristically “made it plain” for those in the pews.
Drawing from the histories of various successful revolutions across the globe,
including ongoing anti-colonial liberation struggles on the African continent,
Malcolm distilled their lessons to offer a biting rebuke of the limited scope of
integrationists and moderate civil rights leaders, as well as a charge to would-be
Black revolutionaries. In his analysis, there existed within the Afro-American
Freedom Struggle a decisive contestation between those who advocated for a
“Negro revolution” and those who sought a “black revolution.” The former
represented the middle-class, moderate leadership, while the latter more closely
resembled the radical consciousness surging at the grassroots. “There’s no such
thing as a nonviolent revolution,” Malcolm explained, “the only kind of revolution
that is nonviolent is the Negro revolution.” In real revolutions, he continued,
oppressed communities did not seek integration with their oppressors, but rather
sought self-determination by breaking free from such a society by any means
necessary and asserting their right to independence by claiming land through armed
struggle. “A revolutionary wants land so he can set up his own nation, an
independent nation,” he argued, “these Negroes aren’t asking for any nation—
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they’re trying to crawl back on the plantation.”250 Malcolm’s espousal of Black
liberation and nation-building through an armed revolution marked a distinct
evolution in his political thought and program. Whereas his previous speeches
under the aegis of Elijah Muhammad had called for the United States to grant Black
Americans monetary and territorial reparations to establish an independent Black
nation under threat of Allah’s destructive wrath, he was now calling for Black
Americans to act as their own liberators and take up the necessary tools to
dismantle an oppressive society and build their own anew.
After laying out his analysis of revolutionary struggle, Malcolm X invited the
audience to consider what he saw as the historical roots of the division amongst the
ranks in Black America that was stifling the nascent revolutionary fervor of the
masses. It was here that Malcolm most famously put forth his analogy of the “house
Negro” and the “field Negro,” which he had raised on occasion in years prior. In his
analysis, the moderate, middle-class leadership of the Civil Rights Movement were
the heirs of “house Negroes,” who Malcolm argued identified with their white
masters and protected his interests as their own. “That house Negro loved his
master, but that field Negro—remember, they were in the majority, and they hated
the master,” Malcolm explained, “when the master got sick, the field Negro prayed
that he’d die.”
To Malcolm, this dichotomy between the “house Negro” and the “field Negro”
was analogous to the differences between middle-class civil rights moderates and
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the disenfranchised Black masses—a type of divergence that been playing out in
Harlem over the previous decade and was coming to define a broader rift that was
widening within the national movement. Driving his point home, Malcolm argued
that as the slavemasters of old had used the “house Negroes” to “keep the field
Negroes in check,” the “same old slavemaster today has Negroes who are nothing
but modern Uncle Toms…to keep you and me in check, to keep us under control, to
keep us passive and peaceful and nonviolent.”251 To support his claim, Malcolm
pointed to the co-optation of the March on Washington by the Kennedy
administration and white religious and labor groups who he argued had defanged
the mass mobilization of its planned disruptive militancy. Through this analogy,
Ward notes, Malcolm delivered his central message to the Black masses: “the civil
rights movement and its leadership could only offer a ‘Negro revolution’; it could
not bring black liberation. It was up to the black masses—the grass roots—the
descendants of field Negroes, to move the struggle ahead and to achieve full and
complete liberation.”252
v
Malcolm X’s keynote address marked the apogee of a two-day conference
that sought to re-evaluate and redefine the Black Freedom Struggle in the midst of
what Liberator magazine dubbed “the year of violence.” Despite the federal
government’s professed support for the ideals of equal rights, the slow pace of
reform coupled with the increasingly repressive measures and reactionary violence
251
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meted out by those with a vested interest in white supremacy had forced a
referendum within the national Civil Rights Movement on the ideologies of
nonviolence, integration, self-defense, self-determination, nationalism, and
revolution. Far from an organic response to systemic violence, this reckoning was
spurred by local people and radical activists who had been engaged in militant
grassroots struggles for economic justice, fair housing, equal education, and political
power in Harlem and other communities across the nation. In many ways, these
grassroots struggles had both spawned and advanced the New Afro-American
Nationalism which John Henrik Clarke had described two years earlier, and was
now beginning to chart the course of the national Black Freedom Struggle. And
while Malcolm’s “Message to the Grass Roots” speech, as Cedric Johnson notes,
“conveys the critical spirit of the New Afro-American Nationalism,” the influence of
the local people and grassroots intellectuals who served as midwife for this strain of
the movement must be acknowledged.253
Though the grassroots organizing of Mae Mallory and Malcolm X during this
period largely marked a disavowal of working within the confines of the political
system, their contributions to the evolution of the Black Freedom Struggle in Harlem
and throughout the nation were based less on scoring piecemeal victories through
policy reform than on empowering a Black radical consciousness that would
become a revolutionary force in America. This emphasis on psychological liberation
and radical imagination was central to the organizing efforts of Mae Mallory during
Cedric Johnson, Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the
Making of African American Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2007), 50.
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this formative period of struggles for rights and power in Harlem. As Ashley D.
Farmer contends, through her intersectional political analysis and praxis, Mae
Mallory “argued that, for black working-class women, adopting a nationalist political
agenda and militant persona was a viable path to liberation, but only if they were
willing to reimagine themselves as vital nationalist political actors.”254
While both weathered the criticism of moderate, middle-class leaders of the
Civil Rights Movement and radical intellectuals alike for what they perceived as a
dearth of a practical program for bringing forth their radical political analysis, these
types of critiques failed to appreciate the formative psychological contributions that
Mallory and Malcolm X made to the evolution of the Black Freedom Struggle. As
William Sales has pointed out, these types of contributions were minimized by
Mallory and Malcolm’s contemporaries—as well as scholars—because such
analyses overlooked the significance of “intellectual and emotional” mobilization
within liberation struggles. Citing sociologist Max Weber, Sales argues that the social
movements that Malcolm X and Mallory orchestrated during this period “provide
the strong emotional support necessary to make the initial break with the
dominance of oppressive ideas over the thinking of the exploited. Once that break is
made, organizational development seems to accelerate.”255 Like Jesse Gray, who saw
tenant organizing as a vehicle by which to draw local people into broader struggles
for Black liberation and political transformation, Mae Mallory and Malcolm X sought
to unleash the revolutionary potential of the Black masses through their grassroots
254
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organizing, radical rhetoric, and practical embodiment of the New Afro-American
Nationalism in Harlem.
While Malcolm’s “Message to the Grass Roots” heralded this radical evolution
of Black Freedom Struggles nationally, it also marked a watershed moment in his
personal evolution. As they sat listening to his gripping speech that day, Gloria
Richardson and Grace Lee Boggs could not help but notice something different in
Malcolm X. “It seemed to me that he was coming just a little bit away from the
sectarian kind of religion thing,” Richardson later recalled. “It sounded like the
preface that he always gave to those speeches was becoming more rote.”256
Richardson was now hearing firsthand what careful observers in Harlem would
have surely noticed throughout that spring and summer. Boggs also took notice of
this curt way in which Malcolm delivered his ordinarily effusive homage to Elijah
Muhammad in his speech that evening. To Boggs, this seemingly trivial aspect of his
powerful address was telling of a deeper evolution in Malcolm’s political
consciousness and analysis. “The tribute to Mr. Muhammad was so nominal and
mechanical as contrasted with the passion and urgency in his ‘off-the-cuff, down-toearth chat’ that I whispered into the ear of Rev. Cleage who was sitting next to me on
the platform, ‘Malcolm’s going to split with Mr. Muhammad.”257 Though Grace Lee
Boggs had no way of knowing the impending firestorm that would embroil the
Nation of Islam in the days to come following the assassination of John F. Kennedy
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and the revelations of Elijah Muhammad’s infidelities, her intuition proved
prescient. “After two decades of attending political meetings,” Boggs later reflected,
“my ear had become sensitized to the rhetorical changes that suggest that a radical
political change is in the offing.”258
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CHAPTER 6
“TALKING AND ACTING IN OUR INTEREST”: INTERRACIAL ORGANIZING AND
BLACK COMMUNITY POWER IN HARLEM, 1960-1963
If we are successful…in getting the support of the Black Nationalists including
Malcolm X we will need to offset the impact of their participation by involving
as much of the white community as possible. We are playing with dynamite.
The nationalists have a stronghold in Harlem; and we may have to choose
between the possibility of having them with us or against us. –Carl Anthony
(1962)1
If bigotry would slow down, then it might be possible to consider the argument
of gradualism. The fact is that bigotry and indifference makes steady inroads
into our communities and our fight must be hard, constant and effective. The
Negro is like a man being strangled. We say stop the choking now, at once. You
can’t afford to be gradual about stopping a strangulation. –Gladys Harrington
(1963)2
In the fall of 1959, thousands of New York City residents received a letter
from James Robinson, the executive director of the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE). “Many say that the Battle for Brotherhood is being lost in the great cities of
the North,” the letter read, “while advances are painfully made in the South.” From
their national headquarters in downtown Manhattan, Robinson and other CORE
officials had surely borne witness to the turmoil that was swelling uptown that
summer as Black communities fought for their liberation in the chambers of the
NAACP’s national convention, on the airwaves of local television stations, and in the
streets of Harlem. Though Robinson tacitly acknowledged the progresses which had
Letter from Carl Anthony to Peter Countryman, June 19, 1962, Box 8, Folder
10, Northern Student Movement Records, Schomburg Center for Research in Black
Culture (henceforth referred to as NSM Records).
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been made in New York, largely through the efforts of local people in Harlem and
elsewhere, he also noted “there is no doubt that much segregation remains here, and
racial tensions have been rising.”3
A white, Catholic pacifist from upstate New York, Robinson was a founding
member of CORE in 1942 and had spearheaded the New York chapter’s direct action
campaigns in support of the Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs fair housing bill in 1957 shortly
after he was named executive director of the national organization.4 Though CORE
claimed credit for the passage of this landmark housing legislation and garnered
much media attention for their efforts, the local chapter and the national
organization had been largely moribund in the late 1950s—despite the dramatic
resurgence of struggles for African American rights and power locally and
nationally. Even as tenant organizing and fair housing campaigns had come alive by
the end of the decade in ways unseen since the Left-led housing activism of the
Depression-era, NY CORE was largely a bystander to this heightened mobilization.
To Robinson, CORE’s marginalization during these years demonstrated a need to retool the interracial organization’s programs to more adequately combat the
institutional nature of Jim Crow society in the urban North. “The challenge lies in
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making CORE work in large northern cities,” Robinson wrote in the fall of 1959, “and
unless we can do this, CORE is outmoded except in the border and southern states.”5
All this would change at the turn of the decade, as a new wave of southern
student activism reinvigorated the Civil Rights Movement and launched CORE back
into national prominence at the forefront of the Movement. Through their active
support of the sit-ins in early 1960 and their inception of the Freedom Rides the
following spring, CORE mobilized communities throughout the nation—Black and
white—to engage in direct action campaigns in support of the southern movement
and in service of freedom struggles in their own neighborhoods. While the initial
“sympathy strikes” brought individuals into the fold of organized action, northern
CORE chapters quickly seized on the momentum generated by the southern
movement to wage local campaigns for fair housing practices, equal employment
opportunities, and police reform.
At the same time, however, local people in New York City and throughout the
nation were pushing their local CORE chapters, and consequently the national
organization, to adopt more militant tactics to achieve more immediate and
expansive liberation in their own communities. In Harlem, specifically, where a
deeply rooted radical political milieu had begun to flower at the grassroots, Black
communities saw CORE not as a messianic force in civil rights struggles, but rather
as a vehicle by which they could realize their demands for human rights and selfdetermination. New York native and CORE member Jimmy McDonald succinctly
expressed the way many Black residents of Harlem felt about interracial, nonviolent
5
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organizations like CORE during these years when he told an interviewer, “to hell
with the way you go as long as you are on the road towards my freedom.”6
In the wake of the Freedom Rides in 1961, another interracial organization
joined CORE “on the road” toward Black liberation in Harlem. Growing out of a
shared concern for supporting the student-led movement in the South, the Northern
Student Movement (NSM) drew waves of college students from their campuses into
northern cities beginning in 1962. Largely organized by white college students on
the pristine campuses of liberal arts colleges in New England, the formation of the
NSM in the fall of 1961 marked the emergence of a network of students outside of
the South who saw their fate in America as intertwined with their southern
counterparts fighting for equality and justice many miles away.
Though many of these students were drawn into the fledgling organization
through its early fundraising campaigns for SNCC, most came to see northern cities
as the next frontier of the Civil Rights Movement. “New York is the most important
city in America,” Columbia University student Carl Anthony wrote in the summer of
1962. “A really dynamic student civil rights movement here would set the North on
fire.”7 Like CORE, however, the ideologies that initially guided NSM’s organizational
praxis quickly evolved as its members established “projects” in several northern
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cities and became immersed in the Black radical traditions of communities in
Harlem, Philadelphia, Boston, and New Haven.
This chapter traces the development of both CORE and NSM in Harlem from
1960-1963 to analyze the ways in which local people shaped the emergence and
evolution of national organizations in ways that transformed broader struggles for
Black liberation. Beginning as interracial organizations dedicated to supporting the
southern Civil Rights Movement through fundraising and nonviolent direct action
campaigns, by 1963 these organizations had shifted their focus to community-based
organizing for Black equality and empowerment in the urban north. Through the
active involvement and influence of grassroots organizations and indigenous
leaders, these organizations would transform their positions on integration,
community-based organizing, self-determination, nationalism, and nonviolence, and
in the process, emerge as leading forces in northern Black freedom struggles.
“I should get on that line”: Sympathy Strikes and CORE’s National Revival
News of the sit-ins in Nashville and Greensboro swept across the nation in
the early months of 1960, leaving few places or people untouched by the bold
actions of young African American students willing to put their bodies on the line for
desegregation and civil rights. Even in communities like Harlem where African
American-led struggles for rights and power were already in motion, the southern
students energized and inspired local people to greater action in their shared
struggle. As the sit-ins spread across the South, civil rights organizations in New
York mobilized protests of department stores like Woolworth’s and S.H. Kress to
pressure the national chains to end their segregationist policies. With many in its
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Black community already in step with the tempo of organizing set during the
summer of 1959, Harlem became the locus for the emergence of sympathy protests
in New York.
From February through October of that year, New York CORE was among a
handful of organizations that led pickets, demonstrations, and sit-ins at department
stores in Harlem and throughout the city. Two weeks after the sit-ins in Greensboro,
NC captivated the nation, members of NY CORE and Columbia University CORE
launched their first sympathy protest in New York City at the Woolworth’s store on
125th Street and Lenox Avenue in Central Harlem. “Within a half hour the store was
cleared of customers,” Columbia University student and CORE picket captain Martin
Smolin wrote. “Hardly anybody on this busy thoroughfare crossed our picket lines.”8
Over the next several weeks, CORE collaborated with a range of community
leaders and organizations, including radical attorney and State Assemblyman Mark
Lane, Mae Mallory and the New York Crusader Family, Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., the NAACP, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, and Jesse
Gray and the Lower Harlem Tenants Council (LHTC), as part of an ad hoc coalition to
coordinate protests throughout the city. With his flair for spectacle, Gray and LHTC
Director Horace Townsend led one of the more colorful protests that February when
demonstrators carried a casket on a picket line in front of the Woolworth’s on 116th
Street to signify the death of Jim Crow.9
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Among those on the initial picket lines was Jimmy McDonald, a Yonkers
native who had become involved with the local NAACP as a teenager in the late
1940s after a trip to Richmond, VA where he “saw a black man hanging” and
Klansmen roaming about. “It was from that day on,” McDonald later recalled, “that I
began to become conscious of my blackness, in the fact that I was a 14 year old kid
out here who had to make it in this white man’s world.” By the late 1950s, McDonald
had become a fixture as a singer and actor in the café scene in Greenwich Village,
where he first caught wind of CORE’s planned “sympathy strikes” in Harlem. The
national coverage of the Greensboro sit-ins captivated McDonald, who by this time
had become disillusioned with the perceived inactivity of the civil rights
establishment he had previously been involved with. “The NAACP wasn’t doing a
goddamn thing,” he later recalled, “they were still having their cocktail sips and it
was the elite organization of the black bourgeoisie.”
Having participated in earlier CORE struggles to desegregate a public pool in
the Palisades in New Jersey, McDonald was anxious to re-engage in direct action
struggles after serving in mainly a fundraising capacity through his performances
over the past several years. So when NY CORE announced their plans to picket
Woolworth’s on 125th Street, McDonald recalled, “it was only natural before I went
to work that night I should get on that line. And I did that.” For McDonald, joining in
the picket line alongside CORE veterans James Peck and Marvin Rich proved an
impetus for his greater engagement in the organization. In the following weeks and
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months, McDonald would spend his days in the CORE office and his nights in the
cafés of Greenwich Village.10
As the weather began to warm that spring, members of NY CORE expanded
their campaigns against Woolworth stores throughout the city. Aroused to action by
the disturbing images of white mobs attacking peaceful students at southern lunch
counters and the increased mobilization in the streets of Harlem, Black communities
throughout New York, along with some whites, heeded the call to “get in step with
our brother and sister youth in the South.” By early April, CORE members were
coordinating pickets and sit-ins at scores of Woolworth’s in all five boroughs of the
city. The high point of the protests came the first weekend of that month, when
CORE spearheaded the picketing of over 80 Woolworth’s across the city,
culminating in a mass rally in front of the Hotel Theresa where Bayard Rustin, Jackie
Robinson, and A. Philip Randolph addressed a crowd of 3,000.11
Though the pickets had mobilized thousands and drastically reduced
Woolworth’s patronage in New York City that weekend, illustrated by photos of an
empty lunch counter at the 125th Street store in the Amsterdam News, many CORE
leaders saw these northern protests as little more than a means to an end of
dismantling southern segregation. “We don’t want to put Woolworth stores and
others out of business in the North by our picket lines,” CORE field secretary Gordon

10

Jimmy McDonald interview with James Mosby, November 5, 1969.

T.R. Bassett, “3,000 Picket in Harlem To Aid South Sitdowners,” New York
Herald Tribune, April 3, 1960; “First Sit-In Staged At Store Here,” New York Herald
Tribune, April 3, 1960.
11

307

Carey told reporters that weekend. “We just want to put justice in business in the
South.”12
Though the contributions of CORE chapters and supporters in New York City
in reaching their goal of southern desegregation are immeasurable, as Meier and
Rudwick note, the national leadership believed that their national boycott campaign
had been directly responsible for the 8.9 per cent drop in sales from the previous
year that Woolworth’s reported in March 1960.13 These economic sanctions, in turn,
had compelled southern stores to reconsider their racially discriminatory policies.
By July, when the stores in Greensboro began serving Black customers, Woolworth’s
had begun to desegregate its stores in 27 southern cities. Within the next few weeks,
ninety towns in eleven southern states had reported changes in their local store’s
racist policies.14 Locally, the sympathy strikes also had the significant impact of
drawing students and local people, like Jimmy McDonald, into the active ranks of NY
CORE and into direct action campaigns in their communities.
Although their vanguard efforts in Harlem had helped the national
organization coerce the desegregation of southern department stores and lunch
counters, NY CORE struggled to find their place within Harlem’s activist milieu in
1960. While predominantly Black organizations like the LHTC and NY Crusader
Family had mobilized Harlem communities to join picket lines at local Woolworth’s
as part of their broader programs, the mostly white demonstrators from NY CORE
12
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and Columbia CORE were essentially viewed as interlopers in a majority Black
neighborhood when they launched their protests against southern segregation.
When the group of students first began walking the picket lines in Harlem that
February, according to Brian Purnell, “many black pedestrians looked askance at the
overwhelmingly white group.” In a neighborhood where Black nationalist rhetoric
resonated from street corners and was increasingly characterizing political thought
at the grassroots, the white students stuck out like a sore thumb. However, through
active outreach to local churches, civic groups, and politicians, NY CORE eventually
earned the endorsement of prominent leaders such as Adam Clayton Powell, who
agreed that the problem of segregation was a national issue and urged that all
“American citizens interested in democracy stay out of these stores.” Through their
outreach and continued presence in front of multiple Woolworth’s, the NY CORE
picket lines drew a larger proportion of Black demonstrators by the early spring.15
Despite the greater racial parity along the picket lines, however, the middleclass orientation of NY CORE’s organizational policies and emphasis on
respectability politics stood in the way of building authentic coalitions with
grassroots organizations and poor and working-class communities in Harlem. At a
February meeting of the chapter, CORE’s white executive director James Robinson
stressed that “well-dressed pickets were received more favorably by the public than
those who carried casual dress to the extreme,” while others debated the merits of
having quiet, orderly picket lines. Two days later, the national office issued
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guidelines for all CORE pickets, which closely resembled these discussions of the NY
chapter and instructed demonstrators to abstain from any disruptive actions or
“abusive” chants or slogans.16
So when Jesse Gray, Horace Townsend, and the LHTC staged more raucous
demonstrations at the picket line on 125th Street, CORE demonstrators were quick
to confront the LHTC leaders about the “extremely noisy” protest and their
organization’s “lack of discipline.” When Gray and Townsend defended their
chanting of slogans, which “had at certain points turned into jeering and
wisecracking,” Robinson hesitantly conceded but proposed that the groups sing
instead.17 Although NY CORE had scored a modicum of success in mobilizing Black
communities in Harlem through their sympathy protests, it was clear that the
organization would need to reconsider its programs and policies at the local and
national levels in order to get in step with the rhythm of grassroots organizing in
Harlem.
As a result of their efforts to actively support the southern sit-in movement,
CORE witnessed an exponential growth in 1960. From July through December of
that year, the number of chapters grew from 24 to 49 nationwide. Despite this
national growth, however, there remained only a handful of chapters outside the
South, and most of these chapters were predominantly white.18 Furthermore, the
flurry of activity that year strained the capacities of the national office and exposed
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rifts over leadership styles and organizational philosophies. To Marvin Rich, a white
Army veteran, member of NY CORE and the National Action Committee, and CORE’s
national community relations director, the bureaucratic leadership style of national
director James Robinson was inhibiting CORE’s emergence as a front-line civil rights
organization.19 According to Rich, the decision to name James Farmer as national
director in 1961 was the culmination of extensive internal efforts to shift CORE from
“essentially a leader organization to a mass organization.” At the same time, the
national office realized that Black leadership was critical to actualizing this shift to a
“mass organization.”20
As a predominantly white, middle-class organization as late as 1961, Rich
and others in the national office understood that for CORE to build a mass
movement they needed to appeal to greater numbers of African Americans,
specifically poor and working-class communities. Jimmy McDonald was just one of
many who “resented the fact” that the interracial civil rights organization was led
primarily by white men like Rich, Robinson, and field staffer Gordon Carey.21 By
hiring Farmer, a dynamic speaker with a magnetic personality, CORE sought to draw
upon the successes of charismatic leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. and energetic
college students who were effectively mobilizing and empowering Black
communities in the South in the late 1950s. “Lots of things were done to make the
19
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organization more appealing to black masses,” Rich recalled. Hiring Farmer to
succeed James Robinson “was done in part with that in mind.”22 Though the
organization remained steadfast in its position on building an interracial mass
movement, CORE’s selection of James Farmer as national director represented a
tacit acknowledgement of the organizational imperative of rising calls at the
grassroots for Black self-determination within civil rights organizations in the early
1960s.
“We have much to learn as well as do”: New York CORE Moves Uptown
Though the sit-in campaigns marked the emergence of NY CORE and
spawned the formation of other chapters, most notably Brooklyn CORE, it was also
clear that the northern chapters of CORE needed to chart their own course of action
if they were to confront the racism deeply embedded within northern cities. That
February, when CORE’s National Action Committee appointed James Farmer as the
organization’s new national director, the twenty-year veteran of struggles for civil
rights made clear his intentions to bring the organization into step with the
demands of northern Black communities whose interests in southern sympathy
campaigns had waned. Speaking at the national convention that year, Farmer
explained that the northern chapters of the organization could not survive solely “on
sympathy with the South,” but needed to engage in local struggles that addressed
the range of pressing needs in the North.23 “CORE’s method of direct, non-violent
action will be used in aggressive efforts during the coming year to end the evil of
22
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segregation not only at lunch counters,” Farmer announced, “but also in theaters,
housing, employment and transportation.”24 Despite the ongoing dramatic struggles
for civil rights in the south, Farmer and others in the national office put a premium
on organizing in the urban north, particularly in New York City where CORE’s
national headquarters was located. Farmer wasted little time in setting the
organization’s northern agenda, telling Amsterdam News reporters just days after
his appointment that CORE’s top priorities would be “the complete wiping out of
discrimination in housing” and “the end of segregation in employment” in the city.25
By the time Farmer dedicated the national office to open-housing campaigns
in the city, NY CORE’s housing secretary Gladys Harrington had already laid the
groundwork for such efforts. Born in Gainesville, Florida in 1928, Harrington had
graduated from Florida A&M and participated in the 1956 Tallahassee bus boycotts
before moving to Corona, Queens in the late 1950s.26 A social worker by day,
Harrington quickly established herself amongst the leadership ranks of NY CORE,
and by the spring of 1960 she was coordinating open housing drives throughout
New York City. Although NY CORE had been an active supporter of the 1957
Sharkey-Brown-Issacs Bill which outlawed racial discrimination in housing rentals,
discriminatory rental practices persisted in the city and Harrington used the
momentum of the sit-in campaigns as a springboard to promote integrated
24
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neighborhoods in the city. In the spring of 1960, Harrington announced NY CORE’s
plans to test the city’s enforcement of its fair housing law by having white CORE
members apply for rental units after Black applicants had been denied. In cases
where Black applicants were denied, but white applicants were accepted for a
rental, Harrington led CORE members in demonstrations and sit-ins at rental offices
to protest the discrimination, while also filing complaints with the city’s
Commission On Intergroup Relations.27
Harrington and NY CORE’s approach to tackling the housing crisis facing
Black communities in New York City was fundamentally different than that of Jesse
Gray and other tenants rights activists in the city. Whereas Gray and the LHTC
organized tenants to fight against exploitative landlords and for humane housing
conditions and political empowerment within Black communities, Harrington’s
mission was to break down the barriers that restricted Black residents to
neighborhoods where poor housing predominated. Upon announcing these early
housing efforts, Harrington pointed out that CORE did not intend to wage a
“broadside campaign,” but rather to assist those who wanted to obtain housing
“outside ghetto areas.”28
Despite a handful of successes in securing housing for middle-class Black
renters in Brooklyn, including future NY CORE chairman Clarence Funnyé in the
summer of 1961, CORE’s open housing drive was limited in its impacts for two
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primary reasons. First, as Meier and Rudwick note, “few blacks had the money,
inclination, and stamina to move into white neighborhoods,” therefore restricting
the benefits of CORE’s efforts to those in the Black middle-class while failing to
engage poor and working-class communities whose interests were outside the
scope of CORE’s organizing.29 Second, by leaning heavily on the city’s Commission
on Intergroup Relations CORE fell into the trap of advocating for civil and human
rights through an apparatus of the liberal governance which had already proven
wholly incapable of bringing forth any meaningful political or social reform. Despite
these obvious shortcomings in CORE’s early housing programs, Harrington was
influential in employing confrontational direct action tactics to protest housing
conditions—a tactic which would come to define CORE’s approach to community
organizing in Harlem after she was elected chair of the NY chapter later that year.
Though the sit-in movement and open housing campaigns of 1960-61 buoyed
CORE’s national and local reputation, the membership of NY CORE remained
dismally low. With a total membership base of less than 50 people, NY CORE was
still the largest active chapter outside of the South, but paled in comparison to the
number of members and supporters that other organizations in the city claimed.30
In addition to the middle-class bias of their organizing efforts and protest ethos, NY
CORE’s bureaucratic membership policies largely discouraged the active
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participation of the grassroots. According to Meier and Rudwick, field staff were
“instructed to zealously maintain CORE’s tradition of ‘closed membership” by
mandating that chapters restrict formal membership to “those who served a
probationary period, participated in action projects, received approval from twothirds of the chapter, and committed themselves to following the CORE Rules For
Action.”31 In addition to its reputation as a white organization, this rigid
membership process contributed to popular perceptions in Harlem that CORE only
accepted people with a college education.32
Furthermore, operating out of a donated office space in mid-town Manhattan,
NY CORE was a civil rights organization with no brick and mortar presence within
the borough’s largest African American community. Though the members of other
groups like the Organization of Young Men and On Guard For Freedom largely lived
downtown or in Brooklyn, they also recognized the importance of locating their
organizational efforts in the streets of Harlem. Despite the momentum generated by
the sit-ins and the minor victories scored in housing integration, these factors left
NY CORE floundering in a city where the Black masses were ready to move. This
began to change, however, when Farmer became national director in early 1961 and
embarked on one of the most impactful and iconic campaigns of the Civil Rights
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Movement. “When Jim came in,” Jimmy McDonald recalled, “a whole new thing took
place.”33
Farmer’s appointment that winter coincided with the organization’s search
for a new national campaign that would allow CORE to penetrate the Deep South
with nonviolent direct action while launching the organization into the vanguard of
the Civil Rights Movement. “That began another era in CORE,” McDonald later said,
“Jim came in and they began talking about a freedom ride.”34 The same week that
Harrington announced NY CORE’s plans to apply the Ghandian tactics of non-violent
resistance to housing desegregation in New York City, a group of thirteen CORE
members left the nation’s capital on two Trailways buses headed South. The
interracial group, which included NY CORE members James Peck and Jimmy
McDonald, set out to test the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boynton v. Virginia,
which outlawed segregation in interstate bus and train terminals.
As the Freedom Rides grew that spring and summer amid bus bombings,
brutal beatings, and relentless violence, activists from throughout the country
joined the campaign in waves, departing from points across the South. It was during
these latter waves of Freedom Rides that John Lowry, a white student from New
York, made the trip to Monroe, NC in early August in an attempt to prove that
nonviolent direct action could work in a crucible of white supremacist violence.
After dozens were beaten and arrested during nonviolent demonstrations, including
SNCC leader James Forman, Lowry was charged with kidnapping alongside Mae
33
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Mallory and Robert F. Williams and spent months in jail and years battling the
spurious criminal charges. Despite their failure to curb racial violence and
segregation in Monroe, the Freedom Riders did largely succeed in eliminating
segregation in interstate travel facilities by provoking confrontations that exposed
the naked brutality of southern racism and forced federal intervention.
While the Freedom Rides and their impacts upon the Civil Rights Movement
have been extensively documented and analyzed, the specific ways in which this
watershed campaign influenced the development of NY CORE and local struggles in
New York City have received less scholarly attention. Like the sit-ins, the Freedom
Rides energized and inspired Black communities in Harlem—particularly the poor
and working classes—to engage more actively in local struggles for rights and
power. Whereas the sympathy strikes and other demonstrations had previously
drawn the support of predominantly white, middle-class protestors, by the summer
of 1961 CORE saw an influx of working-class Black participation.
With this changing demographic came a shift in organizational priorities and
policies, which came to more closely resemble the grassroots militancy that was
beginning to flower in Harlem at this time. Increasingly disillusioned with gradualist
approaches to Black equality and empowerment and recognizing CORE as a
potential vehicle for social transformation in the wake of the Freedom Rides, this
new wave of activists would push the organization to adopt more militant tactics to
achieve more immediate and fundamental goals in the months and years to follow.
This groundswell of poor and working-class local activists, furthermore, was forcing
local and national CORE officials and members to wrestle with the debates over
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nonviolence, grassroots community organizing, self-determination, integration, and
Black nationalism that were shaping the broader Black Freedom Struggle.35
While NY CORE remained dedicated to its principles of nonviolence and
integration during this period, some organizers were also sewing the seeds of a
militant nationalism that would flower in the years to follow and cause a major rift
amongst the New York chapters. As Farmer’s appointment in early 1961 indicated,
there were growing demands in New York and across the nation for increased Black
representation in the national decision-making bodies of CORE and other civil rights
organizations. At the same time, NY CORE and other local chapters were fighting for
the decentralization of the national leadership, seeking greater representation in the
decision-making process and greater autonomy for local chapters. Gladys
Harrington herself expressed concern “that participation in the arm that is
responsible for the day to day decisions (program and policy) of CORE by the areas
and persons most affected is noticeably absent.”36
These struggles came to a head in the fall of 1961, when Harrington and
former executive director James Robinson waged a successful struggle to
democratize the national organization through restructuring CORE’s governing
body, the National Action Council.37 More importantly, however, these internal
debates were reflective of broader demands for Black community control and self-
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determination within both civil rights organizations and American society writlarge. “Perhaps, we are still in the throes of birth pains as a National Civil Rights
organization and we have much to learn as well as do,” Harrington suggested in
early 1962. “In the process, let us not lose faith with the people we are fighting with
and for.”38 With these ends in mind, Harrington and other CORE leaders in the NY
metropolitan area increasingly identified their organizational approaches with the
needs and aspirations of poor and working-class Black communities who were
fueling these calls for more immediate self-determination, human rights, and
political empowerment.
Though Harrington and NY CORE struggled throughout 1961 and the
following year to devise comprehensive direct action programs that could
effectively challenge the systemic racism of the urban north, they did take important
steps in this direction. The earlier open housing campaigns had scored only minor,
piecemeal victories, but had provided useful lessons on the programmatic
limitations of open-housing campaigns that catered to the middle-class. Recognizing
the need to develop new programs that would attract the active support of the
grassroots, who were quickly becoming the most dynamic force within the Black
Freedom Struggle, Harrington announced in September 1961 that NY CORE would
be moving its office to Harlem.
By November, NY CORE had set up shop in a building on 125th Street that also
housed the New York branch of the NAACP. To the editorial staff of the Amsterdam
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News, the close proximity of these two major civil rights groups held the promise of
a dynamic collaboration that could mobilize the masses in Harlem. “A hard-hitting
youthful NAACP branch, working side by side from the same offices, with a freeswinging, two-fisted CORE unit,” an early November editorial predicted, “should
cause many who have been too long walking on their heels in this community to get
back up on their toes again.”39 While Malcolm X’s calls for a Black united front at this
time had largely gone unanswered by integrationist leaders and organizations, the
Amsterdam News saw the makings of a similar, if more moderate, coalition in CORE’s
move uptown. Though the editorial staff may have overestimated the influence of
the NAACP in Harlem at this time, they nonetheless recognized the impacts that a
youthful organization that championed direct action could have upon the
progression of the Movement and the realization of economic, political, and social
justice in Harlem.
More than a symbolic gesture, the move to Harlem represented a formative
moment in NY CORE’s evolution as a community-based organization. Though some
of the chapter’s members objected to the move, arguing that an organization
advocating an open society should not move into the “heart” of a “ghetto,” the
majority of its membership felt otherwise. “We are desperately trying to get more
Negroes involved. That’s why we moved to Harlem,” one of the chapter’s leaders
said, while also acknowledging that most of the organization’s efforts to that point
had been geared toward “the bourgeois, the educated.”40 Though Meier and
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Rudwick credited the Freedom Rides with stimulating CORE chapters in the North
to take a greater interest in grassroots organizing within Black communities, such
attribution fails to acknowledge how the existing groundswell of activism in such
communities influenced this organizational shift. In actuality, the move to Harlem
really signified a tactical recognition of a powerful radical grassroots milieu,
nurtured by Black communities and leaders, which had been fueling Black freedom
struggles in northern cities.
The grassroots base that CORE sought to attract with their move uptown was
part and parcel of this radical milieu. While participating in CORE’s nonviolent
direct action protests, members of the organization like Harlem native Peggy
Trotter Dammond Preacely were also deeply moved by the Black nationalism that
was surging in their communities. “We heard Malcolm X speak at the local Muslim
mosque, and we hung out late into the night at Micheaux’s famous black bookstore
on 125th Street,” Preacely later wrote.41 In order to truly get their organization “off
the ground” in New York City, the organization would need to tap into this
wellspring of radical Black activism in Harlem that was informing grassroots
political consciousness and action throughout New York City and the nation. In the
years to follow, however, this local radical milieu that NY CORE sought to mobilize
into a nonviolent movement for an open society would end up pushing the local and
national organization to reconsider many of its positions on integration, self40
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determination, and nonviolence in the service of a more expansive program for
Black liberation and social transformation.
“Their fight is now our fight”: The Genesis of the Northern Student Movement
By the time NY CORE made the move uptown, it had become clear that they
weren’t the only interracial group with their sights set on Harlem. As the Civil Rights
Movement surged across the nation in the summer of 1961, an interracial group of
Cornell University students left the scenic gorges of Ithaca, New York to get a first
hand glimpse of what was happening on the front lines of the Movement. As part of
an initiative called “Project Understanding,” the group of seven students visited
Harlem that summer to “learn from Lenox Avenue.” “More than most streets in
America,” group member Danny Schechter wrote, Lenox Avenue had “a lesson to
offer.”42
Led by Schechter, a Jewish labor-relations major at Cornell and Bronx native,
the group sought out lessons on the realities of the Jim Crow North in the
classrooms of the streets of Harlem. During their brief trip, the students saw
churches and bars, Sugar Hill and tenement blocks. They visited the Nation of
Islam’s Temple No. 7, and ate bean pies while Malcolm X “spoke about soul.” But the
most effective teachers of Harlem, Schechter reflected, were “the men who do
nothing more than stroll down this broad promenade.” If Malcolm X and other
observers were right in their assessment of urban Black underclasses as the most
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explosive element in American society, then the students had learned from some of
the most capable teachers of northern racism in the nation.
Though a relatively minor undertaking, “Project Understanding” was part of
a rising tide of concern about American racism and civil rights that was sweeping
across college campuses throughout the nation. The prior year, Black students
across the South had galvanized the Civil Rights Movement with widely-publicized
sit-ins, and ushered in a new phase of nonviolent civil disobedience and student
activism. In 1961, the Freedom Rides launched by CORE, and continued by SNCC,
sent shockwaves through the nation as footage of burning buses and bloodied
Freedom Riders flashed continuously across television screens in American
households. SNCC’s emergence as an independent, grassroots student organization
marked a clear departure from the bourgeois leadership that had long dominated
mainstream civil rights organizations. With the new decade still in its infancy, this
generation of students—the age peers of Emmett Till—had sparked what James
Baldwin described as “a revolution in the consciousness of this country which will
inexorably destroy nearly all that we now think of as concrete and indisputable.”43
Inspired by the bold actions of their southern counterparts, college students in the
North began to engage in mobilization efforts to aid in the southern struggle.
As the Freedom Rides were underway through the South in the spring of
1961, stirrings amongst concerned white college students in the North began to
coalesce into coordinated action for involvement in the national Civil Rights

James Baldwin, The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction 1948-1985
(New York: St. Martin’s-Marek, 1985), 262.
43

324

Movement. In New Haven, Connecticut, a meeting with three Black students from
Virginia Theological Seminary and College proved inspirational for Yale University
sophomore Peter Countryman. A white philosophy major from Chicago, Illinois,
Countryman had been assisting youth workers with programs for Black children in a
local neighborhood when the three young women from Virginia came to discuss
their experiences at a recent sit-in demonstration. “I was very impressed with their
honesty and integrity and sacrifice,” Countryman said of the encounter, “it made the
academic world seem pretty sterile, and I decided I had to do something.” Moved by
the experience, and told of the dire condition of the school’s library by one of the
young women, Countryman cut class for the next two weeks to wage a personal
campaign to send six thousand books to Virginia.44
Countryman’s chance encounter with the students from Virginia Theological
Seminary proved a formative moment in his personal and political development.
More importantly, however, it provided the impetus for the organization of
northern college students for collective involvement in the Civil Rights Movement.
At a conference sponsored by the New England Student Christian Movement that
June, Countryman was chosen as chairman of a committee to “investigate the
possibility of creating a Northern student civil rights movement.”45 The committee
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initially decided to coordinate a fundraising campaign to support the Freedom
Riders in the South, but by October, Countryman had pressured the committee to
pursue a more expansive program. That October, representatives from twenty
college campuses gathered in New Haven under the auspices of the Northern
Student Movement Coordinating Committee to develop a program and structure for
a national movement of northern college students. “As students we can no longer
disregard the challenge put to us by the indomitable spirit of the Southern student
movement,” the members of the fledgling “movement” declared in their founding
document. “We are not free until they are free; their fight is now our fight; their
burdens, ours also.”46
The first year of the Northern Student Movement’s (NSM) involvement in
civil rights activities was characterized by a two-pronged approach: providing
support for the Southern student movement and developing programs to confront
“Northern Civil Rights Problems.” By 1962, the NSM had raised $9,000 for SNCC’s
voter registration campaigns in the South and sent 10,000 books to Miles College in
Birmingham, Alabama.47 The major sources of these contributions came from
college and church organizations, as well as minor individual donations.48 In
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addition to raising financial support for the southern movement, the NSM also
understood the importance of raising individual awareness of the “urgency of the
racial problem” in communities that were largely untouched by the conflicts
sweeping the nation.
As a northern campus movement of predominantly white students at its
inception, the NSM’s initial target population was other white students who were
not directly impacted by racial oppression and had few ties to the southern struggle.
Countryman and other NSMCC organizers understood the problem of American
racism as “basically psychological” and “rooted in the individual,” and therefore
designed their early organizing efforts to confront racism and inspire political action
on college campuses at a personal level.49 “The motivation then, was essentially
personal,” Bill Strickland later wrote of NSM recruitment in this period. “There
was…a strongly felt need to educate college students to the reality of the racial
situation.”50
To activate this latent demographic, NSM organizers promoted a moral
imperative based upon their identities and privileges as college students to inspire
empathy and compel students to become actively involved in struggles for civil and
human rights. In a flyer to drum up financial support for SNCC’s voter registration
drive, the NSM described the experience of a student from Trinity College who was
left scarred by a shotgun blast while participating in voter registration work. “There
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are constant threats of beatings, shootings, and lynchings—but these students stay
there,” the flyer read. Students reading the flyer on northern campuses were then
prompted to ask themselves why their southern counterparts would stay there
despite the great risk to life and limb. “Mainly because they believe that what they’re
doing is right and is important,” the flyer concluded, “and because it sometimes
seems that if they don’t try to help, no one else will.”51
Over the next several months, the NSMCC focused its energies on outreach
and organizing on college campuses in the Northeast, primarily liberal arts colleges
in New England. To Peter Countryman, who himself had undergone the type of
political awakening that he was trying to replicate, recruiting students into a
northern movement required that students first be drawn into the southern Civil
Rights Movement vicariously through these campus solidarity campaigns. Once this
level of consciousness had been established and mobilized, Countryman believed,
students could then be organized “to concentrate on the less spectacular” problems
of racial oppression in the North.52 By the summer of 1962, the NSMCC had
mobilized this approach on dozens of college campuses and took its first steps
toward organized direct action campaigns in the urban north.
In April 1962, 300 delegates from 60 colleges converged on the Bronxville
campus of Sarah Lawrence College for an Inter-collegiate Conference on Northern
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Civil Rights convened by the NSMCC.53 As the founding convention of the NSM, the
conference was called to educate students on the realities of racial discrimination in
the urban north and to build a program for organized student participation in the
northern Civil Rights Movement. To develop such a program, the NSMCC called upon
the expertise of leaders in northern Black Freedom Struggles, such as Kenneth Clark,
Mark Lane, Paul Zuber, and Rev. Leon Sullivan, to explain how a northern brand of
Jim Crow shaped conditions in housing, education, employment, and policing in
Black communities.54 Clark, Lane, and Zuber were all seasoned veterans of ongoing
struggles for equal justice in education, housing, and politics in Harlem. Sullivan, a
stalwart in civil rights struggles in Philadelphia and uncle of Sarah Lawrence
student Joan Cannady, spoke to students about a series of “selective patronage”
campaigns that he coordinated to successfully protest discriminatory hiring
practices of several businesses in his city.55 Sullivan encouraged the students to
undertake similar campaigns in their own cities, while also building more expansive
programs for African American empowerment.
While focusing specifically on engaging with northern struggles for rights
and power, Countryman and the NSMCC coordinators understood their “movement”
as intrinsically linked with the southern struggles that they had been supporting
53
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from afar for several months prior. At the Sarah Lawrence conference, NSM
organizers demonstrated that they not only looked south for personal inspiration to
engage in similar struggles in their own communities, but also for guidance in
translating that inspiration into strategic organizing as part of a national student
movement. Countryman had been in frequent correspondence with southern
organizers as he worked to build the NSM, and had invited Charles Sherrod and
Chuck McDew of SNCC to speak to northern students at the conference about their
organizing experiences in the South.56 McDew, chairman of SNCC at the time, and
Sherrod, director of the organization’s Southwest Georgia Voter Registration
Project, provided the students with materials on SNCC’s organizational structure
and leadership principles, and explained how voter registration campaigns emerged
from a collective belief that liberatory societal change was possible in the Jim Crow
South through individual empowerment and collective action.57 With this education
and inspiration, delegates at the Sarah Lawrence conference resolved that NSM
would expand upon their supporting role in the southern Movement to officially
begin organizing campaigns in northern Black communities.
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The Northern Student Movement Comes to Harlem
The students of the NSM were certainly not alone in their ambitions to
organize northern campaigns for African American rights and power within the
framework of a broader national movement. Rather, the NSM’s efforts were
symptomatic of escalating efforts of northern organizers to connect their struggles
in the Jim Crow North more prominently within the surging national Civil Rights
Movement. For the past several years, New Yorkers had mobilized in support of
southern struggles through solidarity protests and fundraising campaigns, while
also framing their own struggles within the context of the more highly publicized
southern movement.
The same night as the Sarah Lawrence Conference, members of CORE and
SNCC organized a mass meeting at the Roosevelt Auditorium in Union Square to
“protest the treatment of southern freedom fighters and to call attention to the
atrocities going on at present.” Among the 200 attendees of the meeting were a host
of nationally recognized civil rights leaders, including Cleveland Robinson of the
Negro American Labor Council, James Farmer and Jim Peck of CORE, Elton Cuff and
Chuck McDew of SNCC, comedian and activist Dick Gregory, and Bayard Rustin.
Rustin, who served as chair of the meeting, called attention to the under-recognized
national scope of American racism, plainly stating that “equality of housing,
government jobs, and other fields of endeavor is not yet prevalent in New York.”
Though hardly news to those in attendance, Rustin’s declaration was a call to action
for a national coordination of civil rights organizations to confront the expansive
nature of an American apartheid that knew no geographic borders. “Inequalities
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must be suppressed not only in the South,” Rustin declared, “but also in New
York.”58
Rustin’s charge to the mass meeting at Roosevelt Auditorium was indicative
of a popular recognition of a northern civil rights milieu, nurtured by local people
and grassroots organizers, which the NSM sought to engage with. Emerging from the
Sarah Lawrence conference with a sense of purpose and direction, members of the
NSM launched several nonviolent, direct action campaigns to protest racial
discrimination, and began organizing community projects in several cities. That
summer, 100 students formed a day-long picket line outside an apartment complex
in Rye, NY to protest the landlord’s refusal to rent to an African American family.59
During the fall, the NSM sent busloads of students to the Eastern Shore of Maryland
to participate in sit-ins at restaurants that refused to serve African American
customers. Recognizing the systemic nature of racial inequality in the region, the
interracial group of students involved in the Eastern Shore Project escalated their
organizing efforts to focus on voter registration campaigns in Easton, Cambridge,
and Chestertown with the broader goal of building a self-sustaining local movement
through the promotion of “a community consciousness and an indigenous
leadership among the Negroes.”60
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The most expansive initiative that the NSM began in 1962, however, was
aimed at leveraging the skills, privileges, and access to resources that college
students possessed to confront the gross racial inequalities in public education in
northern cities. In Philadelphia, Harlem, and Prince Edward County, Virginia, NSM
field staff established tutorial programs that summer to provide underserved high
school students with greater access to educational opportunities, as well as to
organize communities against the oppressive conditions of public education that
pervaded African American communities.61 Despite the organizing efforts of
community leaders such as Ella Baker, Kenneth and Mamie Clark, Mae Mallory, and
Paul Zuber over the previous decade, African American students in Harlem—and
throughout New York City—largely remained in segregated, underfunded, and
overcrowded schools. NSM organizers understood these persistent conditions of
Harlem’s schools as symptomatic of the systemic racial oppression that created and
enforced the institutional restraints of urban ghettos.62 At the same time, NSM
organizers believed, this systemic denial of educational opportunity was inherently
oppressive by design and served to perpetuate a ghetto pathology marked by
resignation, apathy, unemployment, criminality, and hopelessness. Therefore,
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organizing to improve and expand educational opportunity held the potential to
disrupt this “vicious circle,” and the possibility to inspire “the awakening of the
ghetto to the extent of its own power.”63
With grand visions and modest beginnings, student members of the NSM
formally launched the tutorial program in Central Harlem in July 1962.64 In the
months following the Sarah Lawrence conference, a coordinating committee of
student organizers worked with the Harlem Neighborhood Association (HANA), a
community coalition of 80 church and civic groups, to build the organizational
framework for what would become the Harlem Education Project (HEP). At its
inception that summer, HEP’s tutorial program consisted of 25 tutors recruited by
NSM members from various colleges and universities and 50 students. Twice a
week, tutors would meet with small groups of students at HANA headquarters and
the nearby Harlem YMCA for tutoring sessions in basic academic subjects.65 By
September, 215 college students were tutoring Harlem students in bi-weekly
sessions at five community centers. In addition to the tutoring sessions, HEP also
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launched a student newspaper, The Harlem Voice, and held workshops in art, dance,
and drama.66
One overlooked, but central aspect of HEP’s educational programming was a
series of public lectures and discussions on African American history and the Civil
Rights Movement. These weekly sessions were led by prominent Black intellectuals
and activists in Harlem, including intellectual-activist and Freedomways associate
editor Dr. John Henrik Clarke, sociologist Dr. Robert Johnson, and SNCC chairman
Chuck McDew. Discussions focused on “the historical and cultural heritage and
contributions” of African American communities, as well as ongoing campaigns for
rights and power led by civil rights organizations such as CORE, the NAACP, SNCC,
and NSM. According to an informational leaflet distributed by HEP, these
community sessions were designed “to draw the Harlem students into these
activities in their own community through such action programs as voter
registration projects and selective patronage campaigns.”67 Though the turnout for
these sessions was generally smaller than the tutorial sessions, the impact upon the
consciousness of students and tutors alike was no less significant. “I enjoyed the
programs very much,” one student testified, “they had almost the effect of a
revolution on my mind.”68
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Interracial Organizing, Black Nationalism, and “Operational Education in the
Ghetto”
More than just a supplemental element of HEP’s educational programming,
these community sessions were indicative of a larger organizational focus on
promoting societal transformation through educational empowerment. According to
an assessment by HEP tutor and eventual project director Andrea Cousins, one of
the fundamental analyses that guided NSM’s involvement in Harlem held that “the
power of community organization to sustain itself grows largely out of the sustained
education of its constituents; and that a method of problem-solving must become
part of local perspective, if that community is to become politically powerful.”69
Cousins was introduced to the NSM as a student at Sarah Lawrence, when the “very
charismatic” Peter Countryman came to the campus “spreading the word about a
northern civil rights movement.” A native of New Canaan, CT, Cousins had grown up
in an affluent, white liberal family, and was the daughter of the well-known editor of
The Saturday Review, Norman Cousins. Like many of her peers, however, Cousins
had become disillusioned with the shortcomings of white liberalism to meaningfully
remedy the political, economic, and moral crises fostered by a racist, imperialist,
and capitalist American society. “In that time of my life,” Cousins later recalled, “I
was always arguing with my father. Liberals and radicals to me were
incompatible.”70
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The “radical” political education and awakening that Cousins experienced
during her years at Sarah Lawrence represented a personal embodiment of the
intersections of the New Left, African nationalism, the southern Civil Rights
Movement, and Black Freedom Struggles in the urban north, and shaped her
organizing in Harlem. During the summer of her junior year, Cousins traveled to the
recently independent nation of Guinea with Organization Crossroads Africa, where
she saw Sékou Touré “in the streets in his white Cadillac.”71 While she was in Africa,
Tom Hayden and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) published “The Port
Huron Statement,” the manifesto of the New Left and the surging student
movement, which had a formative influence on Cousins’ political thought and
analysis.72 Upon returning to Sarah Lawrence for her junior year, Cousins started
volunteering at the HEP storefront office at 135th Street and 8th Avenue, where she
met SNCC organizer Stokely Carmichael, who had grown up in New York City and
was an occasional visitor to the office.73
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The influences of this cross-section of radical political activity in the early
1960s were evident in the analyses that Cousins put forth in her 1964 assessment of
the organizational philosophies and actions of HEP and the NSM in Harlem.
Demonstrating the centrality of community empowerment and self-determination
that undergirded these varying freedom struggles, Cousins wrote that one of the
two primary objectives of the NSM in Harlem was “to bring the local population into
greater control of their own lives, and consequently of the institutions which
exerted power upon them.”74 Though this organizational focus on selfdetermination was complicated by the outsider status of many of the NSM and HEP
staff, who also saw Harlem as a possible proving ground for building a sustainable
interracial movement, the project endeavored to seek out the involvement of
indigenous leadership to inform their organizing initiatives and eventually take over
the program. “Our idea was that the whole thing would eventually be taken over by
local people,” Cousins later recalled.75
Despite their connections with Harlem leaders and professed dedication to
supporting community leadership, the interracial organization’s entrée to Harlem
was met with a mixed reception. NSM’s arrival in Harlem coincided with a period of
resurgent racial consciousness and Black Nationalist organizing in the city. “Like
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black ghettoes throughout the country,” Danny Schechter observed in 1962, Harlem
“is reasserting its blackness.”76 Though still a student at Cornell at the time,
Schechter had kept a watchful eye on happenings in his native New York City.
That March, Schechter had invited Malcolm X to Cornell for a debate with
CORE national director James Farmer in a program titled “Which Way Civil Rights:
Separation or Integration?” In his first debate with a national civil rights leader,
Malcolm X chided Farmer for being married to a white woman, while also
characteristically speaking of the shortcomings of integration and nonviolent direct
action campaigns for achieving justice for the centuries of brutal oppression faced
by African Americans. “We’ve been giving slave labor for 400 years and we’re not
going to get sufficient payment through any Jackie Robinsons, Marian Andersons or
a cup of coffee.”77 As though to illustrate Malcolm’s analysis, Jackie Robinson was
the target of picketers in Harlem three months later after he criticized nationalist
groups for alleged anti-Semitic chants during an economic boycott of a Jewish
restaurateur on 125th Street.78 Though Robinson and boycott leaders, including
Louis Michaux, later buried the hatchet during a radio broadcast, it was nonetheless
clear that Robinson’s moderate brand of civil rights advocacy was resonating less
with the masses in Harlem than was Malcolm’s.
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Though Schechter was still a year away from joining the NSM, his appraisal
of Harlem’s rising racial consciousness and militancy closely resembled those of
organizers on the ground who expressed concern about the efficacy of an interracial
organization within this radical political milieu. Even before joining NSM, Andrea
Cousins was made explicitly aware of her place as a white woman within this
political climate charged with revolutionary fervor. During her freshman year at
Sarah Lawrence, Cousins went with her African American “big sister” to a “huge
African Nationalist program” in New York City where Miriam Makeba performed
and Hubert Humphrey spoke. “As I was riding back on the train to Sarah
Lawrence…with my big sister…she told me that when the revolution came, she
would have to kill someone like me. So that was an eye opener,” Cousins later
recalled.79
The realities of this kind of racial dynamic in Harlem presented members of
the interracial organization with difficult, and often contentious, conversations
about race and American society as they struggled to formulate a program for their
involvement in the community. NSM organizers in Harlem, including Peter
Countryman who was there on occasion, were often confronted by local people who
challenged their positions on integration and the assumed leadership roles of white
students in predominantly Black communities. These critiques were also lobbied by
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individuals within the organization, including Carl Anthony, an African American
student at Columbia University and NSM member, who had worked in Harlem
throughout the summer of 1962. At an October 1962 meeting of the NSM in New
Haven, Anthony expressed his frustrations with having to interpret the lived
realities of racial oppression that informed Black political consciousness for his
white comrades, and criticized Countryman and others for their failure to truly read
the temperature of Harlem’s political climate. “The point that I’m trying to make,”
Anthony explained, “is that something is happening in Harlem which is causing
black people to reject your kind of analysis. It’s as simple as that.”80
As an organization with a stated goal of achieving an integrated society,
however, NSM organizers needed to find a way to reconcile their integrationist
ideals with rising demands for Black self-determination in Harlem. From the outset
of their involvement in Harlem, NSM organizers attempted to walk what they saw as
a political tightrope. On one side, organizers recognized that if they were to be
successful in building programs in Harlem, they would need to tap into the
ideological, if not organizational, base of Black Nationalist groups. “For, the Malcolm
X’s of the generation have ‘stirreth the eagles nest,” HEP organizer Bob Knight
noted, “now it becomes our role to challenge that anger and channel that massive
human resource into a sense of community.”81 On the other side, however, many
organizers believed that to embrace the political zeitgeist of Black Nationalism in
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Harlem meant to risk alienating moderate whites that they sought to bring into the
fold of the Civil Rights Movement. “We are playing with dynamite,” Carl Anthony
wrote to Peter Countryman in 1962. “The nationalists have a stronghold in Harlem;
and we may have to choose between the possibility of having them with us or
against us.” Anthony and other organizers feared that aligning too closely with
radical Black organizations would cost the NSM a critical opportunity to create “a
really dynamic student civil rights movement” in New York City, which, Anthony
believed, had the potential to “set the North on fire.”82 To walk this tightrope meant
that NSM would need to develop an analysis and approach that “could encompass
extreme points of view and communicate with either a nationalistic negroe [sic] or
an cautious white.”83
To work within this tenuous political and organizational territory, HEP
embraced a broad base of programs beyond the initial tutorial program. By
developing a variety of community-based programs under the broad ideological
umbrella of empowerment through education, HEP organizers were able to
reconcile their aspirations of creating a vibrant student movement with the
organizational imperative of promoting Black self-determination. Through the
tutorial program, hundreds of college students were recruited from local campuses
to come into Harlem and provide needed educational support for students. During
their time in Harlem, the interracial corps of tutors gained a more intimate
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understanding of the complexities of life in the Jim Crow North and many were
inspired to take larger roles in local struggles for rights and power. “HEP has
allowed me to act rather than just study,” one tutor testified, “while at the same time
it has made me more aware of the complexities of America’s race problem and has
encouraged me to look further and do more.”84 Another student who experienced a
similar political awakening as a HEP tutor began working with the parents of his
tutee to organize tenants to demand repairs of their building. Although the tutorial
program did not present the “dramatic” mobilization of a student civil rights
movement that Carl Anthony initially hoped for, it brought hundreds of students
into active engagement with struggles for educational justice and laid the
groundwork for NSM’s involvement in grassroots struggles for rights and power in
Harlem.
The Sealtest Boycott and New York CORE’s “Ghetto Thrust”
Like the NSM, NY CORE in 1962 was attempting to navigate a political terrain
that had been charged by the militant rhetoric and praxis of grassroots organizers
like Mae Mallory, Malcolm X, Jesse Gray, and their expansive networks of radical
activists. As local branches and the national organization struggled throughout that
year to develop an effective program in the city, CORE leaders repeatedly pushed
the organization to identify with the needs of poor and working-class Black
communities who were fueling this grassroots militancy in Harlem. By that point,
nearly all of CORE’s northeastern branches had Black chairmen, reflecting the
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earlier push for greater Black representation in leadership positions. However, the
middle-class focus of many of CORE’s organizing campaigns, like the open-housing
drives, did little to win the allegiance of the majority in Black communities in New
York and elsewhere. At a workshop at the national convention that year, CORE
members resolved that the organization was “primarily middle-class, and to
broaden our base, we must begin to concentrate on the needs of the working
class.”85 In many ways, this resolution represented a national recognition of calls
that had resonated from the streets of New York City, where CORE leaders like
Gladys Harrington and Lincoln Lynch were pushing for greater attention to mass
movement building. Earlier that year the New York Metropolitan Area Coordinating
Council, a confederation of CORE chapters in and around New York City,
“overwhelmingly passed a motion offered by Lincoln Lynch that the organization
must make itself ‘more attractive to rank and file Negroes.”86 For Harrington, Lynch,
and other CORE leaders in New York, the logical move to bring the Black working
classes into the fold of organized action was to address their immediate needs of fair
employment opportunities.
Though NY CORE had waged earlier protests against major corporations in
New York City over discriminatory hiring practices, these demonstrations never
really gained the same type of organizational attention or popular traction as the
sympathy strikes. In many ways, these early employment campaigns had the same
shortcomings as those waged by the NAACP around this time, in that the primary
85
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focus was on breaking the color barrier through placing a handful of Black workers
into middle-class jobs that were out of reach to most of the community. Meier and
Rudwick go so far as to claim that from 1960-1962, “not one of New York CORE’s
employment projects brought worthwhile gains.”87 By early 1962, however, local
grassroots struggles for economic justice and fair hiring practices were pushing
CORE chapters and the national organization to reconsider their programs for
confronting employment discrimination. In Philadelphia, Rev. Leon Sullivan had
been engaged in a years-long selective patronage campaign to coerce white-owned
national companies into hiring Black employees. In Harlem, where economic
boycotts had a rich history and nationalist organizations routinely mobilized “Buy
Black” campaigns, an ad hoc coalition was in the midst of boycotting a white-owned
steakhouse on 125th Street in the heart of Central Harlem and the nascent Northern
Student Movement was helping to orchestrate a boycott of a major dairy company.
So when the national office announced that year that CORE would be taking a
different line on issues of employment discrimination, its leaders were largely
following the lead of Black communities that were already in motion.
CORE’s first major action that demonstrated this new approach to
discriminatory hiring practices came in the fall of 1962 when the national office
endorsed a boycott of Sealtest Dairy in New York City. That summer, Carl Anthony
and a handful of other NSM members began organizing a coalition of religious, civil
rights, and labor leaders to coordinate protests against the national dairy company,
which employed only twelve Black and Puerto Ricans among its workforce of 1,500
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across four New York plants. After negotiations between the NSM and Sealtest
stalled that August when representatives claimed the company was “already doing
everything in our power to employ qualified Negroes and Spanish-Americans,” the
students announced plans for a boycott.88 CORE chapters in New York joined the
protest campaign that fall after the NSM’s low numbers caused the boycott to
flounder and by December the national office had thrown its weight behind the
campaign.
The Sealtest boycott provided the national office with an opportunity to put
its new organizational emphasis on “compensatory hiring” into direct action.
Recognizing that token integration was insufficient given the rampant national
problem of racial discrimination in hiring practices, the National Action Council
earlier that year had debated the issue of preferential hiring practices. “We used to
talk simply of merit employment, i.e., hiring the best qualified person for the job
regardless of race,” field secretary Gordon Carey wrote that fall. “Now, National
CORE is talking in terms of ‘compensatory’ hiring. We are approaching employers
with the proposition that they have effectively excluded Negroes from their work
force for a long time and that they now have a responsibility and obligation to make
up for their past sins.”89
This new emphasis was reflected in the demands that CORE and their allies
made upon Sealtest that December. In negotiations with Sealtest representatives,
CORE leaders demanded that the company hire at least ten Black or Puerto Rican
88
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laborers within 30 days, and a minimum of 50 within a year’s time; implement an
affirmative action hiring plan to rectify the racial imbalance of their workforce; and
meet with CORE representatives at 90-day intervals to evaluate progress made
toward these ends.90 Although Sealtest representatives initially rejected these
demands outright, the pressures that CORE, NSM, and the New York Selective
Patronage Coordinating Committee put upon the company through the two-month
boycott brought Sealtest back to the bargaining table in early 1963. Though Sealtest
maintained that it’s hiring practices “had not been discriminatory,” they agreed to
immediately hire ten Black or Puerto Rican workers and pledged to give “initial
exclusive priority” in all job openings in 1963 to Black and Puerto Rican
applicants.91 Satisfied with this compromise as “evidence of the company’s good
faith,” CORE called off the boycott in early February.92
The Sealtest boycott, as Meier and Rudwick note, marked a turning point for
CORE’s national office in its embrace of more progressive programs to rectify
systemic racial inequalities in employment opportunities. For NY CORE, the boycott
marked the emergence of mass protests against employment discrimination that
would take center stage in the city by the summer of 1963. Implicit within this shift
away from demands for token hiring and toward affirmative action programs was
an organizational recognition of grassroots demands for systemic change, rather
than piecemeal reform. Harlem residents were no longer satisfied with a handful of
90
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white-collar Black workers being hired by a company while the unemployment rate
in Harlem remained double that of white communities.
While the thrust for this change in CORE’s approach came from the
grassroots, the shift was put into praxis in NY CORE largely through the efforts of
Velma Hill, the chair of the branch’s employment committee, and her husband
Norman Hill, a member of the national office’s field staff. The Hills came to New York
in the fall of 1962 from Chicago, where Velma had been the president of the NAACP
Youth Council and Norman was the executive secretary of the Illinois Socialist
Party.93 From their respective leadership roles in the local and national
organization, the Hills sought to make CORE “more appealing to grass-roots people”
through loosening membership restrictions, focusing on community-organizing and
indigenous leadership, and undertaking campaigns that would benefit poor and
working-class Black communities.94
As chair of the employment committee, Velma Hill pushed NY CORE to use
the momentum generated by the Sealtest boycott to propel the chapter into greater
involvement in employment campaigns as part of a broader “ghetto thrust.”95 It was
clear through their rhetoric and programs that both Velma and Norman Hill viewed
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the Black poor and working-classes as the most powerful force in the Black freedom
struggle, particularly as seen in the successes of radical organizations in mobilizing
Black people in Harlem by the thousands in the early 1960s. To Norman Hill, the
Sealtest boycott represented a template that could be used to not only combat the
“pattern of discrimination in all job categories,” but also to “provide a direct
alternative to the Muslims in terms of aims, programs, and results.”96
Like Carl Anthony and the NSM, the Hills and NY CORE remained weary of
cooperating with radical organizations like the NOI, even while they tried to court
the same demographics that such organizations had proven so popular with. As
leaders of NY CORE continued to shift their focus to community organizing in the
following months, however, the grassroots militancy of the poor and working-class
residents that the chapter sought to recruit would push the organization to adopt
more radical ideologies and militant actions, thereby setting the stage for dramatic
confrontations with the city’s power structure in the summer of 1963.
Nurturing Indigenous Leadership through the Neighborhood Commons
Project
While Velma Hill worked with Gladys Harrington and the other leaders of NY
CORE in an effort to help develop this sense of community leadership and action,
NSM began supporting neighborhood improvement and “social action” projects that
had the potential to foster indigenous leadership. Like Jesse Gray, who NSM staffers
would soon become intimately acquainted with, NSM organizers did not see “quality
of life” problems as marginal within the framework of the Black Freedom Struggle,
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but rather as issues around which communities could be organized and empowered
through collective action. One of the earliest “social action projects” that NSM
organizers became involved with was the Sealtest boycott in 1962. Inspired by Carl
Anthony’s work with the New York Selective Patronage Coordinating Committee
that summer, as well as the boycotts led by Rev. Sullivan in Philadelphia,
Countryman pushed for NSM on a national level to coordinate “SNCC drives, sel. pat.
[selective patronage], and tutorial in one package…in Negro communities
throughout the East.”97 Though NSM involvement in selective patronage campaigns
proved to be short-lived, the efforts provided organizers with an introduction to
various leaders in the city, including Bayard Rustin, A. Philip Randolph, James
Lawson, and Malcolm X, and represented an early foray into community organizing
campaigns.
While participating in the selective patronage campaign, Anthony also played
a key role in coordinating HEP’s first social action project, the Neighborhood
Commons Project. Initially proposed in May of 1962, the “Commons” sought to bring
together college students with local laborers and teenagers to clean up and develop
vacant, city-owned lots in Harlem into community recreation spaces. The location
chosen for the project was a large, debris-filled lot on 147th Street between
Bradhurst and 8th Avenues. One of the fundamental goals of the project was to
supplement the education of local students with practical experience in
architecture, masonry, carpentry, horticulture, and commercial art in the service of
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developing a space for communal gatherings.98 HEP organizers envisioned the
Commons as a meeting space where community concerns could be discussed and
plans could be developed for collective action. In addition to the outdoor
recreational space, HEP also acquired and renovated unused basement-level spaces
in the buildings that faced the lot for educational programming. By the fall of 1963,
HEP was using these spaces for a Science Workshop, where students learned and
practiced game and computer theory, an office space for the Commons staff, and
plans were in place to establish a low-cost daycare center, music workshop, and
gymnasium.99
Though conceived as a plan to convert vacant lots into pocket parks for badly
needed recreational space, HEP organizers envisioned the project as a means of
fostering community empowerment and “indigenous leadership” through active
involvement in all aspects of its development. Using their connections with various
community organizations, HEP staff recruited neighborhood teenagers and adults to
build a corps of local leaders who would work in cooperation with architectural
students to design and build the commons. “All of their lives these people have been
using their skills working for other people,” Anthony told The New York Times, “we
want to show them what they can do if they use their skills for themselves.”100 The
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larger goal, then, for the Neighborhood Commons Project was not the piecemeal
construction of recreational spaces, but the demonstration of “how scattered
resources can be brought together in a so-called ‘slum community’ to create a new
reality.”101
Through the Neighborhood Commons Project and the visibility gained
through the tutorial, HEP provided a springboard for the empowerment of
indigenous community leadership. Though the Commons took about a year to finally
get underway, it marked the start of a concerted shift in HEP’s programmatic focus
toward dedicating more energy and resources to community organizing. By the end
of 1963, with the plans for the Commons underway, HEP moved from their
storefront office on 8th Ave. and 135th St. up to a railroad apartment in a tenement
on 147th St. that bordered the vacant lot.102 The re-location provided HEP organizers
with a base within a community from which they could expand their tutoring,
programming, and organizing initiatives. “There was a lot of work on community
organization,” Andrea Cousins recalled, led in large part by Roscoe “Chick”
Bradley.103 A neighborhood resident and community activist, Bradley began
working with HEP in the spring of 1963 with another local resident, Earl Spence, to
furnish and supervise a small gymnasium for teenage boys as part of the
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Commons.104 Within a few short months, Bradley had established himself as the
head of the 147th St. Neighborhood Council, HEP’s hyper-local community decisionmaking body, “which in democratic fashion was to determine the nature of block
redevelopment.”105 Bradley’s involvement with the Commons spurred a life-long
dedication to community empowerment in Harlem and demonstrated that HEP’s
seemingly trivial focus on local issue-organizing was capable of supporting the
development of impactful local leaders.
By the fall of 1963, many HEP organizers were dedicating more of their time
and resources to community organizing than the operations of the tutorial, setting
the stage for a major rift in the movement by the year’s end. Though the model of
grassroots empowerment evident in the Commons did influence an evolution in the
tutorial program toward a sustainable, community-controlled model, staff members
increasingly recognized the educational inequalities that they had been battling as
symptomatic of an inherently unjust society. HEP and NSM continued to organize
around educational empowerment in various ways, including the establishment of
Freedom Schools and support for school boycotts, but the inherently limited scope
of the tutorial program, critiqued by some as a “service program,” was no longer
seen as viable for creating a movement for societal transformation. “We have always
had a high degree of success in the educational programs,” NSM staffer Gordon
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Davis wrote in 1964, “but this only partially fulfilled our aspirations.”106 With the
Civil Rights Movement and white violence raging in Birmingham and throughout the
South that summer, and the March on Washington looming large in public
consciousness, NSM organizers felt a need to engage more assertively in the
northern struggle to achieve more immediate results.
“Our fight must be hard, constant and effective”: NY CORE’s Construction Site
Protests, 1963
While NSM members and local people labored to build the Neighborhood
Commons and foster long-range community empowerment through education and
collective action, Gladys Harrington and NY CORE sought to speed up the tempo of
the Black Freedom Struggle in New York City. Despite the nearly ten years of
continued organizing efforts waged by local people and national organizations in
New York City, few systemic reforms had been won and city officials and white
citizens continued to preach patience and gradualism amidst growing racist
violence and Black discontent nationwide. Furthermore, with 1963 marking the
centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation, many civil rights leaders were
sounding the call for “Freedom Now” after one hundred years of waiting for the
rights of full citizenship. Though many white New Yorkers prided themselves on
their racial liberalism in the absence of explicitly racist laws and policies in the city
and claimed the legacies of Union soldiers who had supposedly fought for the
emancipation of enslaved people of African-descent, few understood their insistence
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upon gradual equality for Black people as inherently complicit in the continuation of
racial oppression.
Such was the case when a white Long Island resident publicly criticized
Lincoln Lynch in January 1963 after the LI CORE chairman called for a “massive and
sustained assault on the bastions of degradation and debasement of Negroes and
Puerto Ricans.” Accusing Lynch of yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, the white
commentator argued such an approach “is not the way to win equality in the North,
which is acutely aware of its own shortcomings and equally aware that its soldiers
freed the slaves."107 As the nation entered the centennial year of the Emancipation
Proclamation, this defensive criticism of Lynch became a hot topic of debate in
newspapers throughout the Northeast. In many ways, the conversations arising
from this exchange captured the increasingly tense atmosphere in the city, as Black
New Yorkers grew impatient with the pace of racial reform while their white
counterparts tired of the constant commotion and responded with increasingly
hostile rhetoric and governmental policies.
Of those who came to Lynch’s defense, Gladys Harrington was among the
most vocal and assertive in her appraisal of racial tensions and the state of the
Movement in New York. “If bigotry would slow down, then it might be possible to
consider the argument of gradualism,” Harrington told reporters. “The fact is that
bigotry and indifference makes steady inroads into our communities and our fight
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must be hard, constant and effective.”108 Under Harrington’s leadership, NY CORE
had grown substantially in the year leading up to the Sealtest boycott. Whereas the
chapter had floundered from 1960-1961 with an active membership of less than 60
people, by 1962 NY CORE’s membership had nearly quadrupled as the ranks
swelled with working-class Black members.109 Described by CORE member Doris
Innis (née Doris Funnyé) as “a very strong woman” who had an innate ability to
motivate people to action, Harrington’s emphasis on dramatic nonviolent protest
campaigns, including sit-ins, fasts, and pickets at government offices, had proven
effective in growing the ranks, even if the protests achieved few tangible policy
results. Indeed, it was the sit-ins that Harrington organized at a Brooklyn rental
office in 1961 to help Clarence Funnyé secure an apartment that drew his sister,
Doris, into the ranks of NY CORE. “She had a technique that was not abrasive or
overly aggressive, but of making you feel she was asking you to do something
important,” Innis recalled, “that she had faith in you.”110
Despite her relatively moderate political analysis as a staunch integrationist,
it was clear that Harrington had become an effective organizer who was capable of
mobilizing Harlem residents to engage in collective action. Though she remained
dedicated to the principles of nonviolence and integration as the means to achieve
Black equality and empowerment, Harrington’s presence within a political milieu
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that “encouraged a nationalist thrust,” as CORE field secretary Gordon Carey
described Harlem in the early 1960s, had spurred an increased militancy in her
political praxis by 1963. From 1960-1962, Harrington’s organizing campaigns had
largely consisted of interracial nonviolent direct action protests aimed at coercing
public officials to act on the interests of Black communities through moral suasion.
By 1963, however, the protests waged by NY CORE under Harrington’s leadership
began to demonstrate the growing influence of a grassroots militancy that was
coming to define the uptown chapter and changing the course of local and national
Black Freedom Struggles.
Most evident in a series of protests against employment discrimination at
publicly funded construction sites that summer, this evolution in Harrington’s
political praxis reflected a broader shift in the northern Movement. That summer,
Harrington and NY CORE served notice to the city’s white power structure that they
were no longer patiently asking for equality to be granted to Black people. Rather,
through civil disobedience and disruptive protests, NY CORE and their supporters
signaled their intentions to gain social, economic, and political justice through more
assertive and militant means. Though Harrington remained apprehensive about
leaders like Malcolm X, the influence of the radical milieu he helped to shape was
undeniable in Harrington’s rhetoric by the dawn of 1963. “The Negro is like a man
being strangled,” Harrington declared. “We say stop the choking now, at once. You
can’t afford to be gradual about stopping a strangulation.”111
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In the spring of 1962, Mayor Wagner had announced long-awaited plans for a
major construction project to renovate and expand Harlem Hospital on 135th Street
and Lenox Avenue. Promising “decent high-level medical and hospital care” for all,
Wagner broke ground on the $48 million project that fall as 800 residents looked on
at the ceremonial event.112 Though better healthcare was on the minds of many
community members who for years had pleaded with city officials to make
improvements to the public hospital, the question of who would be employed in the
projected three-year construction project was also a pressing concern. In a
community where the unemployment rate was over twice that of white
communities due to racial discrimination in hiring practices and a general lack of
adequate training and educational opportunities, few had reasons to believe that the
economic windfall that the construction project would bring to laborers in the
construction trades would extend to Harlem residents.113
The building and construction trade unions, which largely determined those
employed in construction projects like the Harlem Hospital, were notorious for
discriminating against Black and Puerto Rican laborers. So when the plans were laid
for this major project in the heart of Harlem, many residents assumed that the site
would, as the Pittsburgh Courier later predicted, become a “beehive of skilled
workers—lathers, brick-layers, electricians, plumbers, painters, etc., among whom
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Negroes would have been as scarce as hooded Klansmen on Seventh Ave. and 125th
St.”114
Though racial discrimination in employment was technically illegal in New
York City, as Dr. Kenneth Clark noted, the laws were rarely enforced and racial
discrimination remained a particularly common practice in the construction
industry. Restrictive apprenticeship training programs and union membership
policies, along with “gentleman’s agreements” and other forms of covert racism,
largely precluded Black laborers from employment in the construction trades.115
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers, for example, counted zero African Americans
amongst its membership of 3,300 at this time.116 When Black workers were hired in
the construction trades, it was usually for so-called “Negro jobs”—unskilled
positions with “menial status, minimum wages, and little if any security.”117
Adding to the economic anxieties and frustrations of Black laborers, a study
put out by the New York City Department of Labor that year predicted a decline of
70,000-80,000 unskilled and semi-skilled jobs by the end of the decade.118 Within
the local and national context of surging demands for Black rights and power—
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particularly in a community with a tradition of supporting economic nationalism—
such economic insecurity in the face of a major, publicly funded construction project
that would predictably bring white laborers into Harlem fueled community
resentment toward the Hospital site. “Such a situation building up, this mass of
unemployed and frustrated Negro youth, is social dynamite,” the anti-poverty social
service agency Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU) explained. “We
are presented with a phenomenon that may be compared with the piling up of
inflammable material in an empty building in a city block.”119
Though HARYOU was primarily concerned with the pathological implications
of unemployment in Central Harlem, the organization also noted with great interest
the propensity of economic inequality for drawing the community into collective
struggles for equitable employment opportunities. This was certainly the case in the
summer of 1963, as a coalition of civil rights groups in Harlem, including NY CORE,
organized mass resistance to the Harlem Hospital construction to demand jobs for
Black and Puerto Rican workers on the project. Just weeks after police forces turned
their dogs and hoses on peaceful protestors in Birmingham, Alabama, and days after
William Worthy called for a Freedom Now Party in Harlem, the Joint Committee for
Equal Employment Opportunity announced plans to picket the Harlem Hospital
construction site in early June after city officials and union leaders refused a
meeting to discuss charges of employment discrimination on the project. “For
years,” NAACP labor secretary Herbert Hill declared, “we have attempted through
conferences, memoranda and interminable negotiations to make progress for Negro
119
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workers in the AFL building trades craft unions. This has been an exercise in
futility.”120
As spokesperson for the coalition, which consisted of CORE, the NAACP, the
Urban League, the Negro American Labor Council, the Workers Defense League, and
the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, Velma Hill (no relation to Herbert)
announced that the Joint Committee demanded an immediate commitment from city
officials, union leaders, and contractors “that discrimination against Negro and
Puerto Rican construction workers will end.” With work already underway on
laying the foundation of the hospital buildings, Velma Hill noted that of the 64
laborers working on the job, only nine (14%) were African American. Building on
the affirmative action demands of the Sealtest boycott, Hill demanded that Black and
Puerto Rican workers be hired immediately with a goal of reaching 35% of the
workforce.121
Early in the morning of June 12, the Joint Committee led an interracial group
of 150 protestors in a picket line at the entrance of the construction site at 135th
Street and Lenox Avenue. The previous night, members of the six organizations
distributed leaflets throughout Harlem as a soundtruck drove along the streets
urging residents to join the demonstration. When workers arrived to the
construction site that morning, they were greeted with chants of “If we don’t work,
nobody works,” as groups of protestors sat down in front of the entrances on 135th
“Promise Mass Action on Building Trade Unions,” New York Amsterdam
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and 136th Streets, barring workers and delivery trucks from entering the site. The
predominantly white construction crew milled about outside the fenced in site,
awaiting instructions from contractor Julius Nasso, who pleaded with Herbert Hill
and other demonstrators to allow the workers to pass through their lines.
The pickets were resolute, however, and a scuffle broke out when Hill, Urban
League member Ramon Rivera, and several others broke through a police barricade
to block the remaining open entrance. As officers struggled to forcefully remove the
group, which also included CORE member William Mahoney and NAACP members
Morris De Lisser and Isaiah Brunson, reinforcements of 300 officers arrived on the
scene to forcefully keep the entrance clear. In the ensuing confrontation, police
manhandled the group of nonviolent demonstrators and shoved De Lisser up
against a fence, leaving him hospitalized with head and neck injuries.
Coverage of the demonstration in the Amsterdam News included a photo of a
man lying on the ground in front of a police barricade “after being kicked and
assaulted” during the confrontation. Promising to file a formal complaint of police
brutality against the NYPD, Hill said that the situation was “worse than
Philadelphia,” where police officers had beaten and arrested RAM leaders Max
Stanford and Stan Daniels weeks earlier. Though the massive police presence
allowed workers to enter the site around 9am after the scuffle, the confrontation
coerced Deputy Mayor Paul Screvane to warn that he would halt construction if the
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building trade unions “did not act immediately to end any discriminatory practices
there.”122
Screvane, who was serving as acting Mayor while Wagner was in Hawaii for a
conference, made good on his threat the following day as protests continued at the
construction site. While demonstrators were back on the picket line at six o’clock
that morning, again attempting to block the entrances to the site, leaders of the
Building and Construction Trades Council met at Screvane’s request to discuss the
allegations of racial discrimination against their unions. The Council’s president,
Peter Brennan, was to report to Screvane immediately following the meeting with
their proposed action plan to address the allegations. As the day dragged on with
the protestors awaiting word from the acting Mayor about the outcomes of the
meeting, the atmosphere at the construction site grew increasingly tense. Several of
Harlem’s most notable nationalist leaders, including Malcolm X and James Lawson,
along with journalist Louis Lomax, looked on as groups of bystanders who had been
watching from the sidewalks joined the demonstration and protestors laid in front
of cement trucks in an effort to block their deliveries.123
In the early afternoon, police clashed with protestors for the second time in
as many days when a group tried once again to barricade an open entrance to the
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site. Within minutes of the heavy police presence forcefully securing the entrance,
however, word spread through the crowd that the construction workers had been
ordered to stop and the site was officially shutdown. Citing concerns over “public
safety,” Screvane’s order to halt construction pending an investigation over charges
of discrimination was met by cheers from the hundreds of protestors at 135th Street
and Lenox Avenue.
Despite the initial elation at the construction site, City Hall’s intervention was
met with mixed reactions from community leaders in Harlem. After conferring with
Mayor Wagner, Screvane announced that the Mayor would appoint a three-person
committee to investigate the charges of racial discrimination in the construction
industry. The move was characteristic of Wagner’s passive approach toward
resolving issues of racial inequality and tension in the city through commissions,
evoking memories of the Committee on Harlem Affairs formed in the wake of the
1959 “near riot.”124 While CORE’s assistant program director Norman Hill welcomed
Screvane’s proposed committee investigation as “a step in the right direction,”
NAACP labor secretary Herbert Hill was less enthused. To Hill, such a token
response from City Hall was “sheer fakery” which represented only “a further
postponement for justice to the Negro worker in New York City.”125
Hill’s assessment, shared by other leaders of the Joint Committee for Equal
Employment Opportunity including Velma Hill and Gladys Harrington, proved
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prescient. The Mayor’s “action committee,” which had no representation from civil
rights organizations or community groups, deliberated for nearly a month while the
site remained closed, finally releasing a public report in mid-July. Without once
using the word “discrimination,” the committee’s report detailed the exclusion of
Black and Puerto Rican laborers in scores of construction unions in the city while
lauding others for “actively trying to recruit more nonwhites.” To rectify these racial
disparities in union labor, the committee offered a series of recommendations to
open union membership to qualified Black and Puerto Rican workers through
“voluntary compliance” from the building and construction trades unions.126 In
effect, the committee proposed that unions voluntarily desegregate with minor
provisions for governmental oversight of the integration process—the type of
resolution that few Harlem residents had any faith would bring any meaningful
change whatsoever.
Hoping to salve the mounting protests by striking a compromise between the
unions and the communities they systematically discriminated against, city officials
quickly found themselves facing opposition from both sides. Building and
Construction Trades Council President Peter Brennan maintained that the 122
unions the Council represented did not discriminate and would not tolerate
“dictation by any outside group” as to their membership practices and policies. In a
statement characteristic of union defenses against charges of discrimination in
membership and employment at the time, Brennan told a press conference that the
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unions were against discrimination, but “would not lower its standards for
employees to accommodate a situation.” Dismissing the legitimate claims of racial
discrimination, the narrative that Brennan and other union leaders put forth
explained the lack of Black and Puerto Rican laborers among their ranks as an
absence of qualified applicants rather than the presence of discriminatory policies
and practices. Furthermore, Brennan suggested that the unions were so “thoroughly
maligned” by such accusations that they “may start picketing ourselves.”127 Rather
than budging on any policy reforms recommended by the Mayor’s committee, the
unions appeared ready to dig in their heels and fight back against the protests that
were spreading throughout the city by mid-July.
While the unions fought against the Mayor’s committee, community leaders
criticized the shortcomings of their recommendations and demanded stronger
action from City Hall. Even before the committee released their report, the Joint
Committee for Equal Employment released their own recommendations for
rectifying the discriminatory practices of the unions. Among the demands of the
Joint Committee were the admission of all qualified Black and Puerto Rican
journeymen into the unions, the opening of apprenticeship programs for Black and
Puerto Rican workers at twice their proportion of the city’s population, and that
such skilled workers need only pass a test to gain admission to a building trades
union.128
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When the Mayor’s committee finally released their report, the Joint
Committee acknowledged that it “showed progress in thinking,” but asserted that
any program based on voluntary compliance remained weak and was “no substitute
for meaningful action.”129 Spokesman Ramon E. Rivera announced that the Joint
Committee would give the unions and building contractors ten days to study the
recommendations of the Mayor’s committee and report back on how they would put
the recommendations into action. If the unions failed to act, Rivera said, the Joint
Committee would escalate their protests to force Mayor Wagner and Governor
Rockefeller to shut down all city and state construction projects until the unions
adopted a “meaningful program of integration.” At the same time, the Joint
Committee asked the Mayor’s committee to recommend legislative action to the
Mayor to force union adherence to the committee’s program.130
While representatives of the Joint Committee convened with city officials and
union leaders, the rank and file of the organizations within the Committee had been
escalating their protests on the ground. Hoping that the Harlem Hospital shutdown
would result in government action to create a model for fair employment policies
throughout the city, Amsterdam News editor James Hicks urged the civil rights
organizations involved in the protests to “immediately turn their attentions to some
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other city project and force home the same conditions.”131 Gladys Harrington and
NY CORE needed little encouragement from Hicks to expand their protests against
employment discrimination in the construction trades throughout the city that
summer. “The Harlem Hospital demonstrations,” historian Brian Purnell notes,
“made fighting against racial discrimination in the building trades the most
important civil rights issue in the city.”132
While excluded from the Mayor’s “action committee,” Harrington and other
CORE leaders ensured that City Hall would hear from them in other ways. In the
second week of July, Harrington led a handful of CORE members in round-the-clock
sit-ins at the offices of Mayor Wagner and Governor Rockefeller to demand
legislative action for fair employment on publicly-funded construction projects. “We
feel the Governor is empowered to act within the scope of present discrimination
laws,” Harrington told reporters. “We feel that with strong moral leadership, the
average American will adopt the true spirit of democracy.”133 The moral leadership
Harrington was appealing to faltered, and by the end of the month, the sit-ins
escalated to fast-ins. During a 48-hour fast in late July, both Harrington and Bronx
CORE member Tina Lawrence collapsed in the Mayor’s office.134
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While Harrington’s moral appeal failed, other CORE chapters throughout the
Northeast region used the momentum generated by the Birmingham campaign and
the Harlem Hospital demonstrations to launch direct action protests against other
construction sites. CORE chapters led similar confrontational protests at the
construction sites of housing developments including the Rutgers Houses on the
Lower East Side and Rochdale Village in Queens. In nearby Newark, New Jersey,
Newark-Essex CORE and the New Frontier Democrats, led by Robert Curvin and
George Richardson respectively, coordinated a major protest campaign against
employment discrimination at the construction site of a public high school that
spurred the emergence of sustained civil rights activity in that city. In early July,
Brooklyn CORE began picketing the construction site of the Downstate Medical
Center, drawing thousands of protestors to the site and into the Movement.
Emerging in the wake of the Harlem Hospital protests, Purnell argues, Brooklyn
CORE’s involvement in the Downstate demonstrations “signaled a newer, more
confrontational approach to civil rights activism.” Furthermore, the campaign
“attracted many young people and first-time activists,” including Sonny Carson,
Frances Crayton, and Yuri Kochiyama, who were drawn to the militancy and
dramatic actions of the protests.135
The Downstate protests also drew the attention of Malcolm X, who again kept
a watchful eye on the demonstrations as a heavy police presence became
increasingly repressive and confrontational. Though members of the NOI did not
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participate in the protests due to their professed rejection of nonviolent resistance,
a BOSS detective reported, Malcolm X “made it clear that if at any time the nonviolent pickets are in need of Muslim aid they would be present to heed their
call.”136 Even from the sidelines, Malcolm’s conversations with demonstrators would
have profound impacts on the political development of protestors like Sonny
Carson, a former gang member and future leader of Brooklyn CORE, who thereafter
“began to direct his energies and leadership abilities toward black nationalist
politics and community activism.”137 This influx of militant action inspired by the
Harlem Hospital protests marked the emergence of widespread direct action
protests throughout New York City that would coalesce into a powerful social force
in the months to come.
Despite such dramatic protests throughout the city that summer, the building
and construction trades unions proved resilient in their efforts to maintain their lilywhite membership while city and state officials provided little more than lip service
to challenge this obvious racial inequality. Though over 2,000 Black and Puerto
Rican workers had submitted applications for union membership to the City Labor
Department by the end of the summer, only ten Black workers had been accepted
into construction unions by October.138 This paltry number was at sharp odds with
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predictions made by the city’s Labor Commissioner weeks earlier that at least 600
Black and Puerto Rican workers would be admitted during this time.139 Denouncing
such dismal progress as “tokenism at its very worst,” Gladys Harrington called for “a
renewed attack on this shameful situation” as NY CORE began protests at the
construction site of a new federal office building in Foley Square that fall.140
The Foley Square demonstrations, just blocks from City Hall, marked an
escalation of protest tactics as well as police repression. In mid-October, Harrington
and two other NY CORE members were arrested for climbing atop a crane to halt
work on the construction site, just days after police brought out their mounted unit
to forcefully suppress protests there.141 After over a week of protests at the site,
Harrington led a 200-person march from NY CORE’s headquarters on 125th Street to
City Hall to protest continued inaction from the Mayor and Governor in addressing
discrimination in the construction industry. Joined by 100 marchers from Brooklyn,
the eight-mile march culminated in a rally at City Hall, where 700 protestors
listened to speeches by Percy Sutton, James Peck, Mark Lane, Lincoln Lynch, and
SNCC chairman John Lewis, who called for the “mass nonviolent overthrow of

“City Aide Confident Unions Will Accept 600 Negroes Soon,” New York
Times, September 2, 1963.
139

Malcolm Nash, “Harlem Hospital Site Costing City $500 A Day,” New York
Amsterdam News, October 19, 1963.
140

“NYC Losing $1400 A Day In Harlem,” New York Amsterdam News, October
26, 1963; “CORE Assails Mayor on Mounted Police,” New York Times, October 17,
1963.
141

371

segregation and racial discrimination.”142 The march and rally at City Hall
represented an impressive convergence of national and local civil rights leaders in
New York City and marked an apex of sorts for the four months of dramatic protests
against the construction industry in the city. Such impressive mass action, however,
failed to bring about the kinds of tangible changes in employment discrimination
that Harrington and the Joint Committee demanded.
When Mayor Wagner ordered work to resume on the Harlem Hospital
project two weeks later, eleven of the sixteen workers on site were African
American, but neither City Hall nor the Building and Construction Trades Council
had agreed to any meaningful change in employment policies or practices. Again
haranguing these limited gains as “tokenism,” the Joint Committee objected to the
resumption of work without a more systemic commitment to racial equality from
labor leaders and city and state officials.143 Though the four-month wave of militant
protests that the Harlem Hospital demonstrations inspired failed to rectify racial
discrimination in the building and construction trades, they nonetheless had
profound impacts on Black freedom struggles in New York City. By the time work
resumed on the Harlem Hospital site, the 151-day shut down had cost the city over
$500 per day for maintenance and security at the site, demonstrating to city and
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state officials the economic costs that continued racial inequality could incur.144
Furthermore, the confrontational tactics used at the construction sites represented
an escalation of protest activities throughout the city. Whereas national CORE
leaders had counseled local pickets during the “sympathy strikes” of 1960 to remain
peaceful, orderly, and to not obstruct businesses, by 1963 local people had pushed
CORE leaders to adopt more assertive tactics, including civil disobedience, to force
physical confrontations and demand concessions from various levels of the white
power structure. NY CORE and their allies served notice that if Blacks and Puerto
Ricans were not given seats at the table, nobody would sit.
This escalation in tactics coincided with a fundamental shift in CORE’s
demands in the early 1960s. Whereas previous protests had sought to integrate
public accommodations or break the color barrier in employment or housing on a
case-by-case basis, CORE’s swelling grassroots base was pushing its leaders to
demand more systemic changes in employment, housing, and police reform. Like
Malcolm X, whose insistence on governmental reparations for enslavement had won
the support of many in Harlem and beyond, by 1963 CORE leaders were demanding
that employers and city officials rectify their complicity in past employment
discrimination through preferential hiring and training programs for Black and
Puerto Rican workers. Inherent within this organizational evolution was a growing
identification with the analyses and demands of poor and working-class Black
communities in New York City. “What would have been big gains a year ago no
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longer are regarded by the rank and file,” Velma Hill said in early 1964. “The result
is a problem, restiveness among the members. They want to demonstrate if we do
not get even bigger victories.”145
While CORE’s organizational thrust in 1960-1961 was characterized by
struggles for an “open society,” by 1963 NY CORE and other local chapters were
forcing the national organization to adopt programs that focused on community
development and empowerment within predominantly Black neighborhoods.
Described by program director Norman Hill as a “ghetto thrust,” NY CORE’s
evolution during this period set the stage for a major conflict in the chapter by the
year’s end. At the same time, NY CORE’s growing grassroots base brought the
interracial organization into the fold of militant, vanguard struggles for human
rights, self-determination, and political power—the radical hallmarks of Black
nationalism and later the Black Power Movement.
Toward Community Organizing and Black Power at the Grassroots
The surging involvement of poor and working-class Black communities that
was pushing NY CORE in more radical directions was part of a broader evolution of
Black Freedom Struggles in New York City by the end of 1963. The naked brutality
of white racism inflicted upon the Birmingham campaign had enraged and enlivened
individuals and communities across the nation, spurring an influx of new activists
and organizers in local movements throughout that summer. Though this
groundswell of working-class activists in CORE had largely begun two years earlier
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in the wake of the Freedom Rides, the militant responses of the Black community in
Birmingham to racial terrorism that spring had inspired more confrontational
action far beyond the Mason-Dixon Line. Considered by some observers to be the
first urban rebellion of the 1960s, the clashes between Black protestors and white
police in Birmingham expedited the radical evolution of northern civil rights
organizations whose growing grassroots base had less tolerance for gradualism,
nonviolence, and negotiating for freedom than their middle-class counterparts.
Though Meier and Rudwick trace this evolution of CORE’s ideologies and praxis in
New York City to the Freedom Rides in 1961,146 as noted above, the radical political
milieu nurtured by Black nationalists, radical intellectuals, and grassroots
community leaders in Harlem during this same period played a substantial role in
shaping the political consciousness and actions of this groundswell of activism
embodied in CORE and NSM alike.
With racial violence continuing unabated in the South and seemingly basic
demands for equality being met with dogged resistance, official indifference, and
police repression in Harlem that summer, the militant rhetoric and analysis of
Malcolm X became increasingly attractive to would-be activists and seasoned
veterans of interracial organizations alike. By the end of the summer, Gladys
Harrington was appearing on stage with Malcolm X at street rallies in Harlem. At an
August rally amidst the construction protests, Harrington shared a stage with Dan
Watts, Bessie Phillips, and Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali), where she echoed
Malcolm’s calls for a Black united front and criticized President Kennedy’s co146

Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 145.
375

optation of the March on Washington in front of a crowd of 2,000.147 The previous
summer, New Haven CORE leader Blyden Jackson, who by 1963 would join NY CORE
before forming a rival chapter by the year’s end, began speaking at street rallies
sponsored by the Harlem Anti-Colonial Committee.148 Led by Bill Jones and Selma
Sparks, the small radical group included John Henrik Clarke, Sylvester Leaks,
William Worthy, and Pernella Wattley, each of whom had played an active role in
supporting the Monroe defendants and African liberation struggles in the early
1960s.149
Like NY CORE, which drew many of its members during these formative
years from the same grassroots base that Malcolm X reached so effectively,
members of the NSM became increasingly involved in Harlem’s radical milieu. Carl
Anthony, who recalled hearing Malcolm X speak on dozens of occasions in Harlem,
spent countless hours in Louis Michaux’s bookstore where he immersed himself in
the works of Carter G. Woodson, J.A. Rogers, James Baldwin, Lorraine Hansberry,
LeRoi Jones (Amiri Baraka), and Harold Cruse.150 Marilyn Lowen, a Jewish college
student from Detroit who was drawn to the NSM after hearing Anthony speak in
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New Haven in the fall of 1962, began working with the Harlem Anti-Colonial
Committee and the Freedom Now Party before joining HEP full time in the summer
of 1963. In Harlem, Lowen and her boyfriend Bob Fletcher also became associated
with members of the radical Black literary group Umbra, high school activist
Sherron Jackson (Amina Rahman), and Stokely Carmichael.151 Having grown up in
the Bronx, Carmichael came by the HEP offices from time to time that summer while
on respite from his work with SNCC in the South, even participating in a HEP tutor
orientation program in June 1963, where he spoke about “Direct Action” on a panel
with NSM staffers Carl Anthony, Bob Knight, Roger Siegel, and Kathie Rogers.152
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the radicalization of NSM members
during this period was Sherron Jackson (Amina Rahman), a student at the High
School of Music and Art, who had been involved with SNCC and CORE protests in the
South, volunteered for HARYOU, and was a correspondent of NSM’s student
newspaper, Harlem Voice. Though only a teenager at the time, Jackson was deeply
involved in interracial, nonviolent struggles for Black equality and empowerment. A
meeting with Malcolm X at the Harlem Hospital protests that summer, however, had
transformative impacts on the young activist’s political consciousness and
involvement in struggles for Black liberation. As the demonstrations got underway
in June, Jackson walked the picket lines for a couple hours before getting on the bus
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to head to school. When protestors fought to block cement trucks from entering the
construction site on the second day, Jackson was among those lying down in the
street when she realized that Malcolm X was looking on from across the way.
Moments later, Malcolm sent word through James 67X that the minister wanted to
have a word with her.
Though Jackson initially refused citing her protest duties, she eventually
ventured across the street to speak to Malcolm X when her shift was finished. “We
had quite an argument that morning,” then 14-year-old Jackson later said. As he had
with Maya Angelou and Rosa Guy in the wake of the UN demonstrations two years
earlier, Malcolm explained to Jackson that her participation in nonviolent
demonstrations was misguided. “I was trying to convince him of the rightness of
what I was doing and how fearless I was about that construction truck and the
workers, I was putting my body on the line for the cause,” she later recalled. “I
talked about what we were doing in appealing to the moral conscience of the
truckdriver by laying our bodies on the line in front of that truck.” Malcolm,
however, challenged the young activist to question the fundamental assumptions
that guided her actions that day. Rahman’s recollection of the encounter is worth
quoting at length for the formative impact that it had on her political thought:
Malcolm said, ‘but that’s because you think he has a moral conscience,
something that you ought to question given the history of what white people
in this country have done to Black people. If these are people who could
lynch Black people, murder Black children, burn down churches, starve
people, enslave people, why couldn’t they run over somebody with the truck?
Oh, they’d say it was an accident. He’d say ‘oops! My foot slipped,’ but you’d
be just as dead from an accident as you would be had it been done on
purpose.’ It was quite a conversation and admittedly I’d never thought about
that kind of thing. I’d never put two and two together in the context of Black
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people and white people at that point in time. And when he left and I turned
around to go back across the street to the demonstration, I went back and I
got on the picket line but I never laid down in the street in front of a truck
again.153
Though she retained her affiliations with HARYOU and NSM, Rahman became a
regular visitor of Mosque No. 7 in the weeks following this encounter with Malcolm
X. By early September, Rahman was sharing a stage with Malcolm X at rallies in
Harlem, where she routinely criticized her prior participation in nonviolent
demonstrations to achieve integration and called for immediate liberation and selfdetermination by any means necessary.
Speaking at a mass rally at 114th Street and Lenox Avenue that month,
Rahman told the crowd of 700 that Black Americans “will never gain anything until
they see the light and place their faith in a god who will represent them. When this is
done black people will then be united in the world wide black revolution and will
then stop turning the other cheek and fight force with force.”154 Though a dramatic
example, Rahman’s introduction to Malcolm X that summer is illustrative of the
ways in which Harlem’s radical milieu was shaping the direction of mainstream civil
rights organizations and challenging popular perceptions of integration and
nonviolence as a panacea in Black Freedom Struggles.
While Malcolm’s radical analysis and rhetoric inspired greater militancy at
the grassroots, Jesse Gray’s emphasis on the revolutionary potential of grassroots
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community organizing came to define the thrust of CORE and NSM by the fall of
1963. Whereas NY CORE’s earlier housing activism campaigns had focused
primarily on desegregation and open housing legislation, by 1963 chapters
throughout the city began to focus on their efforts on improving housing conditions
in predominantly Black communities. More than just a tactical shift in advocating for
better housing conditions, CORE’s emphasis on tenant organizing by 1963
represented the organization’s continued movement toward an operational
advocacy of self-determination, grassroots empowerment, and community
organizing among poor and working-class Black New Yorkers.
By the end of the year, these trends would cause a rift in the organization as
Blyden Jackson, Norman and Velma Hill, and a group of NY CORE members split
from the chapter to form the more militant East River CORE. In NSM, the rising tide
of grassroots militancy and Black nationalism in Harlem led the organization to
reconsider education as its primary focus in the neighborhood as community
members pushed for greater involvement in direct action and community
organizing. Like NY CORE, such trends and budding relationships with other
community leaders like Jesse Gray would also spur the emergence of a new wing of
the NSM, known as the Harlem Action Group (HAG), by the year’s end. With the
emergence of Gray’s widespread rent strikes in Harlem and throughout the city in
the early fall of 1963, both CORE and NSM embraced the surging grassroots
militancy and shifted their organizing actions to keep apace with Black grassroots
demands for immediate rights and power in New York City.
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As this groundswell was pushing the NSM to reconsider its operational
analyses and directions, historian Matthew Countryman notes, “there was a growing
feeling that NSM should have a black director.” Despite the ongoing interracial
struggles in the South, the continuing rise of Black militancy and nationalist politics
in NSM’s project cities, including Harlem, Detroit, and Philadelphia, made having a
white director untenable. Echoing the call for Black self-determination inherent in
the surging militancy of the time, Joan Countryman later recalled the “need for black
leadership for an organization that [focused] on black issues.”155 In September 1963,
Peter Countryman stepped down from his post as national director to return to Yale,
and was succeeded by Bill Strickland, a Black Harvard graduate, Marine Corps
veteran, and old friend of Malcolm X.156
Coinciding with HEP’s immersion in more radical grassroots organizing
initiatives in Harlem, Strickland’s arrival on the scene ushered in a new era for the
NSM in New York and the nation. “It is becoming increasingly evident that ‘civil
rights’ is no longer either an adequate term or an accurate description of the quest
for full freedom which is now challenging our society,” Strickland told a crowded
conference at Columbia that October. “It is also evident that an institutionalized
system of disadvantage provokes just as dangerous a reaction in the overcrowded
and under-resourced northern ghetto as in the more publicized and tragic south.”157
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Strickland’s stirring speech at Columbia illustrated a new operational analysis of the
systemic nature of northern racism that both NSM and NY CORE members alike had
developed through their experiences in Harlem and elsewhere. Confronting this
system through a grassroots struggle for human rights would require a new
organizational framework, and would bring NSM and NY CORE to the front of
Harlem’s flowering radical political milieu as the city bounded into what would be
the most explosive year of an already turbulent decade.
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CHAPTER 7
“SOMETHING’S GOTTA BE WRONG”: RENT STRIKES, REPRESSION, AND
REBELLION IN HARLEM, 1963-1964
People ask me why I spend all my time on heat and hot water and I say heat
and hot water is the biggest organizing tool we have; it may even kick off the
revolution in the ghetto. –Jesse Gray (1964)1
Heretofore Harlem has been nonviolent. I think the leadership of Harlem would
prefer that we remain nonviolent. As long as we can press for equality with a
nonviolent technique then this is a good one. The problem isn’t the leadership,
the problem isn’t even the masses of people, the problem is how long can you
keep denying a people freedom and expect them to remain nonviolent. Turning
your cheek once is fine, turning it twice is alright, but the third time you get a
little bit sick of being slapped down. And you know if you don’t hit back you’re
in trouble. I’m not advocating hitting back. I’m only saying that if we don’t
break through, somebody is going to get violent. –Thelma Johnson (1963)2
In early December 1963, millions of Americans tuned in to their local CBS
station to watch a special report on the state of the Black Freedom Struggle in
Harlem and the conditions caused by racial oppression there. For months, reporters
brought their cameras through the streets of Harlem, filming street scenes and
interviews with a cross-section of community leaders as part of an “examination of
the Negro Revolution as it exists in Harlem.” While the dramatic protests and violent
backlash that surged throughout the South that summer commanded the attention
of most national media outlets, the rising grassroots militancy in Harlem
demonstrated through confrontational protests at construction sites and the
uncompromising rhetoric of nationalist street rallies that summer had drawn the
“Jesse Gray Tells Plans In New York: The rent-strike season is on,” National
Guardian, November 11, 1964.
1
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gaze of the nation to its most famous Black community. “Instead of focusing on the
Southern race problem,” executive producer Fred W. Friendly stated in a press
release, “The Harlem Temper” was intended to depict struggles for rights and power
in Harlem “as a microcosm of the Negro in the North.”3
As the televised report opened with scenes of Black people moving about the
sidewalks of a bustling 125th Street and gathering around stoops on residential
blocks, white reporter Harry Reasoner described the “invisible barriers of
prejudice” that created “some of the worst of city slums.” While most Americans
were undoubtedly familiar with the explicit conditions of racial oppression in the
South, having seen on the news “whites only” signs, police dogs set upon peaceful
protestors, and the destruction of Black churches, far fewer truly understood the
problems of northern “ghettoes” as part of a national system of institutional racism
that knew no geographic bounds. If racial injustices existed in a northern
community where “full legal equality…ostensibly already exists,” Reasoner posited,
then the question begging to be answered was, “how do we achieve real equality?”
From footage of Malcolm X, Louis Michaux, and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.
speaking forcefully at street rallies to formal interviews with Jesse Gray, Gladys
Harrington, Paul Zuber, Thelma Johnson, and many others, the hour-long program
explored this question through the voices of those who had spent years in search of
its answer. The diversity of analyses and programs that these prominent leaders
explained during the course of the program was representative of the range of

“CBS Will Report on ‘The Harlem Temper,” Cleveland Call and Post,
November 30, 1963.
3
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competing ideologies at play in Harlem’s charged political milieu. Though the timing
and tone of the report suggested that Harlem was in its infancy of organized political
action, struggling to grapple with the complexities of racism in the urban north, the
program aired amidst a high point in struggles for rights and power in Harlem.
James Haughton, chairman of the NAACP’s Labor and Industry Committee, made this
point clear when questioned about the “new militancy” in Harlem. “I don’t think
there’s anything new about the militancy and the dignity and the strength and the
pride and the courage of the Negro people,” Haughton bluntly told Reasoner.
Despite this deep tradition of militancy, however, Haughton conceded that Harlem
remained a “sleeping giant,” yearning for organized action that would engage the
grassroots and awaken the Black Mecca’s dormant power.
While “The Harlem Temper” aptly presented the breadth of political thought
and action in Harlem through the community leaders it featured, its producers and
reviewers were critically mistaken in their conclusions that such a convoluted
political milieu precluded collective action. “The kaleidoscope of opinions and
impressions was so diverse as to create a canvas of total negation,” a Boston Globe
reporter noted.4 With seemingly irreconcilable debates around nonviolence,
integration, nationalism, and self-defense predominating in the program, it is easy to
understand how observers could make such assumptions. In many ways, these
debates and disagreements had characterized the movement in Harlem over the
past decade as organizations searched for ways to effectively build mass movements

Percy Shain, “Portrait of Disunity In Northern Negroes,” Boston Globe,
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to achieve Black equality and empowerment. For years, activists and intellectuals
who recognized the limitations of a Balkanized movement had called for a Black
united front to uproot northern racism and transform their society.
Though conflicting visions of the means and ends of this social
transformation routinely hamstrung the development of such a united front at the
dawn of the 1960s, by the time the CBS report aired, inter-organizational coalitions
had emerged around various protest campaigns with much greater frequency. At
the insistence of local people and indigenous leaders, relatively moderate middleclass organizations like CORE and the NAACP had embraced an ethos of workingclass community action and entered the fold of militant grassroots organizing. The
Northern Student Movement had begun to move from service-oriented tutorial
programs to community organizing for political empowerment. And by that
summer, Malcolm X was sharing the stage with leaders from along the spectrum of
Black political thought in Harlem, from staunch integrationist Gladys Harrington to
radical anti-colonial editor-activist Dan Watts, as he escalated his calls for united
action for Black liberation.
Though the programs and analyses embraced by these organizations may
have differed, they shared a common overarching goal: the immediate liberation of
Black communities in the United States. To James Haughton, this nascent unity
reflected a common recognition that the demands of the people must be reflected in
the organizations who claimed to represent their interests. “It’s a matter of what the
Negro people are demanding,” Haughton said, dismissing questions about the
supposed dichotomy between integration and separation in the Black Freedom
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Struggle. “It’s my understanding that they’re neither demanding total separation,
which is Malcolm’s position, nor are they demanding total integration. They’re
demanding total equality.”
By the fall of 1963 these demands for total equality became manifest in a
citywide rent strike which had emerged from the grassroots in Harlem and
galvanized local people, community groups, political leaders, and civil rights
organizations throughout the city and across the nation. For Jesse Gray, whose
radical activism in Harlem bridged the Left-led movements of the post-World War II
Era with the radical insurgencies of the Civil Rights Movement, the rent strikes
served as a great unifying force in the community’s struggles for Black liberation.
“Everybody in the community was around the basic struggle,” Gray later said,
“struggle unifies the community.”5 By centering the needs of the most economically
and politically marginalized communities in New York City, the rent strike
movement of 1963-64 drew into the fold of Harlem’s radical political milieu the
poor and working-class masses that Haughton, Harrington, and Johnson had
described in “The Harlem Temper” as the key to building a mass movement in
Harlem. Furthermore, through their involvement in organized struggle, this
previously untapped well of political power came to realize its collective strength
while also developing a more radical analysis of the many facets of the white power
structure in New York City.

Jesse Gray interview with Katherine M. Shannon, July 26, 1967, Ralph
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University.
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For the past decade, poor and working-class Harlem residents had fueled the
escalation of protest activity and demands for human rights and self-determination
that pushed local and national civil rights organizations in more assertive,
imaginative, and radical directions. Inspired by Harlem’s deeply-rooted Black
radical tradition, along with national and global liberation struggles, local people
had begun to develop a revolutionary consciousness, which through the rent strikes
in the fall of 1963, had stimulated the makings of a promising, if shaky, Black united
front in Harlem. Forged through school boycotts, rent strikes, economic picket lines,
and protests against police brutality over the previous decade, this popular
consciousness and political action reflected frustrations over the limitations of racial
liberalism in New York City and was mobilized to fight for self-determination and a
more progressive form of urban governance. Through participation in local
organizing efforts to improve living conditions and combat institutional racism,
some of the most marginalized communities in New York City had developed a
radical critique of urban power structures that challenged the legitimacy of an
inherently oppressive society.
This chapter examines the emergence, evolution, and impacts of the Harlem
rent strikes of 1963-64 within the context of escalating demands for immediate
rights and power in New York’s Black and Puerto Rican communities. Through
active engagement in the rent strikes, thousands of Black and Puerto Rican New
Yorkers forged an urban “movement center” that mobilized the masses in struggles
for racial justice in the city’s economic, political, and social institutions.
Consequently, as many activists and intellectuals observed, the emergence of this
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movement center in Harlem was met with increasingly hostile and repressive
actions and policies from the city government and its police force. This dogged
resistance to Black empowerment, in turn, spurred grassroots organizers to adopt
more militant analyses and tactics as they fought to secure human rights and selfdetermination for Black communities in Harlem and throughout the city. This
chapter thus frames the outbreak of the 1964 Harlem Rebellion as the result of a
collective disillusionment with the repressive limitations of liberal governance to
meaningfully address systemic racial oppression. Though a spontaneous act of
police brutality provided the impetus for the uprising, this fatal shooting occurred
within a volatile political climate charged by increasingly repressive state violence
that was employed to maintain the racial status quo as radical and revolutionary
analyses were inspiring mass mobilization in Harlem and beyond.
v
If the March on Washington had provided a sense of optimism and hope for
many African Americans who looked forward to the promise of federal civil rights
legislation, the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church just two weeks later
tempered any sense of elation. Describing the racist attack as “one of the American
answers to the march,” James Baldwin and MOW organizer Bayard Rustin swiftly
announced plans for mass demonstrations nationwide to protest the seemingly
endless violence in the South. “It is not enough to mourn the dead children,” Baldwin
declared from Harlem, “what we must do is oppose and immobilize the power that
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put them to death.”6 Joined by Blyden Jackson of NY CORE, Baldwin and Rustin
mobilized the collective anger throughout New York City into a protest of 10,000
New Yorkers at the federal courthouse in Foley Square one week after the deadly
terrorist attack in Birmingham.7
As 200 police officers looked on, including mounted units and members of
the notorious Tactical Patrol Force, Rustin called for a nonviolent “uprising” in 100
cities “where we will sit and stand and stand and sit and go to jail and jail again,
until there are no color barriers.” Rustin’s careful insistence on nonviolent action
served as a rebuttal of sorts to comments made by John O. Killens and Louis Lomax
in support of armed self-defense at a mid-town memorial service two nights prior.8
With justice still in short supply amidst wholesale racist violence, Rustin was
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fighting an uphill battle in trying to check the growing influence of those who
advocated armed self-defense to protect Black communities.
While Rustin called for a national campaign against the naked brutality of
southern racism that afternoon, Baldwin ensured that the less visible, yet
interrelated evils of northern Jim Crow went neither unspoken nor unchallenged.
Calling New York a “segregated city,” the celebrated writer called for a “mass
campaign of civil disobedience” to expose and oppose the many faces of racial
violence in the city. “We have got to bring the cat out of hiding,” Baldwin declared,
pointing to the veiled, institutional nature of northern inequality.9
In his widely published essays of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Baldwin
had demonstrated a deep concern for explaining and analyzing the human impacts
of racial discrimination in education, employment, policing, and housing in Harlem.
Now, with the grisly murder of four young Black girls in Birmingham as a backdrop,
Baldwin urged New Yorkers to confront these local manifestations of the same
violent, national system through direct action. “What would happen,” Baldwin
pointedly asked the crowd that Sunday afternoon, “if Harlem refused to pay the
rents for a month?” Unbeknownst to Baldwin, a small group of tenants nine miles
uptown had begun doing just that.
The Rebirth of the Rent Strike
The notion was not a new one in Harlem, where rent strikes had been a
staple of Left-led tenant movements during the Great Depression before reemerging
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with Jesse Gray’s strikes in 1959. By the summer of 1963, rent strikes were once
again creeping into the minds of many in Harlem as City Hall proved unwilling to
enforce hard-won housing policies secured through tenant organizing over the past
several years.10 Weeks before the March on Washington, Gray had threatened a
strike at a rally on 117th Street when he urged the residents of the block’s crumbling
tenements to march on City Hall and tell the Mayor “we are not going to pay any
more rent on these blocks until the violations in our homes are corrected.”11 Called
under the banner of “Civil Rights and Tenants Rights,” the rally was one of three that
Gray and the Community Council on Housing (CCH) organized in lower Harlem that
month, drawing the likes of Anna Arnold Hedgeman, Hulan Jack, attorney Cora
Walker, Assemblyman José Ramos-Lopez, and Malcolm X. Sharing the stage with
these formidable Harlem leaders, the CCH called for “stiff fines and long jail terms
for landlords who refuse to obey the law.”12 With the March on Washington looming
large in public consciousness, the rallies attempted to draw tenants out of their
buildings and into the fold of organized political action by explicitly linking tenants
rights with civil rights.
While Gray continued to tirelessly organize tenants in his lower Harlem
neighborhood, members of the Northern Student Movement (NSM) had also begun
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moving into the field of tenant organizing that summer. Dissatisfied with the limited
scope of their Harlem Education Project’s (HEP) tutorial programs, organizers
wanted to work on programs, like the Neighborhood Commons, which would
develop indigenous leadership and spur autonomous community action.13 Inspired
by the successes of SNCC in working with local people to build community-led
movements, NSM members moved into the ripe field of tenant organizing in Harlem.
“Fannie Lou Hamer, activist share croppers, people who emerged out of the
community, who became the voice of that community,” NSM’s city field secretary
Danny Schechter later said, “that’s what we believed in, bottom-up.”14 Like Jesse
Gray and Jack O’Dell, whose analysis of radical grassroots struggle informed their
move into tenant organizing years earlier, Schechter and other NSM members saw
Harlem tenements as the next frontier of the Civil Rights Movement.
By early July, HEP workers had begun conducting housing surveys in the
neighborhood near their office on 8th Avenue between 136th and 137th Streets. While
canvassing the neighborhood, HEP staff met Granville Cherry, an unemployed
shipping clerk who lived in a railroad apartment at 2560 8th Avenue, just a few
doors from the HEP office.15 The apartment that Cherry shared with his pregnant
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wife and six children was riddled with code violations, including broken windows, a
broken toilet, crumbling walls, a leaking ceiling, and a horrible rat infestation.16 To
Cherry and the other tenants, these conditions were not isolated, but rather
symptomatic of the racial oppression inherent within northern Black communities.
“They believe,” the New York Times wrote of the tenants, “that their troubles arise
directly from the opportunities for exploitation that a racial ghetto affords white
owners.”17
Frustrated by the unchecked exploitation of their landlord, Daniel Fardella,
an Italian-American Bronx resident who charged $34.70 a month for the apartment,
yet provided no services or repairs, Cherry formed a tenants council with the
assistance and encouragement of the HEP staffers. While Cherry organized his
neighbors, Bob Fletcher and the HEP staff served as liaison between the tenants and
landlord in an attempt to negotiate repairs of the building.18 After two meetings
with Fardella failed to bring any improvements to their apartments, however, the
newly-formed tenants council decided to withhold their rents and make the repairs
themselves. When Fardella objected to the tenants making improvements upon his
building, the tenants council, after months of fighting for repairs with the landlord
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and city agencies, officially began a rent strike.19 Garnering front-page coverage in
the New York Times by the end of September, the tenants of 2560 8th Avenue
cranked up the heat on a simmering tenant movement and answered Baldwin’s
challenge in a resounding way.
The Rent Strike Spreads
Within a matter of weeks, the rent strike had scored immediate victories for
the tenants and launched grassroots tenant struggles into the forefront of civil rights
activity in the city. After Fardella failed to evict the tenants through court
proceedings for nonpayment of rent, the city’s Rent and Rehabilitation
Administration ordered a rent reduction in mid-October until the landlord resolved
the violations in the building. Cherry and his neighbors had their rents reduced from
$34 to $1 per month, thereby slashing the landlord’s monthly revenue from the nine
apartments in the building from $969.43 to $9.20 While the tenants claimed victory
against their landlord, believing the rent reductions would compel Fardella to make
the necessary repairs, the city patted itself on the back for resolving the issue and
curbing the rent strike. Informing the New York Times that the rent strike had been
made “academic,” the RRA pushed the narrative that tenants need only work
through the prescribed channels of governmental agencies to solve their housing
issues.21
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If the RRA thought they had dodged a bullet with the rent reductions, any
sense of relief was short-lived. Once the story of Cherry’s rent strike made the front
page of the Times, there was no putting the cat back in the bag. In a sermon at
Abyssinian Baptist Church just days after the Times article was published, Adam
Clayton Powell, Jr. celebrated the reemergence of the rent strikes and other
economic protests in Harlem. “The way to make a man holler is to withhold his
dollar,” Powell declared from the altar. Speaking at a press conference after the
service, Powell announced that he would meet with James Baldwin that week to
discuss plans for a national rent strike. Drawing upon his own experience of leading
a rent strike in Harlem in the early 1930s, Powell suggested that such a movement
“is a good method of getting Northerners into the black revolution.”22
While Powell used his pulpit and bombast to call for a national movement,
“rent strike fever” was spreading rapidly throughout New York City. As word of
Cherry’s successful rent strike got out, other renters in that neighborhood began
organizing their own buildings to join the tenants council. Just days after the RRA
ordered the rent reductions, Mary King and Rita Jackson approached Cherry with a
list of tenants in their buildings on the other side of 8th Avenue who were interested
in joining the council. Like Cherry, the two Black women complained of gaping holes
in the walls and ceilings, broken toilets, leaking pipes, fire hazards, and rats for
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roommates. “I wish I was the judge, I’d send the landlord to the electric chair,” the
superintendent of Jackson’s building at 2577 8th Avenue told a reporter from the
Daily Worker. “I’d do worse than that,” Jackson said, “I’d let him live here.”23 Inspired
by Cherry’s success, the two women worked diligently in the next several months to
organize their buildings and expand the nascent rent strike.
While the Worker heralded the organizing efforts of King and Jackson as
evidence that “a fuse has been lit…by the rent strike victory,” the “spark” was also
spreading to other sections of the city. In early October, Brooklyn CORE chair Oliver
Leeds threatened a rent strike in Bedford-Stuyvesant if tenants’ demands for repairs
were not met. “No one expects people to buy stale bread or rotten meat,” Leeds said,
“housing should be provided on the same basis. It should be decent, or it shouldn’t
exist at all.”24 In the Lower East Side, NYU CORE and Mobilization For Youth, a social
agency formed two years earlier to combat juvenile delinquency and organize poor
and working-class Black and Puerto Rican communities, both shifted their focus
from service-based housing clinics to organizing tenants for collective action.25
Uptown at NY CORE, where the chapter had established a housing clinic in
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December 1962, the housing committee moved away from conducting independent
building investigations and toward organizing tenants associations “to confront
landlords with ‘direct action,’ including pickets and rent strikes.”26
Though these organizations had yet to organize or join a rent strike up to this
point, their collective attention to the housing concerns of poor and working-class
tenants in the months leading up to Cherry’s opening salvo was significant for two
primary reasons. First, this emphasis on tenant organizing over open-housing
campaigns was reflective of a broader trend in the city’s Black Freedom Struggles
toward grassroots organizing, community empowerment, and self-determination in
Black and Puerto Rican communities. Second, that housing was seen as the primary
vehicle through which this type of community power could be developed was a
direct recognition and outgrowth of Jesse Gray’s decade of radical grassroots
organizing in Harlem. Though Gray may not have organized the first rent strike of
1963, he had meticulously tilled the soil from which it grew.
In addition to sparking a mass mobilization around tenants’ rights in the city,
the birth of the rent strike on 8th Avenue proved an immediate boon for the NSM in
Harlem. In Cherry, NSM found the indigenous leader they were looking for to jumpstart a local movement around housing. “He was articulate, he was committed, he
was a hard worker, he was willing to take initiative, and distribute leaflets and talk
to people,” Schechter later recalled.27 Although HEP organizers had earlier proven
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successful in fostering productive relationships with community leaders like Chick
Bradley on the Neighborhood Commons project, they saw in Cherry’s tenant council
the potential for building a much broader social movement. “The real significance of
this project,” the NSM News reported that fall, “is that it indicates that the NSM
philosophy of community action, community-led, is workable.”28 Toward this goal of
expanding their involvement in community-led struggle, Cherry’s emergence as an
indigenous leader gave the NSM “a kind of legitimacy,” Schechter said, “somebody in
the neighborhood.”29 While the tutorial programs had earned HEP a reputation for
their community-service in Harlem, their involvement with the burgeoning rent
strike movement provided stronger social capital in the context of Harlem’s surging
grassroots militancy by the summer of 1963.
With this more formidable neighborhood presence, Cherry and NSM staff
moved quickly to establish a new group dedicated to the grassroots community
action that the rent strikes exemplified. Within a few short weeks, the ranks of
Cherry’s tenant council had grown to include a volunteer secretary and fieldworker,
with plans to recruit greater involvement in the neighborhood. In mid-October,
Cherry announced that the council would be opening an office at 307 W. 147th Street
“to continue and broaden the fight.”30 Located near the Neighborhood Commons, the
storefront office would become the home of the Harlem Action Group (HAG), an
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organization under the umbrella of the Northern Student Movement dedicated to
community organization and political action.
In the following weeks, HAG staffers, including Bob Knight, QR Hand, Jim
Finch, and Julian Houston, used the momentum generated by Cherry’s strike to
expand their grassroots organizing efforts and bring more tenants into the fold of
the rent strike. Going door-to-door in the neighborhoods surrounding the HEP and
HAG offices, HAG workers distributed hundreds of leaflets to inform tenants of
Cherry’s recent victory against his landlord. Featuring newspaper coverage of
Cherry’s success alongside a photograph of a Black woman holding her young
daughter in a crumbling apartment—a familiar scene for residents in many of the
buildings they canvassed—the HAG flyers read, “2560 8th pays $1 a month rent so
can you.”31 By the end of the month, HAG workers had helped Mary King and Rita
Jackson to organize their buildings to formally join the rent strike.
“What we want is action”: The CCH Joins the Strikes
While HAG, CORE chapters, and other community organizations in New York
began to focus their energies on tenant organizing, Gray and the CCH worked
feverishly to capitalize on the sudden widespread attention on housing that their
ten years of groundwork had finally wrought. Though the CCH had not yet declared
a rent strike, Gray and his small but committed group of organizers used the
momentum from Cherry’s strike to organize more buildings in their Lower Harlem
neighborhood. At the same time, the CCH leveraged this increased attention to make
Harlem Action Group Flyer, 1963, Box 31, Folder 17, Metropolitan Council
on Housing Records, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New
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more expansive and immediate demands upon the city’s power structure. As the
rent strike on 8th Avenue was underway in mid-September, Gray escalated his plans
for a mass march on City Hall the following month to demand that the Mayor “either
order the courts to mete out stiffer penalties or invoke the receivership law” to
rectify the rampant abuses of Harlem slumlords.32
To drum up support for the march, the Pittsburgh Courier reported, members
of the CCH conducted a month-long “house-to-house canvas of every building from
110th to 118th Streets from Park Avenue to Morningside Avenue to discuss with
tenants the problems they face as a result of the neglect of landlords.”33 This diligent
organizing work was necessary to not only mobilize support for the march, but also
to help tenants overcome apprehensions about taking action against their landlords.
In a city with a housing vacancy rate around 1%, many tenants had good reason to
be wary of crossing their landlords and risking eviction.
Although some tenants were hesitant to get involved, others were anxious to
take action. At a meeting of the CCH in early October, the Pittsburgh Courier
reported, tenants of buildings on 116th Street and 146th Street “voted not to pay rent
to the landlords until all violations were removed.”34 Gray, however, remained
focused on coordinating that month’s march and claimed that tenants in over 100
buildings had been organized to take their complaints to City Hall. That Gray was
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hesitant to launch a rent strike in early October despite calls from CCH members
and the tempting press coverage received by Granville Cherry is indicative of his
larger strategy at the time. Rather than attempting to force slumlords to repair their
buildings in piecemeal fashion, Gray sought to coordinate a mass tenant movement
to compel the City to undertake a mass rehabilitation of Black and Puerto Rican
communities.
Through his decade of experience in tenant organizing, Gray understood the
inherently limited scope of targeting individual landlords for building repairs. These
fights required long, diligent organizing efforts to wrangle shiftless landlords and
apathetic city agencies and seldom achieved tangible victories, let alone systemic
change. For a radical organizer with visions of broader societal transformation,
systemic problems required systemic solutions. Thus, by the fall of 1963 Gray
increasingly focused his rhetoric and organizing on City Hall, rather than slumlords.
“The Harlem tenants,” Gray told reporters in mid-October, “hold Mayor Wagner
primarily responsible for the court’s asserted coddling of slum owners.” 35 By
targeting the Mayor, Gray effectively challenged tenants in Harlem to develop a
more systemic critique of the broader power structure in New York City by
personifying a complex system.
In addition to promoting a more radical popular consciousness, Gray’s
systemic critique also brought some action from City Hall. A week before the
planned march, Mayor Wagner issued an alarming, if unsurprising, report on a
recent wave of housing inspections conducted by the Department of Buildings.
35
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During what Commissioner Harold Birns described as the first “cellar-to-roof
inspections in which every building on a block was visited,” the Department found
40,000 violations in 2,647 buildings Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the South
Bronx. Of these buildings, 833 were referred for court action, 357 were
recommended for rent reductions, and 50 were referred to the city’s receivership
process.36 Whereas previous inspections in these same neighborhoods had only
found 4,000 violations, the dramatic increase in this new report revealed the
severity of the housing crisis, along with the insufficiency of city resources
dedicated to inspections and code enforcement. Furthermore, the report gave
greater leverage to tenant organizers in these predominantly Black and Puerto
Rican neighborhoods who understood that inspections alone would not bring about
any immediate improvements as winter neared.
With the housing crisis as a matter of political fact, Gray and the CCH
demanded that the Mayor “cut rents on buildings where there are violations, take
over those buildings immediately and make repairs of the violations,” all while
bringing stiffer punishments upon recalcitrant landlords. Additionally, Gray told
reporters that the CCH would ask the Mayor to establish a “non-biased, three-man
arbitration board” to handle tenants’ cases and to enforce the 1962 receivership law
to order the takeover of slum buildings “for rehabilitation at once.”37 Although the
mass inspections marked a partial fulfillment of Gray’s demands years earlier for a
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housing and code enforcement program that operated not on a reactive complaint
basis, but rather on proactive inspection basis, by this point he and the CCH
understood that inspections did not translate into repairs. For Gray, the expansion
and swift enforcement of the receivership law was key to expediting repairs and
improvements, as well as bringing about the systemic transformation of housing
policy in the long-run through collective ownership of low and middle-income
housing. While working toward this longer-range program, Gray also told reporters
after the Mayor issued his inspection report that “what we want is action. Now.”38
Unimpressed by the Mayor’s inspection report, Gray led the planned march
on City Hall a week later. Though for the past two months he had predicted 2,000
tenants would join in the protest, only 200 tenants showed up on a rainy Monday
afternoon. The protestors who braved the weather spent three hours outside City
Hall, where they distributed leaflets listing the 110 buildings in lower Harlem that
they demanded action on. More specifically, the tenants called upon the city to take
over every single building on 117th Street from Fifth Avenue to Madison Avenue.39
Despite the relatively weak turnout, the protest served notice to City Hall
that tenants in Harlem made no distinction between tenants rights and political
power in the city. While Gray met with the Mayor’s Executive Assistant inside City
Hall to present their demands, protestors outside chanted “No action in ’63, no votes
in ’64,” sounding the call to Mayor Wagner that they were prepared to take their
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protests to the polls in the upcoming election year.40 Returning to the ranks after his
meeting, Gray made the point more explicit. “The Wagner Administration has
proved that it is unable to handle the housing problem and we don’t want him to
come to Harlem next year to ask for votes.”41 Later that week, Gray announced plans
for another demonstration at the City Housing and Redevelopment Board to
continue pushing the CCH’s demands for the city takeover of all buildings on 117th
Street, as well as the formation of an arbitration board. “We’re tired of inspections.
That’s all they do in Harlem,” Gray said at a meeting at the Dunlevy-Milbank
Community Center on W. 118th Street. “We don’t want inspectors. We want
action!”42
As City Hall floundered, tenants took action just days later when November
rents were due. On the first of the month, HAG organizers announced that 36
tenants in the two buildings Mary King and Rita Jackson organized across the street
from Granville Cherry’s apartment had gone on strike.43 Further downtown in the
Lower East Side, NYU CORE announced that 110 tenants in six buildings had gone
on strike after months of fighting for repairs through city agencies and the courts.44
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Three days later, 45 tenants in three buildings that neighbored the CCH storefront
on E. 117th Street announced that they too had gone on strike.
Though the CCH-backed rent strikes began with meager numbers, Gray
predicted rapid growth. By the following weekend, Gray claimed, 12 more buildings
would be on strike and by December the total number of buildings participating in
the rent strike would eclipse 100.45 The basis for these claims rested upon the years
of groundwork that the CCH had already laid in these buildings, along with the
extensive organizing campaign for the march that summer. Furthermore, Gray had
his finger on the pulse of the community and felt that the people were ready to
move. According to Mark Naison, it was the “growing militancy” of the CCH’s rankand-file at meetings and protests over the previous weeks and months, which
prompted Gray to finally launch the strike in early November.46
The Emergence of the Rent Strike Movement
Bolstered by the participation and leadership of the CCH, the rent strikes
quickly evolved from scattered tenant revolts to a coordinated movement by the
beginning of December. Though more buildings had been on strike in the Lower
East Side in early November, the organizational strength of the CCH and the rousing
the RRA had already cut rents in the Eldridge Street buildings by 33 to 50% that
July, the landlord failed to undertake any major repairs on the 410 violations and
demonstrations continued throughout the summer. After a court appearance on
November 1st to bring charges against the landlord, the predominantly Puerto
Rican tenants announced that they would be giving their rentals to NYU CORE for
deposit in an escrow account.
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rhetoric of its leader quickly established Harlem as the epicenter of the rent strikes
as tenants there joined the strike in droves. Inspired by these Harlem tenants, civil
rights organizations, housing advocates, and civic groups throughout the city moved
to organize their own communities to engage in rent strikes. Flyers distributed by
the Metropolitan Council on Housing were illustrative of this rent strike fever that
was spreading throughout the city: “IT’S TIME FOR US TO STRIKE BACK! Harlem
tenants organized rent strikes and are getting results. WE CAN DO THE SAME.”47
Within a week of the CCH’s involvement, the rent strikes had also drawn the
support of CORE’s national office. “The rent strike has proven an effective weapon,”
James Farmer told the Amsterdam News in early November, urging that “more of
them should be employed by tenants having problems with indifferent slumlords.”48
Uptown, NY CORE’s new chairman Marshall England threw his chapter’s support
behind the strikes. “We have talked with landlords, begged landlords and have met
with a number of city agencies,” England said in early December, “so far the result
has been nil.” Calling for “massive rent strikes” in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant,
England argued that only “when the landlord is faced with no rents, then we get
some action.”49
Heralding the emergence of “a new and major weapon in the civil rights
fight,” the New York Times reported on December 1st that 16 buildings were on
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strike in Harlem. At a community meeting called by the CCH at the Milbank Center
later that day, tenants in 36 more buildings announced they would be joining the
strike, bringing the total number of striking tenants in Harlem up to 585 in over 50
buildings, according to Gray.50
One of the tenants in these newly organized buildings was Mrs. Elizabeth
Evans, a mother of eight who spent her nights guarding the crib of her three-month
old daughter from rat attacks in their W. 118th Street apartment.51 Mrs. May
Robinson, building leader of the rent strikers at 54 W. 117th Street, also announced
the participation of the tenants in her building at the meeting. The tenants in
Robinson’s building, including her next-door neighbor Elise McGee, complained of a
terrible rat infestation amongst myriad other health and safety violations. “There
are more rats in this building than people,” Miss McGee said. “I’m here having tea
and there they sit, looking me straight in the face.” Other buildings on the street, like
15 E. 117th Street, had no lock on the front door and had been without heat and hot
water for months. Tenants of the building, like Muriel Jackson and building leader
Doris Roper, had resorted to gathering their children around their gas stoves to
keep warm at night, and heating up gallons of water on the stove each morning so
that their children could bathe before school.52
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At the meeting, Jesse Gray’s right-hand-man, Major Williams, announced that
3,000 more tenants were ready to join the strike. “We should move those landlords
out of Harlem,” Williams told the 130 tenant representatives in attendance. “It’s up
to the younger people to keep up the fight for good living conditions.” While calling
upon the civil rights generation to join in the fight, Williams also spoke directly to
the daily tribulations women like Elizabeth Evans suffered through. “Every week we
have some child bitten by a rat,” Williams decried, “this must stop.”53
After Williams addressed the meeting, Gray laid out the program for the rent
strikes in the following weeks. First, the CCH would urge the chief justice of the Civil
Court to refuse to grant “slumlords the right to dispossess tenants when there are
violations.” With such a meager vacancy rate in the city, Gray sought to ensure legal
safeguards for tenants against the possibility of landlords evicting them in lieu of
completing repairs. Second, to dramatize the realities of their living conditions in
these tenements and solicit sympathy through the courts, tenants would show up to
all future court cases with rubber rats tied around their necks. Lastly, Gray
announced plans to picket the Department of Buildings to again demand cellar-toroof inspections throughout lower Harlem.54
While laying out the legal side of the CCH’s rent strike organizing program,
Gray, Williams, and the building leaders were also working out their strategies for
dealing with landlords and city housing policies. Two days later, the CCH held a
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landlord-tenant meeting on West 116th Street, where thirty tenants directed their
demands, as well as their frustrations, at the two landlords who accepted the
invitation to attend. Tenants seized upon the opportunity to lambast their
intransigent landlords, but the two bold enough to attend passed the blame for
building conditions along to drug addicts in the neighborhood, a lack of capable
superintendents, and the tenants themselves.
It is doubtful that an organizer of Gray’s experience had any illusions about
landlords willingly making repairs upon their buildings. If anything, by inviting
slumlords to meet with their tenants face-to-face, Gray helped to empower and
embolden striking tenants by providing a forum to directly confront their
oppressors. In essence, the meeting served notice to evasive landlords that their
tenants were learning their identities and would no longer allow them to remain in
the shadows. Recognizing the futility of relying upon slumlords to hold themselves
accountable, however, Gray also redoubled his calls for the city to take over the
striking buildings en masse under the receivership law as a first step toward “a
mass rehabilitation of this ghetto.” In essence, the meeting evinced to both the city
and the landlords that tenants would be waging their fight on two fronts. While
pressuring the city to act swiftly and programmatically upon the receivership law,
Gray made it clear that they would take their fight to the landlords to demand
immediate repairs in the meantime.55
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In such a multifaceted struggle, coalition building was imperative to meeting
the organizational demands of dealing with city and state officials, city agencies, and
landlords, while also growing the rent strike. With tenants in more buildings
represented by HAG and the CCH engaging in rent strikes throughout November, the
two organizations joined forces to form a working coalition in Harlem. The coalition
was brokered by Danny Schechter, who was introduced to Gray through a mutual
connection in the old-Left circles he had become familiar with as a high school
student in New York. “I went over there, and we said, ‘Look, we’re doing these rent
strikes, we want to help organize and help you,” Schechter later recalled. “He said,
‘Great.’…and suddenly the thing started taking off in the winter.”56 By December,
HAG and CCH had developed a working relationship, sharing resources, organizers,
and a common vision for grassroots political empowerment in Harlem.
The experience and expertise of Gray and the CCH was a boon for HAG
organizers who were still green in the fields of community organizing and tenants
rights. “I thought everybody should be behind something like rent strikes,” HEP and
HAG organizer QR Hand said. “I didn’t come into this with a really, what you call,
radical orientation, I just figured that there were problems that had to be met and
there oughta be people out there taking care of the problems.”57 NSM organizers like
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Hand, Schechter, and Bob Knight, as well as national director Bill Strickland, who
had been inspired by the organizing ethos of SNCC in the South, quickly developed
strong ties and a close identification with the grassroots organizing tradition that
Gray and the CCH embodied. “I learned something very important from Jesse and
the rent strikes,” Strickland later recalled, “which was that the secret to real
organizing is to get people to organize themselves.”58
Other NSM staffers, however, were skeptical of Gray and his motives for
organizing tenants. At a community organizing training session, NSM mentor
Stanley Aronowitz suggested the Gray may be using the rent strikes as a means to
build a base for his personal political ambitions. “Is he really concerned about
developing leadership among the tenants,” Aronowitz queried, “or is he interested
in building a large following?”59 Though Aronowitz’s concerns were primarily with
Gray’s penchant for waging campaigns for political office, his recognition of Gray’s
broader ambitions to build a grassroots political movement were perceptive. The
concern was rational, given Gray’s well-crafted public image, flair for dramatic—if
half-baked—campaign announcements, and proximity to politicians over the years.
Aronowitz’s skepticism, however, did little to sway the formative influence that
Gray’s brand of grassroots organizing had upon aspiring organizers and civil rights
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workers in New York City as the rent strikes coalesced into a movement by midDecember.
On December 15th, the CCH called a mass rent strike rally at the Milbank
Center to demonstrate surging popular support and to encourage more tenants in
Harlem to withhold their rents when the New Year came. Leaflets for the rally
distributed throughout Harlem exhorted tenants to take action against their
landlords by joining the ranks of the 58-building rent strike. “We are not going to
pay rent for rats to eat our children, no heat and no hot water, stopped-up toilets,
leaking ceilings, or any other violation,” the leaflet read. Demonstrating an effort to
build a broad political coalition around the rent strikes, the speakers invited to the
rally included politicians, clergy, civil rights, and labor leaders, including former
Borough President Hulan Jack, State Assemblyman Lloyd Dickens, Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., President of the NY branch of the NAACP Rev. Richard
Hildebrand, and Local 338 leader L. Joseph Overton.60
While tenants were drawn to the rally by leaflets that targeted their
landlords, the speakers at the rally laid the blame for the city’s housing crisis
squarely upon City Hall, demonstrating a growing frustration with the slow-pace of
meaningful housing reform. At a meeting earlier that month, 35 city and state
officials agreed to expand efforts for building inspections on 117th and 118th Streets
and asked the Mayor to dedicate more personnel and resources to expediting
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receivership proceedings in the city.61 Angered by the Mayor’s knack for excluding
grassroots community leadership from such meetings, Gray fired off a letter to
Wagner the following week criticizing what he saw as weak, piecemeal responses to
a dire systemic problem. Criticizing the Mayor’s vow to expedite rent reductions
where buildings were found to be in violation of code, Gray argued “this does not
put heat and hot water in a cold building.” In his analysis, the City had the legal
power to rectify the housing crisis, yet lacked the courage and sense of duty to act
meaningfully on behalf of its most marginalized residents. “The rent strikers will not
accept tokenism,” Gray explained to reporters. “They are determined and prepared
to continue the rent strike as long as it is necessary to rid the homes of rats, to
achieve elementary services dictated by law and to eliminate all violations in
existence on the buildings.”62 To both Gray and the New York Times alike, such
limited, status quo responses from City Hall were little more than “a move to…stop
the rent strike from spreading.”63
As City Hall continued to offer token reforms to the systemic housing
problem facing Black and Puerto Rican residents, a rent strike movement began to
take shape inside the crowded basement of the Milbank Center on December 15th.
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With a bare cinder block wall as his backdrop, Adam Clayton Powell spoke fervently
and nostalgically to the 200 tenants who gathered just down the block from the CCH
office. “If the City of New York doesn’t take over the buildings, then I say we should
have a march on City Hall,” Powell declared. “Let’s give Harlem the old spirit it used
to have!”64
After informing those in attendance that tenants in 35 more buildings had
pledged to join the strike by New Year’s Day, Gray doubled-down on Powell’s
targeting of City Hall by calling for a boycott of the Democratic Party writ-large if the
city failed to immediately cut rents and take receivership of the buildings. In an
exciting bit of political theatre, Powell seconded Gray’s calls, declaring that he would
“dump the Democratic Party” if no action was immediately taken to improve
housing conditions in Harlem.65 The mood was electric and the various invited
leaders in attendance quickly fell in line to back the surging rent strikes. Hulan Jack,
along with Assemblymen Lloyd Dickens and José Ramos-Lopez all pledged their
support for the rent strike and Rev. Hildebrand pledged legal support from the
NAACP.66 At the end of the meeting, Gray announced that a representative
committee would soon be established to coordinate the expansion of the strike.67
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The convergence of political, labor, religious, and civil rights leadership at the
Milbank rally was momentous for not only the rent strikes, but for grassroots Black
Freedom Struggles in Harlem as well. The fervor stirred up by the rent strikes by
mid-December led the Hartford Courant to conclude two days after the rally that
there was “a storm gathering in Harlem.”68 The Courant proved perceptive, and by
the end of that week, the Rent Strike Coordinating Committee had brought together
a coalition of representatives from the CCH, HAG, NAACP, CORE, HARYOU-ACT,
several block clubs and community groups, and several Harlem Assemblymen and
Democratic district leaders.69
Formed under the premise of coordinating a city-wide rent strike to force “a
mass rehabilitation of the ghettos,” 70 the coalition marked the emergence of the rent
strikes at the vanguard of Black Freedom Struggles in the city. “The great power
blocs of the Harlem Community, the ministers and the politicians, were lining up
behind the strike,” Mark Naison noted, “and CORE groups in Brooklyn and the
Lower East Side were already beginning to organize their locales.”71 Joining NYU
CORE in the Lower East Side was Mobilization For Youth (MFY), which retooled its
housing clinics into tenants’ councils to foster tenant leadership while converting
68
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“the service role as quickly as possible into direct action techniques, rent strikes, et
cetera.”72 Additionally, the nascent movement was also beginning to spread across
the nation, with groups of tenants in Providence, Chicago, and Cleveland, all engaged
in rent strikes by mid-December.73 The decade of grassroots tenant organizing that
Gray and the CCH had undertaken in Harlem was finally showing the makings of a
mass movement in New York City.
“Power is something that one must organize”
At the inaugural meeting of the Rent Strike Coordinating Committee on
December 22nd at the Mount Morris Presbyterian Church on 122nd Street, the group
laid out plans to recruit tenants in hundreds of other buildings in Harlem with a goal
of expanding the rent strike to 1,000 buildings by early January. Representatives
from seven organizations pledged field staff to distribute 50,000 leaflets throughout
Harlem in a door-to-door campaign to instruct tenants how to organize their
buildings and join the strike.74 The goal was ambitious, but the campaign was
illustrative of the extensive organizing efforts necessary for building a grassroots
movement. Despite the promise the fledgling coalition held, however, few of the
participating organizations had much experience with grassroots tenant organizing.
Thus, at its inception, as one student organizer noted, the Committee “is at present
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little more than a list of supporters.”75 Though the NSM’s national office brought in
ten field secretaries to work as full-time organizers with HAG on the rent strikes, the
bulk of the organizing work fell upon Gray and the CCH.76
The grassroots organizing that the CCH undertook to build the rent strikes, as
well as the analyses and ideologies guiding their actions, are worth examining in
detail for the insights they offer to the inner-workings of a grassroots social
movement. While the strikes that fall had emerged from the militancy of the
grassroots, Gray’s decade of organizing in his lower Harlem neighborhood had
primed tenants there for organized action. “The Community Council had regular
meetings every Wednesday to discuss the problems, organize demonstrations, and
so on,” Major Williams said. “At these meetings the people come out with their
problems,” ranging from issues with landlords to the sanitation department, and
beyond.77
Through his tireless advocacy for some of the most marginalized
communities in New York City, Gray had earned his reputation in the community as
the man people when to when they had problems with city agencies. “There were
buildings in Central Harlem,” Naison noted, “where the name ‘Jesse Gray’ would
open any door.”78 The impacts of this groundwork was evident in how rapidly the
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rent strikes spread within its first weeks. In the six weeks since the CCH announced
their participation in the rent strike, the number of CCH-organized buildings on
strike had grown from three to a reported 58 by December 15th.79 “The only limit on
the speed of organization,” Naison noted, “seemed to be the time that was required
to explain the mechanics of the strike.”80
Though hardly bureaucratic, the “mechanics of the strike” did include a
process for organizing buildings that required extensive human and material
resources for mobilizing and organizing community power. “I think power is
something that…the Black community must organize,” Gray later explained, “blockby-block, house-by-house, apartment-by-apartment.”81 For a rent strike to be
successful in changing housing policies and practices, Gray believed the Black
community would need to be organized into a united front capable of exerting
power over slumlords and the various levels of city government. As a local,
grassroots organization of poor and working-class tenants, however, the resources
necessary for such expansive organization were often in short supply. When the
strikes began, as Naison notes, the CCH “teetered on the edge of bankruptcy” and
depended on membership dues and private donations from “wealthy radicals” to
cover operating costs. The Council’s leadership consisted of four men, including
Gray and his “lieutenant,” Major Williams, who were the only two full-time
78
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organizers on staff and drew meager subsistence salaries from the organization.82
With such paltry resources at their disposal to build an organization and a
movement, fostering indigenous leadership was not only a guiding philosophy, but
also an organizational imperative.
The membership structure of the CCH reflected its dedication to empowering
grassroots involvement and leadership in social movements. “Each member, upon
joining, is required to be active in his own behalf,” Ebony reported in 1964. Unlike
the tedious, bureaucratic membership policies of many CORE chapters, the
requirements for CCH membership were primarily action-based. “This is one group
where just signing up won’t do a bit of good,” one member said, “you’ve got to pull
your own weight if you want to get out of this mess.” Members were also required to
pay monthly dues of $1, which guaranteed legal advice and representation during
rent strikes. Though the dues were laxly enforced in a neighborhood where
economic means were extremely limited, one of the intangible benefits of
membership, as Ebony reported, was the “sense of security that springs from the
knowledge that they are no longer alone in their fight against negligent landlords
and rats.”83
Pulling one’s own weight in the CCH meant the refusal to pay rent, the
forming of house meetings, and active participation in weekly strategy meetings. To
bring new members into the fold, the CCH placed a heavy emphasis on leafleting
neighborhood blocks, building-by-building, door-by-door. “I went around to houses
82
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trying to get people to participate in the rent strikes,” organizer Peter Bailey
recalled, “trying to get people to understand the rent strike, how the effective use of
the rent strike could really…bring about changes.”84 When tenants expressed
interest, they were instructed to hold a building meeting where a building captain
would be elected to serve as their representative in the CCH. “The organizers are all
volunteers,” Major Williams said, “they live in the slums and know what the people
are up against. They know what it’s like to go to the bathroom with an umbrella
because the plumbing leaks.”85
The building captain was then responsible for attending weekly strategy
meetings, where plans for the upcoming week would be formulated in a
participatory manner.86 “He would have a weekly or nightly meetings—either
emergency ones or ones planning what he was going to do the following week—
where maybe one or 200 people could sit and talk and discuss it,” Gloria Richardson
Dandridge recalled.87 An occasional visitor to Harlem while engaged in her own
militant struggles in Cambridge, Maryland, Dandridge became a close comrade of
Gray and a regular around the CCH office and meetings in 1964. “He was very good
as a speaker,” Dandridge said of Gray’s leadership style at these meetings of CCH
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building captains. “You listened and you understood that he was going to act or he
was asking you, did you agree to join him and act on it? Whether it was a
demonstration or whether it was some fight with the city government…and what he
intended to do about that and what may or may not happen.”88 Through these
meetings, tenant leaders not only received a political education from veteran
organizers like Gray and Richardson, but also took active part in shaping
organizational policies and actions.
Black Women Leadership in the Rent Strike Movement
While the central leadership of the CCH consisted exclusively of men,
however, Black women carried out the bulk of the organizing work. According to
scholars Ronald Lawson, Stephen Barton, and Jenna Weissman Joselit, “the strike in
Harlem was run on a day-to-day basis by two women—Florence Rice and Anne
Bradshaw—and women were numerically predominant on the city-wide strike
coordinating committee.”89 Though little information has come to light about
Bradshaw’s background prior to working with the CCH, as Roberta Gold notes, she
was responsible for bringing her friend Florence Rice into the organization. After
working in defense manufacturing during World War II, Rice found work in a
unionized garment shop and became a staunch advocate for Black and Latinx
women laborers in the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU).
“That’s when I began to understand how economics works,” Rice later recalled, “And
88
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once I began to understand economics, that’s when I realized that I’d have to fight
about it.”90
It was through this background in labor organizing that Rice entered the fold
of radical labor movements in Harlem. In the fall of 1961, Rice was part of A. Philip
Randolph’s Emergency Committee For Unity On Social And Economic Problems
which was organized in the wake of another “near riot” to demand a broad platform
of policy initiatives to rectify racial inequality in employment, housing, education,
and policing in Harlem. After working alongside the likes of Bayard Rustin, Malcolm
X, James Haughton, Bill Epton, Selma Sparks, and Calvin Hicks on the Emergency
Committee, Rice joined Haughton, Epton, and NMU veteran Josh Lawrence in a
struggle for control of the Negro American Labor Council (NALC) to build a more
militant, “fighting” labor organization.91
By the time the rent strikes were underway that fall, many of these same
connections were throwing their support behind the nascent movement. In midDecember, Haughton pushed the militant Labor and Industry Committee of the
NAACP’s NY branch to organize regular fundraising events for the CCH. Lawrence, a
comrade of Gray’s from the NMU, had been working with Gray in tenant organizing
over the years while also being active in labor organizing through his Carpenters
Union #2162. By early 1964, Malcolm X would also lend his support to the rent
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strikes and forge a close relationship with Gray and Gloria Richardson to form the
radical organization ACT, as well as his Organization of Afro-American Unity that
spring.
While it is unclear if Rice knew Gray personally prior to her involvement in
the rent strikes, there was extensive overlap in the radical political circles that the
two veteran labor organizers occupied. Furthermore, the political thought of both
Rice and Gray emphasized the importance of independent grassroots leadership for
radical movement building. “I find myself fighting many of the leaders who are
supposedly representing us,” Rice said in an interview for “The Harlem Temper” in
the fall of 1963. “I would also like to see our leaders speak more accurate[ly] what
the Black people in the community feel and not what the white power structure sets
up—to speak for us.”92
While Rice, Bradshaw, and Gray’s close associate Maxine Green handled most
of the day-to-day operations of the rent strikes, the Black and Puerto Rican women
who comprised most of the building leaders were in the streets ensuring that “what
the Black people in the community feel” was translating into organized action.
Building leaders like Mary King, Rita Jackson, May Robinson, Doris Roper, Marjory
Cruz, and Inocencia Flores were primarily responsible for mobilizing and organizing
tenants to participate in the rent strike in Harlem. While Gray received the majority
of the media spotlight during the strikes and scholarly attention thereafter, these
women building leaders have gone underappreciated for the impacts that their
labor had upon the emergence and evolution of the rent strikes. By Gray’s standards,
92
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at least 75 percent of tenants in a building had to be on board before any collective
action could be taken. With 58 buildings on strike by mid-December with an average
of 15 tenants per building, according to Gray’s calculations, this meant that the
cadre of building leaders primarily comprised of Black and Puerto Rican women
were responsible for organizing over 650 families to engage in the rent strikes.93
As the cold of winter set in and the Christmas holiday approached, these
women leaders found unlikely allies in the city’s major newspapers. Aided by Gray’s
widely publicized, yet unsuccessful calls for the Red Cross to declare lower Harlem a
disaster area in late-December, reporters jumped at the chance to cover the heartwrenching stories of families without heat and hot water on Christmas Day. While
the city floundered in its enforcement of the rampant housing violations, the New
York Times carried stories of families in Harlem huddled around their gas stoves to
stay warm on Christmas Day.94 “This is the worst Christmas we’ve had here,” Mrs.
Harrison Nelson told a reporter, “no heat or hot water, but plenty of roaches and
rats.” The only source of heat in the apartment Mrs. Nelson shared with her husband
and two daughters at 18 E. 117th Street was the kitchen stove. “We got a Christmas
tree set up in the front room but we can’t enjoy it ‘cause it’s colder than the North
Pole in here,” Mrs. Nelson told reporters. Across the street, rent strike leader Doris
Roper said that her building had gone months without heat, hot water, and a
superintendent. Additionally, the building that Mrs. Roper lived in with her four
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children had broken windows on every floor and hallways cluttered with debris and
fallen plaster. “I’ve had this oven on for the last two nights,” Mrs. Roper said, “and I
guess it will stay on until someone decides to do something about this building.”95
Though not often considered as such, these kinds of media exposés
represented additional labor and contributions to the rent strike movement from its
women leaders who routinely opened their homes to reporters and inspectors.
Focused almost exclusively on Black and Puerto Rican mothers, these stories that
frequently occupied the front pages of several New York newspapers throughout
December, elicited popular empathy and support for the burgeoning movement
through its gendered coverage of the tenants who made up the strike. Homer Bigart,
a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the New York Times who covered many of these
stories, was said to have come out of one of the buildings on E. 117th Street
“quivering with anger” over the conditions he witnessed inside. “This is the worst
thing I’ve seen in all my years of reporting,” he told a publicity manager for the CCH
that month, “I’ll write anything you want.”96 Aided by this type of press coverage,
which also included regular television and radio appearances for Gray, and fueled in
large part by poor and working-class Black and Latinx women, the rent strike
movement became the premier political issue in New York City and “the cause
celebre of the civil rights movement in the North” by the end of 1963.97
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The City Responds to the Rent Strike Movement
As pressures mounted from the Rent Strike Coordinating Committee and the
news media throughout December, token responses from City Hall were becoming
increasingly untenable. According to Mark Naison, a “leading housing attorney”
claimed that the rent strikes had driven City Hall into “a state of complete and utter
panic” by the year’s end.98 Recognizing the potential political force of a city-wide
rent strike movement in an election year amidst evolving national Black Freedom
Struggles, city agencies scrambled to churn out proposals to address housing ills
and therefore curb the anger undergirding the strikes.
Earlier that month, three city agencies announced joint plans to develop 350
units of low-income housing through a massive slum clearance project on 117th and
118th Streets. “The ancient rat-ridden tenements to be cleared under this proposal
make up one of the worst slum blocks in the city,” Borough President Edward
Dudley declared. While quality, low-income housing was certainly needed in Harlem
and throughout the city, the proposed development would have only exacerbated
the housing shortage by displacing 500 families to build 350 units.99 Furthermore,
such proposals flew in the face of the demands of the CCH and many of the striking
tenants who favored rehabilitation over renewal. Reflecting a broader vision of
community empowerment, rent strike leaders like Inocencia Flores balked at the
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idea of being relocated, asserting she would rather “stay here and change the
system.”
At the same time, city agencies also sought to defang increasingly potent
critiques of the systemic nature of housing inequality in the city by shifting the
blame to the offending landlords in lower Harlem. Just days after Harlem tenants
spent the Christmas holiday huddled around their kitchen stoves for heat, Health
Department officials released the names of six landlords who they had been unable
to serve with summonses for building code violations. Despite the condemnatory
rhetoric used in describing such landlords as “determined to bleed these buildings
and spend their time trying to avoid prosecution,” the public shaming of landlords
did little to instill any confidence in the traditional inspection-summons
procedures.100 Such maneuverings evidenced the influence that the rent strikes
were having upon city power structures, but remained merely piecemeal responses
to increasingly systemic critiques.
While city officials floated this hodgepodge of housing reform initiatives,
thirteen striking tenants from 16 and 18 E. 117th Street were preparing for an
appearance in Civil Court for nonpayment of rent. Though rarely analyzed as such,
the rent strikes to this point had represented a mass display of civil disobedience in
that the withholding of rent was a punishable offense in Civil Court. The risk of
eviction or monetary penalties inherent in rent strikes, therefore, had served as a
prohibitive factor for many who may have otherwise felt compelled to join the
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strike. The court hearing of these thirteen striking members of the CCH, scheduled
for December 30th, represented the first legal test for the burgeoning movement.
As the striking tenants were preparing for their court appearance, the
Wagner administration was working feverishly to develop a comprehensive plan to
head off the strikes, which Gray predicted would expand to upwards of 200
buildings by the first of the year. The night before the court date, Rent Administrator
Hortense Gabel announced that City Hall would soon present a “bold plan to deal
with the Harlem problem.”101 Reporting on the announcement the next day, the New
York Times declared that Mayor Wagner was “forging new weapons to combat the
slum conditions that have prompted Harlem’s spreading rent strikes.” Though
details were scarce, the Times reported that these “new weapons” would likely
include stiffer penalties for offending landlords, greater expediency of the city’s
receivership program, more frequent inspections, broader outreach efforts to
inform tenants of their rights and duties, and a housing program to present to the
State Legislature.
Although the rent strikes had forced the city to acknowledge and formulate
plans to act upon the housing crisis in Harlem, city officials continued to defend
their present course of action. After Gray criticized the Wagner administration on
live television the night before the trial for “its failure to intervene effectively to
correct slum conditions,” Buildings Commissioner Harold Birns praised the rash of
inspections that his department had undertaken over the previous weeks and
months. The 37,000 violations that the inspections turned up, Birns argued,
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indicated due diligence on behalf of the city to correct its housing problems.102 For
Gray and the striking tenants in Harlem, however, the inspections were too little and
too late. “We’re the most investigated and inspected people in the world,” Gray said,
“but it seems the only reason they send inspectors up here is to find out if we’re still
black.”103 To the CCH and the hundreds of striking tenants, counting violations was
one thing, but acting upon them was another entirely.
On the day of the trial, tenants were prepared to take their mounting protests
against horrid living conditions in Harlem into the courtroom. Having previously
found little recourse through the courts, which many tenant leaders harangued as
being controlled by the interests of landlords, the CCH sought to use the platform
provided by the trial to wage a dramatic demonstration. Beginning the previous
week, Gray and the CCH had urged the thirteen tenants to save every rat they killed
in their apartments to bring into the courtroom as evidence against their landlords.
Though officers confiscated some of the dead rodents outside the courtroom after
learning of the plan through the newspapers, the tenants managed to smuggle in
five rats under their coats.104
The stunt received widespread media coverage in the following days, but the
rats were never submitted as evidence, as the attorney for the landlords conceded
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the conditions in the buildings. While the rats provided spectacular imagery for the
proceedings and marked the emergence of the rat as a potent protest symbol for the
rent strikes, the major significance of the court proceedings lay in the ruling of Judge
Guy Ribaudo. Basing his decision on a 1930 law that permitted tenants in seriously
neglected units to deposit their rents with the court, Ribaudo ruled that the tenants
were within their rights in withholding rent for units where such “shocking”
conditions existed.105 According to Roberta Gold and Michael Lipsky, Ribaudo was
alerted to the seldom-used law by Columbia University law professors allied with
MFY. After deliberating with Gray, the tenants’ legal team (including Attorney Bruce
Gould), and the landlord’s attorney, Ribaudo declared that landlords could
withdraw the court-deposited rent money to make repairs “only after the tenants’
representative had approved.”106 As Gold perceptively notes, the Ribaudo decision
essentially established “a de facto receivership—court-controlled spending of rent
money for repairs,” which could achieve more immediate repairs than the sluggish
process of the city’s receivership law.107
Though Ribaudo announced in court that he did not condone the rent strikes,
his decision nonetheless granted legal sanction that empowered the rent strike
movement. Outside the courtroom, Gray declared the ruling a victory for the rent
strikers and reiterated his pronouncement that the movement would grow to 300
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buildings within the next two days. “This gives us the push our campaign needs,”
Gray told reporters, “the tenants now know they don’t have to pay rent to landlords
who do nothing for them. No services, no payment.”108 Seizing quickly upon the
opportunity presented by the legal victory, Gray led a march of a dozen tenants and
organizers to the nearby offices of Hortense Gabel. Joined by Danny Schechter, Anne
Bradshaw, and Bruce Gould, Gray requested that Gabel reduce rents to $1 in the
buildings Ribaudo ruled upon, arguing that tenants should not pay full rent while
awaiting repairs—regardless of where the rent was paid to. Though Gabel was
hesitant to reduce rent on the two buildings in question, she did agree to
immediately reduce rents on seven other CCH-organized buildings, demonstrating
the heightened political leverage that the CCH wielded following the Ribaudo
ruling.109
Just days after the landmark decision, Mayor Wagner formally announced his
action plan for addressing the city’s housing problems. As part of a platform he
described as a “pocketbook attack on the slumlord,” Wagner urged the creation of
special housing courts, increased building inspections, higher fines and jail
sentences for landlords, a more streamlined process for verifying violations, and city
support for a state bill to legalize rent strikes.110 Later that week, Wagner followed
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up on his initial statement by announcing additional plans for a $1 million “anti-rat”
program, which would be carried out by 148 new employees of the Health
Department and reimbursed in part by billing landlords for the services.111
As Lipsky points out, this barrage of new city initiatives served two clear
political purposes. First, the programs were “distinct responses to basic tenant
complaints,” which the city finally felt compelled to act upon after years of pressure
from the grassroots had reached a point where political action was unavoidable. As
one City Commissioner explained to Lipsky, “the feeling was—we have to do
something…we felt it was real political power at the grass roots. And we even talked
about the revolutionary impact” of the strikes.112 As the Commissioner attested to,
the radical fervor fostered by the city’s increasingly militant Black Freedom Struggle
made the Mayor’s actions less a matter of political obligation or goodwill than a
conscious attempt to curb radical political movements in the city through
addressing the most visible struggle at that time.
The second function of these “highly dramatic programs,” as Lipsky argues,
was the “manipulation in the communications media to influence public opinion in
ways favorable to city departments.”113 The editorial board of the New York Times
proved a ready ally in promoting such a friendly narrative, having just weeks earlier
taken the position that “the answer to better housing conditions is not the anarchy
and lawlessness implied in a rent strike but the strict enforcement of the Building
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Code.”114 As the Times editorial suggested, the narrative that the Wagner
Administration pushed in this regard was that tenants ought to place their faith in
City Hall to address their housing complaints rather than resorting to independent
grassroots action which had the undesirable potential to flow into broader struggles
for rights and power.
The Mayor’s proposed broadside attack on slum conditions was met with
decidedly mixed reactions from city officials, tenant organizers, and some members
of the press. Though many city officials were concerned about the potential power
the rent strike movement wielded, many also embraced the impetus they provided
for prioritizing housing reform. “Part of it was fear, part of it was relief,” one
member of the Mayor’s Housing Executive Committee said, “finally it’s out in the
open—now we can do something.”115 Jesse Gray also cautiously welcomed the influx
of political attention finally being paid to the city’s housing crisis. “We are impressed
with the Mayor’s talk,” the CCH leader announced in a press release, “however talk
does not give heat and hot water.”116
While Gray offered lukewarm support, other housing advocates were less
reserved in their response to the proposed actions. R. Peter Straus, the head of radio
station WMCA who had spearheaded the women-led “Call to Action” call-in tenant
advocacy service, called the Mayor’s proposal “a lot of hot air” and argued that the
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city already had “plenty of authority to make improvements under present laws.”117
As if to prove Straus’s point the following day, New York Telegram and Sun reporter
Woody Klein called attention to the Mayor’s dismal track record of promises made
and routinely broken regarding housing reform. After describing 15 proposals for
housing reform during the Mayor’s decade in office, Klein described the January
1964 program as “nothing more than a warmed-over version of past promises, with
the possible exception of legalizing rent strikes.” To further illustrate his point, Klein
concluded the article with a quote from a conversation he had with the Mayor six
years prior that shed light upon the Mayor’s personal views on housing reform.
“There’s nothing you can do about the slums, you know that,” Wagner explained to
Klein. “They’re always going to be that way.”118 Despite the bombast and tepid
support that accompanied the Mayor’s most recent declaration of war on slumlords,
his track record did little to instill confidence in Harlem tenants that City Hall would
take meaningful action to address the city’s rampant housing crisis without
sustained pressure from tenants and civil rights organizations.
Local Struggle, National Movement
Buoyed by the Ribaudo decision and another ruling in Brooklyn in early
January, the rent strike movement gained the kind of momentum necessary for
applying sustained pressure upon the city’s power structures. Just days after the
Mayor unveiled his legislative program, Judge Fred Moritt ruled that five tenants in
117
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Red Hook represented by Brooklyn CORE “could live rent-free for as long as
landlords failed to correct housing evils that menaced health and safety.” Taking
Ribaudo’s earlier ruling a step further, and echoing the CCH’s demands for sweeping
rent reductions pending repairs, Moritt declared from the bench “that the landlord
in extreme cases is not entitled to any rent until the conditions are remedied.”
Whereas Ribaudo had refused to condone the rent strikes, Moritt was less reserved
in his rebuke of slumlords and the sluggish enforcement of building violations and
repairs. “Some of the buildings are not fit for pigs to live in,” Moritt told the court,
adding “if it takes the landlord two years to make the repairs, he gets no rent for two
years. Period.”119 With the backing of the city’s judiciary, the rent strike movement
spread rapidly throughout the city.
Just days after the Moritt ruling, MFY brought together a broad coalition of
tenants, civil rights, and labor organizations in the Lower East Side to establish the
Lower East Side Rent Strike Committee.120 “Harlem led the strikes,” an MFY
newsletter that month declared, “Now a Lower East Side Rent Strike organization
has alerted our area! The strike is growing.”121 To help coordinate and energize the
committee, the MFY staff invited Jesse Gray to participate in one of its initial
meetings. “It was a very exciting coalition,” Lower East Side activist Frances Goldin
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said of Gray’s convergence with the committee, which also included NYU and
Downtown CORE, Puertorriqueños Unidos, the Metropolitan Council on Housing,
and several other groups. “He brought a kind of a gutsiness to the struggle [that] I
don’t think we would have had otherwise.”122 With Gray’s guidance and inspiration,
the LES Rent Strike Committee quickly organized tenants in 60 LES buildings to join
the city-wide rent strike, which also spread to 90 more buildings in the Bronx and
Bedford-Stuyvesant by February 1st.123 In the following weeks, Gray would
collaborate with LES activists, including Jose Fuentes and Genoveva Clemente, to
lead a torchlight parade of 200 tenants downtown and a mass demonstration at
hotly contested rent-control hearings at City Hall.124
Meanwhile, organizations uptown were actively discussing the potentials
that the rent strike movement had for igniting the type of broader mass movement
that Gray had envisioned all along. When the NSM City-Congress met that month,
the rent strikes were the predominant topic of conversation in the confab attended
by Bayard Rustin, QR Hand, Peter and Joan Countryman, and Bill Strickland. After
Rustin spoke about the broader meanings of the rent strikes for the national Civil
Rights Movement, as Elizabeth Tobierre notes, Hand explained to the group that
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there was a “possibility that the [rent strikes] were the first movement in the North
that is not all middle-class.”125
Hand’s appraisal of the surging grassroots movement closely resembled the
class analysis that guided Gray’s organizing in poor and working-class Black
communities. “I’m one that believes that there can be an all-class unity in the Black
people’s movement,” Gray later said, “I believe that once the black masses from the
back streets start to move, they’ve forced the black middle class to go, whether they
want to go, or not.”126 To Strickland, the recent successes of the rent strike had the
profound impact of awakening these Black masses to the power that they held in
their communities. This power, in turn, could be mobilized for a more expansive
political and social movement. “The radical change in the mental attitude of the
people,” Strickland suggested, could provide the impetus for a “multi-issue, crossracial, and cross-class lines movement.”127 Over the next several weeks and months,
organizers from NSM, CCH, CORE, and several labor and nationalist organizations
would work fervently to translate this grassroots power revealed through the rent
strikes into a radical movement center in Harlem.
As the rent strikes emerged at the vanguard of Black Freedom Struggles in
New York City, a new generation of young organizers was drawn into the zeitgeist of
the movement. One such organizer was Peter Bailey, an Army veteran and Howard
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University student from Tuskegee, Alabama, who had taken a leave from college to
join in the Black Freedom Struggle in Harlem. Once in Harlem, Bailey became a
regular at Malcolm X’s street rallies at 116th Street and Lenox Ave. and participated
in the Harlem Hospital and Downstate Medical Center protests in the summer of
1963 as a member of NY CORE. When the rent strike movement took off, however,
Bailey quickly joined the ranks of the Rent Strike Coordinating Committee. “I went
from CORE to Jesse Gray because I thought that he was doing something more
immediate to the people,” Bailey recalled.128
For Bailey and many others of his generation who had grown increasingly
disillusioned with the goal of integration that guided the efforts of most civil rights
organizations to this point, the rent strikes provided a bridge between integrationoriented civil rights and the radical nationalism that was coming to characterize the
Black Freedom Struggle in Harlem. Through tenant organizing, such activists gained
experience in building a movement not for integration, but for community power
and self-determination—central tenets of Black Nationalist thought which would
later define the Black Power movement. The “rent strike fever” that sparked this
new direction in political activism, as Naison explained, instilled in young activists
“an extraordinary sense of exhilaration and even of historic destiny that drew
people to the movement as the initiator of a new stage in the civil rights
movement.”129
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The peak of this excitement over the transformative potential the rent strikes
were believed to hold came January 12th at a major rally called by the Rent Strike
Coordinating Committee. Coming the day after the LES Rent Strike Committee
announced its formation, “rent strike fever” was in the air in the crowded
gymnasium of the Milbank Center. As 600 Harlem residents, civil rights workers,
and representatives from tenants organizations throughout the city filed into the
room, Jesse Gray sat alongside a broad array of influential Harlem leaders, including
John O. Killens, James Baldwin, Anna Arnold Hedgeman, Hulan Jack, Bill Strickland,
SNCC Chairman John Lewis, Congressman William Fitts Ryan, Councilman Paul
O’Dwyer, Assemblyman José Ramos-Lopez, and union leaders Leon Davis and
Cleveland Robinson.
Addressing the crowd from behind a table clad with posters sardonically
depicting the Republican and Democratic Party mascots as rats, the speakers took
turns declaring their support for the rent strike and denouncing the racism that
undergirded housing inequality in Harlem.130 After once again taking aim at city
officials like Hortense Gabel, who he declared, “acts just like any other slumlord and
has got to go,” Gray took the opportunity to announce another march on City Hall at
the end of month to demand the extension of rent-control protections that were set
to expire, as well as “to demand that he City jail all slumlords.”131 Gray also
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announced that plans were in place to form a city-wide rent strike coalition to bring
the full weight of Black and Puerto Rican renters upon City Hall.
While Gray laid out the program for the rent strikes in the weeks to follow,
the most rousing speeches of the evening came from John Lewis and James
Baldwin.132 Rising from his seat, Baldwin spoke “as a witness” to the intrinsic
relations between housing inequality in Harlem and institutional racism in the
United States. “This is a revolution,” Baldwin explained to the attentive crowd, “it is
going to be harder and harder and harder because the revolution has got to revise
the entire system in order for us, as Negroes, to live and in order for the country to
survive.” In this assessment, Baldwin gave voice to the revolutionary analysis that
informed Gray’s housing activism, yet was often muted in public addresses that
were consumed by the daily rigors of tenant organizing and dealing with various
levels of city government. Broadening his analysis to challenge Harlem residents to
locate their rent strikes within the context of global struggles for Black liberation,
Baldwin went on to declare that this revolution “connects with the condition of
black and dark people all over the world. One must be bold enough to see and say
this.” As his address came to a climax, Baldwin urged Harlem residents to bring this
analysis into their daily organizing work with the rent strikes to build a broader
movement for confronting and overthrowing Jim Crow society in America. “Things
can be corrected but only if we force them to act,” Baldwin charged, “we know that
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the situation in the South was precipitated by the Negro people in the streets…it is
because the people couldn’t wait for Mr. Charley to give them their freedom.”133
While Baldwin issued an inspirational and forceful challenge to Harlem
residents to engage in revolutionary struggle, John Lewis focused his remarks on the
impacts that the rent strikes were having upon national Black Freedom Struggles.
Lewis began his address by telling the crowd he had spent the previous night in a
jail cell in Atlanta, Georgia, but bucked the usual trend of refusing bail in order to
make it to Harlem that morning. The rent strikes represented to Lewis “something
very new and meaningful,” not only to New York, but also to the national Movement.
“Those of us who live and work in the Deep South have been following the struggle
here in Harlem with great interest,” Lewis explained, flipping the popular
perceptions of northern movements following in the wake of those in the South.
“Some of us have been saying all along,” he continued, “that when the masses get
moving in Harlem, the masses in the whole nation will move.”
With the landmark March on Washington well in the rearview mirror and the
promise of a Civil Rights Act looming just over the horizon, Lewis acknowledged
that new directions must be found and implemented to realize the fundamental goal
of Black liberation. “If all over this nation, if during the next two weeks and February
there is born a general rent strike you will see something very beautiful,” Lewis
predicted. “You will make 1963 look very petty and 1964 will be the year of the civil
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rights revolution.”134 The weight of Lewis’s prophetic speech was not missed by the
600 residents and activists in attendance, who cheered his remarks with a standing
ovation and stirring rendition of “We Shall Overcome.”135 After nearly a decade of
active grassroots struggle in Harlem, Black and Puerto Rican residents and activists
were finally made to feel as though they were in the vanguard of the Black Freedom
Struggle, rather than playing second fiddle to the highly-visible struggles raging in
the South. “At this meeting,” one CORE leader expressed, “everyone caught the
fever—Rent Strike…it seemed like the thing to do.”136
Lewis was hardly filling the room with hot air when he told the crowd that
“the whole nation will move” once the Black masses in Harlem were in motion. By
the time Lewis made these remarks, rent strikes were already underway in
Providence, Chicago, and Cleveland, with others in the works in Los Angeles, New
Orleans, Milwaukee, New Haven, Pittsburgh, Hartford, and Washington, D.C., where
SNCC launched its first rent strike later that month.137
Although the hyper-visibility provided by constant national news coverage
helped to introduce the concept of rent strikes to Black communities across the
134

A transcript of Lewis’s address can be found in Halstead, et al., Harlem

Stirs, 64.
“Jim Baldwin Sparks Harlem Rent Strike,” New York Amsterdam News,
January 18, 1964.
135

136

Naison, “The Rent Strikes in New York,” 28.

“Harlem Rent Strike Seeks ‘Push’ From Rights Groups,” Pittsburgh Courier,
January 18, 1964; “NECAP Is Considering Harlem Type Rent Strike,” The Hartford
Courant, January 6, 1964; Dan Day, “Capitol Spotlight: Rent Strike Is New Civil Rights
Weapon,” Atlanta Daily World, January 7, 1964; Rasa Gustaitis, “Tenants Start First
‘Rent Strike’ In District,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, January 25, 1964.
137

443

United States, Jesse Gray was also actively assisting various groups in coordinating
and launching strikes in their own cities. “Jesse was frequently a resource person,”
Howard University student Phil Hutchings recalled. As a member of the SNCCaffiliated Nonviolent Action Group (NAG), which nurtured the political development
of widely-influential leaders including Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael), Ekwueme
Michael Thelwell, Ed Brown, and Courtland Cox, Hutchings regularly made contact
with Gray in both Harlem and Washington, D.C. “We were playing with this idea of
housing strikes, and thought who better to tell us and has experiences with housing
strikes than Jesse Gray?,” Hutchings said, “you just shot up the turnpike and you’re
in New York, or bring him down to interact and get [his] message.”138
Furthermore, the grassroots militancy the rent strikes had helped to cultivate
was now flowering in other struggles in New York City and beyond. In the years
since the school boycott led by Mae Mallory and the Harlem Nine, little meaningful
change had been brought to bear upon the racial inequalities entrenched within the
city’s public school system. As civil rights groups struggled to eke out any
concessions from the Board of Education or City Hall over those years, frustrations
mounted and plans for action escalated. By the winter of 1963, a massive city-wide
school boycott was in the works, with the efforts spearheaded by the militant
Brooklyn clergyman Rev. Milton Galamison who had been at the frontlines of major
civil rights struggles in New York City for over a decade. Drawing from the same
grassroots base as the rent strikes (Inocencia Flores was also an active supporter of

138

Phil Hutchings interview with the author, January 26, 2017.
444

the school boycott), the planned boycott reflected the same impatience with racial
liberalism that fueled the rent strike movement.139
This grassroots militancy embodied in the rent strikes and looming school
boycott in New York City converged in the hours before the rally at the Milbank
Center, when a group of radical leaders from across the country convened in Harlem
to discuss plans for coordinating similar direct action campaigns on a national level.
Having learned of the rent strikes and planned school boycott through the Chicago
Defender, Chicago Friends of SNCC leader Lawrence Landry set up a meeting with
Galamison to discuss the possibility of launching a nationwide school boycott.
Joining the two civil rights leaders and education activists that day were Noel Day,
Boston civil rights leader and husband of Harlem-native and activist Peggy Trotter
Dammond; Ruth Turner, leader of Cleveland CORE who had actively supported Mae
Mallory during her extradition fight and coordinated rent strikes in the city; Stanley
Branche, chairman of the Committee For Freedom Now in Chester, PA; James Bevel,
a leader of the Nashville Student Movement, SNCC, and the SCLC; John Lewis, and
Jesse Gray.140
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During the day-long session, this impressive collective of leading grassroots
organizers hammered out plans for the nationwide school boycott, which resulted in
over one million students boycotting schools in 32 cities the following month.
Though unbeknownst at the time, this summit also marked the first meeting of a
new radical grassroots coalition known as ACT (not an acronym), which in the
following months would grow to include Harlem Parents Committee leader Isaiah
Robinson, comedian and activist Dick Gregory, Cambridge Nonviolent Action
Committee co-chair Gloria Richardson Dandridge, Washington, D.C. CORE leader
Julius Hobson, Negro American Labor Council secretary Nahaz Rogers, and a newlyindependent Malcolm X.
By February, it was becoming clear that the grassroots base of poor and
working-class Black and Puerto Rican Harlemites mobilized through the rent strike
movement was making far greater contributions to the evolution of the Black
Freedom Struggle than many could have imagined when they took the first step of
withholding their rent. Jesse Gray’s vision for building a radical political movement
through tenant organizing appeared on the verge of becoming a reality.
The Landlords and City Fight Back
As the winter stretched on in January and February, the rent strike
movement expanded in size and scope. Bolstered by the addition of scores of
buildings in the Lower East Side, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the Bronx joining the rent
strike by February, the CCH boldly declared that 450 buildings were now on strike
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across the city.141 Though the numbers were likely inflated, the rent strike’s
continued growth demonstrated that the city’s Black and Puerto Rican tenants had
little faith in the Mayor’s January vow to “step up” the city’s “pocketbook attack on
the slumlord.”142
In addition to their swelling ranks, the tenor and tactics of the rent strikers
evinced a grave disillusionment with the continued impotence of City Hall to restore
heat and hot water and make repairs in their buildings. On January 23rd, Gray and
the CCH led tenants from Harlem and the Lower East Side in demonstrations at City
Hall to demand the extension of rent control legislation. While 300 picketing
women, men, and children circled the building wearing rubber rats pinned to their
lapels and carrying signs reading “Wagner Stop Talking Start Acting,” Gray led a
contingency of tenants inside to make their voices heard in the hearing taking
place.143 The scene inside the City Council Chamber was bedlam, with landlords and
tenants alike removed from the room by police after waging disruptive protests.
Gray himself was ejected from the hearing after grabbing for the microphone, before
later storming back into the Chamber to declare the proceedings “a rigged hearing”
and leading the remaining tenants in a walk-out. While Gray was outside, another
woman tenant squared up with a landlord who had assaulted an elderly tenant
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when he rose to address the Council, forcing a recess to be called.144 These
confrontations at City Hall, Fred Halstead wrote, “convinced tenants that they must
resist the landlords by all means.”145 At the same time, that the City Council voted to
extend rent control for another two years showed tenants that their protests were
capable of winning tangible victories.
The militancy displayed at City Hall escalated uptown just days after the
hearing, when Harlem tenants clashed with the city marshal over the eviction of a
rent striker for nonpayment. Although Gray and the CCH had secured a stay on the
24-hour eviction notice presented to Elizabeth Brown, the city marshal entered the
apartment she shared with her 16-year-old son and moved all of their belongings
onto the sidewalk. When Mrs. Brown found her things on the sidewalk and her
apartment padlocked, she called Jesse Gray, who quickly assembled ten members of
the CCH to break the lock and move the belongings back into the apartment.146 The
anti-eviction struggle resulted in a confrontation with the marshal, Reginald Thorpe,
who Gray charged “roughed me up and one of his men punched me in the mouth”
while a police officer on the scene “turned his head.”147 After the patrolman refused
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to arrest Thorpe for assault, Gray led a small protest at the nearby precinct with
demonstrators chanting, “The police must go” and “Brutality must go.”148
Like the dramatic anti-eviction campaigns waged in Harlem by the
Communist Party and community leaders like Queen Mother Audley Moore during
the Great Depression, Gray’s confrontation with the city marshal aroused the ire of
Harlem tenants against slumlords and the police alike. For the next two weeks, the
anti-eviction campaigns would continue, with members of the CCH and HAG battling
city marshals and the NYPD to prevent entry to apartments for carrying out
evictions.
Just days after the first confrontation at Elizabeth Brown’s apartment,
members of the NYPD attempted to aid the city marshal in once again entering her
apartment despite an order staying the eviction. After returning home from
renewing the stay at Civil Court, 16-year-old Christopher Brown found police “trying
to break through the back wall of the apartment” while members of the CCH
barricaded the door from the inside. “There is no law for the people up here, the
police work only for the landlords,” Gray told reporters on the scene. Announcing a
series of pickets at police headquarters to protest the NYPD’s complicity with
slumlords, Gray predicted, “Blood is going to flow if something isn’t done.”149
If this initial clash between rent strikers and the police failed to mobilize the
anger of tenants to oppose the NYPD, another anti-eviction confrontation the
following week tipped the scales. On February 7th, the city marshal showed up at the
148
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apartment of rent striker Luther Brown (no relation to Elizabeth Brown),
accompanied by police and a crew of laborers to carry out an eviction order. Over
the past months, Brown had frequently complained to his landlord about violations
in the apartment he shared with his sister and her five children on W. 118th Street
with no avail. While CCH members scrambled to get a judge to issue a stay of the
eviction ordered the previous night, Gray, Major Williams, QR Hand, and others from
the CCH and HAG joined Brown in physically barricading the apartment until the
stay of eviction could be obtained.
While Ebony photographer Don Hogan Charles snapped pictures, the police
“chopped down the door of the apartment and broke down the barricade” to enter
the apartment and arrest everyone inside. “You should’ve seen all the cops, man,”
HAG leader QR Hand said, "they came just out of nowhere, they had big paddy
wagons out there, four or five patrol cars.”150 This time, rather than putting the
Browns’ possessions in the street, the marshal loaded their belongings into a
moving van to prevent the CCH and HAG from moving them back in. The move was
calculated, with the marshal and NYPD having learned from the previous week’s
confrontations with the CCH. The rent strikers learned from the experience too, and
adjusted their analyses and strategies accordingly. From a jail cell, Gray, Williams,
Hand, and the other rent strikers worked out plans for protests that would “turn the
tables on the police and expose them as the slumlords’ tools.”151
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The following day, the CCH and HAG led picketers in demonstrations outside
the 28th Precinct in Harlem and police headquarters downtown. From their jail cell,
the rent strikers had drafted up a leaflet for the rally with a damning indictment of
the NYPD that surely resonated with Black and Puerto Rican communities
throughout the city. “When the slumlords are guilty of no heat, no hot water, and the
rats biting our children, the police department does nothing,” the leaflet read.
When tenants are being robbed, or when apartments are broken into, where
are the police? Somewhere drunk? In some woman’s apartment? In a garage
asleep? Collecting graft and payoffs from prostitutes? Payoffs from number
men or dope peddlers? But when it is time to illegally evict a tenant for a
slumlord, the whole police department acts with great speed.152
Each of these scenarios represented a common complaint lobbied against the NYPD
by Harlem residents over the years and revealed a sharp contrast with the forceful
police presence in Luther Brown’s apartment just hours after an eviction notice was
issued. Furthermore, the racial undertones of the leaflet were impossible to ignore,
with the majority of landlords and police officers being white and the majority of
Harlem tenants Black or Puerto Rican. Calling for the dismissal of the officers who
arrested the rent strikers inside Luther Brown’s apartment, members of the CCH,
HAG, and their community supporters walked the picket lines with signs reading,
“Slumlord Cops Must Go” and “Arrest City Marshal Thorpe and his SlumlordSupporting Goons.” Later that evening, Gray and the house leaders of the CCH

152

Ibid, 99.
451

convened at the Mount Morris Presbyterian Church to discuss plans for increasing
pressure upon the NYPD, as well as strategies for continuing the rent strike.153
“The cops are all over the place”: Police Repression and the Rent Strikes
Though the protests outside the 28th Precinct and police headquarters
achieved little in terms of concessions from the NYPD, the anti-eviction
confrontations revealed more fully to many tenants the repressive role of the police
within the city’s power structure. While much of Gray’s organizing and rhetoric to
this point had been dedicated to promoting a more systemic critique of housing
inequality in the city, he had spent relatively little time confronting the role of the
police within this analysis he was propagating at the grassroots. Certainly, few
Harlem residents had any illusions about the NYPD, an overwhelmingly white
department that many saw as a corrupt, often abusive, occupying force in Harlem.
“Rare, indeed, is the Harlem citizen…who does not have a long tale to tell of police
incompetence, injustice, or brutality,” James Baldwin wrote in a 1960 essay. “They
represent the force of the white world, and that world’s real intentions are, simply,
for that world’s criminal profit and ease, to keep the black man corralled up here, in
his place.”154 Coming at a period of heightened political consciousness and action,
the anti-eviction confrontations brought the true role of the NYPD into sharp relief
for many Harlem residents who were rapidly coming to see the police as the
enforcement arm of white supremacy in the city.
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For QR Hand, coming face to face with the NYPD that day after several
months of witnessing police harassment and intimidation of rent strikers
radicalized his political perspective. “I didn’t come into this with a really…radical
orientation,” Hand said that spring, “but all of a sudden, you get out there and you’re
trying to do something and the cat’s on your back.” Hand had carefully observed the
increasingly repressive measures meted out to Harlem tenants by the NYPD as the
rent strikes progressed since the fall. Speaking alongside Malcolm X at the Militant
Labor Forum later that spring, Hand recalled a run-in with the police at Granville
Cherry’s apartment building that illustrated his point.
One day that fall when Cherry was leaving his building, he was visited by the
King Cole Trio—a notorious group of Black officers known for their heavy-handed
administration of “law and order.”155 “These are the cats who go into one of the
corner bars…and they get their cut and they don’t say anything at all,” Hand said of
the group’s penchant for graft and extortion, “but all of a sudden, this cat who wasn’t
doing nothing, they decided to rough him up.” As Cherry descended the stairs, Hand
recounted, one of the plainclothes officers grabbed him while the other two kept
lookout. “The guy worked Cherry over a little bit, [and the officer] says, ‘why don’t
you cut this stuff out, we don’t want any trouble.” The aggressive thinly veiled threat
against Cherry, a “happy-go-lucky, good cat,” who was merely trying to improve his
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family’s housing situation, signaled to Hand that the problems they were dealing
with extended far beyond housing policies.156
The increasingly repressive involvement of the NYPD in the rent strikes was
part of the one-two punch that characterized liberal governance under the Wagner
Administration in New York City. With his left hand, the Mayor promised to
investigate and deliver legislative reforms to address demands for equality and
justice in the city. By dressing up minor concessions as major policy advancements,
the Mayor sought to appease protestors and subvert demands for systemic change.
With his right hand, the Mayor dispatched the NYPD to curb protest and civil unrest
through the surveillance, criminalization, and physical repression of activists and
organizers.
The position of the NYPD in this regard was made clear in early March, when
Police Commissioner Michael Murphy declared at a meeting of 6,000 officers that he
would not allow civil rights leaders to “turn New York City into a battleground.”
Singling out Jesse Gray, Malcolm X, and Bronx CORE leader Herbert Callender,
Murphy charged that these “extremist” leaders “see the struggle for [civil rights]
only as a means to a personal end or as the weapon to create chaos in our
community and weaken the structure of government.”157 Interestingly, it was these
three Black leaders who had been among the most vocal about police corruption,
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brutality, and political repression in the several weeks prior. Thus, not only did the
Police Commissioner rally his rank-and-file against leaders of the Black Freedom
Struggle—he also attempted to delegitimize these leaders along with their
legitimate claims against NYPD and City Hall.
Coming after several months of confrontations between police and activists
throughout the city, Murphy’s remarks did little to dispel increasingly common
perceptions that the NYPD was waging a war against Black and Puerto Rican
freedom fighters. As the rent strikes were getting underway that fall, clashes
between the NYPD and peaceful protestors from NYC CORE chapters raised the
specter of police repression of civil rights activists in the city. While protesting the
appearance of the segregationist Alabama Governor George Wallace and President
Kennedy in midtown Manhattan on two consecutive days in early November, CORE
members charged that police officers “waded into the picket lines on horseback
wielding nightsticks and stomping defenseless people.”158 During the two protests,
NY CORE leader Marshall England and eight other CORE members were injured,
including a pregnant woman who was struck in the stomach and a 16-year-old girl
who was trampled by a police horse.159 Demanding that police horses be kept in
stables “where they belong” and “that the police department be reminded that their
responsibility…is to enforce the laws and not to break up demonstrations that they
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don’t like,” CORE leaders threatened a program of civil disobedience that would “put
to shame everything that CORE has done up to now in NYC.”160
Coming in the wake of that summer’s confrontational direct action protests
at construction sites throughout the city, CORE leaders read this type of police
behavior as clear repression of civil rights activity. In a letter to Deputy Police
Commissioner Walter Arm, attorney and CORE supporter Mark Lane charged the
NYPD with having carried out an “unprovoked and organized attack by police
officers against persons who had peacefully assembled to demonstrate for civil
rights.”161 To Lane and other CORE leaders, these police actions in early November
were hardly an anomaly. “The fact of the matter is,” NY CORE’s December newsletter
contended, “that virtually every CORE picket line during the past few weeks has
been the object of either outright brutality or unnecessary harassment by the
police.”162 In response, leaders of CORE chapters throughout the city filed legal
complaints against the NYPD and launched a series of direct action protests
throughout the month of November.
On November 19th, nearly 100 members of various CORE chapters picketed
police headquarters to protest police brutality and political suppression. Led by
Blyden Jackson, Gladys Harrington, Jim Peck, Mark Lane, Tina Lawrence, and CCH
member Leroy McRae, protestors carried signs that read, “Convict the Attackers”
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and “Protect Us, Not Attack Us.”163 Though CORE’s campaign against police brutality
was subsumed by the burgeoning rent strike movement that fall, the organization
sounded the alarm about police repression that would be heard more clearly by the
spring.
The responses from City Hall and the NYPD to CORE’s allegations of police
brutality and repression that fall were indicative of the Wagner Administration’s
brand of racial liberalism. The City not only failed to engage in meaningful
discussions with CORE leaders to resolve their complaints, but also made use of the
myriad resources available to the NYPD in its battle against the Black Freedom
Struggle in New York City to discredit and criminalize the civil rights activists.
Calling CORE’s allegations “blind assertions [that] constitute hypocrisy and haterousing of the lowest-type,” Murphy explained in a press release that such criticisms
of the NYPD were “aimed at destroying respect for law and order and are in effect
calculated mass libel of police.”164
While fighting to control the narrative and stoke public fear of civil disorder,
Murphy also tasked the department’s counterintelligence agency—the Bureau of
Special Services (BOSS)—with conducting surveillance and investigations of the
CORE members involved.165 The day after CORE’s demonstration at police
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headquarters, BOSS ordered an “Investigation of C.P. [Communist Party] Affiliations
Within CORE and of Potential ‘Trouble Makers’ Within CORE.” A BOSS lieutenant
was asked to report on a perceived faction within CORE that “advocates dropping
the ‘non-violent’ approach and adopting instead ‘an eye for an eye-a tooth for a
tooth’ approach.” Named in the report as members of a “militant group” in CORE
were Blyden Jackson, Tina Lawrence, Velma Hill, and Arthur Johnson, whom a
Lieutenant Mulligan claimed were being “pushed by Bayard Rustin.”166 It was hardly
a coincidence that Jackson and Lawrence were among those leading protests against
the police just days before the investigation was opened.
Over the next several months, BOSS detectives used surveillance techniques
and informants within CORE to compile profiles of each of these individuals and
others who were attacked by police at the November protests. When the case came
before the Civilian Complaint Review Board in early January, BOSS detective Henry
Taylor sent a memo to the police oversight board with detailed information about
each of these activists, including Mark Lane and Arnold Goldwag, to cast doubt upon
the allegations of brutality. Using rhetoric characteristic of Cold War era political
repression, the memo detailed the “radical views” held by the activists, along with
Wagner developed a keen interest in “what the police did here” in terms of
surveillance and counterintelligence. Speaking of BOSS surveillance of the Nation of
Islam and other civil rights organizations during an oral history interview in 1979,
Wagner described BOSS as “a very key part of the department, they keep check on
all sorts of different groups and infiltrate…they keep in touch with some of the
radical movements—all of them, the Communist movement.” See “Reminiscences of
Robert Ferdinand Wagner, 1979,” Columbia Center for Oral History, Columbia
University Libraries.
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their alleged links to “ultra-liberal” groups and the Communist Party, as evidence of
“the degree of responsibility” they held in the confrontation with police.167
Amounting to a calculated character assassination, such BOSS involvement
demonstrated the depths of police power in the city that could be used to subvert
any movement to check or reform their abusive and repressive practices.
“Nowhere…have we so closely approached a police state”
Coupled with CORE’s November demonstrations, the NYPD’s complicity in
repressing rent strike activities had helped to sharpen popular understandings of
the police as the enforcement arm of white supremacy in the city. Building upon
decades of protests against police brutality in Harlem, CORE’s campaign that fall laid
the groundwork for a broader struggle against police brutality and repression that
emerged in March 1964 in the wake of Gray’s arrest. The analyses of Gray, Lane,
Baldwin, and Hand in this regard exemplified the three “interrelated grievances”
that Black and Puerto Rican communities had with the NYPD: corruption and
inefficiency, repression of activists, and mistreatment and brutality.168
Compounding these highly combustible issues, state legislators moved in
early 1964 to expand police powers by pushing two highly controversial bills
through the legislature as part of a major anticrime package. With the active support
of Mayor Wagner, the “no-knock” and “stop-and-frisk” bills were signed into law on
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March 3rd over the vocal opposition of Black democrats, civil rights organizations,
and bar associations.169 Under the “no-knock” bill, a police officer in possession of a
search warrant was granted the power to break into a home without knocking or
announcing him or herself as police. The now infamous “stop-and-frisk” bill went
even further, empowering officers to stop, question, and search any individual on
the grounds of “reasonable suspicion.” Spurred in large part by a dramatic increase
in crime rates reported by the NYPD since June 1963,170 the two bills represented an
effort to take the gloves off of the city’s police officers in their war on crime and
suspected “criminals.”
Despite rosy descriptions of the bills in the New York Times as having been
designed to “protect policemen from surprise attack,”171 most Harlem leaders
understood this expansion of police powers as a direct attack on the city’s Black
communities. Pointing out the blatant racial disparities in police treatment in the
city, Amsterdam News editor James Hicks condemned the new legislation as giving a
“green light” to “abuse by bigoted or sadistic police.”172 Echoing another rebuke of
the legislation from the State Bar Association, Harlem Congressman William Fitts
Ryan warned that the bills would create “a police state” and likened their passage to
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the act of a “demagogue or dictator.”173 More concerning for Liberator columnist
Robert Arnold, was the opportunity that these new laws presented for law
enforcement to suppress radical political activity. “The experience of the Rent Strike
and the reaction of officialdom to militant grass roots protest in New York has again
demonstrated,” Arnold contended, “that when push comes to shove the police are on
the side of the slumlords and others who seek to exploit minorities and not the
people and their legitimate protests.” Giving voice to the concerns of most Harlem
residents and activists, Arnold predicted that “what we can expect to see is a series
of unprovoked raids, similar to the attack on the Muslim Temple in Los Angeles,
which will further inflame the already tense racial situation.”174 With demands for
police reform and oversight in New York City having been ignored for nearly a
decade, it now appeared as though the police abuse and repression of Black and
Puerto Rican New Yorkers had won an official endorsement from the Mayor and the
State.
With the masses already in motion in Harlem, civil rights organizations and
community leaders were quick to mobilize opposition to the legislation. Just days
before Rockefeller signed the bills into law, representatives from twenty Harlem
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organizations, including the NAACP, CORE, and CCH formed the Ad Hoc Committee
for Fair Police Practice to coordinate a direct action campaign to compel a veto or
repeal of the two bills. After pickets outside the Governor’s Manhattan apartment
failed to sway his opinion on the anticrime package, the Ad Hoc Committee
organized a mass rally at Speakers Corner to publicly denounce the new legislation.
Speaking to the crowd of 300 gathered at 125th St. and 7th Ave. on March 7th, William
Fitts Ryan described the legislation as “clearly unconstitutional,” while State Senator
Jerome Wilson declared “a man must be free to walk down the street and not be
subject to arrest and detention on mere suspicion.” In explaining these new laws to
the crowd, Attorney Paul Zuber derisively pointed out, “a lot of us folks in Harlem
thought that was the law already because they’ve been doing it that way for
years.”175
The most impassioned address delivered at the rally came from Jesse Gray,
who channeled the frustrations and anger of the poor and working-class Black and
Puerto Rican Harlem residents who were likely to be the most deeply impacted by
expanded police power. Furthermore, that these bills made it through the State
Legislature that winter while code-enforcement bills to aid Harlem tenants were
shot down was a particularly egregious offense to Gray.176 Charging the NYPD with
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being “rotten, corrupt, and degenerate,” Gray directed much of his fury at the 25
uniformed officers assigned to the rally, before calling for the creation of a civilian
review board as a check on police power and abuses in Harlem.177
Though the new laws to expand police powers had passed through the State
Legislature with relative ease, the swift organizational responses to what amounted
to a direct attack on Black and Puerto Rican communities ensured that such
legislation would not be implemented in New York City without a fight. In the weeks
and months before the new laws went into effect, police corruption, brutality, and
repression would become the most pressing—and explosive—issues for the Black
Freedom Struggle in Harlem.
The Decline and Impacts of the Rent Strike Movement
While school boycotts and struggles against police abuses gained traction in
Harlem that February, the rent strike movement began to lose steam. Jesse Gray and
the CCH continued the rent strikes throughout the spring, but as the weather
warmed the problems of heat and hot water became less acute and the newspapers
began to lose interest. The last major initiative of the rent strike movement came in
early March, when Gray and the CCH joined a coalition of civil rights, labor, and
tenant leaders, including James Farmer, Bayard Rustin, and Dorothy Height, for a
march on the state capitol in Albany.
Joining forces with A. Philip Randolph’s Committee for a $1.50 Minimum
Wage and the National Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights, the coalition
charted buses from New York City to demand a legislative program that reflected
177
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the joint economic and housing concerns of many of New York’s Black and Puerto
Rican residents. These demands included: the establishment of a $1.50 minimum
wage; a massive construction program for low-rent public housing; passage of
emergency legislation to compel proper building code enforcement; legislation
legalizing rent strikes; and substantial state aid for educational equality and school
desegregation.178 Though 3,000 demonstrators from across the state braved snow
and sleet to march on the state capitol, the Governor was largely unmoved by the
protest and its leaders left disappointed. Speaking at a rally following the march,
CORE leader Norman Hill told the thousands gathered that “only if we light fires all
over the state, only if we disrupt and dislocate in a creative way, will we get what we
want.”179
The disappointment of the March on Albany served as an inglorious
conclusion of the rent strike movement’s prominence in New York City politics. By
that point, as Mark Naison notes, “the aura of the cataclysmic power that had
surrounded the rent strike in its early days had largely faded away.”180 Several
factors contributed to the decline of the movement’s meteoric run in New York City.
First, despite the media spotlight and strong grassroots support Gray and the CCH
had garnered for the rent strikes, the movement was unable to win the active
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support of other civil rights and community organizations. Though the fifteen
organizations that comprised the Rent Strike Coordinating Committee provided
some funding, publicity, and legal assistance for the movement, the bulk of the
extensive organizing work needed to build a mass movement fell upon the limited
staff of the CCH and NSM.181 Such lack of support frustrated Gray, who blamed the
rent strike movement’s failure to reach his projected building totals on a lack of
“adequate support from local civil rights organizations.”182
Even when the local branches of national civil rights organizations, most
notably CORE, were actively involved in organizing the rent strike movement, they
received scant support from the national office. Although James Farmer had
advocated for rent strikes when they emerged in November, the national CORE
leader distanced himself from the strikes completely once the movement became
identified with Jesse Gray. In a likely attempt to create separation between national
CORE and the Communist background of Gray, Farmer refused to make any public
comment regarding the strikes and lent little if any institutional support.183
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With such meager staffing, financial resources, and organizational support,
the CCH lacked the institutional strength necessary to keep up with the rigors of
tenant organizing while concurrently navigating and applying pressure upon
landlords and the vast network of city and state agencies involved in housing policy.
Though the CCH had for a short while collaborated with larger tenant organizations
in the city, including the Metropolitan Council on Housing, fundamental differences
between the organizations’ visions for tenant organizing hampered any long-term
coalition. While Gray and the CCH were attempting to “build a tenant movement that
is trying to empower itself,” as Gray’s comrade Jack O’Dell later explained, the CCH
viewed the Met Council as more of “a social service thing.”184
Without the backing of such tenant or civil rights organizations, the CCH was
dependent upon a small office staff, a handful of volunteer attorneys, and its
network of building leaders to wage a fight against powerful public entities and
private landlords. While organizers were busy dealing with the courts, city agencies,
and politicians, as Naison notes, little time was left for street rallies, leafleting, and
organizing buildings, which had provided the genesis for the movement by
“shak[ing] the slum population out of its apathy.”185 Even when the CCH scored a
major victory with the Ribaudo decision that December, the legal procedure
established by the ruling was “difficult to employ, time consuming, and involved
constant attention of volunteer or unpaid lawyers,” thereby limiting its impacts for a
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cash and resource-strapped grassroots organization.186 Though some progress had
been made by March, frustrations largely remained over slum conditions in Harlem
as City Hall had made only minor concessions to piecemeal, rather than systemic
demands for housing reform.
Though scholars have aptly pointed out how the rent strike movement
became so bogged down in dealing with city agencies and the courts that the CCH
more closely resembled a housing clinic than a radical social movement by the
spring of 1964, the impacts of the rent strike stretched far beyond the realm of
housing.187 When compared to Gray’s professed mission of forcing a mass
rehabilitation of Black and Puerto Rican communities by transferring residential
buildings from private to public ownership, the successes of the strikes in forcing
housing repairs, rent deductions, and new legal and judicial policies must be
considered marginal gains. However, while falling short of its lofty ambitions for
housing reform, the contributions of the rent strike movement to the Black Freedom
Struggle were profound. NSM rent strike organizer Danny Schechter’s appraisal of
these impacts are worth quoting at length:
For the first time, [the rent strikes] have involved deprived slum dwellers in
a movement for substantive change. They have also expanded the political
consciousness of the ghetto community and channeled frustrations into a
socially effective response. By involving the ‘welfare poor’ in a movement for
change, rent strikes have given thousands new dignity, self-respect, and a
sense of empowerment…As an organizing technique the rent strikes help

186

Lipsky, Protest In City Politics, 64.

See Naison, “The Rent Strikes In New York”; Schwartz, “Tenant Power in
the Liberal City, 1943-1971”; Lipsky, Protest In City Politics; Gold, When Tenants
Claimed The City.
187

467

nurture indigenous leadership and build organizations that can get involved
in other activities (school boycotts, selective patronage, etc.).”188
By the spring of 1964, the model of grassroots organizing that Jesse Gray had
developed over more than a decade had pushed local and national civil rights
organizations to embrace a militant grassroots approach to building Black
community power in Harlem and beyond. The involvement of NYC CORE chapters in
the rent strikes marked the culmination of a move away from a middle-class
integrationist focus and toward the empowerment of poor and working-class Black
communities. “We really have to step up our militancy,” NY CORE rent strike
coordinator William Reed said that spring. “We have to step it up…in organizing the
Black people because our struggle is there for the Black people in the
community.”189
For the NSM, participation in the rent strikes prompted a major shift from
the social service basis of the earlier tutorial projects to the transformative
possibilities of community organizing. “The people who were administering the
tutorials realized…there would be change only if the community organized itself to
create change of its own,” national NSM staffer Chuck Turner pointed out that
spring. “We started looking for ways the people in the community could be brought
together. In New York, we did this through rent strikes.” Furthermore, Turner noted
that the rent strikes served as an important vehicle for political education, as NSM
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was able to “bring people together with different problems and the people see that
those problems are interrelated.”190 For both CORE and the NSM, the radical
grassroots ethos of the rent strikes would serve as a model for their own campaigns
for Black empowerment and self-determination in New York City and beyond.
And this, precisely, was the fundamental goal of Gray’s tenant organizing—to
organize the basis for a revolutionary grassroots movement for Black liberation and
Black power in the nation’s cities. “People ask me why I spend all my time on heat
and hot water,” Gray explained later that year, “and I say heat and hot water is the
biggest organizing tool we have; it may even kick off the revolution in the ghetto.”191
In early March, when Malcolm X split with the Nation of Islam after a three-month
suspension, the revolutionary groundswell fostered by the rent strikes began to
coalesce into a radical grassroots movement center in Harlem.
Jesse Gray, Malcolm X, and the Birth of a National Radical Grassroots
Movement
On March 9th, the New York Times broke the news that Malcolm X was leaving
the Nation of Islam. In the months since Malcolm made his infamous remarks about
the Kennedy assassination as a case of “chickens coming home to roost,” it had
become increasingly clear that Elijah Muhammad had no intention of reinstating his
top minister. Malcolm’s national celebrity and mounting insistence on political
action, alongside his knowledge of Muhammad’s extramarital affairs, had put him on
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the wrong side of the Nation’s leadership in Chicago and made his departure all but
certain that winter. In an interview with reporter M.S. Handler, Malcolm explained
that he could no longer be constrained by the Nation’s restrictions on political action
and engagement with the Black Freedom Struggle. “It is going to be different now,”
Malcolm X declared, “I’m going to join in the fight wherever Negroes ask for my help,
and I suspect my activities will be on a greater scale than in the past.” The
immediate activities that Malcolm had planned included the formation of a “black
nationalist party” in New York that promoted self-defense and emphasized “black
nationalism as a political concept and form of social action against oppressors.”192
After having been silenced by Muhammad for three months, Malcolm X had
much to say and Harlem was anxious to learn of his plans. At a press conference at
the Park Sheraton Hotel three days after the story broke, Malcolm officially
announced the formation of his new organization, Muslim Mosque, Inc. While the
MMI was a religious organization, Malcolm explained that the group’s political,
economic, and social programs would encourage the active participation of nonMuslim Blacks. As an organization with a political, economic, social, and cultural
emphasis on “black nationalism,” the MMI was designed to promote indigenous
Black leadership in the service of achieving self-determination in Black
communities.
While speaking to the long-range plans of building independent Black
political power, Malcolm also asserted the right to self-defense to protect Black
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communities in the meantime. “In areas where our people are the constant victims
of brutality,” he explained, “we should form rifle clubs that can be used to defend
our lives and our property in times of emergency.”193 Taken as a whole, the new
organization that Malcolm explained in his address resembled a synthesis of the
major trends of grassroots Black freedom struggles in Harlem over the past decade.
By extending an olive branch in his address to other leaders he had disparaged in
the past, Malcolm hoped to bring together the array of individuals and organizations
involved in these radical struggles—locally and nationally—into a Black united
front.
Just two days after the press conference, such a united front appeared to be
in the making when Malcolm X attended a conference in Chester, PA called by the
leaders of the fledgling organization ACT. Malcolm’s introduction to the leaders of
the national grassroots organization came through an interesting convergence of
local strands of the national Black Freedom Struggle with Harlem as a fulcrum.
Malcolm was invited to join the organization by Gloria Richardson, leader of the
Cambridge Nonviolent Action Committee, who first met Malcolm X in Detroit after
he delivered his landmark “Message to the Grass Roots” address the previous fall.194
Malcolm X, in turn, was highly impressed by the militant armed struggle that
Richardson and the SNCC-affiliated CNAC had been waging for over two years in the
coastal Maryland town. Stanley Branche, ACT member and chairman of the Chester

George Breitman, ed., Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements
(New York: Grove Press, 1990), 18-22.
193

194

Gloria Richardson Dandridge interview with author, April 19, 2018.
471

Committee For Freedom Now, had also been impressed by the Cambridge
Movement, and had spent time there supporting the struggle. Providing an
introduction between Malcolm X and fellow ACT member Jesse Gray was Bill
Strickland, national director of the NSM, who had grown up around Malcolm in
Roxbury and knew Gray through their active cooperation in the rent strike
movement.195 To bring things full circle, Gray had called Richardson shortly after an
armed confrontation broke out in Cambridge and she then became involved in the
rent strike movement that spring after moving to New York City.196 Through these
connections, the groundwork was laid for a dynamic national network of radical
grassroots leaders beyond the South.
The impetus for the March 14th meeting in Chester was to evaluate the
national school boycotts the collective had coordinated the month prior, the most
notable being the one led by Milton Galamison in New York City. Joining Stanley
Branche in his hometown just south of Philadelphia were 60 representatives from
various northern organizations, including Lawrence Landry, Gloria Richardson,
Malcolm X, Nahaz Rogers, and Dick Gregory. As the Chicago Defender reported, it
was there in Chester that a “third force” in the Black Freedom Struggle was formed,
“composed of the most militant leaders in the Negro Revolution.”197
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Landry, who was elected chairman of ACT at the conference, explained that
“the sole qualification for membership” in the new organization was that “one must
act or utilize direct action to resolve civil rights disputes.”198 The purpose for the
formation of this coalition was to provide a national network of active support
between local struggles for Black rights and power. In many ways, this loose
federation was organized as a direct response to one of the problems that limited
the successes of the rent strike movement—the abandonment of militant local
struggles by national civil rights organizations. “The national organizations, you
know, they were just nothing,” Gloria Richardson Dandridge recalls, “so five or six of
us decided we were going to carry on, right or wrong, the way we thought, and
that's what ACT came out of.”199 Coming out of this meeting, ACT resolved to
establish an “all-for-one and one-for-all type of national support” to the otherwise
independent local struggles being waged in Black communities throughout the
North and Midwest.
The Chester conference was held just two days before a second school
boycott organized by Milton Galamison in New York City, which would provide the
fledgling organization’s first test. After the major civil rights supporters of the
February boycott, including the NAACP, CORE, Urban League, and the National
Association for Puerto Rican Rights, all shunned its second iteration, ACT took the
lead in coordinating and drumming up support for the protest. Calling the desertion
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of the mainstream civil rights organizations an act of “sabotage,” Galamison declared
on the eve of the boycott that “the people have been failed by some of their leaders.”
While the mainstream leadership faltered, however, grassroots leadership in
Harlem helped take the reigns. The day before the boycott, Jesse Gray called a mass
rally at the Milbank Center with Malcolm X to encourage their large collective base
to support the school boycotts. Exercising his newfound freedom to engage in
organized direct action, Malcolm explained to the crowd the he was “aligned with
everyone who will take some action to end this criminal situation in the schools. I
don’t care what kind of action it is.”200 The following day, Malcolm X, Jesse Gray,
Lawrence Landry, Stanley Branche, and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. were all on site at
Galamison’s Siloam Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn to coordinate protest actions
the day of the boycott.
In spite of its abandonment by mainstream civil rights leadership, the school
boycott succeeded in organizing nearly 275,000 students to stay out of school,
including 50% of students in predominantly Black and Puerto Rican communities
and 92% of students in Harlem.201 Though an impressive total, this number
represented only half of those students citywide who had stayed out during the first
boycott. While the president of the Board of Education took this as a sign that school
boycotts were “regarded with markedly diminishing favor,” Galamison described

200

Martin Arnold, “Galamison Sees Boycott Success,” New York Times, March

16, 1964.
Leonard Buder, “School Boycott Is Half As Large As The First One,” New
York Times, March 17, 1964; “Boycott: Split Down Middle—In Leadership and
Support,” Pittsburgh Courier, March 21, 1964.
201

474

the protest as “formidable” and threatened to takeover the Board of Education
building the next time if their demands weren’t met.202
More significantly, however, ACT’s success in supporting a major protest
campaign in opposition to the civil rights mainstream signaled to the organization’s
leaders that a long-awaited shift had finally taken place in the national movement.
“This day marks the end of the big-name civil rights leaders,” Powell declared, “they
boycotted us today, and we’re going to boycott them tomorrow.”203 Riding the wave
of the boycott, Gray predicted that these leaders would eventually fall in line with
their grassroots insurgency, “because we are organizing the people below the top
leaders, and when the people from down below are organized, those on top will get
with it.” With such a groundswell pushing the national organizations to embrace
more militant action, Gray predicted that their leaders would “either join the
bandwagon or it will roll over them.”204
The school boycott created a showdown between national civil rights
organizations and the groundswell of militant grassroots organizations in New York
City that were now part of their own national coalition. With several CORE chapters,
including Brooklyn and newly-formed East River CORE openly defying the national
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organization by joining the protest, the boycott revealed that the winds were
changing in New York’s Black Freedom Struggle.
The Struggle for Police Reform and the Emergence of a Radical Grassroots
Movement Center
In the wake of the school boycott, Gray returned to the lingering rent strike
movement and swelling struggles against police brutality with the added support of
Malcolm X and a national network of militant leaders ready to aid in the struggle.
While the rent strikes waned, the organizing efforts of its primary leadership, the
CCH and NSM, began to show an embrace of what Bayard Rustin described that
winter as “the package deal.”205 Reflecting a collective analysis that racial inequality
in housing, education, employment, and policing were all interrelated within a
larger system of racial oppression, Harlem organizers in the spring of 1964 moved
away from single-issue organizing in an effort to coordinate a collective attack on
systemic racism in New York City.
Consequently, such a systemic analysis revealed the insufficiency of the
popularly accepted lexicon and strategies that previously characterized the Black
Freedom Struggle in Harlem. “It is becoming increasingly evident that ‘civil rights’ is
no longer either an adequate term or an accurate description of the quest for full
freedom which is now challenging our society,” Bill Strickland asserted. “It is also
evident that an institutionalized system of disadvantage provokes just as dangerous
a reaction in the overcrowded and under-resourced northern ghetto as it does in the
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more publicized and tragic South.”206 Through their active struggles over the past
months and years, local people in Harlem had reached similar conclusions, and by
the spring of 1964, they set their sights on the most visible indicator of this systemic
racial oppression—the police.
Throughout the months of March and April, Malcolm X and Jesse Gray
appeared together at a number of mass meetings and rallies to organize resistance
to police brutality and repression as part of a broader effort to build a radical
grassroots movement center in Harlem. At a series of rallies in Harlem in the days
following Police Commissioner Murphy’s target attack upon Gray, Malcolm X, and
Herbert Callendar in March, the leaders redoubled their demands for the
Commissioner’s ouster, asserted the rights of Black communities to defend
themselves, and demanded the creation of a civilian review board.
At the same time, Gray and Malcolm X were couching their campaign against
police brutality and repression within a broader analysis of Black liberation and
self-determination. At a rent strike rally at the Milbank Center on March 22nd, Gray
issued demands for Murphy’s dismissal alongside a call for all Harlem residents to
stop paying rent “until we get better education for our children.” Gray also
denounced Governor Rockefeller for not supporting the $1.50 minimum wage
demanded by the March on Albany weeks earlier. In his address, Malcolm affirmed
his support for Gray’s demands while re-asserting the rights of Black communities
to practice self-defense when the government proved unable or unwilling to protect
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their interests. “I am indicting the government for not defending us,” Malcolm
proclaimed, “if the government can’t do it then let us do it ourselves.” Malcolm
hardly needed to make any specific reference to the recent police legislation and
uptick in police brutality and repression for the 250 Harlem residents in attendance
to understand the premise of his comments.207
That same night, Malcolm X held a mass rally at the Rockland Palace at 115th
Street and 8th Ave to protest the Southern filibuster of the pending Civil Rights Act.
At the outset of the rally, Malcolm introduced Jesse Gray and Rev. Nelson C. Dukes of
the Fountain Springs Baptist Church as “strong Black Nationalists,” and promised to
hold rallies every Sunday night. In the course of this speech, which many described
as among the best he ever gave, Malcolm laid the ideological groundwork for his
nascent nationalist movement.208 In this resounding address, Malcolm X urged the
nearly 22 million “so-called Negroes” across the country to join any Black
Nationalist organization that taught people to “take over their own communities,
politically and economically.”209 It was here that Malcolm also elucidated what
would become one of his most iconic political analyses—the ballot or the bullet. “We
had 3,000 people at that rally,” Malcolm told reporters afterward, “and they all
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supported my call for ballots or bullets, as the only way of emphasizing to the
government that we mean business.”210 Though Malcolm had coupled his call for
“ballots or bullets” with plans for a massive voter registration drive in the urban
North “to determine who will sit in the White House, and who will sit in the dog
house,” the true significance of “ballots or bullets” stretched beyond the confines of
electoral politics. Malcolm presented the looming threat of armed insurrection in
the United States as a logical consequence of the continued resistance of an
oppressive government that refused to concede the demands of 22 million Black
Americans for human rights.
Though Malcolm located this analysis within national and global contexts, it
was particularly well-received in Harlem in light of the city’s repressive responses
to the recent rent strikes, school boycotts, and protests at construction sites. For
over a decade, grassroots activists had grown dangerously disillusioned with the
repressive limitations of racial liberalism in New York City amidst rising demands
for self-determination and Black power. To Malcolm X, it was this collective
disillusionment that made “ballots or bullets” an inevitable conclusion in Harlem
and beyond.
After several more weeks of mass rallies and direct action protests against
police brutality, corruption, and repression, which drew the cooperation of a crosssection of civil rights, religious, labor, and community organizations, these issues
came to a head in Harlem on April 17th. That afternoon, police stormed onto Lenox
Avenue between 128th and 129th Street where a group of children had been
210
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throwing fruit from an upturned stand at each other. As the four patrolman chased
after the children, they were met with jeers from the crowd that had begun to
gather, prompting the officers to call for reinforcements. The backups soon flooded
the block, swinging their clubs indiscriminately and drawing their guns upon people
on the sidewalks and on the rooftops of overlooking buildings.
In the bedlam, police mauled and arrested a group of three teenagers and
two adults who had dared to intervene, or even question, the callous beatings of
Black children. Of those beaten and arrested was Frank Stafford, a 31-year-old
father and salesman in Harlem, who had asked why two officers were beating a
child. The beatings continued inside the 28th Precinct, where for hours 35 officers
brutally beat the five who remained in handcuffs. As a result of these beatings,
which the officers carried out while calling the men “niggers, dogs, animals,”
Stafford spent over a month in the hospital and lost his right eye.211 To literally add
insult to injury, Stafford and the others were charged with assaulting the police
officers, among other charges.
In addition to being callous, this brutal police treatment was also partially
calculated. The arrests of Daniel Hamm and Wallace Baker, James Baldwin explained
in a 1966 report on the case, were in retaliation for an earlier run-in with the police,
when the two teenagers stood their ground against a group of officers who tried to
unlawfully search and detain them. “Their exhibition of the spirit of ’76 marked
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them as dangerous,” Baldwin wrote of the precarious position the teenagers were
placed in because they had asserted their rights in the face of the type of oppressive
policing that was set to become legally sanctioned in July. The retribution escalated
ten days later, when Hamm, Baker, and four other teenagers beaten by police during
the so-called “Fruit Stand Riot,” were arrested for the murder of a white storeowner
in Harlem—an act they almost certainly had nothing to do with.212
The first-degree murder charges brought against the group of teenagers, who
came to be known as The Harlem Six, were severe, and at that time, meant the
possibility of death in the electric chair. Again, the teenagers were brutally beaten
by police while in custody, in an apparent attempt to coerce confessions for a crime
that there was no real evidence they had committed. In the court of public opinion,
such brutality and blatant suppression of civil rights experienced by these teenagers
was evidence that Harlem was suffering under the rule of an occupying force. “It is
axiomatic, in occupied territory,” Baldwin contended, “that any act of resistance,
even though it be executed by a child, be answered at once, and with the full weight
of the occupying forces.”
With swelling opposition to police power in Harlem as a backdrop, the
brutality of the “Fruit Stand Riot” and the persecution of The Harlem Six fueled
opposition to police power in Harlem and spurred a wave of organized action to
check police abuses and reform the department. The mothers of The Harlem Six
quickly organized a committee to fight what many saw as an attempt at the legal
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lynching of their sons. “We mothers stopped feeling sorry for ourselves when we
saw that our children were being railroaded,” Mildred Thomas wrote. “We decided
to join together and fight back, even though none of the rich organizations came to
their aid or defense.”213 Though mainstream civil rights organizations were
unwilling to put their reputations on the line for a seemingly unwinnable murder
case, the Mothers’ Defense Committee enlisted the support of radical civil rights
attorneys William Kunstler and Conrad Lynn, who had been actively involved in the
legal efforts to aid the Monroe Defendants over the past three years.
The Mother’s Defense Committee also drew the support of Mae Mallory, who
had recently returned to Harlem. After a nearly three-year legal battle against the
kidnapping charges she faced in Monroe, NC, Mallory had been convicted in late
February and sentenced to 16-20 years in prison.214 With bond having been posted
by the Monroe Defense Committee pending an appeal,215 Mallory returned to
Harlem and resumed organizing in the community. Just days after being released
from a Monroe jail, Mallory shared the stage with Malcolm X at an evening forum at
the Audubon Ballroom. During this homecoming of sorts, attended by a crowd of
500, Malcolm cited the type of rampant racist violence throughout the country that
Mallory had fought against as evidence in accusing the United States government of
Mildred Thomas, “Harlem Mothers Organize to Save Their Sons,” Liberator
4, no. 8 (August 1964): 10.
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genocide. Echoing Mallory’s own analysis of systemic racism cultivated during her
years of organizing in Harlem, Malcolm insisted that the Black Freedom Struggle
now needed to shift its demands from “civil rights” to “human rights.”216 Although
Mallory kept a low profile following this forum, she played an active, if quiet, role in
supporting the Mother’s Defense Committee.217 In the following months, Mallory
would continue her fight for The Harlem Six with her Organization of Militant Black
Women as part of a radical, multi-issue platform “to be free by any means
necessary.”218
While mainstream civil rights leadership had abandoned The Harlem Six in
their legal defense, the gross brutality of the police melee during the “Fruit Stand
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Riot” spurred local and national organizations to greater action in the fight for police
reform in New York. This outrage was only compounded the following week when
police “pulled out all stops” against CORE-led protests to block vehicular and
subway traffic to the opening of the World’s Fair in Flushing, Queens. 219 In a
telegram sent to Mayor Wagner earlier that month, Brooklyn CORE had threatened a
“stall-in” on the bridges and subways leading to Queens unless the Mayor developed
and implemented a plan to “end police brutality, abolish slum housing, integrate the
construction and brewery industries, and provide integrated, quality education for
all.” Citing the recent arrest of Jesse Gray and Police Commissioner Murphy’s
targeted attacks on radical Black leaders, the telegram pointed out the
contradictions of City Hall’s active persecution of civil rights demonstrators while
perpetrators of discrimination were treated with kid gloves.220 As if to prove this
point, the Mayor ignored CORE’s demands and the NYPD arrested dozens of
motorists on the bridges leading to Queens, while giving “merciless beatings” to
even more during protests in the subways.221
The Fair became a symbol of the contradictions of white opulence in the face
of Black oppression that spring, particularly as the city claimed economic hardship
when it came to exercising its receivership law, yet managed to extend a $40 million
loan to the World’s Fair Corporation which would provide few lasting economic
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benefits. As James Farmer pointed out in a stern rebuke of the City’s Real Estate
Commissioner, who had earlier argued that the receivership law was fiscally
irresponsible, the cost of removing violations from 1,000 buildings at $20,000 per
building would have been $20 million—half of the amount provided to the World’s
Fair and a fraction of a percent of the city’s budget.222 In a press release on the
opening day of the Fair, Jesse Gray charged the Mayor “with practicing a double
standard of justice against Negroes” for his swift recriminations meted out against
protestors involved in the stall-in. Gray argued that the same laws that the city used
to prosecute the stall-in protestors, which prohibited “acts injurious to the public
health, or the commission of a public nuisance,” should have instead been used to
arrest slumlords and brutal police officers.223
The following month, ACT would also utilize the platform of the World’s Fair
to call attention to these same contradictions through a public exposé of the socioeconomic conditions that existed in Harlem compared to the lavish Fair taking place
across the Triborough Bridge. Sardonically advertising their walking tours of
Harlem as the “World’s Worst Fair,” Gray, Gregory, Richardson, and Branche—with
the support of James Baldwin, Abbey Lincoln, Max Roach, and A. Philip Randolph—
emphatically declared, “We Don’t Need a World’s Fair, We Need a Fair World!”224
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Resistance and Repression: The Struggle for a Civilian Review Board
By May, the contradictions between the rhetoric of racial liberalism and the
brutal realities of racial oppression in Harlem had become too clear to ignore. The
uptick in police brutality and repression that spring had tipped the hand of City Hall
and demonstrated to Harlem residents the two sides of the Wagner Administration’s
liberal governance. As James Baldwin pointed out in his later report on the “Fruit
Stand Riot,” the seemingly endless and escalating atrocities committed against
Harlem residents under a liberal democratic administration had put people “in the
impossible position of being unable to believe a word one’s countrymen say.”225
Fueled by oppression and channeled by radical grassroots organizers, this analysis
led many Harlem residents to challenge the very legitimacy of the city’s government
and to search for alternative means of achieving redress for their grievances.
Community campaigns against police brutality found a central rallying point
that month, when formal debate began on a bill introduced by City Councilman
Theodore Weiss to create a civilian review board. If signed into law, the Weiss Bill
would have established a police review board, comprised entirely of civilians, to
investigate allegations of police brutality and misconduct and recommend
punishments. The bill was designed to replace the existing civilian complaint review
board, an internal body of the NYPD in operation since 1953, which simply reviewed
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reports from commanding officers and recommended actions to the Police
Commissioner on the basis of the reports they received.226
The Weiss Bill was a direct response from a “reform Democrat” to the rising
demands of Black leaders throughout the city that spring for police oversight and an
independent review board. In their demands for such police reform, local and
national leaders alike made it clear to the Wagner Administration that much was
riding on this particular issue. In a meeting with Michael Murphy at the end of April,
James Farmer warned the Police Commissioner that he was “concerned about the
summer, and that one of the key issues will be police brutality.”227 For the
remainder of the spring, police reform and the civilian review board became the
central issue for the city’s major civil rights organizations and generated wide
support throughout Harlem. In early May, the Ad Hoc Committee For Fair Police
Practice expanded its program to repeal the “no-knock” and “stop-and-frisk” laws—
which would go into effect July 1st—to include demands for the passage of the Weiss
Bill.
In an attempt to coerce support for the bill in the City Council, the Ad Hoc
Committee established an independent community review board that would serve
as a model and hear complaints of police brutality submitted to CORE. The board
was comprised of ten representatives of various community, religious, labor, and
civil rights organizations, including Farmer, ACLU founder Roger Baldwin, former
James R. Hudson, “Police Review Boards and Police Accountability,” Law
and Contemporary Problems 36, no.4 (1971): 523.
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judge and educational activist Hubert Delany, and NSM national director Bill
Strickland.228 After hearing several cases of police brutality during a simulated
courtroom session in early June, the community review board ruled “the time has
come for the Police Department to cease being its own prosecutor, its own judge and
its own jury.”229 Coupled with a series of direct action protests at City Hall and
police headquarters that month to demand the passage of the Weiss Bill, these
proceedings demonstrated to Harlem residents what a more just system of police
oversight could look like and spurred greater involvement in protest action.
At the same time this cross-section of Harlem organizations were fighting for
police reform through the Ad Hoc Committee, Malcolm X was working to build a
revolutionary movement with a campaign against police brutality as its opening
salvo. After returning to Harlem from his hajj to Mecca, which lasted from April 13th
through May 21st, Malcolm began meeting in secretive sessions with a close-knit
group of intellectuals and activists to develop a new organization. In a motel at 153rd
Street and 8th Avenue, Malcolm met with Lynn Shifflet, John Henrik Clarke, Peter
Bailey, John O. Killens, Muriel Gray, and members of the MMI to develop ideological
positions and programs in response to crucial areas of concern in the community,
including policing, housing, education, and self-defense.230
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While working out a long-range program of Pan-African revolutionary
nationalism, the initial meetings of the fledgling organization emphasized the need
“to find the one issue, housing, jobs, police brutality—whatever it may be, that the
community is concerned with most and wage a resolute struggle around it in order
to galvanize the masses.”231 By early June, this impressive collective of veteran
thinkers and organizers in Harlem had concluded that “immediate action is
necessary in Harlem. The ‘No Knock’ law and police brutality are prime issues.” As
the group worked through its program that spring, it attracted the following of other
local radical intellectuals and organizers, including Jesse Gray, Jack O’Dell, Gloria
Richardson Dandridge, Bill Epton, Conrad Lynn, William Worthy, Ossie Davis, Ruby
Dee, Bill Strickland, Abbey Lincoln, and Ora Mobley, all of whom had played
formative roles in shaping the emergence and evolution of radical grassroots
freedom struggles in Harlem over the past decade or more.232 At the end of June,
Malcolm X would officially announce the formation of this new force in the Black
Freedom Struggle as the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU).
“The time has come”: Harlem Confronts the Limits of Racial Liberalism
With such an array of individuals and organizations involved in the Black
Freedom Struggle in Harlem converging upon the issue of police reform, Police
Commissioner Murphy and the NYPD characteristically dug in their heels and
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prepared for a fight. In his dogged resistance to any modicum of police reform,
Murphy waged a battle on two fronts. In the wake of the “Fruit Stand Riot,” the
NYPD escalated its presence in Harlem as a show of force to fasten down the lid on
any further unrest. For the remainder of the spring, as Michael Flamm notes, the
NYPD dispatched members of its highly militarized Tactical Patrol Force (TPF) to
patrol Central Harlem in pairs.233 Known pejoratively in Harlem as the “riot squad,”
the TPF had been established under the orders of Mayor Wagner nearly five years
earlier as a response to the 1959 “near riot” in Harlem.234 With the possibility of
massive racial unrest looming large that summer, Wagner had moved quickly to
ensure that the NYPD would be prepared and empowered to contain and suppress
any political uprising.
Comprised of physically imposing officers with special training in martial
arts and riot suppression, the TPF in Harlem provided a highly-visible reminder of
the will of the city administration to violently curb any unrest. In addition to
patrolling the streets, as one officer recalled, the TPF “went into the alleyways, the
basements, onto the rooftops, through the tenement hallways,” in an ever-present,
aggressive occupation of Harlem. “They saw it as an invasion of their
neighborhood,” TPF officer Robert Leuci recalled, “back then, I didn’t understand
the rage I saw in their faces, the contempt.” While Leuci claimed in his memoir that
he thought the TPF was “there to help,” other officers were more candid in
appraising their motives for joining the squad. In expressing his excitement over
233
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being selected to join the TPF, officer Jim O’Neil remembered that he “couldn’t wait
to get started” as a member of “an elite, ass-kicking, crime-fighting, gut-busting
squad.”235 With such an escalation of aggressive, militarized police presence came
the predictable result of increased claims of mistreatment and abuse. In the three
months immediately following the “Fruit Stand Riot,” Bill Epton’s Harlem Defense
Council reported that their organization had recorded 300 cases of police brutality
in Harlem alone.236
At the same time, Murphy continued his campaign to control the popular
narrative about demands for police reform, routinely misrepresenting legitimate
demands for reform as calculated, baseless attacks on the NYPD and upon “law and
order” in the city. “Charges that the people of this city fear and hate the police are
without substance,” Murphy declared that spring. “We must not let false cries of
propaganda merchants split the people from their police force.” While the ridiculous
irony of Murphy’s attack on civil rights organizations as “propaganda merchants”
was obvious to Black communities in the city, such rhetoric resonated with white
New Yorkers across the political spectrum who had grown tired of the constant
agitation of a decade-long struggle for human rights waged by Black communities
throughout the city and across the nation.
Bronxville resident Rita C. Tlamsa gave voice to this white backlash in the
city in a letter to Michael Murphy that spring supporting his vocal opposition to
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rising demands for a civilian review board. “The [civilian review] boards are
intended to scare our policemen out of doing their duty,” Tlamsa declared, “and thus
leave the Communists unhindered in promoting virulent lawlessness.”237 By
routinely presenting legitimate demands for police reform as calculated attacks on
police authority waged by outside agitators, Murphy not only sought to delegitimize
the broader aims of the Black Freedom Struggle, but also helped to foment a racist
backlash in the city that would drive support from white voters for heightened
police power.
In this battle for control of the popular narrative around police brutality and
reform, the Wagner Administration and NYPD were given ammunition from an
explosive story by New York Times reporter Junius Griffin at the end of May. In his
highly contested article, Griffin reported that a new gang had emerged in Harlem
known as the “Blood Brothers,” which was responsible for a wave of violent crimes
that spring and had expressed plans to target whites and law enforcement for
retributive violence. In this shocking report, Griffin quoted from alleged interviews
with members of this “hate gang” who he claimed were influenced in large part by
the rhetoric and ideologies of Malcolm X.238 While the story was widely refuted from
a cross-section of Black leaders and organizations in Harlem and beyond, the story
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raised the specter of retributive Black violence in the city and put the NYPD on high
alert for the next several months.239
At a panel discussion on the “Harlem Hate-Gang Scare” hosted by the Militant
Labor Forum at the end of May, Malcolm X explained the dangers of any further
escalation of police presence and repression in Harlem resulting from the “Blood
Brothers” story. “Police Commissioner Murphy is a dangerous man,” Malcolm
explained, “because what he’s doing is creating a situation that can lead to nothing
but bloodshed.”240 Joining Malcolm X on the panel was QR Hand, who cited his
experiences with police repression during the rent strikes as evidence that systemic
forces were at work to violently prevent Black liberation in Harlem. “There’s a
particular reason uptown why the cops have to get their special tactical force up
there,” Hand asserted. “It comes down to the fact that there are an awful lot of
groups, not together as of yet, who are deciding, well we can’t take this any longer.
We can’t take the bad housing, the rats, the roaches, the inferior schools…we can’t
take this any longer.” Hand may as well have been speaking for the masses in
Harlem when he argued that the increasingly repressive presence of the NYPD and
its TPF in Harlem that spring was a direct response to the recognition of a looming
political insurgency in Harlem. “You wanna start talking about hate-gangs in the
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city,” said in conclusion, “let’s talk about the police department, the real hate
gang.”241
Each panelist at the forum, including Malcolm X, QR Hand, SWP presidential
candidate Clifton DeBerry, and NY CORE rent strike leader William Reed, predicted
that violence would soon erupt in Harlem if City Hall continued on its present course
of violently suppressing Black demands for human rights and self-determination.
Rather than lamenting these predictions as a foregone conclusion, however, each
panelist encouraged Harlem residents to take action to defend themselves and
secure their liberation from an illegitimate government by any means necessary. “I
think the time has come when the community must organize itself to be prepared
that when something happens to any individual in the community they should turn
out and be prepared to defend it…to demand that the law enforcement officers
enforce the law instead of breaking it,” DeBerry charged. “We would call it selfdefense, but Commissioner Murphy and Mayor Wagner would call it ‘hate-gang.”
While Malcolm X had avoided explicitly calling for self-defense against police
violence in his numerous addresses that spring, DeBerry made plain what many
Harlem residents had already deduced from Malcolm’s rhetoric.
In this two-hour forum, this cross-section of Black political thought in Harlem
painted a stark picture of an impending crisis that had been over a decade in the
making. By the time summer arrived, the contradictions between the rhetoric of
racial liberalism and practice of racial oppression in New York City had become too
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clear to ignore in Harlem, setting the stage for a dramatic confrontation over Black
demands for human rights, self-determination, and a more progressive form of
urban governance. Fueled by years of hostile and violent resistance to such
demands from city, state, and federal levels of government, this widely-predicted
looming confrontation represented a collective rejection of liberal governance in
New York City as incapable and unwilling to guarantee the human rights of its Black
and Puerto Rican residents. Nurtured for over a decade by radical organizers and
intellectuals in Harlem, this popular analysis that was flowering at the grassroots
made a confrontation with the enforcement arm of the white status quo nearly
inevitable by the summer of 1964.
In concluding his address at the Militant Labor Forum, Malcolm X offered a
dire warning to those in the audience. Comparing the violent conditions of racial
oppression in Harlem to those that spawned an armed revolutionary struggle in
Algeria, Malcolm predicted that America would soon witness the same type of
guerilla revolt in Harlem that transpired in Algeria. “People will realize that it’s
impossible for a chicken to produce a duck egg…it can only produce according to
what that particular system was constructed to produce,” Malcolm allegorized. “The
system in this country cannot produce freedom for an Afro-American…it’s
impossible for this system, as it stands, to produce freedom right now for the black
man in this country.”242 It was with this kind of analysis in mind that Harlem
residents took to the streets less than two months later when a white, off-duty NYPD
lieutenant fatally shot 15-year-old James Powell in broad daylight. After more than a
242

Breitman, Malcolm X Speaks, 66-69.
495

decade of active grassroots struggle for rights and power, the Black and Puerto
Rican residents of Harlem sent a resounding message to the City of New York and
the nation that July: “America, we have found you out.”
v
As day broke upon New York City on July 20, 1964, the Monday morning sun
reflected off shattered glass coating the sidewalks of Central Harlem. In the days
following the police killing of James Powell, the heavy-handed presence of the NYPD
at nonviolent demonstrations against police brutality prompted Harlem residents to
unleash their collective fury upon the myriad individuals, businesses, and
institutions that represented the systemic forces of oppression the community had
fought against for over a decade. Amidst the flurry of articles and photographs on
the so-called “riots” that lined the pages of the New York Times that morning was
another particularly jarring article written by Junius Griffin. Under the headline,
“Guerilla War’ Urged In Harlem,” Griffin reported on a Saturday night rally at the
Mount Morris Presbyterian Church where Jesse Gray had allegedly called for “100
skilled black revolutionaries who are ready to die” in the fight against police
brutality in Harlem.243
Months later, after rebellions had erupted throughout the Northeast in
Harlem’s wake, Gray revisited these remarks during a speech in Rochester, NY.
When the Black community there had rebelled against police violence and systemic
racial oppression just days after Harlem had done the same, the masses in the
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streets of western New York had cried out, “Don’t give us [Martin Luther] King, give
us Jesse Gray.”244 Having spent weeks clarifying his remarks in New York City to
avoid criminal prosecution, Gray took the opportunity in Rochester to set the record
straight. After reiterating claims that he was exhorting Black communities to fight
back against racist terrorism in Mississippi rather than New York, Gray explained
the revolutionary analysis that undergirded his calls for armed self-defense. “I said
in New York City that revolution is an art…and therefore, if revolution is an art, then
the revolutionaries must go into the community and organize that community for
change.”245
Revolution was a common theme in Gray’s addresses that fall and winter, but
it was not purely for the sake of protecting himself from legal persecution. The
Harlem rebellion had provided Gray with an elevated platform that he then utilized
to explain the revolutionary analysis he had developed over nearly two decades of
radical organizing. “Real revolutionaries are out in the streets organizing people
around their day-to-day problems,” Gray explained at a conference that fall. “Those
who are revolutionist in theory must go down to the streets and organize the
people, if they are to be revolutionaries. Only if we do this can we organize the
masses toward independent political struggle.”246 Far from inflammatory rhetoric,
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Gray’s analysis of a grassroots revolutionary movement had been forged in the same
crucible of Black radical thought that had shaped the development of some of the
leading intellectuals and organizers of the Black Freedom Struggle, including Ella
Baker, Mae Mallory, and Malcolm X, amongst many others.
By the summer of 1964, this emphasis on radical grassroots organizing had
come to characterize struggles for Black liberation and empowerment in Harlem
and beyond. Weaving together the various strands of radical political thought and
action over the past decade in Harlem, the rent strike movement that winter
provided a blueprint for engaging poor and working-class Black and Puerto Rican
communities in a radical social movement. Furthermore, through participation in
the rent strikes, thousands of New Yorkers developed a more radical analysis of the
city’s power structures by coming face to face with the very agencies charged with
maintaining the racial status quo in the city.
Though the revolution that Jesse Gray, Malcolm X, and Mae Mallory
envisioned had not yet come to pass, this radical grassroots milieu in Harlem had
effectively demonstrated the ways in which the latent political power of poor and
working-class Black communities in the urban north could be mobilized and
organized for social transformation. While the spontaneous rebellion that summer
should not be confused with organized revolutionary action, it nonetheless signaled
to the city and to the nation that any further attempts to suppress the demands of
Black communities for human rights and self-determination would be met with dire
consequences. From the streets of Harlem came the rainbow sign, and the long, hot
summers of the 1960s had officially begun.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
As the smoke began to clear in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant, newspapers
across the country carried article after article covering the “riots” spreading
throughout the northeast. Alongside dramatic photographs of broken windows and
people running from the police ran columns in which reporters, politicians, police,
and civil rights leaders offered their explanations of the recent unrest in the nation’s
cities. Ranging from condemnations of “looters” and “rioters” who had no regard for
“law and order,” to explanations of the “hopelessness” and “despair” that created a
powder keg in the ghetto, scarce was the person who did not have an opinion on the
cause of the uprisings. Despite the range of explanations or characterizations, there
was general agreement that action needed to be taken in Harlem and elsewhere to
address the demonstrably explosive symptoms of systemic racial oppression. The
disagreement lay in what was to be done about the situation.
In many ways, the disagreements that emerged between City Hall and
Harlem residents in the wake of the rebellion were characteristic of the Wagner
Administration’s general position toward the Black Freedom Struggle over the
previous decade. In a televised address delivered as the uprising began to ebb,
Wagner stuck close to the well-worn script defined by his one-two punch of liberal
governance. With his left hand, the Mayor explained to Harlem residents that he
empathized with their “needs and problems in regard to housing and jobs and
discrimination and the education of your children” and promised to “go all out to
remedy injustice” and “reduce inequality.” On the other hand, Wagner declared “the
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mandate to maintain law and order is absolute, unconditional and unqualified,”
while casting blame for the unrest upon the “tough young ones” who were “ready
for violence…and full of resentment and hate.” Furthermore, the Mayor warned that
“illegal acts, including defiance of or attacks upon the police” would not be tolerated
and that the city would not be “browbeaten by prophets of despair, or by peddlers
of hate.”1
To Harlem residents, the message was abundantly clear—the Mayor was
once again providing lip service and promises of minor concessions to Black
communities while misrepresenting and criminalizing their legitimate demands for
equality and empowerment in order to maintain the racial status quo. “There was
nothing new in Wagner’s statement,” NY NAACP president Rev. Richard Hildebrand
observed, while reiterating demands for a civilian review board over the Mayor’s
expressed objections.2 “We have just gone through a summer where the New York
City administration has completely overlooked some basic demands of the people,”
Jesse Gray concurred in an address later that year.3
To Gray, this continued rejection and suppression of demands for human
rights and self-determination in Harlem, even in the wake of a major urban
rebellion, was a clear sign that new directions had to be sought in the Black
“Text of Wagner’s Radio-TV Appeal for Restoration of Law and Order in
City,” New York Times, July 23, 1964, 12.
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Freedom Struggle. Explaining that the “sit-ins, wade-ins, walk-in, sleep-ins” had
failed to “move the black masses,” Gray argued that any leader interested in truly
confronting the power structures of the city and the nation needed to establish a
base in poor and working-class Black communities of the urban North. “Wagner will
never truly respect the ghetto,” Gray proclaimed, “unless we are able to organize—
independent of any outside force—our politics, our culture, and our education, so
that our community organization develops and its impact is felt throughout this
city.”4 What Gray was describing, Black community control over the social, political,
cultural, and economic institutions within Black communities, would later become a
hallmark of the Black Power Movement.
While profound, the ideas that Gray was talking about that fall were hardly
novel. In fact, they comprised much of the ideological basis for the powerful
grassroots struggles for human rights and self-determination in Harlem over the
past ten years or more. To be certain, the roots of this political milieu were firmly
planted in the political soil tilled by Marcus Garvey, Queen Mother Moore, Adam
Clayton Powell, Jr., Ella Baker, Jack O’Dell, and countless others in the early 20th
Century through the post-World War II era. However, it was through the political
thought and organizing of Jesse Gray, Malcolm X, Mae Mallory, the Northern Student
Movement, NY CORE, and the rank-and-file in Harlem from 1954-1964 that this
grassroots Black Power began to blossom throughout the city, state, and nation. By
focusing their political analysis and praxis on developing indigenous leadership and
community empowerment in service of achieving Black self-determination, these
4
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leading activists and organizations brought local people and national leaders alike
to the realization that any radical or revolutionary movement must be able to
mobilize and organize the “mass reservoir of black power” in Harlem and
elsewhere.5
Beyond a general disillusionment with the limitations of liberal governance
for delivering economic, social, and political justice for Black communities, there
were several defining characteristics of this emergent grassroots Black radicalism,
which Gray referred to as “black power.” Through this decade of grassroots
activism, radical leaders in Harlem had nurtured a popular political consciousness
that centered on Black self-determination, community control of political, social, and
economic institutions, a broader focus on human rights over civil rights, Black
indigenous leadership of organizations, cultural nationalism, an identification with
Pan-African freedom struggles, and a disavowal of nonviolence as an ideology. When
analyzed within this dynamic ten-year period, the evolution of this radical political
milieu offers profound insights into the emergence of grassroots Black Power in the
urban north and its ideological and tactical components at the advent of the long,
hot summers.
In many ways, the threads that comprised the tapestry of grassroots Black
Power in Harlem during this era were woven together in the Organization of AfroAmerican Unity shortly before rebellions broke out that summer. With a broad
membership that included some of the most influential radical thinkers and
grassroots organizers in Harlem over the past decade or more, including Malcolm X,
5
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Jesse Gray, Jack O’Dell, Gloria Richardson Dandridge, John Henrik Clarke, John O.
Killens, Bill Epton, Conrad Lynn, William Worthy, Ossie Davis, Ruby Dee, Bill
Strickland, Abbey Lincoln, and Ora Mobley, the OAAU’s formation on June 28, 1964
held the promise of a long-awaited Black radical united front in Harlem and
beyond.6
By the summer of 1964, however, this proliferation of radical grassroots
action marked the Black Freedom Struggle in Harlem for heightened governmental
repression through the New York Police Department. As the NYPD responded to
Black demands for rights and power in increasingly repressive ways as the spring
progressed, greater numbers of Harlem residents came to embrace Malcolm X’s
indictment of the city government for not only failing to protect the interests of its
Black citizens, but for actively subverting their demands for equality and justice. If
the government was morally bankrupt and politically corrupt, as Malcolm
contended, then there was no reason for its Black residents to operate through its
prescribed channels in seeking redress for their grievances. By July 1964, many felt
that the ballots hadn’t worked, and that it was time for the bullets.
For all the ink spilled by city officials in scrambling to counter the
proliferation of this radical analysis with flowery rhetoric and liberal promises, the
active presence of grassroots intellectuals and organizers in Harlem from 19541964 had pulled back the curtain and brought forth a popular analysis in Harlem
that delegitimized City Hall and made a confrontation with the white-dominated
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power structure all but inevitable by the summer of 1964. This is not to suggest that
violent conflict was unavoidable, predetermined, or calculated, however. Had the
Wagner Administration prioritized the demands of its Black and Puerto Rican
constituents for equality and justice over the heavy-handed maintenance of the
racial status quo during its decade in power, the popular critique of City Hall and
liberal governance that emerged by that summer would have gained far less
traction. Though it was a spontaneous act of police brutality provided the impetus
for the 1964 Harlem Rebellion, the radical and revolutionary analyses that were
inspiring mass mobilization in Harlem and throughout the city compelled thousands
to take to the streets, in recognition of this police violence as a symptom of the
systemic oppression entrenched in the political, social, and economic structures of
the city, state, and nation, and with the knowledge that justice was surely not
forthcoming for yet another Black victim of white State violence.
The fatal shooting of James Powell on July 16th, then, served as a singular
example of the force of the white world pressing down upon a rising Black nation.
Through rebelling against the white power structure and its many faces in the days
following the killing of James Powell, Harlem residents professed their allegiance to
a challenge that Mae Mallory had thrown down three years prior: “the task of
unleashing this Black power until the world is rid of White domination and
exploitation.”7 As city after city exploded in the weeks, months, and years that
followed, it was clear that Harlem residents were not alone in their task.
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The importance of documenting and analyzing these histories of grassroots
struggles for rights and power in Harlem and elsewhere during this formative era
stretches beyond challenging meta-narratives that have either marginalized or
distorted the histories of northern Black Freedom Struggles. These local struggles
against institutional racism in the urban North offer vital lessons for present and
future generations of activists and organizers in the ongoing fight against
institutional racism and for human rights, economic justice, political power, and
social transformation. In her perceptive and powerful historical analysis of the
#BlackLivesMatter movement, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor suggests that “today’s
activists are grappling with questions similar to those Black radicals confronted in
the Black Power era, questions bound up with the systemic nature of Black
oppression in American capitalism and how that shapes the approach to
organizing.”8 In our collective efforts to resolve these questions while building
effective organizational structures, analyses, and strategies, many lessons can be
derived from the struggles waged by poor and working class Black communities in
Harlem in the decade preceding the 1964 Rebellion.
By analyzing school boycotts, rent strikes, campaigns for affirmative action in
hiring, and protests over police brutality in Harlem within their proper context of a
broader struggle for radical social transformation, activists and organizers can
evaluate the successes and shortcomings of past strategies, tactics, and analyses to
not only develop effective organizing praxis, but to envision and implement more
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assertive, imaginative, and radical political analyses and praxis. For pressing
questions that remain in current struggles over interracial organizing, single-issue
and intersectional organizing, class analyses in racial justice campaigns, the roles
and relationships of local people and national organizations, gender roles in social
movements, promoting personal and collective political consciousness,
internationalism and global solidarity, and the dynamic relationships between
reformist and revolutionary analyses and demands, there is much to be learned
from the histories of Mae Mallory, Malcolm X, Jesse Gray, the Northern Student
Movement, NY CORE, and the broader radical grassroots political milieu in Harlem
from 1954-1964. For within these recent histories lie powerful and transformative
narratives and lessons of how some of the most marginalized communities in New
York City, through participation in local organizing efforts to improve living
conditions and combat institutional racism, developed a radical critique of urban
and national power structures that challenged the very legitimacy of an inherently
oppressive society.
In addition to providing powerful lessons for current organization and
movement building, an analysis of this decade of grassroots Black radicalism is
essential for explaining the outbreak of urban uprisings in the 1960s not as “race
riots,” but as rebellions against American Apartheid in the nation’s cities. To
challenge these entrenched perceptions of civil unrest in response to State violence
in the 1960s is to provide vital space for developing a more critical framework for
understanding their recurrence in the 21st Century. As Taylor poignantly notes in
her analysis of the 2014 police murder of 18-year-old Mike Brown and the resultant
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uprising in Ferguson, Missouri, a new generation of young activists and organizers
are “beginning to politically generalize from the multiple cases of police brutality
and develop a systemic analysis of policing.” Furthermore, Taylor notes that many in
this new generation of freedom fighters have begun to “articulate a much broader
critique that situated policing within a matrix of racism and inequality in the United
States and beyond.”9 Taylor’s assessment of the political analysis generated by
grassroots activists in 2014 bears a striking resemblance to those generated by
radical organizers and local people in Harlem in the early 1960s and demonstrates
the continued need for a more critical analysis of the relationships between
institutional racism, political consciousness and action, and urban rebellions in the
United States.
To honestly reckon with the outbreak of rebellions in Harlem and elsewhere
in the mid-to-late 1960s requires a thorough analysis of the preceding periods of
organized grassroots resistance to the white State violence that begat such civil
unrest. Such an analysis is an historical imperative to supplant the problematic, yet
popularly accepted narrative that explains urban rebellions as consequences of an
oppressive societal “powder keg” with a framework that centers the conscious
political agency to Black communities which sought to resist oppression and reform
government in the years, months, and days leading up to these uprisings. This
former type of popular analysis has historically served to delegitimize the
inherently political nature of urban rebellions by obscuring the causal relationships
between grassroots Black radicalism, popular disillusionment with the repressive
9
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manifestations of racial liberalism, and the outbreak of urban rebellions. When
urban rebellions are delegitimized and depoliticized as senseless acts of lawlessness
and violence, history has shown that these narratives have given rise to even greater
physical and political repression, as evidenced by the devastating national legacies
of the War on Crime and the bloody wake left by the FBI’s COINTELPRO.
Furthermore, by denying conscious political agency to those who engaged in
righteous rebellion against American Apartheid, this type of narrative has effectively
resulted in a popular backlash against legitimate demands for equality and justice,
the retrenchment of the more repressive elements of racial liberalism, and the
reification of a State monopoly on “violence.” While changing the narrative of urban
freedom struggles and rebellions will certainly not be sufficient in and of itself for
fomenting systemic change in the nation’s oppressive social, economic, and political
structures, it is an imperative aspect of this multifaceted and expansive ongoing
struggle for human rights, self-determination, and radical social transformation.
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